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FOREWORD 
Several  sectoral evaluation studies have  been  carried out  in recent years  in 
the  field of integrated rural  development  and  development  of small  family 
farm  holdings.  The  two  main reports in this field were  produced  under  the 
aegis  of US/AID  (Development Alternatives,  Inc.,  'Strategies for  Small  Farmer 
Development':  an Empirical  Study of Rural  Development  Projects May  1975)  and 
the  IBRD  (Uma  Lele,  'The  Design  of Rural  Development',  1975).  The  former  cov-
ers  cases  drawn  from  Africa and  Latin America;  the  latter,  African projects 
only. 
On  a  smaller scale,  the  FAO,  in its Programme  Reviews,  has  provided  a  compen-
dium  of the  information  derived  from  the  evaluation of a  sample  of different 
types  of agricultural  development projects.  Four  years  ago  the  EDF  produced 
its first report of this nature  on  the basis of a  sample  of projects in the 
same  secto~,  including hydro-agricultural  schemes  and  agro-industrial peren-
nial plantations,  in the  former  Associated African States and  Madagascar. 
(1973  Report by  the  Commission  to the  Council  on  the  conditions under which 
aid is implemented  and  used  ..•  Part  Two,  doc.  COM  (75)13  final). 
The  evaluation reports pointed up  a  series of common  factors  making  for  suc-
cess or delays  in  'integrated'  rural  development projects,  i.e. projects 
aimed  at promoting  modernization  of small  farms  and  improvement  in the  stand-
ard of living of peasant populations.  Their  conclusions  concur  in highlight-
ing  a  number  of particularly important  factors  determining the  success  of 
such  action:  price  conditions  and  cash returns  on  labour;  adaptation of proj-
ect design  to  local  conditions  and potentials;  the  influence  of sectoral  and 
national policy,  and  also of the  development  institutions'  policies,  on  the 
effectiveness of the  use  of resources;  the  human  factor  in supervision and 
management  and  psycho-sociological  factors  as  a  result of which  local  farmers 
associate  with  the  aims  pursued  by  the  national  authorities and  technical  as-
sistance  teams,  or at least cooperate  in their schemes. 
This  new  evaluation study is concerned  with  the  subsector of  'integrated ru-
ral  development'  projects,  which  was  chosen  as  a  field for  detailed investi-
gation for  three  main  reasons:  firstly the  new  emphasis  in aid activities 
over recent years  on  improvement of conditions  for  the  most  disadvantaged 
populations  and  promotion of economic  development  from  within the countries 
concerned  makes  the  modernization of the vast numbers  of small  farms  a  prior-
ity task;  secondly because  of its profound psycho-sociological  implications, 
this subsector generally raises  more  complex  problems  than other branches  of 
agricultural  development  such as hydraulic  schemes  or agro-industrial  com-
plexes;  and  thirdly the  concept of  'integration'  in rural  development is am-- 4  -
biguous  and  not very operational;  its various  meanings  should  be  defined  and 
their implications analysed with  a  vieuw  to possible  improvements  in sectoral 
development policy. 
The  very  complexity  or the  subsector examined  and  the  limited ressources a-
vailable  for  the  evaluation or a  representative  sample  or projects  in this 
subsector mean  that the  conclusions  drawn  can as  yet only be  considered as 
working  hypotheses.  These  should be  gradually checked  and  refined in the  fu-
ture  by  means  or follow-up  evaluations  and  more  detailed research  on  specific 
aspects. 
In its presentation,  this general  report avoids  a  comprehensive  and  merely 
descriptive  inventory of factors  or success  and  obstacles.  It endeavours  a-
bove all  (in Parts  2  to 6)  to analyse  the  problems  or family  farming  in the 
traditional African environment.  This  is the  type  or farming  which needs  mod-
ernization so that it can provide greater well-being for  the  farmers  con-
cerned  and  contribute  more  fully  to  national  economic  growth.  The  social, 
technical  and  economic  structure or small  farming  in Africa is  complex  and, 
moreover,  it is fundamentally  'integrated',  not only  in itself but also with-
in the  village context. 
It is primarily  in the  light or this analysis  that the  information  and  as-
sessments  regarding  the  objectives,  planning  and  effects or the projects eval-
uated  have  been  arranged.  Where  appropriate,  this material  has  been  compared 
with reports  on  comparable  operations  evaluated by other institutions or re-
searchers. 
C.J.  VANDER  VAEREN 
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INTRODUCTION 
This  study is the result or the  ex-post evaluation or ten rural  development 
programmes  carried out  in nine  countries  in Black Africa over  the past fir-
teen years.  The  projects evaluated are  shown  in the table  overleaf. 
These  ten  programmes  provide  a  fairly varied  and  representative  sample  of 
operations to promote  agricultural  development  in the  Black African rural en-
vironment  financed  out of the first three  EDF  budgets.  The  farms  concerned 
were  small  units  characterized by  low  factor productivity,  minimal  integra-
tion into the pattern of trade,  but  a  high  degree  of integration into the 
pattern of sociological,  cultural  and  technical  tradition in the  rural socie-
ties concerned. 
None  or the projects evaluated  involved  major hydro-agricultural  schemes  or 
the  establishment or large agro-industrial  complexes. 
The  projects evaluated  account  for  commitments  and  expenditure  by  the  Europe-
an  Development  Fund;  totalling nearly  50  million units of account,  or  almost 
a  quarter of the  funds  committed  out  of the first three  EDF  budgets  for  oper-
ations  of this type.  Most  of  the  ten  programmes  were  financed  in several 
stages  or  in successive projects. 
The  evaluation  was  organized  by  the  Specialized Department  for  the Evaluation 
of Aid  Operations  (VIII/A/2}  of the  Directorate-General  for Development  or 
the  European  Commission  and  carried out  in three successive phases  between 
July  1976  and  December  1977. 
PHASE  1:  METHODOLOGICAL  GROUNDWORK  (JUNE-JULY  1976} 
The  purpose  or this phase  was  to  draw  up  a  'guide  for  the  evaluation or inte-
grated rural  development projects',  which  was  to be  the  basic tool  of thee-
valuation  team. 
This guide  was  drawn  up  jointly by  three people:  C.J.  Vander Vaeren  (Head  or 
the Specialized Evaluation Department,  DG  VIII},  H.  Dupriez  (agronomist,  con-
sultant expert)  and  0.  Snoy  (assistant to  the consultant). 
The  guide  consists or three  sections: Country 
Niger 
Niger 
Rwan 
Togo 
Chad 
The  projects evaluated 
Project 
Development  of the  Badeguicheri  Valley 
Rural  development  in the Department of Zinder 
Integrated rural  development:  Bugesera-Mayaga  farm-
ing· communities 
Abricultural  development of the  Central  Region  and 
the  Plateaux Region  (cotton) 
Improvement  of cotton-growing productivity and  inte-
grated rural  development  in the  southern  zone 
Central Afri- Agricultural  development  of the  cotton-growing  zone 
can Republic 
Zaire 
Ivory Coast 
Bemin 
Upper  Volta 
Agricultural  development  in the Eastern Kasai 
Development  of rice-growing 
Agricultural  development of the  Department  of 
Atakora 
Agricultural  development  in the  Comoe  Ord 
Period 
1972-1976 
1973-1977 
(1973-1985) 
1961-1976 
1964-1975 
1965-1976 
1968-1976 
1968-1976 
1972-1976 
1968-1977 
1972-1976 
Funding  in u.a. 
Expendi  tm;e 
completed 
2  665  000 
3  150  000 
2  625  000 
Sanctioned 
not  completed 
1  134 000 
1  876  000 - 11  -
1.  Check-list for evaluating projects  and  format  for evaluation reports 
This  section provided guidelines  for  research  and  interpretation of findings 
of direct relevance  to the  initial objectives. 
2.  Background  for  the  evaluation of project design  and  policy 
This  section provided  background  material  on  integrated rural  development 
based  on past experience  and  a  reading  of the general  recommendations  of the 
Commission1  and  international organizations  on  this subject. 
3.  Model  for  the  survey  on  farmers'  opinions  and attitudes to  the projects 
Some  difficulties were  encountered  during  this first phase: 
(i)  In  the  Commission's  archives,  the  documentation  on  projects and their 
implementation goes  into  co~siderable detail  on  the  subject  of the 
funds  allocated,  but contains little information about  agricultural  de-
velopment itself.  The  Commission  and  its representatives  in the  field 
have  supervised the  use  of funds  allocated  and  monitored the  more  read-
ily identifiable results of projects in hand,  but have  been unable  to 
carry out  any  detailed assessment  of the  full  range  of their effects. 
(ii)  The  nature of.such information  as  is available  on  the results of proj-
ects is always  strongly influenced  by  the  structure of the projects 
concerned.  For  instance,  the statistical data refer to the cash crop 
considered  to provide  the  motive  force  behind  the project,  but little 
information is given about  the progress  of oxher  types  of farming  or 
about  peasant families'  productive activities outside farming. 
(iii) Detailed evaluation of operations  on  a  continuing basis was  not  a  regu-
lar practice;  it was  not until the  time  came  to finance  a  new  phase 
that the results of the  previous phase  were  evaluated,  generally in a 
fairly summary  manner. 
(iv)  The  only plausible statistical data  are  those  on  export crops.  The  es-
timates for  food  crops remain  very  speculative.  Consequently,  analyses 
of rural  economies  based  on  such statistics can easily become  mislead-
ing since,  in fact,  the greater part of rural activity is in the  sub-
sistance sector,  which is very  inaccurately reflected in the  statistics. 
1 
Moreover,  a  reading of the files  shows  that unquantifiable or unquanti-
fied criteria may  determine  whether  or not  a  given project is justifi-
able.  There  are  very  many  such unquantifiable  or unquantified criteria. 
Some  are not stated explicitly in the  implementation reports,  while 
Earlier study  and  report: 
- A.  Combaz-Fauquez,  Etude  de  synthese  des  evaluations  de  projets de  deve-
loppement agricole  finances  par le FED,  June  1974. 
EC  Commission,  1973  Report  on  the  conditions under  which  aid is implement-
ed  and  used  by  the recipient Associated States,  Countries  and  Territo-
ries,  Part 2  (COM(75)13  final). - 12  -
others  are  described  in vague  terms:  'mentalities',  'psychological  fac-
tors',  etc. 
In  view  of these difficulties, it was  decided  to present the  evaluation guide 
as  a  series of analytical propositions  considered  in the  light of rural  de-
velopment.  The  purpose  of this was  to broaden  the  scope  of the  evaluation 
studies  to  embrace  the  general  aim~ of economic  and  social  development,  to-
wards  which  the projects were  intended  to contribute. 
The  third part of the guide  consisted of  a  model  for opinion surveys  intended 
to assess  the  whole  range  of direct  and  indirect effects,  including  those  not 
originally anticipated. 
PHASE  2:  IN  SITU  EVALUATION 
The  in situ evaluation work  was  carried out  by  specially commissioned  experts 
between  September  1976  and  June  1977. 
The  following  persons  carried out  the project evaluations: 
Messrs  G.  Bertrand,  H.  Dupriez  and  P.  Von  Blanckenburg,  agricultural  econo-
mists;  Mr  P.  Thenevin,  Mr  C.  Van  der Vaeren  and  Miss  A.  Hubert,  economists; 
Messrs  M.  Bousquet.  F.  Lussagnet,  R.  Pugol  and  G.  Tondeur,  agronomists;  Miss 
S.  Jean  and  Miss  P.  Roberts,  sociologists;  Mr  G.  la Cognata,  surveyor;  Mr  H. 
Peter,  statistician.  In addition,  assistance  in this work  was  received  from 
three African sources:  the  BARA  consultancy bureau  in the  Upper  Volta,  the 
Bureau  Central  des Projets  in Benin  and  Mr  Mayo  Malanga,  economist,  in Zaire. 
Some  of the experts'  reports concentrated  on  the  evaluation of the project as 
such,  others  on  the  opinion  survey.  Two  requirements  had  to be  reconciled:  on 
the  one  hand,  it was  necessary to obtain an  adequate  number  of evaluations of 
representative projects;  on  the  other  hand,  the  overall cost had  to be  con-
tained within  the  very tight budget  allocations.  As  a  result,  none  of the 
case  studies  was  as  exhaustive  and  detailed as  one  would  have  hoped. 
The  many  difficulties encountered during  this phase  can  be  summarized  as  fol-
lows: 
(a)  The  statistical and  economic  data were  incomplete.  The  statistics concen-
trated heavily  on  the  types  of farming  which  had  been  encouraged under 
the project.  Only  very  limited macro-ecohomic  data were  available  on 
which  to  judge effects  on  the national  economies.  Such  limited macro-eco-
nomic  data as  were  available  were  often based  on  mere  hypotheses  rather 
than  observation in the  field. 
(b)  In  the  localities concerned,  it was  often  diffi~ult to find  informants 
who  had  followed  the  projects  from  beginning  to end  (because  of the high 
turnover  of staff,  the  lack of continuing evaluation reports  and  the  ab-
sence  of local institutions with proper  information  on  the  progress  of 
operations). - 13  -
(c)  The  effects of projects are felt at several  levels  (individual  farms, 
training institutions,  marketing  institutions,  price  support  funds,  na-
tional  economy,  etc.)  and it is not  always  possible  to  dissociate  them. 
To  evaluate  these  effects at each  level it would  be  necessary  for  either 
the  institutions carrying out  the project or  the planning staff to moni-
tor  them  on  a  continuing basis. 
(d)  In the  original projects,  the  presentation of the  aims  and  objectives  in 
many  cases  lacked  a  rational structure;  moreover,  the external  conditions 
required  to carry out  the projects were  not always  fully  examined;  final-
ly,  the  relationship between  the  objectives  and  the  resources  to be  de-
ployed  (and  financed)  were  not  analysed  in sufficient depth.  It was 
therefore difficult to  clearly identify the  structures of objectives  and 
resources  which  had  been  envisaged  and  to  compare  them with what  had  been 
achieved,  particularly in the  case  of the general  aims  and  objectives re-
lating to standards  of living,  nutrition,  employment,  etc. 
(e)  It was  also difficult to  compare  the situation at the  end of a  project 
with the  situation at the  outset,  either as  a  result of specific  circum-
stances  (inflation,  drought,  changes  of political regime,  reorganization 
of institutions,  changes  of policy,  etc.)  or because  of the  lack of com-
parative  data especially those  indicating the  trend  in  living standards: 
housing,  health,  nutrition,  etc. 
(f)  In  some  instances,  it was  impossible  to distinguish the results of a 
project  from  what  would  have  happened  without  the project or  could  have 
been  achieved  by  other  types  of action, 
The  use  of the  guide  itself appears  to have  given rise to  some  difficulties, 
in  some  instances because  the  experts  adhered  rather too rigidly to the for-
mat  provided with  the result that they  had  problems  in using it as  a  frame-
work  for  their findings,  in others because  the problems  to  be  examined  were 
outside the  scope  of the  information normally  available  from  the  reference 
sources at their disposal,  and  in others because  the  survey questionnaires 
which  they  had  prepared  concentrated  too much  on  evaluation of the  action 
carried out under  the projects rather  than  on  the  general  context of the  dy-
namics  of the  rural  community,  despite  the  efforts made  to avoid  this danger. 
For  instance,  far more  weight  was  given  to the  questions  on  the  dissemination 
of techniques  introduced  under  the project than to those  on  the  conservation 
of traditional methods.  Another  shortcoming  was  the  assumption  implicit in 
the  framing  of questions  that there  could  be  no  doubt  in the  mind  of the re-
spondents  that the  institutions were  the  only  source  of technical progress. 
If it is to be  genuinely objective,  a  survey carried out in a  farming  commu-
nity  should give  as  much  weight  to  questions  on  traditional  farming  methods 
as  to  those  on  'modern'  methods.  When  the  researchers are not well  informed 
about  traditional methods,  there is a  likelihood that the  questions  they ask 
will  themselves  contain value  judgments.  Thus  the  answers  given may  be  slant-
ed,  as  the  farmers  will be  tempted  to reply  as  they think they  ought to reply 
to  an  emissary  from  officialdom. - 14 -
PHASE  3 
The  object of Phase  3  was  to draw  conclusions  from  the  in situ evaluation 
studies.  A draft report was  presented by  H.  Dupriez  in June  1977  and  dis-
cussed  by  the  evaluators who  worked  on  Phase  2  and  representatives  of the 
relevant departments  of the  Commission at a  general  meeting  held  in Brussels 
on  13  and  14  September  1977. 
The  report is a  synthesis resulting from  the  cooperation of the  experts  and 
the  representatives of the  Commission  at this meeting  and  the  incorporation 
of proposals put  forward  in the  many  letters and  notes received in this con-
nection. 
Several  methodological difficulties were  also encountered in the  compilation 
of this report;  some  of them  were  attributable to the difficulties which  a-
rose  during  the first and  second  phases,  while  others were  inherent in the 
process  of bringing all the  information  together into  a  coherent whole. 
(a)  It was  not easy to make  comparisons  between projects,  as  each was  situ-
ated in its own  context in space  and  time  and different types  of institu-
tion were  involved in each  case.  What  was  an  advantageous  factor  in  one 
instance  could  be  a  disadvantage  in another.  Similarly,  a  given type  of 
operation may  be  costly in one  project and  economical  in another,  making 
comparative  judgments  impossible.  Rural  development  is conditioned  by 
such  a  wide  range  of diverse  factors  that it is impossible  to  draw  con-
clusions  on  approaches  to be  adopted  which  can be  transplanted without 
modification  from  one  project to another.  Nevertheless,  given  the diver-
sity of the projects  evaluated, it was  possible to entertain conclusions 
of a  general nature,  being less contingent  on  specific  or purely local 
conditions. 
(b)  The  data received.in the  evaluation reports were,  as  has  been  mentioned 
above,  highly polarized.  This  was  largely because  when  an  expert raised  a 
specific problem relating to the  environment of the project he  was  eval-
uating,  it was  not easy for  him  to analyse it in depth.  For  instance, 
mention  was  made  of the difficulty over  early sowing of cotton,  but the 
reasons  for this difficulty were  not clearly assessed because  their ori-
gins lay outside  cotton-growing as  such;  elsewhere,  soil exhaustion was 
reported  by  the  farmers,  but no  detailed  information on its extent was 
found  in the  documents  provided by  the  staff managing  the  project;  to 
give  another  example,  reference  was  made  to the  importance  of the  system 
of prices  and  remuneration,  but it was  difficult to describe  how  it oper-
ated because  no  homogeneous  chronological  series were  available. 
(c)  A major difficulty arose in connection with  the  actual definition of ru-
ral development.  Mere  observation of the results of a  project in relation 
to the  objectives is not sufficient.  What,  for  instance,  is to be  made  of 
a  situation in which  an agricultural  objective  nas virtually been at-
tained,  but the  population is suffering from  food  deficiencies or short-
ages? - 15  -
Moreover,  it has  to be  concluded  that aims  established at the  planning 
stage are not  always  carried over into project design in the  form  of con-
crete objectives. 
The  explanation for  a  failure  may  sometimes  be  traced back to the struc-
ture of the  investment provided for initially,  in which  case  evaluation of 
the specific results of the project in question will  be  a  fruitless exer-
cise.  The  evaluator may  be  unable  to distinguish things which  are  not 
strictly speaking effects of the project. 
(d)  The  results of some  projects had  to be  interpreted on  the basis of periods 
which  were  not long  enough  for  the purpose.  In present farming,  only me-
dium  and  long-term trends are significant;  how,  then,  can  one  establish a 
trend  on  the basis of a  period of three  or  four  years  over which  a  project 
has  been  in operation? 
(e)  By  the  same  token,  it should  be  noted that economic  or political factors 
unconnected  with  the projects can  often have  a  bearing on results.  In the 
circumstances,  there is a  risk of drawing misguided  conclusions  by attri-
buting  success  or failure to what  has  been  done  within  the  context of the 
project itself. 
(f)  The  evaluation reports  did not always  cover,  either explicitly or implic-
itly,  the  whole  range  of problems  of rural  development.  This  does  not 
mean  that these problems  did not exist. 
A number  of decisions had  therefore to be  taken with  a  view  to overcoming  the 
methodological  difficulties: 
(i)  A conscious effort was  made  to ensure that the  scheme  of the  consolidat-
ed report followed  the  logic of peasant  farming  and  rural development. 
This  viewpoint  provided a  better context in which  to identify the  lim-
iting and  favourable  factors which  had  an  influence  in the various re-
gions. 
(ii)  The  appraisal of the extent of development  was  based  on  the  following 
order of priorities:  effects on peasant farms,  effects on national  econ-
omies,  effects on  State finances.  This  was  considered  a  logical  choice 
since State resources  are  dependent  on  national  economies  which,  in 
such essentially rural  countries,  consist largely of the  mass  of small 
farms.  It also had  to be  borne  in mind  that rural  development is cur-
rently the  form  of development by means  of which  the  living standards 
of the great majority of the population  can  be  improved  in sociologi-
cally and culturally coherent  contexts~ 
(iii)  A conscious effort has  been made  to avoid  the use  of vague  terms  such 
as  'peasant mentaiities'  in the  interpretation of effects or results. 
The  view  taken is that peasant  farmers  have  normal  behaviour patterns, 
are  capable of acting  on  their own  initiative and  are  able  to weigh  up 
new  methods  proposed to them  in the  light of conditions  on  their farms 
and  adopt or reject them  accordingly.  With  this methodological  approach, 
it was  possible to make  a  balanced analysis of the  dynamisms  and re-
sponsibilities of each  of the parties involved.  It was  necessary to es-
tablish this balance,  since it was  found  that the rural populations af-- 16  -
fected  by  the  projects  had  scarcely been  represented  during  the  inter-
vention procedures  - either during  the planning phase,  or during the 
implementation phase. 
(iv)  Analysis  or the  technical  facilities  (vehicles,  equipment,  buildings), 
the  administrative  and  financial  procedures  and  intervention methods 
has  been considered  less  important  than  analysis or the  fundamental 
problems.  On  the  one  hand,  little purpose is served  by  comparing  the 
resources utilized in  two  different types  of region,  and  on  the other 
the  approach  adopted  in implementing  a  project is contingent  upon  the 
specific local  conditions. 
The  policy adopted  in the  compilation or this synthetic report was  to base it 
on  the  information derived  from  the  project evaluation reports  and  the  subse-
quent  discussions.  Consequently,  it touches  only very briefly on  some  aspects 
of rural  development.  Nevertheless,  the  conclusions  drawn  here fit into a 
wider  context of thinking  on  rural  development.  The  general  context  has  been 
provided  by  a  substantial  body  of literature produced under the  auspices  of 
institutions other than  the  Commission;  a  list of the  main  references is pro-
vided  in Annex  2.1 
Despite  the  volume  and  variety of the existing literature  on  rural  develop-
ment  in Africa  (to which  this evaluation exercise  makes  some  new  contribu-
tion),  analysis of this type  of development  is still marred  by  lack of infor-
mation  and  approximations.  It is not possible  on  the  basis of evaluation of 
only ten projects  to put  forward  definitive  judgments  on  the  conditions  and 
factors  which  make  for  success  or obstruct progress  in development  operations 
concerned with  small  farming.  The  conclusions  contained  in this general re-
port should  accordingly  be  regarded  as  being more  in the  nature  of working 
hypotheses  which  have  been carefully formulated  on  the basis of verified ex-
perience with  a  view  to guiding future  action and  increasing the  effective-
ness  of resources  used  to promote  rural  development. 
1  A number  of bibliographical references have  been given  in footnotes.  These 
documents  have  been  quoted  because  they provide general  or detailed back-
ground  to  the analysis  and  conclusions in this report.  However,  the  docu-
ments  listed in Annex  3  were  not  used  as material  for  this report,  except 
for  the  works  by  d'Ancey  and  Pelissier on  which  Section 2.1.  is partially 
based. Part One 
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1.01.  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  BADEGUICHERI  VALLEY  (DEPARTMENT  OF  TAHOUA,  NIGER) 1 
OBJECTIVES  AND  CONTENT 
The  Badeguicheri valley development project  (1972-76)2  was  originally aimed 
at developing cotton-growing by making  available  alluvial  land used to grow 
sorghum.  To  do  this,  it was  necessary to develop  land  on  the plateaux and  the 
slopes of the valley for the cultivation of food  crops;  the objective here 
was  to actually increase cereal production sufficiently to meet  the  needs  of 
the  inhabitants of the  valley.  The  development  of the valley slopes was  also 
intended to combat soil erosion and silting of the valleys. 
From  the  structural viewpoint,  the  aim  of the project was  to involve  local 
farmers  in the  implementation of the project so that management  of the facili-
ties set up  could be  handed  over  to  them  during  the final  phase. 
An  organizational  network  was  set up  (6  zones  in the valley and  one  zone  out-
side  the valley with responsibility for technical progress  and  cooperative 
progress respectively). 
After  two  years,  the  programme  was  modified in the  light of unfavourable 
weather conditions in 1972-74 to include reafforestation projects,  drilling 
of wells  for  growing kitchen-garden crops  during the  dry season  and  the  in-
troduction of cowpeas.  Educational  and  social activities were  also included 
at this stage:  training for  women,  literacy and health. 
MANAGEMENT 
Management  of the project enrusted to the  UNCC3  under  the  auspices of the 
Ministere  de  l'Economie  Rurale.  The  difficulties encountered were  manifold. 
1  Evaluated by Miss  P.Roberts,  sociologist. 
2 z 30  700  inhabitants in 1969,  60  villages,  83  inhabitants per square kilo-
metre,  average  annual  rainfall:  425  to 475  mm. 
3  Union Nigerienne  de  Credit et de  Cooperation. - 20  -
From  the administrative point of view,  the  zone  was  divided into two  sub-pre-
fectures.  It was  lacking in infrastructure  and  represented  only  a  small part 
of the  sphere of competence  of the prefectorial authorities.  Decisions,  how-
ever remained  centralized at UNCC  headquarters  in Niamey;  at local  level,  the 
extent of cooperation  tended  to fluctuate. 
From  the point of view  of technical  management,  there were  several  changes  in 
the staff in charge  of the project;  an  expatriate agronomist  who  joined the 
project a  year late was  the  only source  of continuity. 
ATTAINMENT  OF  OBJECTIVES 
Analysis  of the projections  and  results  (see  Table 1.01.a)  shows  the  follow-
ing: 
Soil rehabilitation:  the revised objective for soil rehabilitation by  means 
of terracing was  1  900  hectares.  The  actual  figure  was  95%  of this  as 
1  799  hectares were  terraced  and  1  232  (65%)  under cultivation by  1976,  the 
average  cost was  CFAF  33 000  per hectare for  terracing and  CFAF  6  000  for 
soil preparation. 
On  the  basis of comparison with neighbouring valleys, it is estimated that 
this work  has  had  a  positive effect on  erosion and  silting of the  valleys. 
The  peasant  farmers  appreciated this programme  which  was  compatible  with 
traditional practice in the region and  enabled  them  to earn wages  during 
the  dry season  (40%  of the  cost of construction).1 
Tracks:  tracks were  built and  completed  in 1973.  They  were  needed  to make 
the project physically feasible,  but they also served  the purposes  of pro-
viding routes for  the  evacuation of cotton and  disenclaving  the  valley. 
Little traffic has  developed as yet,  since  there  are  very  few  vehicles  in 
the  region,  and  most of it is still carried by  donkey  or  camel.  Neverthe-
•  less,  an  onion market  has  now  been set up  in the  valley,  thanks  to  the  bet-
ter conditions of access. 
1 
Cooperatives:  the  cooperative  organization was  set up,  but failed  to bring 
the really significant structural  changes  hoped  for.  The  cooperatives were 
proposed  to the  farmers  without sufficient preparation and  the  advantages 
were  not obvious:  the  concentrated too heavily on  cotton,  there were  delays 
in payment  of refunds,  it was  impossible  to set up  a  savings  fund  with 
which  to establish purchasing or storage  services,  credit for  equipment  was 
lacking  and  cooperative officials were  not elected.  The  haste  on  the  part 
of the  bureaucracy to set up  cooperatives  and  the  heavy  concentration  on 
cotton allowed  no  scope  for  development  of the  peasant farmers'  bargaining 
power,  although this is among  the  declared policy objectives of the  Govern-
ment  of Niger. 
Wages  to a  value  of  +  CFAF  22  million were  distributed. - 21  -
Instruction:  the  themes  of the  instruction programme,  which  was  originally 
planned  according to traditional  CFDT  methods,  were  as  follows:  instruction 
in technical subjects  (intensive  sowing,  insecticide spraying,  hoeing, 
etc.);  formation  of  GMPs  (Groupements  Mutualistes  de  Production- Producers' 
Mutual  Groups)  with  a  view to creating homogeneous  blocks  of crops;  inten-
sive  and  repetitive demonstration. 
This  instruction programme  was  carried out  in  an  area which  had  already ex-
perienced  ten years  of CFDT  action. 
The  effectiveness of the instruction programme  was  limited by  the qualita-
tive  shortcomings of the training  (most of the  instructors were  young  and 
inexperienced).  The  instructors tended to reiterate technical subjects which 
the  farmers  already knew  and  were  unfamiliar with  the  practical constraints 
prevailing on  the  farms  themselves. 
The  field staff were  also put in charge  of literacy instruction,  but the 
method  employed  was  slow  and  arduous. 
Training for women:  this  programme  covered small  livestock rearing,  kitchen 
gardens,  obstetrics and  health;  it was  heavily dependent  on  the presence of 
a  foreigner,  on  whose  departure it fell off. 
Animal-drawn  tillage:  the  sale  on credit of teams  of oxen  and  equipment  was 
appreciated by  the  farmers  of several reasons:  transport,  possibility of 
hiring out,  usefulness  for  work  in kitchen gardens,  but also commercial 
speculation.! The  programme  was  hampered  temporarily by  the  short supply of 
oxen  and  the  mediocre  quality of some  of the  equipment.  Nevertheless,  136 
units were  sold  on credit between  1973  and  1975.  The  cost of a  team  and  all 
the  equipment  ranged  from  CFAF  77  220  to  93  600  and  was  repayable  over four 
years.  Ownership  of oxen  was  only viable in so far  as  there  were  opportuni-
ties to use  them  for non-agricultural work. 
- Dry  season crops:  in 1974 it was  decided  to build  50  wells.  34  were  sunk for 
kitchen garden  irrigation and  9  for water supplies.  The  total area of irri-
gated kitchen gardens  doubled  as  a  result. 
The  species grown  in kitchen gardens  were  diversified.  They  brought  an  im-
provement  in the quantity  and  quality of food  available  in the valley,  but 
the  problems  of marketing  the  surplus were  not  solved. 
Reafforestation:  some  trees were  planted in villages and  a  number  of gao 
(acacia albida)  plantations were  established. 
The  structure of the  EDF  expenditure  was  approximately as  follows: 
tracks  40% 
soil rehabilitation  20% 
- expatriate adviser  11% 
1  A farmer  buying  a  team  on credit at the official price  was  able  to sell it 
immediately at a  good profit. - 22  -
- local field workers  9% 
- miscellaneous  (reafforestation, 
bridges,  inputs,  etc.)  20% 
RESULTS 
Production statistics 
The  production statistics must  be  regarded with great caution.  The  progress 
and  fluctuations  of the  main  crops  do  not  seem  to be  directly connected with 
the action carried out under  the project.  These  farmers  react in a  very di-
rect way  to prevailing weather  conditions:  sorghum/cotton substitution,  ex-
tension of land under cultivation,  travelling away  from  the  area to find  work 
when  harvests are in doubt,  etc.  Moreover,  outputs before  the  period  covered 
by  the project were  probably underestimated. 
In absolute figures,  the objectives of self-sufficiency in cereals was 
achieved,  despite the handicap of the  drought years.  Average  production  from 
1973  to 1976  was  12%  above  the  requirement,  estimated at 8  750  tonnes  or 
250  kg per inhabitant per year. 
A considerable effect of the project can  be  recorded  in the  case of cowpeas, 
however.  Drought-resistant seeds  were  introduced in the  zone  in 1974;  the 
official price of this crop  was  high  and production  increased considerably  in 
competition with cotton.  The  OPVN 1 was  unable  to buy  the  output,  however,  and 
the official price was  reduced  by  25%  the  following year,  with the result 
that production fell. 
Marketing results 
The  project organizers anticipated that the rise in food  crops  would  not  ex-
ceed the villagers'  subsistence needs  and  accordingly made  no provision for 
marketing  food  crops.  The  policy pursued  by  the  cooperatives  in this sphere 
was  aimed at stabilizing prices in the  towns,  so that cooperative  stores were 
not set up  locally.  The  producers  did not always  have  adequate  stocks of ce-
reals,  nor  the necessary storage facilities.  They  were  therefore  obliged to 
sell at low prices  and  buy back subsequently at high prices. 
Farmers.'  cash  incomes 
Farmers'  cash incomes  rose slightly,  thanks  mainly  to sales of cowpeas  and 
the  increase in cotton production. 
1  Office  des  Produits Vivriers  du  Nige~ - 23-
Table  l.Ol.a 
Comparison  of objectives  and  actual production in the Badeguicheri  valley 
Period  covered by  the 
project 
Cotton 
Area: 
Objectives  (ha) 
Actual  (ha) 
Intensive  (ha) 
Production: 
Objectives  (t) 
Actual  (t) 
Yield: 
Objectives  (kg/ha) 
Actual  (kg/ha) 
Cereals 
Area: 
Objective  (ha) 
Actual: 
- sorghum 
- millet 
Production  (t): 
Objectives 
Actual: 
- sorghum 
- millet 
Yield  (kg/ha): 
Objectives 
Actual: 
- sorghum 
- millet 
1972-73  1975-76 
0  ------------------------------0 
1  919 
134 
(?)  915c 
476 
3  350 
6  350 
872 
89 
456 
529 
5  441 
8  083 
3  440 
945 
632 
117 
1  395 
133 
713 
513 
5  669 
10  558 
5  550 
8  770 
975 
825 
2  450 
1  435 
229 
3  700 
1  651 a 
1  5oob 
(?)  850 
,:t10  000 
3  866 
4  732 
.±5  100 
1  828 
3  075 
510 
800-225 
650 
1976-77 
919* 
91* 
3  331 Cowpeas 
Area  (ha) 
Objectives 
Actual: 
- single crop 
- mixed  crops 
Production  ( t) : 
Objectives 
Actual 
Yield  (kg/ha): 
Objectives 
Actual: 
- single  crop 
Dry  season crops 
(kitchen gardens) 
Area  (ha): 
Objectives 
Actual 
*  In August  1976. 
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Table  1.01.a  (continued) 
1972-73  1973-74 
306 
1974-75 
79 
2  860 
1  480 
1  100 
420 
a  On  alluvial soils  (fadoma)  in the  valley. 
1975-76 
230 
2  240 
3  900 
1  200 
669 
1976-77 
100 
870 
b  1  100 according to the  SDRAT,  a  figure  disputed  by  the  CFDT;  850  kg/ha ac-
cording to the Ministere  du  Developpement rural,  UNCC,  Production Cotonni-
ere,  Tahoua,  annual  report 1975/76. 
c  Elements d'evaluation,  projet de  Badeguich~ri,  SDRAT,  Tahoua,  1975.  The 
project implementation report of December  1974 quotes  1  208 t. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The  people of the  Badeguicherie valley had  been  living in precarious condi-
tions for very many  years,  not only as  a  result of the  climate conditions, 
but also because  of specific problems  and  constraints:  not enough  land  for 
self-sufficiency in food,  competition between  cotton and  sorghum  for  the 
richest alluvial soil,  soil erosion and  silting of valleys as  a  result of de-
forestation,  lack of fire wood,  conflicts between  farmers  and graziers in - 25-
Table  l.Ol.b 
Finance  for  the  Badeguicheri  valley project 
CFAF  Convention  I 
Technical  Assistance  e3 200  000 
(1974)b  37 800  000 
Sahel  special  aid  5  000  000 
Supervisors/local personnel  39  510  000 
Soil rehabilitation  62  300  000 
Infrastructure,  equipment 
and production aid  44  959  336 
Roads  ~95 000  000 
(1974)b  ~21 000  000 
Buildings  6  000  000 
Vehicles  ~17 500  000 
(1974)b  23  000  000 
~quipment 
t~ 
500  000 
(1974)b  500  000 
TOTAL  ~18 969  330 
(1974)b  15  069  000 
a  End  of 1976 
b  1974 revision. 
Expenditure8 
31  371  830 
5  000  000 
24  561  692 
56  597  708 
29  642  065 
114  981  813 
7  130  564 
15  439  875 
749  492 
285  405  010 
need  of grazing during  the  dry  season,  migration  of workers,  lack of organi-
zation of food  markets,  poor health facilities. 
It its original  form,  the project was  virtually limited to  an  attempt to 
solve  the  problem  of the  extension. of cotton growing.  Subsequently,  in the 
light of the  tragic events of the  drought,  the  aims  were  diversified  and 
brought  more  into line with the real needs  and  constraints in the area.  How-
ever,  the  resources  deployed  during  the  second phase  seem  to have  been  spread 
too thinly between  various  schemes,  which  were  genuinely effective in  some 
instances but,  overall,  did not have  any  fundamental  impact. 
The  staff's low  level of training and  the authoritarianism of the  cotton-
growing  advisory programme  have  meant that a  process  of autonomous  develop-
ment  has not yet started in the valley,  despite the interest shown  by  the  lo-- 26  -
cal population  in  a  number  of the  schemes,  which  are  highly  dependent  on  aid 
from  the  government  and  abroad.  A certain lack of coherence  between  the na-
tional policy of self-development and  cooperation and  the  methods  used  by  the 
staff in charge of the project has  to be  reported. 
The  chief merit of this first project at Badeguicheri  has  been  to provide  in-
valuable  information on  the possibilities and  difficulties of carrying 
through  the  integrated development.of an  area by  tackling the  problem of pro-
tection and  rehabilitation of soil under  heavy attack  from  erosion. - 27  -
1.02.  INTEGRATED  RURAL  DEVELOPMENT  IN  THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  ZINDER  (3M  PROJECT), 
NIGERl 
This is a  long-term project  (1973-85)  and  only  the first phase  (1973-76)  has 
been  evaluated. 
Three  arrondissements
2 
and  some  50  000  family  farms  producing nearly 60%  of 
Niger's groundnut crops are affected by  the  project. 
SPECIAL  PROBLEMS  IN  THE  REGION 
Rural  development  in this area posed  several problems: 
(i)  the  increase  in the production of groundnuts  had  been  achieved  up  to 
that point by  extension of land  area,  but the  lack of land  made  it nec-
essary to adopt  more  intensive  ~echniques; 
(ii)  groundnuts  were  in competition with  food  crops  and  the  trend in ground-
nut prices was  not  advantageous  to the producer; 
(iii)  abandonment of the practice of fallowing  was  gradually causing  a  de-
cline in soil fertility; 
(iv)  land  shortages,  drought  and  the  absence  of a  real  programme  for  the in-
tensification of agricultural production and  for  employment  were  lead-
ing to migration of young  people  during the  dry season  and  decay of the 
rural  environment; 
(v)  the difficulties confronting the population included malnutrition,  dis-
ease,  inadequate roads,  the  shortcomings  of the  commercial,  health and 
educational  systems  and  a  level of taxation which  obliged farmers  to 
sell their essential produce at disadvantageous prices. 
1  Evaluated  by Miss  P.  Roberts,  sociologist. 
2  Mirriah,  Matameye,  Magaria. - 28  -
AIMS  OF  THE  PROJECT 
The  aim  of this project was  to give  effect,  in the  area concerned,  to the 
Government's  policy of setting up  cooperative  self-development structures  and 
raising standards of training  among  village instructors and  farmers  in order 
to  increase productivity levels in the  rural  environment. 
The  intensification of agricultural production was  principally concerned  with 
groundnuts,  as  the  production  and  marketing  of food  crops  was  considered  a 
problem of lesser importance  since it was  believed that they would  follow  the 
rise in the population's requirements. 
Another  aim  of the  project was  to  combat  soil exhaustion. 
RESOURCES  AND  ACTION  UNDERTAKEN 
Four  Departmental  Services  were  to cooperate in the  implementation of a  joint 
programme:  the  UNCC 1  and  the  agriculture,  'animation'  and  literacy services. 
The  UNCC  was  the  executive  agency  and it was  decided  to strengthen its re-
sources  so that  a  new  cooperative effort could  be  undertaken,  the  training 
and  organization of farmers  'auto-encadrement'  could  be  set up,  large scale 
testing of fertilizers for soil rehabilitation could  be  organized  and  a  cere-
al  seed selection and·multiplication programme  could  be  carried out. 
The  EDF  financed  part of this strengthening process,  but the  bulk  of its com-
mitments  were  to be  used  to  finance  the regional  infrastructure  (road build-
ing,  buildings for  cooperatives),  operation of the project,  supply  of vehi-
cles and  construction of 50  wells.2 
Technical  assistance was  limited to  a  few  support missions.  A feature  of the 
project is therefore that it was  implemented by  the  existing institutions and 
did not  take  the  form  of a  specific operation;  this method  offered  the  advan-
tage of better integration of the  funding  with  the national  structure and  the 
disadvantage  of making it more  difficult to evaluate the results of the  aid 
component. 
Various  types  of action were  taken to achieve  the  aims  of the project. 
1.  The  'auto-encadrement'  structures 
The  provision of trained national staff for  the  cooperative  system was  organ-
ized through the  establishment of 1  060  GMVs  (groupements  mutualistes villa-
geois  - village mutual  groups)  whose  membership  represents  approximately  50% 
of the  population.  These  groups  elect PDAs  (paysans  demonstrateurs  d'agricul-
1  Union  Nigerienne  de  Credit et de  Cooperation. 
2  The  finance  structure is shown  in Table  1.02.b. - 29  -
ture- peasant demonstrators  of farming  methods),  of whom  there  are  1  075  cur-
rently;1  the  PDAs  attend  an  annual  training course  at  one  of the  CPTs  (centres 
de  perfectionnement  technique  - technical  training centres)  and  then  demon-
strate selected techniques  to  GMV  members.  The  GMV  general meetings select 
certain PDAs  to become  AVs  (auxiliaires de  vulgarisation - training auxilia-
ries),  of whom  there  are  approximately  one  to every five villages;  the  AVs 
follow  longer  courses  and  are put in charge  of organizing the  activities of 
the  PDAs.  AVs  receive  payment. 
In addition,  the  technical  training centres train JAs  (jeunes agriculteurs  -
young  farmers,  of whom  there are  306)  and  ARs  (artisans ruraux - rural arti-
sans,  of whom  there are  49)  on  seven-month courses,  having first checked after 
an  initial trial that they enjoy sufficient autonomy  of action in their mi-
lieu.  Originally,  the  young  farmers  sent to  the  CPTs  were  family  aids  who 
were  not entitled to  work  a  plot of land of their own,  so that they had vir-
tually no  opportunity to put what  they had  learned  into practice.  From  1976, 
however,  the project organizers pressed for  young  couples  to be  sent to  the 
CPTs,  so that now  a  trained farmer,  being married,  has  the right to his  own 
farm  where  they can  apply  the techniques  learned.  The  training given to the 
wives  enables  them  to play  a  full ·role  on  the  farm. 
The  training for  JAs,  ARs  and  their wives  is a  comprehensive  course encompass-
ing  farming  techniques,  literacy,  agricultural machinery,  etc.  On  completing 
the  course,  some  are granted  a  loan  by  the  Centre  to buy  a  team  of oxen;  the 
equipment produced  by  the  rural artisans is supplied to the  farmers. 
Each  year  the  programme  for  the  season is discussed  among  the  PADs,  AVs  and 
JAs,  together with the  DVs  (delegues  villageois  - village delegates,  of whom 
there are  two  to each village)  and  the  staff ot the cooperatives,  who  are 
trained by  the  UNCC.  Literacy training is given by paid monitors  in the  CPTs 
and  in 301  centres set up  in the  region covered  by  the project. 
A women's  training programme,  covering subjects connected with farming  and 
health,  was  also carried out. 
It became  apparent  after two  years that the  content of the training courses 
was  too narrow;  starting from  1975/76 it was  enlarged by  the  incorporation of 
the  new  technical  themes  and  animal-drawn tillage. 
In  order to increase the  efficiency of the  'auto-encadrement'  system,  'aides-
encadreurs'  were  trained to monitor the  work  of the  PDAs  and  AVs.  However, 
these  young  school  leavers who  are paid by  the  administration still lack au-
thority. 
By  the  end  of the first phase  of the  project it was  too early to assess  the 
results of the  work  done  in the  field of  'auto-encadrement'.  Some  techniques 
are familiar to the  farmers  but are not always  put into practice because  of 
organizational difficulties;  there have  been delays in deliveries of equip-
ment,  fertilizers  and  insecticides. 
1  The  figures  correspond  to the  period  from  the  beginning of the project un-
til 1976. - 30  -
Literacy training has  not yet  taken  on  the  desired functional  characteristics 
and  practical use  of the written word  has not  been  developed.  Only  very limit-
ed  progress  has  been  achieved  with self-managed cooperatives. 
The  dialogue  which has  been  set up  between  the  farmers  and  the project author-
ities is a  positive feature,  although it is as yet difficult to evaluate all 
its consequences  on  the basis of ·the  limited experience  to date. 
2.  Other action 
The  results of an aerial photography  survey to determine  the  priority regions 
for  soil regeneration were  not available until 1976,  too  late to be  acted upon 
during the first phase. 
Large-scale fertilizer tests were  carried out in 1975  and  1976  in the Yaouri 
and  Sawaya  zones.  Few  results are yet available after this short period of ex-
perimentation.  During  this period the first phosphate  fertilizers  from  Tahoua 
appeared  on  the market. 
The  seed programme  met  with many  difficulties.  The  groundnut varieties propos-
ed  were  unsuccessful,  initially because  of the  drought,  then because  of seri-
ous  outbreaks of rosettes in 1975  and  finally because  the  farmers  were  appre-
hensive  about  slow-maturing varieties.  The  cereal seed multiplication pro-
gramme  was  postponed. 
The  Matameye-Kafin  Baka  road  linking  two  oil-mills in the  area was  built at a 
higher cost than that estimated  in the project.  As  a  result the  Droum  track, 
which  serves to disenclave  one  of the production areas  covered by  the project, 
had  to be  financed  out of Sahel  special aid. 
Finally,  the  scheduled construction of fifty village wells was  completed  on 
time  thanks  to the  work  of the  OFEDES. 1 
ATTAINMENT  OF  OBJECTIVES 
Table  1.02•.a  summarizes  the  technical objectives  and  achievements  of the proj-
ect.  In 1975/76,  the  last year of the first phase,  the  cereal crops were  well 
above  the  objective,  but groundnuts fell short of the  target.  The  difference 
between  the  objectives  and  actual production is shown  following,  expressed  as 
growth rates for  production. 
It would  however  be  difficult to attribute  any  increase in overall production 
to action carried out under the project,  since  the extent to  which  techniques 
have  been  adopted  and  the  technical  results achieved  are not known.  Actual 
groundnut production has  been quite different from  the project forecasts,  a 
1  Office d'etude et de  developpement  des  eaux  du  sol. Millet and  sorghum 
Groundnuts 
Cowpeas 
- 31  -
Forecast 
+  6% 
+  20% 
+  62% 
Actual 
+  20% 
+  2% 
+  205% 
fact explained to a  large extent by  the difficult conditions under which  the 
project has  to operate during the  four years,  but also by  the radical revi-
sion of production priorities.  The  rainfall was  low  and  the groundnut harvest 
was  affected not only by  the  drought but also by  attack  from  insects,  rodents 
and  rosettes.  Farmers  adopted alternative strategies, with more  emphasis  on 
cereal production  (by giving over more  land to cereals)  and  on production of 
cowpeas.  An  increase  in the  cowpea  crop had  therefore been expected.  However, 
the official estimates fell far short of the quantity coming  onto the  market 
in 1975  and  the  OPVN  was  unable  to  cope  with  the  level  of supply. 
Although  the project clearly cannot  be  held  responsible  for the extremely un-
favourable  natural conditions,  there is reason to doubt  whether its objec-
tives had  been  formulated  in a  realistic manner,  taking  account of the possi-
ble reactions of the  farmers  to changes  in their environment. 
A second  cause  of divergence  between  objectives  and results lies in the rela-
tionship between  the  strategy adopted  and  the final objective.  A strategy 
aiming  to use  'auto-encadrement'  by trained peasants should have  included  a 
period of trial and  adaptation,  even under  ideal  conditions with  optimum re-
sults being obtained  from  the  techniques  and  guaranteed availability of in-
puts.  Moreover,  the  demographic  approach to the problem of land  shortage  did 
not necessarily correspond to the peasants'  own  analysis  of their problems 
and  constraints.  The  peasants attached far more  importance  to the  control  of 
resources and  access to inputs  than to learning new  techniques.  They  also 
took  a  more  general  view of their circumstances,  in which  demographic pres-
sures were  of little importance  in relation to earnings  and  keeping  cash in-
comes,  the key factor  determining migration. 
As  regards organization of the present farming  environment  and  assumption by 
the  local population of responsibility for their own  development,  an effec-
tive structure for dialogue,  both between  the  farmers  and  the authorities and 
among  the  authorities themselves,  has  been set up  in the project committee. 
From  the viewpoint  of long-term progress, it is essential for  the officials 
to adopt  a  positive approach to present attitudes and  'mentalities'  and to be 
able  to modify  technical objectives in response  to the villagers'  requests, 
since  only under  these conditions can  a  continuing  joint effort be  made  to 
bring the  technical services offered into line with  the  farmers'  preoccupa-
tions. 
Nevertheless,  the extent of continuing evaluation and  systematic analysis of 
the operating constraints  a~fecting the  farmers  and  their advisers is still Table  1.02.a 
3M  Project:  Comparison of objectives  and  actual production 
1966/67  1975/76 
Groundnuts 
Area  {ha): 
Objectives  {-) 
Actual  129  000  177  260  57  500 
Production  ( t): 
Objectives  {98  755)  w 
1\) 
Actual  84  000  98 000  63  420  75  914  107  555  65  950  13  920  42  250  I 
Yield  (kg/ha): 
Objectives  (  1  395) 
Actual  713  599  892  533  90  733 
Marketed 
production (t):  99  777  78  893  90  505  73  947  16 022  62  408  24  104 
Cereals 
Area  (ha): 
Objectives  (-) 
Actual 
- millet  277  000  .·243  800 
- sorghum  32  000  185  855 
,<··  :t·'\\~1,  c;:. - 40  -
Table  1.03.a 
Mayaga-Bugesera  farming  communities:  objectives  and  actual  figures 
Establishment of farming  communities 
Agricultural  land 
- Establishment of farmers  (2  ha plots)a 
Grazing  land  (hectares) 
Land  for afforestation  (ha) 
P  d  t .  f.  (t)c  ro uc  1on  1gures 
Coffee 
Beans 
Maize 
Sorghum 
Bananas 
Manioc 
Sweet potatoes 
Potatoes 
Groundnuts 
State revenue  (1915) 
Rwandese  francs  (million) 
Budget  resources  for the State 
Additional  contribution to the 
coffee equalization fund 
Indirect revenue  (tax) 
Objectives 
15  517 plots 
21  250  ha 
4  878 
2  517 
7  663 
7  663 
13  794 
53  217 
14  475 
34 060 
6  811 
508 
95.8 
23.4 
16.0 
Actual  figures 
14  192a 
.:t18  250  hab 
785 
1  359 
8  774 
unknown 
7  066 
24  980 
51  185 
34  123 
unknown 
182 
49.8 
12.2 
8.0 
a  Establishment of 14  192  families  on  2  ha plots;  the  documents  on which  the 
projects had  been  formulated  had  been  based  on  the  allocation of one  plot 
to an  average  rural  family  of 4.7 persons.  In 1976,  the  evaluation report 
survey  indicated averages  of 6.45 persons to a  family  and  6.82 persons  to 
a  plot. 
b 
1  685  families  are currently established  on  the grazing  land,  occupying 
about  14%  of this land. 
c  In the  absence  of reliable figures  for  food  crop  areas  and  yields,  the  ton-
nages  quoted  are  approximations  only. Production  ( t): 
Objectives  (210  293) 
Actual 
- millet  143  604  122  226  154  010  122  775  93  350  183  850 
- sorghum  48  354  45  888  59  460  26  800  72  080  72  500 
Yield  (kg/ha): 
Objectives  750) 
Actual 
- millet  568  490  608  483  433  616 
- sorghum  531  435  585  426  416  608 
Cow12eas 
Area  (ha): 
Objectives  (-) 
Actual  199  000  229  030  w 
w 
Production  ( t): 
Objectives  35 800) 
Actual  24  418  17  814  24  065  31  840  77  910  73  500 - 34-
insufficient.  The  viability of the project depends  on  these activities,  and 
also on  the  development  of training at all levels  (literacy instructors, 
farmers  etc.).  As  for  the  cooperative  system,  the scale of self-management is 
still very  limited;  the  role  of the  UNCC  advisers  includes control  of depos-
ited funds,  and  the  cooperatives  have  no  influence  on  pricing and  marketing 
policy in the  State  companies. 
Studies  on  cooperative  structures and credit in the  region  before  the project 
started stress the  importance  of the hierarchical structure of rural  Hausa 
society and  control of access  to resources  by  the traditional elite. It does 
indeed  appear that support  and  mana~ement of the  cooperatives are still to 
some  extent limited to the better-off and  politically more  influential  farm-
ers. 
During  the first phase  of the project,  the  cooperative  system,  despite  the 
limitations found,  was  already playing a  useful role,  particularly in the 
self-managed  organization of a  strategic stock of cereals,  an  operation which 
was  very popular with the  farmers  concerned. 
Table  1.  02.  b 
3M  Project:  Finance 
Budgeted  for  in the  convention 
- According to 1976  review 
CFAF  521  000  000 
CFAF  551  000  000 
Distribution of expenditure to end  1976 
Technical assistance  16  588  000 
(Buildings,  repairs,  wells  and  equipment)  107  132  692 
Roads  180  909  131 
Vehicles  28  459  174 
Research  12  071  250 
Supervision,  training  34 066  885 
Operating/office  costs  8  370  000 
TOTAL  387  567  132 - 35  -
1.03.  INTEGRATED  RURAL  DEVELOPMENT  IN  MAYAGA-BUGESERA  (RWANDA) 1 
The  Mayaga-Bugesera region straidles the  boundaries  of the Prefectures of 
Kigali,  Butare  and  Gitarama,  on  the eastern and  western banks  of the  River 
Akanyaru. 
The  EDF  has  been  active  in this region since  1959,  but the first projects be-
gan  in  1953  under  Belgian auspices. 
The  pressure of population growth  in the  other regions of Rwanda  was  such 
that it was  necessary for  the  people  and  the administrative authorities  to 
open  up  new  land for  agriculture.  The  Mayaga-Bugesera  region  had  remained 
relatively underpopulated;  (95  inhabitants per  km2  in Mayaga,  21  in Bugesera); 
little is known  about  the  reasons  for  this. 
In 1952,  the colonial  administration intensified research with  a  view to es-
tablishing the first settlers,  along the  lines of the  'farming communities' 
already being tried at the  time  in the  Belgian  Congo.  Settlement was  started, 
then slowed  down  on  account of difficulties with graziers  seeking to estab-
lish access  to the grazing  land in the  region.  It resumed  and  continued at a 
rapid rate  from  1961,  following  the  aboliti0n of the  feudal  system. 
The  history of past EDF  aid may  be  summarized  as  follows: 
1960:  Study  on  the  development of Mayaga-Bugesera:  hydrological  survey, 
tsetse fly eradication and  pilot farming  communities.  The  OBM  (Of-
fice  de  Bugesera-Mayaga)  was  set up  at this time. 
1961-1962:  Establishment of four  coffee-growing  farming  communities,  funded 
by  EDF  1. 
1962: 
1965: 
1966: 
Presentation by  the national authorities of a  programme  for  15  ad-
ditional perimeters of four  separate  types,  none  of them  growing 
coffee,  in the  Bugesera ecological  zone. 
Establishment of a  non-coffee  farming  community  combining stock-
farming  and  agriculture at N'Kanga  (Bugesera),  financed  by EDFl. 
Financing of four  further perimeters  in Mayaga  out of EDF  2. 
1968-1976:  Financing out  of EDF  2  and  3,  of welfare  and  technical  assistance 
infrastructures for  the  16  completed perimeters,  10 of which  had 
been financed  by  the  EDF. 
1  Evaluated  by  Mr.  G.Tondeur,  agronomist. - 36  -
Altogether,  11  perimeters were  established with EDF  funds  and  6  with  other 
(mainly  Belgian)  sources of finance,  out of the  29  perimeters  studied in the 
area as  a  whole. 
Total  actual  expenditure  on all these  schemes  was  Rwandese  francs  382  400  000, 
1  compared  with  438  600  000  budgeted  for. 
The  total number  of farmers  involved  in these  developments  was  21  195,  of 
whom  20  817  were  coffee planters.  The  number  benefiting  from  EDF  financing is 
estimated to be  approximately  14  192,  including  13  814  coffee planters.  (See 
Table  1.03.a.) 
The  imbalances  and  constraints prevailing in the  area concerned  may  be  de-
scribed as  follows: 
(i)  demographic  imbalance  (natural growth of 2.5% before  1960  and  total 
growth of  5%  per  annum  including  immigration).  These  demographic  imbal-
ances  inevitably led to  imbalance  of the  subsistence  farming  systems; 
(ii)  traditional  imbalance  of the  feudal  land  tenure  system which  - accord-
ing to the  promoters  of the  formula  - needed  to be  superseded by  the 
establishment of land  tenure structures of the  farming  community  type;2 
(iii) health and  food  shortage problems,  sometimes  famine. 
The  projects were  planned  to contribute  to  the  attainment of the  following 
national  objectives: 
(i)  a  better geographical  distribution of the population and  a  more  satis-
factory balance  between population  and  soil resources; 
(ii)  removal  of constraints deriving  from  the  land  tenure  system; 
(iii)  development  from  a  subsistence  economy  to  a  market  economy  in order to 
forestall  a  growing  imbalance  between  the situation in the  'traditional' 
milieu  and  national  trends  towards  socio-economic  progress. 
The  general  objectives  of the  projects were  expressed  as  follows: 
(i)  to increase  the  average  money  income  of rural  households  to  enable  them 
to buy  more  and better food; 
(ii)  to increase exports  and  the  country's  foreign  currency revenue  by  de-
veloping coffee production; 
(iii)  to increase the State's budget resources; 
(iv)  to increase production of food  crops  in order to  improve  supplies to 
the  local market.3 
1  Equivalent to 4  601  500  and  5  488  300 u.a.  Calculated in  1975 units of ac-
count,  the  expenditure in constant  terms  becomes  6  573  215 u.a. 
2  The  traditional  land  tenure  system was  dismantled by  the  abolition of the 
3 
feudal  system  in 1959. 
This  objective was  assumed  but not pursued  as  such. - 37  -
In parallel with  these  economic  objectives various  socio-economic  objectives 
were  envisaged;  limitation of emigration in order  to  safeguard the country's 
manpower  potential,  grouping  of scattered populations,  development  of unoc-
cupied  areas  to  accommodate  population surpluses  from  other regions,  improve-
ment  of health and nutrition,  training of peasants,  organization of coopera-
tives,  establishment of a  new  land tenure  system,  literacy training. 
Given  these objectives,  the projects set themselves  the  tasks of: 
(i)  establishing  'farming communities'  designed  in a  manner  systematically 
distributing and  laying out plots of land  in the  light of contour-lines 
and  the potential  of the  land  for  agriculture,  stock-farming or forest-
ry.  The  £arming  communities  were  designed  on  the basis of allocation of 
crop-farming plots with dispersed housing  - the grazing  and  forest land 
remaining  in collective ownership; 
(ii)  organizing the  campaign against erosion; 
(iii)  increasing coffee production  and  yields  (in Mayaga),  integrating agri-
culture  and  stock-farming,  developing  animal-drawn tillage,  promoting 
cooperative  equipment,  education,  health,  etc.; 
(iv)  establishing the  infrastructure for  communications  and  marketing. 
EFFECTS  AND  RESULTS1 
Effects on  household  incomes 
In view  of the rate  of population growth,  the rise in incomes is of extremely 
hypothetical value.  Bearing  in mind  the  difficulties of obtaining accurate 
figures  in this sphere,  there appears  to be  a  parallel trend in incomes  on 
either side of perimeters,2  except that incomes  from  coffee-growing are 
larger  (about  40%  higher)  in the  farming  communities. 
Increase in State revenues 
The  increase  in foreign  currency revenue  was  in the  region of 50%  of the 
forecasts. 
State budget resources  (export taxes,  equalization funds),  increased by  some 
50%  of the  forecasts.  Fiscal revenue  did not  increase,  given  the  low  level of 
cash  incomes. 
It should nevertheless be  noted that the  increase  in coffee production,  which 
generates  State resources  and revenues,  is not entirely attributable to the 
project.  In the  neighbouring areas,  production has  also increased - although 
1 
2 
The  results are  shown  in Table 1.03.a,  page  40. 
This  trend  represents  a  parallel  stagnation in terms  of constant prices. - 38  -
not  quite as  much  as  in Mayaga-Bugesera  - as  a  result of the  combined  effects 
of population growth  and  general  promotion  of agricultural  techniques. 
The  reinvestment  fund  which  was  to have  drawn  its finance  from  repayments  by 
farmers  of capital  investments  was  never set up. 
Increase  in marketed  food  production 
No  plausible comparative  assessment  of aims  and  achievements  can be  made,  giv-
en  the  absence  of data and  clearly defined  aims.  Although  food  supplies  did 
not present crucial problems,  there was  nevertheless  a  deficit.  On  the  fre-
quent  occasions  when  first-season  crops fail,  farmers  may  be  obliged to  spend 
a  considerable proportion of their income  from  coffee  on  buying  food  and  the 
quality of their diet gradually declines  and  reliance  on  manioc  in particular 
increases. 
It has  been  found  that food  reserves were  larger in the  farming  communities 
than  elsewhere  and  action by  the  OBM  has  made  it possible  to  foil  speculation 
on  foodstuffs  during periods of shortage.  There  has  been no  clear-cut improve-
ment  in nutritional standards  in the area,  however;  the  highest  number  of 
cases of kwashiorkor  was  recorded  in the  very heart of the  area covered by 
the project. 
The  socio-economic  field 
In the  socio-economic  field,  a  number  of positive results can be  recorded: 
effective establishment of a  new  tenure  system,  a  higher level of school  at-
tendance  in farming  communities  (46%)  than elsewhere  (36%),  virtually com-
plete eradication of sleeping sickness  in humans  and  animals,  water supplies 
reaching roughly  50%  of families. 
It nevertheless  has  to be  recorded  that the  objective  of maintaining balance 
between natural  resources  and  the population has  not  been  achieved.  The  popu-
lation living on  the  farming  units in 1976  was  substantially higher  than the 
norms  adopted at the  beginning of the project  (6.8 persons  in 1976  compared 
with 4.7 anticipated initially).  There  is no possibility of the initial norms 
being established,  given the  high  population growth  throughout  the  country. 
There  has  been  a  parallel increase  in the  livestock population. 
OVERALL  ASSESSMENT  AND  EFFECTIVENESS  OF  PROJECTS 
The  project was  successful  over  a  period  in channelling settlement within the 
perimeters by  farmers  in need  of land,  by  offering them  plots.  The  settlers 
integrated into the  systemized structure,  but had  no  alternative other than 
to carry on  using traditional  farming  methods  as  far  as  food  crops were  con-
cerned.  Income  from  coffee growing  has  helped to improve  housing  standards 
but,  as  indicated  above,  the  families  are often obliged  to use  part of it to 
buy  food. - 39  -
Twenty  years'  work  with  farming  communities  has  been  undermined  by  the extra-
neous  factor  of the population explosion.  With  the  passage of time,  t~e popu-
lation density  has risen and  the  farming  land has  been  broken  down  into smal-
ler units within the  organized structure. 
Regarding  the effect on  the  Mayaga  land of coffee-growing,  the minerals  taken 
out of the  land have  not  been  matched  by corresponding inputs of fertilizers. 
The  high cost of mineral  fertilizers meant  that they  could not be  used prof-
itably,  given  the  average  prices paid to the  farmers  for their coffee. 
The  model  'fermettes'  aimed  at combining  livestock and  crop-farming have  not 
progressed  beyond  the  experimental  stage.  The  supervisors  have  not  succeeded 
in demonstrating to the  farmers  how  to effect the transition from  traditional 
methods  to  those  of the  model  proposed. 
The  cooperative organization is still linked to the structures of the  OBM.  In 
the  farming  environment,  whose  own  structure has  been  completely dismantled 
by the  two-fold effects of the  elimination of the  feudal  system  and  the indi-
vidualism  of the  migrant population,  it has not really been  able  to play its 
part as  a  unifying force  or,  more  specifically,  to attract farmers  to partic-
ipate. 
The  technical  design of the projects is now  nearly 20  years  old  and  has  be-
come  unsuited to requirements,  particularly in view of the  manpower  con-
straints. 
Continuing  information and  evaluation at operational  level  have  been  very 
inadequate;  hence  the difficulty experienced in the  past and currently of 
proposing  improvements  to the established system. 
The  essential point,  however,  seems  to be  that economic  considerations  and 
concern with profitability have  caused programmes  to  be  oriented too exclu-
sively towards  coffee-growing,  at the  expense  of objectives which  are closer 
to the  immediate  interests of the  Rwandese  rural population,  a  population 
which  is very unapproachable,  given  the  individualization and  absence  of so-
cial organization resulting  from  socio-political events. 
The  infrastructures which  have  been set up  (roads,  dispensaries,  social  cen-
tres,  water  supply etc.)  would  seem  to be  viable.  As  long as  the  agronomists, 
veterinarians,  medical  staff etc.  are paid by  the State,  the  OBM  will be  able 
to retain financial  autonomy  as  far  as its cooperative activities are  con-
cerned.  It would  nevertheless be  necessary for the  OCIRl  to allow the  OBM  an 
additional  mark-up  so that it would  not  need  to balance its coffee budget 
with resources  from  other activities. 
On  the  other hand,  the  situation regarding production and  balances  between 
population and  resources  is not viable  and  unlikely to become  so for  a  long 
time,  given the general  rural  development  situation in Rwanda.  Reducing  the 
1  Office  de  commercialisation des  produits industriels du  Rwanda. - 40  -
Table  1.03.  a 
Mayaga-Bugesera  farming  communities:  objectives  and  actual  figures 
Establishment of farming  communities 
Agricultural  land 
- Establishment of farmers  (2  ha plots)a 
Grazing  land  (hectares) 
Land  for  afforestation  (ha) 
P  d  t .  f"  (t)c  ro uc  1on  1gures 
Coffee 
Beans 
Maize 
Sorghum 
Bananas 
Manioc 
Sweet potatoes 
Potatoes 
Groundnuts 
State revenue  (1975) 
Rwandese  francs  (million) 
Budget  resources  for the  State 
Additional  contribution to the 
coffee equalization fund 
Indirect revenue  (tax) 
Objectives 
15  517 plots 
21  250  ha 
4  878 
2  517 
7  663 
7  663 
13  794 
53  217 
14  475 
34 060 
6  811 
508 
95.8 
23.4 
16.0 
Actual  figures 
14  192a 
.±18  250  hab 
785 
1  359 
8  774 
unknown 
7  066 
24  980 
51  185 
34  123 
unknown 
182 
49.8 
12.2 
8.0 
a  Establishment of 14  192 families  on  2  ha plots;  the  documents  on which  the 
projects had  been  formulated  had  been  based  on  the  allocation of one  plot 
to an  average rural  family  of 4.7 persons.  In  1976,  the  evaluation report 
survey indicated averages  of 6.45 persons to  a  family  and  6.82 persons  to 
b  a  plot. 
1  685  families  are currently established  on  the grazing  land,  occupying 
about  14%  of this land. 
c  In the  absence  of reliable figures  for  food  crop  areas  and  yields,  the ton-
nages  quoted  are  approximations  only. - 41  -
Table  1.03.a  (continued) 
Yields 
(kg/ha) 
1957  1962  1967  1972  1974 
Sorghum  a  2  441  2  945  1  916  1  852  2  030 
Beans 
b  1  505  956  946  881  1  116 
Groundnuts  1  706  1  049  907  709  917 
a  Sown  in March.  b  Sown  in October. 
population density in the  project area to the  level at which it would  be  in 
balance  with resources  would  be  tantamount  to overpopulating other regions; 
allowing the  situation to  develop  in line with its present dynamics  would 
mean  the  overpopulation of the  farming  communities  themselves.  Apart  from  ac-
tion to affect the population pattern  (limitation of the growth rate or a 
policy of emigration to other African regions),  only drastic action to in-
crease  the productivity of the  factors  of  food  production would  have  benefi-
cial effects.  Such action,  in order to be  reliable and  efficient,  would entail 
a  thorough  revision of the  methods  currently employed. 
Table  1.03.b 
Rwanda:  Finance 
(RWF  '000) 
Finance  Forecast  I 
Actual 
Preparation and  organization of work  11  550  13  727 
Tsetse fly  campaign  19  965  21  450 
Staff and  equipment  201  857.7  141  396 
Establishment of farming  communities  77  476  84  693 
Social  and  economic  infrastructure  127 767.5  121  093 
TOTAL  438  616.2  382  359 - 43  -
1.04.  AGRICULTURAL  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  CENTRAL  REGION  AND  THE  PLATEAUX  REGION 
IN  TOG01 
The  EDF  has  been active  in the  Central  and  Plateaux regions  since  1964  and 
its work  has  taken  four  forms:  price  support,  'aid to production'  (supply  of 
equipment  and  inputs),  integrated agricultural  development  (second  EDF),  de-
velopment  of cotton-growing  (third EDF). 
In addition to price  support and  aid  to production,  the first phase  enabled 
the  State to establish the  five  SORADs  (regional planning and  development 
companies),  two  of which  are  concerned with evaluation and  allocation of in-
stallation,  equipment  and  supervision expenditure.  Its essential  aims  were 
improvement  of the  structure of farm units in order to make  them  more  compet-
itive through  the  dissemination of techniques,  the distribution of inputs, 
small-scale mechanization  (animal-drawn  tillage)  and  the  combination of live-
stock and  crop-farming. 
However,  no  analysis  was  made  of the  needs,  potentiality and  constraints of 
rural  development  in the  regions  concerned before  the broad-based structures 
were  set up  and  equipped,  so that they  lacked  a  coherent regional  development 
policy. 
The  second  phase  was  planned  on  the basis of the  same  regional  structures as 
the first,  except that it aimed  at significant intensification of effort on 
all perennial  and  annual  crops  grown  in the  two  regions  (coffee,  cocoa,  cot-
ton,  groundnuts),  including  animal-drawn  tillage and  combined  livestock  and 
crop-farming.  The  development  of irrigated agriculture recommended  by  the 
Togolese  Government  was  not  implemented. 
It was  planned  that the  technical assistance  teruns  assigned  to the various 
SORADs  would  prepare proposals for  an  overall  development  programme  for  each 
region  as  a  matter of priority. 
The  third phase  was  also planned  on  the basis of structural aid,  but no  long-
er included  measures  for  the development  of animal-drawn tillage or  the  com-
bination of livestock and  crop-farming.  The  aid initially intended for  the 
SORADs  - expatriate personnel  and  technical  and  financial  resources  - was 
partly transferred to a  new  company,  SOTOCO,  which  was  set up  in 1974  to pro-
mote  cotton-growing.  Another  company,  SRCC,  took  over the  coffee  and  cocoa 
1  Evaluated by  c.  Van  der  Vaeren,  economist,  and  G.  Bertrand,  agricultural 
economist. - 44  -
1 
activities,  while  others  took  over fruit,  cereals,  etc.  Regionally integrat-
ed planning was  thus  superseded  by  sectoral planning. 
The  planning pattern evolved  in line with  the  course  of the  programmes  (first 
programme  oriented  towards  regional  planning,  second  programme  oriented to-
wards  sectoral planning),  but not  enough  provision was  made  to ensure  that 
the institutional reforms  were  accompanied  by  improvement of the  rural  infra-
structures and  structures  ('animation',  education and  health facilities, 
roads,  cooperative  and  mutual  organizations,  etc.)  which  could  have  supple-
mented  and  reinforced  the  economic  work  of the sectoral  companies. 
During  this period,  moreover,  pricing policy was  hampered  by very disruptive 
market  situations:  the policy of developing  cotton as  a  'motive'  crop  was 
thwarted  by  a  sudden  and  spontaneous  increase  in staple  food  prices.  In par-
allel with this,  rice-growing  in the  lowlands  was  developed  and  attracted in-
creasing interest on  the part of producers. 
THE  RESOURCES  DEPLOYED  AND  ACTION  CARRIED  OUT 
A variety of technical resources  were  deployed  and  these  should  be  assessed 
individually in the  light of the results achieved. 
The  technical  assistance programme  opened  in chaotic  fashion  and,  over  three 
years,  only that part of it which  was  connected with the  spending of the  EDF 
funds  was  completed.  Apart  from  a  few  exceptions  the staff were  of mediocre 
calibre.  They  concentrated heavily on  development  of the  cotton economy  and 
this meant  that the  tasks of regional  planning,  environmental  structuring and 
training of middle  and  junior staff were  not carried out.  The  technical  as-
sistance staff,  having  in 1970  joined the national  structures  which  had  been 
in existence  since  1965,  virtually took  over  the  management  of the  companies. 
The  takeover of duties  from  them  caused  no  problems,  but  the  SORADs  were par-
tially dismantled shortly afterwards. 
The  Togolese staff performed  their role relatively satisfactorily when  oper-
ating  on  a  broad  front  advising farmers  on all aspects  of farming  problems  -
in so far,  that is,  as  the  technical  innovations  were  attractive.  Their 
training and  discipline at work  left something to  be  desired  in some  cases, 
however,  because  they were  left to themselves  too much. 
From  the point of view  of infrastructure,  it would  appear that the  SORADs 
were  either overequipped  or  inefficient in planning their investments,  wheth-
er  on multi-service centres,  garage-workshops  or storehouses.  These  were  gen-
erally underutilized;  a  larger number  of small  local  investments  would  have 
been  more  effective. 
1  SOTOCO  = Societe  togolaise  du  eaton;  SRCC  Societe pour  la Regeneration  de 
la Cafeiere et de  la Cacaoyere. - 45  -
The  building of roads,  tracks  and  bridges was  not coordinated.  Equipment re-
mained  unused  in the  absence  of an  after-sales service;  bridges were built 
without  any  corresponding roads;  contracts  for  a  few  dozen  kilometres of road 
used  up  funds  allocated for  a  hundred kilometres,  etc. 
The  effectiveness of the  resources  deployed  was  therefore  very uneven.  The 
highest degree  of efficiency was  found  in structural aid,  supervision and  im-
provement  of communications  and  the  SORADs'  operational  resources. 
On  the  other hand,  the multi-service  centres,  workshops  and  animal-drawn 
tillage  equipment  served  no  purpose;  the  storehouses  and  civil engineering 
equipment  were  under-used. 
The  research programmes  financed  by the  EDF  over  a  number  of years produced 
results,  thanks  to additional  finance  which  enabled  them  to be  extended.  How-
ever,  these  programmes  suffered  from  two  defects:  lack of coordination aris-
ing out of the division of work  between  specialized institutesl and  a  lack of 
liaison with the  advisory programme. 
THE  EVOLUTION  OF  STRATEGIES 
From  the strategic viewpoint,  two  important  considerations were  contained in 
the  initial guidelines.  It was  necessary  on  the  one  hand  simultaneously to 
modify  and  intensify farming  methods  and  on  the other hand  to establish dy-
namic  and versatile development  structures at regional  level  (SORADs)  and 
local  level  (cooperatives)  which  could  implement  integrated rural development 
policies. 
From  the  technical viewpoint,  the instruction in intensification of agricul-
tural techniques  covered early sowing,  densities,  fertilizers,  insecticides, 
the  adoption  of selected seeds  and  the  adoption of animal-drawn tillage. 
Although it proved relatively easy  to introduce  new  techniques  and  cotton va-
rieties,  the efforts to introduce  animal-drawn tillage failed.  There  were 
several reasons  for this:  lack of conviction and  negative preconceptions  a-
mong  SORAD  and  livestock service staff;  failure to carry out preliminary re-
search prior to promotion  and  selection of breeds  (local breeds were  unsuit-
able);  absence  of a  structure  to promote  integration of agriculture  and  live-
stock-breeding);  unsuitability of some  of the  equipment  supplied with EDF 
finance  and  lack of coherent purchasing policy  (in the first phase:  'aid to 
production').  The  introduction of improved  cereal varieties is still at an 
early stage.  The  selection of seed varieties is a  relatively long-term proc-
ess  and  the  action in this field was  not  long  enough for results to be  ex-
pected before  the  end  of the  period of the project. 
1  The  Togolese,Government  has  consequently decided  to set up  a  single re-
search establishment combining  agronomy  departments  and  a  rural economics 
institute. - 46  -
Finally supporting research and  educational  programmes  were  organized sepa-
rately for  cotton,  coffee  and  cocoa,  and  food  crops.  The  research has  only 
recently been  concerned  with  establishing the  most  suitable rotations,  study-
ing interactions between  various  crops,  the  farmers•  agricultural calendars 
and  overall factor productivity. 
As  regards  structures,  considerabl€  progress  has  been  made  over  the  years.  Be-
fore  the first EDF  action,  the  intervention structures were  within  the general 
administration which  was  made  up  of pyramid-shaped  departments  operating in 
parallel with  one  another  (agriculture,  water  and  forests,  livestock,  fisher-
ies,  etc.).  The  SORADs  were  set up  from  1965  to coordinate all development 
activities at regional  level.  Their resources were  increased  in 1971  by  the 
establishment of a  technical  assistance  team  (second  EDF)  and  in  1973  the 
Government  asked  the  UNDP  to carry out regional  studies  to enable  the  two 
SORADs  to establish their operations  on  a  more  coherent basis.  The  results of 
these  studies only  became  available in 1976.  Meanwhile,  in a  change  of policy, 
the  Togolese  State set up  companies  for  the  main  products  (SOTOCO,  SRCC, 
SONAPH, 1  etc.),  because  the  SORADs  lacked effectiveness.  The  latter had 
spread their range  of activities too widely  and  lacked  a  coherent  programme; 
in addition,  they became  instruments of political as well  as  economic  and 
technical policy.  In  the production sphere,  the  SORADs  had  nevertheless  con-
centrated most  of their efforts on  cotton  in the  hope  of achieving self-fi-
nancing,  an  objective  assigned to  them  in  1971.  In  the  same  hope,  some  of 
them  ventured  into profit-making activities outside  the  scope  of their role 
in rural development. 
After the  formation  of the product companies,  the  SORADs  were  free  to concen-
trate on  food  crops,  but they had  little impact,  for  lack of resources  and 
organization. 
It was  still planned  during  the  2nd  and  3rd phases  to promote  structures for 
rural  self-development at an  intermediate  level  between  the  farmers  and  the 
regional  organizations.  Nothing has  been  done  in this respect by  the  SORADs. 
There  have  been tensions between these  companies  and  the  existing coopera-
tives,  while  the  emerging cooperatives have  not yet acquired  the  influence 
which  their dynamism  could bring  them. 
ATTAINMENT  OF  OBJECTIVES 
Taken  overall,  the  production objectives were  not fully achieved,  with either 
cotton or food  crops  (cf.  Tables  l.04.a and b).  Over recent years,  the effect 
of competition  from  cotton has  made  itself felt  on  food-crop  farming.  Whereas 
it may  be  true that there has  been  a  slight improvement  in farmers•  standards 
of living,  there  has  been no  increase  in the  State!s financial  revenue. 
1  Societe nationale  du  palmier a huile. - 47 -
However,  comparison of objectives  and  actual  figures is not a  sufficient ba-
sis for  an  assessment  of the  effects of successive  schemes. 
Production of Hirsutum  cotton has  progressed well  for ten years.  However, 
this increase  has  been offset by  the  decline  in production of Mono  cotton. 
The  extension of areas under  cultivation has  created  a  strong  demand  for la-
bour,  particularly during  the  ploughing season,  and  the  failure to meet  this 
demand  has  been all the greater in that the efforts to promote  animal-drawn 
tillage have  failed completely. 
The  improvement of food  crop productivity has  tended to be  neglected  by  com-
parison wlth  cotton-growing.  A variety of factors  accounts  for this:  modifi-
cation of traditional agricultural methods  is more  complicated  than  the  adop-
tion of new  techniques;  cotton-growing intensification methods  were  well 
known,  whereas  the  SORADs  had  no  valid technical proposals  for food-crop 
growing.  The  first results of research did not materialize until  1975;  unlike 
food  crops,  cotton had  been subject to a  controllable purchase  monopoly.  This 
meant  that trade  in this crop  could  be  a  lucrative activity for  the public 
bodies  involved  (SORADs,  SOTOCO,  OPAT  and  the Treasury).! 
From  the viewpoint of the  economics  of farming,  the  competition between the 
food-crop  and  cotton options has  become  more  clear-cut over the past  few 
years.  In addition,  the producer price  for  cotton was  kept fairly  low until 
1973/74.  Cotton has consequently not played  the  'motive role'  which  had been 
assigned  to it with  a  view  to increasing incomes  and  capacity for  investment 
in inputs. 
From  the State's viewpoint,  revenue  has  not  increased.  The  revenues  of the 
OPAT  and  the  State have  been  just enough  to reach break-even point on  the 
balance-sheet of the  cotton operation. 
The  same  has not  been  true of coffee which,  despite  some  difficulties,  has 
proved highly profitable both for producers  and  for the  Togolese  State. 
CONCLUSION 
In general  terms,  the  farmers  in the  Central  and  Plateaux regions  have  shown 
themselves  to be alert and  keen to progress.  However,  as yet it cannot be 
said that confident relationships have  been established between broad-fronted 
supervisory staff able  to give general  advice  and  farmers  who  are  able  to as-
sume  only  a  relatively small  share  of the tecnnical  and financial risks. 
Moreover,  social pressures prevent individuals  from  progressing to the  extent 
that they  leave  the group  behind  them.  For  this reason it is essential that 
the  supervisors'  efforts be  directed  towards  communities  rather than  towards 
individuals.  The  communal  approach to supervision would  have  been the  strate-
1  OPAT  ~Office des  Produits Agricoles  du  Togo. Year 
Table  1.04.a 
Objectives  and  actual  figures  for cotton production 
in the  Central  and  Plateaux regions  (Togo) 
Objectives 
Actual  Production 
(tonnes  seed-cotton) 
1st Operation  r2nd  Plan  (1970-75)  I 
2nd  Operation  I 
3rd Operation 
b  (whole  country)  (2  regions)  (2  regions) 
1964/65  6  300 
e 
I 
1968/69  5  300c  20  oooa 
1969/70  MOt:IO  2  600  e 
Hirs.  2  350 
Total  4  950 
1970/71  Mono  1  650  e 
Hirs.  4  000 
Total  5  650 
1971/72  Mono  1  200 
Hirs.  5  800 
Total  7  000 
1974/75  Mono  1  300  Mono  6  600 
Hirs.  9  550  Hirs.  21  350 
Total  10  850  Totald  27  950 
1979/80  Mono  5  600 
Hirs.  14  200 
Total  19  800 
a  Objective  announced:  22  000 t, but against  a  base  (overestimated)  of 8  500  t  in 1964/65. 
b  The  whole  country. 
~Two regions  (Plateaux and  Central). 
Total  objective  announced:  31  500 t, but against a  base  (overestimated)  of 8  300  t  in 1969/70. 
e  Year  from  which  the objective was  launched. 
(2  regions) 
e 
I 
Mono  5  200 
~  17  500 
Total  22  700 Year 
Table  1.04-.a 
Objectives  and  actual  figures  for cotton production 
in the  Central  and Plateaux regions  (Togo) 
Objectives 
Actual  Production 
(tonnes  seed-cotton) 
1st Operation  l2nd Plan  (1970-75)  I 
2nd  Operation  I 
3rd Operation 
b  (whole  country)  (2  regions)  (2  regions) 
1964/65 
e 
6  300  I 
1968/69  5  300c  20  oooa 
1969/70  Mo:t:10  2  600  e 
~ 2  350 
Total  4  950 
1970/71  Mono  1  650  e 
Hirs.  4  000 
Total  5  650 
1971/72  Mono  1  200 
Hirs.  5  800 
Total  7  000 
1974/75  Mono  1  300  Mono  6  600 
Hirs.  9  550  Hirs.  21  350 
Total  10  850  Totald 27  950 
1979/80  Mono  5  600 
Hirs.  14  200 
Total  19  800 
a  b  Objective  announced:  22  000 t, but against  a  base  (overestimated)  of 8  500  t  in 1964/65. 
c  The  whole  country. 
d  Two  regions  (Plateaux and  Central). 
Total  objective  announced:  31  500 t, but against a  base  (overestimated)  of 8  300  t  in 1969/70. 
e  Year  from  which  the  objective was  launched. 
(2  regions) 
e 
I 
Mono  5  200 
Hirs.  17  500 
Total  22  700 Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1971/72 
1972/73 
1973/74 
1974/75 
a  Objective 
b  Panicle. 
c  According 
d  According 
Table  1.04.  b 
Togo:  Groundnuts  (both regions) 
Surfactt  (ha)  Production  (t) 
Objective  I 
Actual  Objective  I 
Actual 
4  021  1  752 
4  250  1  735 
6  oooa  6  200 
Food  crops:  Millet and  sorghum in both regions  and 
5  636  (31  489)  3  679~  (25  813) 
6  600  (34 800)  4  280  (23  515) 
6  292  37  000  (  9  100) 
Rice  (rain-fed and  irrigated)  in both  regions 
2  380d  1  834 
2  950d  2  280 
1  340c  1  600c 
700d  2  500  - 3  000  2  520  7  600c  8 
for the Central  region only. 
to technical assistance contract No  AT/927. 
to SEDES  survey. 
Yield 
Objective 
700 
(maize) 
{kg/ha) 
I 
Actual 
~ 
<.0 
I - 50  -
Table  l.04.c 
Nature  and  financing of project activities and  investments 
in the  Central  and  Plateaux  SORADs 
(1  000  CFAF) 
Forecast  Actual 
Supervision  517  332  586  707 
- Togolese staff  232  752  333  640 
1st operation  136  452  196  993 
- cotton  50  172  73  045 
- groundnuts  43  532  62  604 
- coffee  41  100  61  343 
2nd  operation  14 000  15  181 
3rd operation  82  300  121  466 
- Technical  assistance  284  580  253  067 
2nd  operation  102  180  94  429 
3rd operation  182  400  158  638 
Investment and  eguipment  1  044  061  991  861 
- connected with research  7  582  3  300 
- connected with production  239  748  206  413 
- connected with operations by  the staff  357  721  328  807 
- connected with marketing  437  156  462  171 
- programme/wells  15 000  8  000 
Applied research  90  895  86  516 
- cotton research  62  295  56  347 
- food  crop  research  28  600  30  169 
TOTAL  1  652  288  1  665 084 
gy  wher~by funds,  collective infrastructures,  commercial  structures  (coopera-
tives),  etc.  could  have  been set up.  Although this strategy had  been planned, 
it was  not put into effect. - 51  -
In  the  context of the  successive projects, it would  have  been necessary to 
have  access  to regular information on  conditions  and  developments  on  farm 
holdings;  without it, there  was  no  overall development strategy,  but  only 
specific,  uncoordinated activities. 
In addition,  greater flexibility in the  operational agencies would  have been 
required,  particularly more  autonomy  over resources  and  decisions  on supplies, 
but also greater adaptibility to new  problems as  they arose in the rural en-
vironment. 
Finally,  the  influence of political factors  should  have  been  favourable  to 
such  a  socio-economic  programme,  instead of disrupting its initiation and  ex-
ecution. - 53  -
1.05.  IMPROVEMENT  OF  COTTON  PRODUCTIVITY  IN  THE  SOUTHERN  ZONE  OF  CHAD
1 
Cotton production began in Chad  in 1928  and  the  area under cultivation 
reached its maximum  (~ 300  000  ha)  by  about  1960.  At that time,  the  Chad  Gov-
ernment  had  put action in hand  to make  structural  improvements with  a  view to 
increasing productivity.  The  FAC,  and  then the  EDF  from  1965,  supported this 
action until 1977.  The  operational area,  which  was  initially limited,  spread 
rapidly until 1968,  by  which  time it covered  the entire cotton-growing region. 
The  population affected currently is approximately 1.8 million,  occupying 
292  000  farm  holdings. 
AIMS  AND  CONTENT  OF  PROJECTS 
The  choice  of agro-economic  policy which  had  prevailed during the  early 1960s 
was  for  a  substantial increase in cotton growing,  since  cotton was  regarded 
as  a  'motive'  crop  whose  development  would  bring an  improvement  in other ac-
tivities,  notably food-crop  cultivation. 
Following the phase  of extension of areas under cultivation,  which  was  organ-
ized  in an  uncompromising  way,  it became  necessary to  improve  the  production 
costs structure in order to remain  competitive  on  international textile mar-
kets.  The  purpose  of this structural improvement  was  to increase cotton pro-
duction without modifying the  land  tenure structure  (small  peasant holdings), 
by  trebling yields  and reducing the  hazards  of disease  and  climate. 
The  EDF's  operations  should  be  seen in two  phases. 
From  1965 to 1972,  the  EDF's  aid took the  form  of support for  cotton prices 
(four instalments plus  a  loan which  was  not repaid)  on  the  one  hand  and  sup-
port for fertilizers and  insecticides  (structural aid)  on  the  other. 
From  1972,  the  structural aid became  part of an  integrated range  of inter-
linked complementary operations known  as  the  'cotton plan'. 
1  Evaluated  by  P.  Thenevin,  economist,  and  H.  Dupriez,  agro-economist.  This 
way  a  joint EDF-FAC  study,  since the  programme  evaluated had  been financed 
jointly by  these  two  funds. - 54  -
In addition to this structural  aid,  which  was  increased  and  developed  (ferti-
lizers,  insecticides,  sprayers,  disinfectants,  transport of these,  etc.),  the 
cotton plan called for  the provision of animal-drawn  equipment for planters, 
the  development of breeding of draught  animals,  intensification of food  crops, 
supervision of farming  operations,  training and  technical assistance for su-
pervision staff,  supporting research and  production of selected seed. 
The  cost of the  technical  and  financial  programme  to be  put into effect dur-
ing the period  covered  by  the  cotton plan  was  CFAF  11  600 million  (40  000  000 
u.a.),  or five  times  as  much  (in nominal  terms)  as  the  expenditure between 
1965  and  1971. 
The  finance  came  from  various  sources: 
Finance  in 
%  CFAF  million 
~ 
Farmers  3  100  26.8 
State  2  682  23.2 
Aid 
EDF  4  207  36,3 
FAC  1  584  13.7 
TOTAL  11  572  100 
When  account is taken of expenditure  on  purchase of draught  oxen,  not includ-
ed  in the  above  table,  55%  of the  costs were  met  by  Chad  and  45%  by  foreign 
aid  (cf.  Table  1.05.c). 
THE  RESOURCES  DEPLOYED  AND  ACTION  CARRIED  OUT 
The  structural aid as  such  had  a  very positive impact,  on  the  one  hand  be-
cause it gave  farmers  access  to cheap  inputs,  on  the other hand  because it 
has  enabled  the  State to stabilize operating expenditure.  From  this point of 
view,'  the  ONDR's  supply operations were  essential.1  It is possible that more 
flexibility in supplies  and  more  expeditious purchasing procedures  could  have 
given  a  more  even pattern over recent years. 
1  ONDR  = Office national  de  developpement rural. - 55  -
The  introduction of animal-drawn tillage and  means  of transport was  a  success 
which  the  aid programme  encouraged with  a  subsidy of approximately  15%  on  the 
total cost of teams  and  equipment. 1  The  number  of draught  oxen  increased at 
an  annual  average  of 20%,  despite  the  ground  lost during the  drought  period. 
The  number  of carts,  however,  rose  more  slowly.  Development  of the use  of an-
imal-drawn  equipment  depended  on  the  scope  for extending areas under cultiva-
tion,  which  was  not  always possible for  a  variety of reasons.  The  market  in 
jobbing work  developed considerably and,  for  some  farmers,  this was  probably 
a  major  factor making  ownership  of the  equipment viable. 
Very little real effort was  put into food  crops.  The  supervisory work  was 
concentrated  on  cotton growing. 
The  agricultural  supervisory staff,  set up  by  the  ONDR  and assisted by the 
administrative authorities,  has  proved efficient in dealing with supplies of 
inputs  and  dissemination of the  main guidelines.  However,  the  farmers still 
regard  the  staff as  the promoters  of cotton and  distributors of inputs rather 
than as their agricultural advisers.  Because  of their specialized  and·  author-
itarian nature,  the supervisory services have  had little effect on  the re-
structuring of the rural  environment  and  are not yet able  to deal  with  the 
whole  range  of problems  on  which  farmers  need assistance.  Economic  incentives 
appreciated by  the  producers,  effective marketing  and  regular,  reliable sup-
plies are  now  seen as more  efficient ways  of stimulating the  farming  communi-
ty than the  dissemination of information,  which  has  reached the  limits of its 
usefulness. 
In this connection,  it may  be  said that the FAC-financed  TIKEM  centre is op-
erating satisfactorily in training rank-and-file  advisers  and  supervisors. 
However,  the  conditions of service  of this personnel  (pay,  promotion etc.) 
are leading to waste  of the  training.  The  Bailli school  is no  longer  managing 
to provide  adequate  training for  the middle  level of agricultural supervisors 
who  would  be  necessary to raise the  overall efficiency of supervision.  This 
school  should be  reformed  and  recruitment  should be  more  closely related to 
the real outlook for work  in the  rural  environment.  The  staff trained at 
Bailli are  currently preventing experienced  advisers  from  gaining promotion, 
which  is already difficult for  them. 
The  supporting agronomical  research  was  financed  by French aid  and  funds  from 
the  Chad  Government. 
Cotton research was  carried out reliably by  the  IRCT  with remarkably success-
ful  results:  very high experimental yields,  high quality seeds,  identifica-
tion of protective treatments,  etc.  During recent years,  the  IRCT  has  made 
efforts to develop its experimental  network  in the  farming  environment.  How-
ever,  its work  is still primarily concerned with fibres,  despite attempts to 
integrate cotton in rotations.  Economic  analysis and  analysis of peasant 
farming  systems  are still at an  elementary level. 
1  Including oxen,  the  equipment  and  in some  cases  the cart. Half of the e-
quipment  was  financed  by  the  EDF. - 56  -
Food-crop research did not  achieve  any  significant results.  The  programmes 
lacked resources,  coordination and  continuity,  despite the personal efforts 
of some  staff.  The  agricultural stations were  not  able  to provide  the  reli~ 
able  seeds  which  would  have  been needed  for generalized adoption. 
In general  terms,  the  research effort has  not yet  found  satisfactory solu-
tions to the crucial problems  of replacing fallowing,  soil exhaustion and  the 
adaptation of agricultural  techniques  to complete  farming  systems rather than 
to cotton-growing alone. 
The  livestock-breeding part of the  cotton plan was  formulated  primarily in 
the  light of the prospects  for  the  development  of animal-drawn  tillage. It 
was  itself divided into several parts:  infrastructure investment  (transit 
markets,  veterinary stations,  vaccination centres, etc.); veterinary products 
for health and parasite control  campaigns;  local staff and  technical assist-
ance  staff;  equipment  and  operating costs;  incentives for the building of 
barns. 
This part of the  cotton plan was  ill conceived  and  this detracted  from  its 
effectiveness in practice: it was  not  an  integral part of the .general context 
of a  policy on  livestock breeding;  too much  importance  was  attributed to un-
necessary  investment  (transit markets);  there  was  dissension between  the 
livestock-breeding services  and  the  ONDR;  some  aspects,  such as manure  barns 
and silage pits,  were  of only marginal  interest;  there was  no  working capital 
for  the purchase  of veterinary products,  etc. 
The  objectives for the  supply of draught  oxen proved  irrelevant,  since sup-
plies were  obtained without help  from  the project.  The  veterinary campaigns 
were  carried out  spasmodically as  the  Government  changed  the  conditions  of 
payment  for  drugs  from  time  to  time.  The  most positive action,  which  had  not 
been included in the initial plans,  was  the  establishment of 143  GDSs  (grou-
pements  de  defense  sanitaire),  associations of owners  of draught  oxen  which 
maintain regular contact with  the  veterinary services.  However,  lack of work-
ing capital means  that it is not certain that this  scheme  will be  able  to 
continue  operating  autonomously. 
EFFECTS  AND  RESULTS 
The  effects of the  operation are to be  judged  on  two  separate planes:  that of 
the  cotton economy  itself,  and  that of the  agrarian economy  as  a  whole. 
Chad's  cotton production has risen from  some  100  000  tonnes  of seed cotton to 
approximately  150  000  tonnes  (cf.  Table  1.05.a, p.  60.  Average  yields have 
progressed since  1965  from  roughly  335 kg/ha to about  490  kg/ha,  an  increase 
of 46%.  The  rise in production has  been  achieved exclusively through  improve-
ment  of productivity,  since  the  total area under cultivation has  remained  in 
the region of 300  000  hectares., - 57  -
In economic  terms,  the  cotton productivity improvement  programme  proved  ad-
vantageous  for all parties involved. 
The  farmers  have  seen  an  increase  in  incomes  and  been able  to spend  some  of 
their resources  on  equipment  for  their holdings  (teams  and  equipment for ani-
mal-drawn  tillage, carts, etc.). 
The  sharp  improvement  in prices  since  1973/74,  particularly in 1974/75,  after 
twelve years of stagnation has  had  a  decisive effect over recent years.  It is 
estimated that farmers'  resources  doubled  in nominal  terms  between  1972  and 
1976.  However,  there has  not  been  a  similar development  in their purchasing 
power,  given  the widespread inflation affecting imported  consumer goods  and 
domestic prices. 
The  State benefited  from  substantial increases in resources  through export 
taxes  and  income  from  its holding  in COTONTCHAD.  Account  being  taken of the 
EDF  subsidy,  the State's annual  revenue  from  the  cotton economy  has  been in 
the  region of CFAF  1  500  to 2  000  million  (subsidy,  side effects,  CSSPC1  rev-
enues,  proceeds  from  the  'productivity'  exercise). 
COTONTCHAD,  the  mixed-economy  company  responsible for marketing  and  packaging, 
has  operated very satisfactorily and  been able  to reinvigorate the  industrial 
capacity which  had  been allowed  to decline  somewhat  by its predecessor, 
COTONFRAN.  Its fixed  assets rose  by  CFAF  800  million between  1972  and  1976. 
In terms  of the  development  of new  economic  and  socio-economic  structures, 
there  were  other effects,  some  of which may  be  seen as positive,  others as 
insufficient or negative. 
The  positive effects,  apart from  the  improvement  in resources mentioned  above, 
are  as  follows:  the  farmers'  investment capacity nas  increased  (some  15%  of 
annual  incomes  is invested each year in intensification of cotton-growing); 
the  traditional bottleneck of lack of cartage  equipment is being eased;  the 
establishment of a  large stock of draught  animals  in the  farming  environment 
is creating good prospects for real  development  of combined  stock-farming and 
agriculture  and  of meat production by  farmers;  the  farming world has  shown 
genuine  dynamism  and  mastered  increasingly intensive cotton-growing tech-
niques. 
The  following  table highlight the structural characteristics which  seem  to 
have  accounted for the  development  of intensification by cotton planters in 
Chad. 
They  show: 
(i)  how  the  return on  labour per kg  of cotton produced held steady and  then 
rose,  without  any  fall over  a  period of several years; 
(ii)  how  the  State achieved relative stabilization of fluctuations  in oper-
ating costs; 
1  Caisse  de  soutien et de  stabilisation des prix du  eaton. - 58  -
1970/71  1975/76 
1.  Price of seed 
cotton to the 
producer F/kg  26  28  29  31  43  45 
2.  Producer's costs 
(share of levies) 
F/kg  5.9  5.85  5.7  5.68  6.8  8.5 
3.  Return  on pro-
ducer's  labour 
F/kg  20.1  ~  23.3  ~  36.2  ~ 
4.  Structural aid 
F/kg  (4.5)  5.8  6.2  4.9  8.1  18.9 
5.  Structural aid 
as % of net re-
turn (! x  100) 
3 
(22.3)  26.2  26.7  19.3  22.3  51.8 
6.  Price of seed 
cotton to the 
producer,  bal-
ancing  the re-
turn on  labour 
at the  same 
level  (1  +  4) 
F/kg  (30.5)  33.8  35.2  35.9  51.1  63.9 
7.  6.  as % of 1.  117.1  120.7  121.4  115.8  118  142 
(iii) how  the level  of return  on  labour remained  stable in 1975-76,  despite  a 
sharp rise in production costs. 
The  following  table illustrates an additional point of importance  in relation 
to the efficiency of structural aid:  if the State had required the producer 
to assume  all the costs of intensive production  (in 1975/76:  CFAF  27.4 per 
kg)  while at the  same  time  increasing the price per kilo of cotton by  an a-
mount  equivalent to the structural aid  (CFAF  45  plus 18.9 = 63.9 per kilo of 
seed cotton),  the  advantage  of switching to intensive production would  have 
been  less clear-cut to the grower,  since the  return  on  labour in the  tradi-
tional  system would  have  been  87%,  as  opposed  to 61%,  of the return on  labour 
using intensive methods  in 1975/76. 
This  table  shows  that structural aid has  had  very positive effects where it 
has  been provided in the context of coherent,  stable economic policies sup-
ported by well-established organization. 
The  stability of the  farming  economy  and its polarization towards intensifi-
cation were  probably the  main  factors  accounting for  the  successful results - 59  -
Return  on  labour,  traditional 
Return  on  labour 
intensive  Compensated  prices  Adjusted prices 
(161  days/ha)  (line  1  of table a)  (line 6  of table a) 
CFAF/day  %  CFAF/day  %  CFAF/day  % 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
1971-1972  129.3  100  73.4  56.8  89.0  68.8 
1972-1973  138.2  100  72.5  52.5  88.0  63.7 
1973-1974  152.1  100  89.2  58.6  103.0  67.7 
1974-1975  214.3  100  153.1  71.4  181.9  84.9 
1975-1976  200.4  100  122.0  60.9  173.4  86.7 
in Chad.  It would  have  been  highly desirable  for similar efforts to have  been 
made  with  a  view  to  improving the  food  economy. 
Stability necessitates  long-term planning extending beyond  the  normal  scope 
of projects  (3  to  5  years).  The  State must  have  the necessary resources at 
its disposal  to stabilize producer prices and sufficiently flexible  stocks of 
inputs  to adjust supply  to demand  quickly. 
There  are  no  grounds  for  assuming  that it is necessary to monopolize  trade  in 
order to stabilize the ratio between  input and  output prices,  or that struc-
tural aid is only efficient when  applied to export crops. 
Some  effects have  been  insufficient in relation to the objective of making 
cotton the  'motive'  crop.  The  cotton economy  has  not  had  a  major  impact  on 
production and  upstream  and  downstream  trade  in the  country as  a  whole;  there 
has  been little development of complementarity between  farmers  and graziers 
and  little attempt has been  made  at diversification of economic activities; 
there has  been very little improvement  in purchasing power  and  the effects on 
living standards  (improvement  in housing,  development  of trade,  etc.)  are 
barely noticeable. 
Some  negative aspects  of the project also have  to be  recognized.  No  solution 
has  been  found  to the  fundamental  problem of long-term soil exhaustion;  re-
garding food  supplies,  the situation has  improved  in the  region  and  the fre-
quent  shortages  between seasons  have  ended,  but cotton-growing is preventing 
food-crop  production  from  developing sufficiently in the  southern  zone  to re-
duce  the country's serious  food  deficit;  the  conflicts between graziers  and 
farmers  are being exacerbated by  economic policies which  concentrate exclu-
sively on  the  development of export  trade rather than  the potential  for  lo-
cal,  regional  and  inter-State trade. 
In the  case of livestock products  in particular,  Nigeria offers very attrac-
tive markets.  Customs  regulations  can  do  nothing to restrict this trade,  nor - 60  -
Table  1.05.a 
1964/65 
Total  cotton-growing area,  ha 
- Objective 
- Actual  287  080  297  250  300  412  299  600  295  960 
Intensive cotton-growing 
area,  ha 
- Objective 
- Actual  6  308  13  216  19  666  25  016  34  443 
Total production seed 
cotton,  t 
- Objective 
- Actual  99  105  86  830  122  836  102  033  148  770 
Cotton price paid to the 
producer  (CFAF/kg  seed 
cotton)  26  26  26  26  26 
Net return on  producer's 
labour,  intensive 
(CFAF/day) 1 
1  For  an  estimated total of 148  days. 
are  they  a  substitute for  a  policy on  livestock breeding to encourage  local 
people  to make  the  most of their stocks.  The  commercial  interests of the 
breeders,  given the attraction of foreign markets,  are  opposed to the inter-
ests of the  farmers,  who  try to appropriate  draught  animals.  There  has  accord-
ingly been  an increase  in the prices of draught animals  and  a  decline  in the 
quality of those  available for purchase. 
Finally,  a  number  of trades  ar.e  losing their skilled craftsmen  (blacksmiths, 
carpenters)  as  a  result of competition  from  subsidized supplies from  the 
ONDR. 1969/70 
299  020 
44  115 
107 035 
26 
CONCLUSIONS 
298  000 
302  880  301  910 
40  602 
43  000 
41  957 
108  000 
94  890  108  500 
26  28 
111.9 
- 61  -
Development of cotton production in Chad 
300  230  301  030 
275  620  269  026 
59  550 
44  723 
72  150 
54  852 
141  000  156  580 
104  200  104  400 
29  31 
120.4  133.7 
302  140 
272  156 
85  875 
74  976 
170  535 
143  640 
43 
223.7 
1976/77 
302  920  303 000 
331  960  310  174 
99  000  109  625 
126  192 
182  885  190  000 
171  986 
45 
192.3 
The  cotton-growing  improvement  programme  during the  11  years of the EDF's in-
tervention was  a  major  economic  programme  which will  continue to have  long-
term effects for all concerned.  The  stability of the  structural aid  and  the 
maintenance  or steady  improvement of the  outputs/inputs ratio with its conse-
quences  on  the maintenance  and  improvement of returns  on  labour are the main 
factors  accounting for the very satisfactory economic  results achieved.  How-
ever,  the project did not produce  structural results in the field of food 
crops  similar to those  achieved  for cotton growing.  The  fundamental  problems 
of Chad's  economy will  only be  solved if the  work  of structural  improvement 
is consciously extended  to all farming activities and not restrtcted to those 
offering prospects of exports;  this more  fully integrated strategy will be 
pursued  in a  further project to be  financed  out of the fourth  EDF  budget. - 62  -
Table  1.05.  b 
Chad:  Results  of the  cotton plan 
Actual 
Objective 
Average  Average 
1971/72 to  1974/75 to 
1976  1973/74  1976/77  1976 
start of  end  of 
cotton plan  cotton plan 
Total  cotton-growing 
area  (ha)  302  920  282  185  304  763  331  960 
Production  (t)  182  885  105  700  148  542  171  986 
Average  yields 
(kg/ha)  627.35  375.13  488.23  419 
Intensive cotton-
growing area  (ha)  99  000  47  177  100  584a  126  192 
Estimated yield 
918.5a  intensive  (kg/ha)  929  954.3  884 
a  Average  for  1974/75 and  1975/76  only. - 63  -
Table  1.05.c 
Summary  table of agreed  funding  of the  programme  for the 
improvement of cotton productivity and  integrated 
rural development  in the  southern  zone  of Chada 
(millions  CFAF) 
Period 
Chad  Chad  EDF  FAC 
(farmers)  (State) 
1965-68  306.0 
b  374.0 
1965-68 
b 
4  125.2c  -
1964 
b  436.0d  -
1969-70  255.1 
b  178.5 
1970-71  230.0  b  223.6 
1971-72  353.5  b  263.9 
1972-73e  228.9 
b  235.4 
1972-76  3  099.8  2  682.1  3  126.8  1  589.9g 
1972-76f  - - 450.0 
1972-76  - - 630.3 
4  473.3  b  10  044  -
~ Excluding finance  for  the disinfection of cotton seeds  by  COTONFRAN. 
Provision of staff and  facilities. 
c  Support for cotton prices  (four instalments). 
d  Advance  to the  CSSPC.  This  advance  was  not reimbursed  and  may  be  regarded 
as  a  fifth instalment of support for  cotton prices. 
;  Interim agreement. 
Supplementary agreement  TC  306b/71. 
g  Agreements  by annual  instalments - 1972:310;  1973:359.1;  1974:272.0; 
1975:313.8;  1976:335. - 65  -
1.06.  AGRICULTURAL  DEVELOPMENT  IN  THE  CENTRAL  AFRICAN  COTTON  ZONE1 
Since  1967,  the  EDF  has  financed  two  programmes  in the  Central African  Repub-
lic.  The  first of these  (1968-69 to 1971-72),  called the  'regional programme 
in  OUAKA',  covered  24  000  holdings2 in the regions of Grimari,  Bambari  and 
Kouango.  It was  aimed  at increasing cotton production  through  intensification 
and mechanization. 
The  second,  called the  'cotton zone  integrated development  programme'  (1973-
74  to 1975-76),  covered  the  whole  of this zone, 3 in which  the  smaller zone  of 
Ouaka  was  included.  166  000  farm  holdings in the centre and  north-east were 
involved.4  The  aim  was  to boost the  cotton economy(+  40%)  and  the  coffee 
economy(+  150%). 
The  total  amount  of funds  committed  by  the EDF  was  CFAF  2  524.5 million 
(9  384  000  u.a.)  to which  must  be  added  the  'aid to production'  during the 
years  running  from  1967  to 1971  (support for the  stabilization fund). 
The  problems  experienced  by  the  regions concerned were  many  and various:  weak-· 
ness  of monetary  incomes  and  trade,  dispersal  of the population over large a-
reas,  diversity and  heterogeneity of peoples  and  land-types,  economic  depend-
ency.5 insufficiency of food  production  (the  town  of Bangui  has  always  had 
sporadic  supply problems).  As  regards  the agricultural environment,  the fol-
lowing deficiencies were  noted:  lack of organization of the road  network  and 
trade infrastructure,  inadequate training of supervisory staff,  disruption of 
agricultural services as  a  result of the  land  reform in 1970,  non.existence 
of reliable economic  and  statistical data,  a  very  low general  level of educa-
tion,  the  absence  of supplies of consumer,  manufactured  and capital goods 
(housing,  timber,  cement,  etc.). 
1  Evaluated  by Miss  S.  Jean,  sociologist,  Mr.  P.  Von  Blanckenburg,  agricul-
tural economist,  and  Miss  A.  Hubert,  economist,  through  the Association In-
2  ternationale pour le Developpement  Rural  (AIDR). 
3 z 102  000  persons  including 3  800  Bororo graziers. 
Kemo-Gribingui,  Bamingi-Bangoran,  Ouaka,  Basse-Kotto,  M'Boumou  and  Nana-
4  Mambere,  Ouakam,  Ouakam-Pende. 
5  998  000  persons,  or 66%  of the  total population of CAR. 
Economic  dependency resulting from  the  extroverted nature  of the  Central 
African economy. - 66  -
AIMS  AND  CONTENT  OF  THE  PROJECTS 
The  Ouaka  programme  and  the  integrated development  programme  shared the  same 
aims:  to  improve  farmers'  cash  incomes  by  increasing the  marketed  output of 
cotton and  coffee.  This  increase was  to be  derived  mainly  from  higher produc-
tivity rather than  the  extension of surfaces.  Table  1.06.a shows  the  objec-
tives and actual  figures  for production and  yields. 
The  Ouaka  programme  comprised  substantial structural aid  (subsidies  for  fer-
tilizers,  insecticides and  spraying equipment),  aid for  animal-drawn  tillage 
equipment,  a  technical  training programme,  renovation of the  regional  road 
system  and  reorganization of the  commercial  system. 
The  integrated programme  covered  a  wider  range  of operations:  structural aid 
for  cotton production,  technical training,  improvement  of seed varieties; 
reclamation of coffee plantations,  training of planters  and  a  subsidy on cof-
fee  inputs;  the  establishment of storage  infrastructures and  the clearing of 
505  km  of rural tracks. 
The  planning and progress of the  programme  were  strongly influenced by  the 
political situation in this country and its financial  and  economic difficul-
ties. 
Apart  from  a  few  coffee-growing areas,  the bulk of the  resources was  devoted 
to cotton,  which is of decisive  importance  to the  country's  economy.  In the 
zones  concerned,  it was  the  only crop  on  which  taxes  could be  raised  and  was 
consequently subject to authoritarian measures. 
The  staff working  on  the  two  successive programmes  inherited the  methods 
which  had prevailed in the  Republic  before  the  establishment of the  ORDs.1 
Because  of their lack of training  and  the  inappropriate institutional envi-
ronment,  the staff generally relied more  on  the traditional methods  of moni-
toring and  supervision than  on  the provision of an agricultural advisory 
service. 
In addition,  the  vast geographical  coverage  of the  integrated programme  meant 
that the  numbers  and  training of the  supervisory staff were  insufficient.  The 
land reform  launched  from  1970 abolished the  ORDs  and  recentralized the  serv-
ices responsible  for rural  development.  At  this stage,  direct responsibility 
for  supervision was  assumed  by  the  European  development  company  financed  by 
the  EDF.  Although paid by this  company,  the  supervisory staff remained  under 
the authority of the  Government's  agricultural agencies,  a  situation which 
gave rise to several difficulties,  which  were  exacerbated  by  disagreements  on 
the  types  of action  to be  carried out  (for instance,  animal-drawn tillage, 
which  was  abandoned under  the  integrated programme).  When  the  financing 
agreement  came  to an  end,  the  Central African staff were  returned  to the  Min-
istry of Agriculture.  Since their wages  were  not paid,  the  supervisory staff 
then  lived as  the guests of the villagers with  the  job of persuading them, 
with  the  help  of the  local authQrities,  to grow cotton. 
l  Offices regionaux  de  developpement. - 67  -
Generally  speaking,  it may  be  said  that although  the  number  of  jobs  in the 
supervisory services was  as  planned,  the quality of staff left something to 
be  desiredi with  a  low  standard of training and  rapid  turnover of technical 
assistance  and  administrative staff.  A feature  of the recruitment of techni-
cal assistance staff and  Central  African staff was  its heterogeneity,  as re-
gards  the  sources  from  which  they were  drawn  and  the contracts of employment 
offered.  Advisory activities were  reduced  to the  most  elementary level:  over-
seeing,  distribution of fertilizers  and  collection of loan repayments;  the 
supervisory services concentrated entirely on  cotton to the  exclusion of food 
crops. 
Initially,  the  ORDOHK2  was  in charge  of execution of the  Ouaka  programme.  It 
was  made  responsible for  the marketing of oil-seed crops,  rice and  maize  in 
conjunction with the  subprefecture  cooperatives and private traders.  The  mar-
keting of cotton was  the responsibility of the  UCCA.3 
After  the  land reform  in 1970,  the  ONCPA
4 
was  set up  to handle  the marketing 
of foodstuffs;  it was  abolished in 1974 and its activities were  taken over by 
authorized purchasers.  The  cooperatives were  also abolished,  except in the 
coffee  zone  where  they assisted private planters.  The  development  company  was 
given the  task of carrying out the  work  called for under  the project,  com-
pletely autonomously,  in cooperation with  the  UCCA  and  the Ministry of Agri-
culture's cotton price stabilization fund. 
On  the  commercial  side,  the  UCCA  organized  the marketing of cotton smoothly. 
By  contrast,  the  coffee  crops were  not fully marketed  in 1974  and  1975  and  no 
action was  taken under  the project to assist cooperatives in difficulties. 
EFFECTS  AND  RESULTS 
The  evaluation study gave  an  indication of the effectiveness of the  main  ac-
tion undertaken. 
The  preliminary studies were  carried out with EDF  finance  by  a  European  com-
pany between  1963  and  1965.  They  included extensive pedological  surveys,  as-
pects connected with mechanized agricultural methods,  sociological data,  re-
gional  and  sectoral studies.  Limited  financial  resources  and  staff made  avail-
able  were  far  from  sufficient to  make  full  use  of the  data gathered or the re-
commendations  derived  from  them. 
The  results of the  advisory activities cannot be  assessed accurately.  It ap-
pears that some  success was  achieved  with  the  introduction of new  coffee-
growing  techniques,  given the profitability of this crop at the  time.  In  the 
1  Average  length of stay:  between  17  and  19  months,  except for project lead-
ers  (2  in 7  1/2 years). 
2  Office regional  de  developpement  de  la Ouaka et de  la Haute-Kotto. 
3  Union  cotonniere centrafricaine. 
4  Office national  de  commercialisation des  produits agricoles. - 68  -
case  of cotton,  however,  methods  known  to the  farmers  are  not being applied 
properly,  because  they are not economically attractive and  because  of bottle-
necks  in the  farmwork  calendar,  although  some  of them,  such  as  early sowing, 
have  made  some  progress.  This  accounts  for  the decline  l.n  production.  The  in-
troduction of animal-drawn tillage,  which  was  launched under the  Ouaka  re-
gional  programme,  should have  helped to ease  some  bottlenecks  and  bring an 
increase  in the  areas  worked  by  the  more  progressive  farmers.  It was  thwarted 
by technical,  financial  and  sociological difficulties which  the project 
failed to bring under control  and  was  abandoned  under  the  integrated pro-
gramme.  The  advisory services were  accompanied  by authoritarian measures, 
free  food  supplies  and  arbitrary selection.  With  such measures,  the  only pos-
sible result was  to increase the constraints on  crop-farming.  The  responsible 
authorities failed  to provide  supplies of inputs  for  their 1975/1976  season 
and this led to a  fall in production of some  30%  against the  average  for  the 
previous  three years. 
The  action carried out  did not  lead to any  appreciable  improvement in food· 
crops.  A noticeable feature  was  the  competition from  cotton affecting cereals 
(millet and  sorghum)  during the  sowing  season.  This  competition encouraged 
by  the  cotton advisory services,  led to a  decline in cereal  cro~s in favour 
of manioc.  In the  regions  where  coffee was  grown,  however,  rice  appeared  to 
enjoy more  favour  than  any  other food  crops. 
The  marketing of cotton was  carried out efficiently by  the  UCCA,  which  has  a 
purchasing monopoly.  Prices rose  from  28  to 32  francs  per kilo of seed  cotton 
between  1968  and  1974  and  then increased to 45  francs. 
The  marketing of coffee was  more  problematical.  Prices per kilo ranged  from 
116  francs  (1968/1969)  to 177 francs  (1970),  but fell  back  to  137  francs  in 
1974.  The  1974/1975 crop  year  was  interrupted by  the  official authorities, 
with  the  banks refusing to grant credit.  Only private traders were  able  to 
continue with  limited purchases. 
The  land reform measures  reduced  the role of the  cooperatives  (of which  there 
were  five in 1975)  to the  marketing of coffee.  They  were  dependent  for credit 
on  arrangements  between private traders and  exporters,  a  situation which pre-
vented  them  from really functioning  as  cooperatives. 
The  cooperative  approach was  indeed  a  failure  during the period.  Each  cooper-
ative  drew its members  from  the  whole  of a  Department.  They  had  been set up 
under  an earlier project.  Under  the  integrated project,  cooperative members 
enjoyed some  advantages  (sale of small  tools,  fertilizers,  pueraria seed, 
etc.), but no  rebate  was  ever paid and  the cooperatives,  whose  role was  al-
ready severely limited,  were  obliged to discontinue  coffee purchases  in 1975. 
No  management  assistance was  provided under the integrated programme. 
Applied research did not start until 1973.  No  results were  available until 
the last year.  The  nurseries  supplied  the  equipment needed  for  the  establish-
ment  of 3  000  hectares of  coffe~ plantations.  The  IRCT,  for its part,  estab-
lished a  network  for  testing cotton varieties,  but this work  was  interrupted 
at the  end  of the project. - 69  -
As  regards  infrastructure  improvements,  20  wells  and  200  km  of roads  were 
built in Ouaka,  with bridges  and  drains  during the first project. During  the 
second,  150  km  of tracks  and roads,  against the  505  planned,  were built with 
funds  allocated for  the  purpose.  However,  it is not certain that the  recur-
rent costs of maintaining roads  and  equipment will be  covered in the  future. 
Regarding  the  results of this action,  the  production  and  yield objectives for 
cotton  were  never achieved.  Moreover,  the  manner  in which  they were  arrived 
at is open  to question.  Comparison  of the  average  figures  for  the  last three 
years  (1973/74  to 1975/76)  with  the  three years  from  1968/69 to 1970/71  shows 
a  25%  fall  in cotton production.  Average  actual production at the  end of the 
period was  49%  of the  objective  fixed  three years earlier.  What  is certain, 
however,  is that the project made  it possible to maintain farming activity 
which  would  otherwise  have  disappeared as  a  result of the  extensive disrup-
tion of services  in the  country at that time. 
The  breakdown  of production figures  in each  sub-prefecture  does  not  show  any 
marked  differences  in productivity  from  one  region to another,  apart  from  a 
relatively high  and  stable level of yield in Ouaka,  which  could  be  an 
achievement of the  regional  programme. 
In view  of the  favourable  conditions for coffee,  the results achieved  in this 
field were better than forecast.  However,  the effects  on production cannot  be 
measured,  since with  coffee  the  period required for  judging results is con-
siderably longer  than  the  period of the project.  This  said,  measures  con-
cerned with  coffee growing  affected only  a  small  area of the  zone  covered by 
the  integrated project. 
The  projects did not bring  any  increase  in public  revenues  or any  improvement 
in the  foreign trade balance  since  the  increase  in coffee  exports  was  partly 
offset by  the fall in cotton exports.  Nor  did  they lead to  any substantial 
improvement  in social  conditions for  the  rural population.  It should never-
theless  be  stressed that the  two projects made  an effective contribution to 
the  avoidance  of a  more  serious  decline in the  cotton economy  which  would 
have  occurred without  the  assistance  work  which  was  carried out. 
In evaluating the effectiveness of the  action taken,  it should not be  forgot-
ten that the projects were  carried out during  a  particularly difficult period 
for  the national  economy.  The  budget situation was  extremely bad;  as  a  result 
of the  land reform,  several  development  institutions had  been abolished  and 
the administration was  undergoing radical reorganization;  the  transport and 
marketing,systems  had  been disrupted  by  this process  of reorganization.  Under 
such  circumstances, it was  undoubtedly  a  positive achievement to maintain 
relatively stable supplies of fertilizers  and  insecticides,  to put  a  brake  on 
the  steady fall  in cotton production  and  to enable  the  agricultural supervi-
sory staff to continue  doing their job. Table  1.06.a 
Ouaka regional  programme  Cotton 
Area  (ha) 
- Objective 
- Actual: 
- Total  area 
-Area productivity A 
-Area productivity B 
- Productivity area  (A  +  B) 
Production  (t) 
- Objective 
Actual 
Yield  (kg/ha) 
- Objective 
- Actual 
- 70  -
Average  cash  income  per  family  (CFAF) 
- Objective 
- Actual 
Interim programme  (1972/73)  and  integrated 
programme  (1973/74  - 1975/76) 
Cotton 
- Area  (ha): 
- Objective 
- Actual 
-Area,  productivity A: 
- Objective 
- Actual 
- Area,  productivity B: 
- Objective 
- Actual 
1968/69 
21  850 
10  800 
493 
1969/70 
19  915 
5  478 
3  113 
43.1% 
10  058 
505 
134 000  . - 71  -
Comparison:  Objectives  and  actual  figures,  Central  African Republic programmes 
1970/71 
21  425 
4  486 
3  950 
39.3% 
9  554 
446 
1971/72 
20  000 
20  614 
7  604 
4  184 
57.0% 
14 000 
9  986 
700 
484 
12  500 
? 
133  499 
1972/73 
19  432 
7  606 
4  972 
64.6% 
11  528 
593 
137 000 
136  278 
45  000 
31  000 
17  000 
21  200 
1973/74 
20  265 
5  506 
4  384 
48.4% 
8  471a 
415a 
142  000 
135  948 
58  000 
27  194 
19 000 
22  724  (?) 
1974/75 
6  136 
4  120 
8  804 
147  000 
135 000 
71  000 
15  160 
21  000 
53  490 
1975/76 
152  000 
134  818 
85  000 
15  968 
23  000 - 72  -
Table  1.06.a  (continuation) 
Production  (t) 
- Objective 
- Actual 
Yield  (kg/ha) 
- Objective 
- Actual 
Coffee 
Total area  (ha) 
- New  coffee plantations 
- Objective 
- Actual 
- Restoration of existing coffee plantations 
- Objective 
- Actual 
Production  (t) 
- Objective 
- Actualf 
Yield  (kg/ha) 
...  Objective 
- Actual 
Food  crop  production  (t)a 
Groundnuts 
Sorghum,  millet 
Maize 
Rice 
a 
1968/69  1969/70 
57  824  58  743c 
3  655 
b  Estimated. 
Revised  objective:  the project had  anticipated  97  200  t  in 1975/76  on  the 
basis of 65 000  t  in 1971/72,  the base  year,  but the figure  was  reduced  pro 
rata to the  actual production return for the base  year. 
c  Taken  from  'Situation agricole  de  Centrafrique',  March  1976. d 
e 
1970/71  1971/72 
46  260c 
68  000  71  000 
42  600  45  000 
42  188  43  327 
7  000  7  080 
Source:  UCCA. 
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1972/73 
72  450 
51  800d 
530 
380 
925 
3  670 
327 
72  500 
49  000 
44  400 
6  500 
1973/74 
45  700 
336 
300 
1  279 
1  850 
4  487 
367 
74  000 
47 800 
47 000 
6  700 
Including  +  470  t  on  improved plantations and  120 
1974/75 
47  500 
352 
600 
2  229 
2  775 
5  000 
370 
75  000 
42  695 
45  754 
12  608 
1975/76 
68  500b 
33  496 
640 
248 
900 
3  349 
3  700 
3  700 
300-400g 
t  from  new plantations 
f  coming  into production. 
In  the  areas  covered  by  the project:  Basse-Kotto,  M'Bomou  and  South  Ouaka. 
g  350 kg/ha  on  improved plantations and  400  kg/ha  on  new plantations  coming 
into production. - 74  -
Table  1.06.  b 
Financing of Erojects  in Central African  Re:eublic 
(in  CFAF) 
Estimates  Expenditure 
Ouaka regional  Erogramme 
{1968/69  - 1973/74)  625  000  000  699  417  360 
Supervision  and  technical assistance  299  623  000  330  427  300 
Supplies  and  equipment  199  298  000  166  125  524 
Buildings  and  tracks  153 079  000  202  864  546 
Aid  to Eroduction 1970/71  23  400  000  23  400  000 
Year  1972/73  (Intermediate  programme)  251  020  000  225  471  000 
Supervisory and  technical  assistance 
staff  69  345  000  66  313  173 
Supplies  181  675  000  159  157  897 
Integrated  Programmes  (Years  1973/74  -
1974/75)  1  621  507  000  1  470  241  000 
Means  of production  426  883  000  653  648  000 
Supervision  487  360  000  355  104 000 
Logistical  facilities  95  314 000  103  399  000 
Infrastructures  322  950  000  338  158 000 
Supplementary  finance  289  000  000 
Advances  (repayment)  20  000  000 
TOTAL  2  547  927  000  2  650  129  000 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is fairly characteristic that the  resistance was  greater in the  case of 
cotton growing  and  more  easily broken  down  in the  case of coffee.  Hence  the 
main  obstacle is lack of interest in cotton growing.  The  projects,  which  were 
integrated with  existing structures,  did not  help  to make  it a  more  attrac-
tive crop  in the  areas where it was still the  only potential sources  of cash 
income. 
The  low  incomes  of cotton producers  and  the  downward  trend in their purchas-
ing power,  despite the increase  in the purchase price of cotton during the - 75  -
period  covered  by  the project,  was  the main  factor  accounting  for the  incon-
clusive results of the projects as regards  cotton production. 
Moreover,  apart  from  the  question  of paying taxes,  levies  and  administrative 
dues  in general,  farmers  are not greatly interested in working  much  harder in 
order to increase their money  incomes  in view of the  lack  of supplies of con-
sumer  goods  in the villages;  this is particularly true of the. older growers. 
As  for  the  younger  men,  who  would  be  motivated  by  cash  earnings,  they are  by 
and  large inclined to prefer the  higher and  above  all more  reliable earnings 
to be  derived  from  paid  employment. - 77  -
1.07.  AGRICULTURAL  REDEVELOPMENT  IN  EASTERN  KASAl,  ZAIRE! 
The  project evaluated covered  a  total period of eight years,  with  two  phases 
of EDF  financing,  the first lasting  five  years  (1968/73),  the  second  three 
years  (1973/76). 
14 000  families  were  settled in farming  communities  during the first phase 
and  6  000  more  during the  second phase.  The  farming  community  system  had  been 
introduced  in the area as  long  ago  as  1947,  but had  largely broken  down  dur-
ing the  1960s  as  a  result of  dete~ioration in the  supervisory structures.  In 
1967  the  State reintroduced  compulsory  crops  (cotton  and  maize).  The  second 
phase  saw  the  takeover  of responsibility from  the  technical  assistance agency 
and  a  gradual  reduction in financial  support  from  the  EDF,  which  was  offset 
by  funds  from  the national  budget  and  revenues  generated  by  the project it-
self. 
The  recipient of the  EDF  finance  is the  Commission  Agricole  du  Kasai  Oriental 
(CAKO),  a  public body  enjoying complete  financial  autonomy  and  control  over 
organization of its work  and  administration of its resources. 
The  EDF  finance  amounted  to  57%  of the  total cost of the project  (10  767  347 
u.a.)  and  was  used to cover  the  costs of technical assistance  and  local staff 
(49%),  supply of agricultural  inputs  (20%)  and  capital expenditure  (19.5%). 
The  area covered  by  the  project included the entire administrative  zone  of 
Gandajika  and  part of two  other  zones:  Mwene-Ditu  (to the  south)  and 
Tshilenge  (to the northwest). 
The  population in the  region covered by  CAKO  was  estimated  in 1975 to be 
36  754  families  with  an  average  of 5.39 persons per family.  The  relatively 
individualistic character of the  Luba  people was  well  suited to the  farming 
community  system,  which  is based  on  individual plots gathered together in 
blocks growing  the  same  crops. 
OBJECTIVES  AND  PLANNING  OF  THE  PROJECT 
The  objectives  aimed  at by  the project were:  (a)  to produce  a  surplus of mar-
ketable  food  crops,  thereby  saving foreign  currency by reducing  imports of 
1  Summary  evaluation carried out by  C.  Van  der Vaeren  and  M.  Mayo,  economists. - 78  -
maize;  (b)  to increase  cotton production to provide  raw materials for  the 
local  textile industry  (reduction in imports  of fibre-cotton);  (c)  to improve 
nutritional conditions  for village populations  and  increase peasants  cash in-
comes. 
The  project was  organized  around  two  central principles:  the  farming  communi-
ty  as  a  format  for agricultural  development  and  the  regional  development 
agency  (CAKO)  .as  the centre  for  coordination of the various operational re-
sources  and  methods  used. 
The  farming  community  system facilitates superv1s1on of farmers,  monitoring 
of compliance  with requirements  to grow  specified crops  and  access  to fields; 
it also encourages  lively competition between  farmers.  Compliance  with rota-
tions  and  methods  can  be  enforced.  The  tasks  of the  regional  agency  were  to 
advise  farmers  on  technical matters,  provide  supplies  on  credit,  market  and 
in some  cases process  products.  It was  intended  that it would  be  entirely 
self-financing by the  time  the  foreign  aid  came  to  an  end. 
During  the  course of the project,  CAKO  was  entrusted with an  additional func-
tion:  mechanical  ploughing of fallow  land about  to be  turned  over to crops. 
RESOURCES  AND  ACTION  TAKEN 
Initially,  the  technical  assistance  agency  was  responsible  for general  organ-
ization of the project,  management  of technical  services  and  administration 
of the various agricultural sectors.  On  completion of the first stage,  the 
positions of responsibility held by  technical  assistance personnel  were 
transferred to nationals,  with  the expatriates becoming  advisers to the 
Zairean officials. 
The  quality of the  supervisory staff,  who  performed  their task by  means  of 
verbal  contacts  and  demonstrations  in the fields,  is satisfactory,  but their 
position is ambiguous  because  their duties  include enforcement of compulsory 
crops  as well  as  instruction.  This  supervisory system is not the  most effi-
cient way  of ensuring that information about  the  problems  encountered by  the 
peasant  farmers  is passed  up  the  line to senior officials. 
The  investments  included purchase  of vehicles for  senior officials and  mopeds 
and  bicycles for  field staff,  regular availability of means  of transport be-
ing essential to the efficiency of supervision. 
The  planned training centre  was  not built,  because it was  decided at an early 
stage that on-the-job training would  be  preferable. 
As  regards  other buildings,  in addition to those  for  the nursery centre built 
during the first phase  (offices  and  storehouses),  the  construction of a  vast 
storehouse for selected seeds  has  been  started. - 79  -
Transport  equipment  was  purchased  so  that  CAKO  could market  cotton in its 
area of activity,  taking over  from  ONAFITEX  (Office National  des  Fibres Tex-
tiles),  which  is experiencing great difficulty in carrying out this task. 
In addition to what  was  planned  under  the project,  a  stock of tractors and 
agricultural machinery was  acquired with  finance  from  the national budget. 
The  fairly comprehensive  equipment for maintenance  of cotton tracks purchased 
with  EDF  finance  and  handed  over to  CAKO  is rarely used  for  lack of fuel  and 
finance  to cover running costs. 1  The  garage-workshop,  also financed  by  the 
EDF  is finding plenty of work  and  is helping to make  up  to some  extent for 
the shortage  of spare parts. 
Regarding  factors  of production,  the  EDF  financed  supplies to  CAKO  of ferti-
lizers,  insecticides  and  fungicides  for all growers  with plots in farming 
communities  during the first phase.  During the  second  phase,  it financed fer-
tilizers only  and  the  cost of insecticides was  met  out of the national  budget. 
Analysis  shows  a  satisfactory cost/benefit ratio  (2.6)  for fertilizers used 
on  cotton,  but the ratio would  have  been better had fertilizers  been  supplied 
for maize,  given the prices realized by  food  crops in recent years.  Analysis 
also shows  that average  areas under cultivation were  apparently influenced 
more  by  the relative profitability of cotton  compared  with  food  crops  than  by 
mechanization  of tillage.  CAKO  provides  a  large  subsidy  (40%  of the total 
cost price)  on the price which peasants have  to pay for mechanized tillage 
and  the peasants would  appear to prefer manual  tillage in the  event of with-
drawal  of the  subsidy. 
CAKO  is the  main  economic  structure involved  in the  organization of the proj-
ect and  was  actually set up  for this purpose.  It has  taken  over  completely 
from  the State structure for  agricultural  supervision in the area covered. 
Decentralization of decision-making to regional  level  makes  for  flexible  and 
rapid allocation of available resources. 
However,  CAKO  is dependent  on  other structures and  also  on  the national eco-
nomic  situation in certain areas  which  have  a  very strong bearing on  the  ef-
fectiveness  of action taken:  upkeep  of tractors;  supplies of fertilizers,  in-
secticides and  fuel;,  collection of seed-cotton  from  farmers  and  payments to 
farmers;  delivery of cotton seed;  agronomical  research. 
ONAFITEX  is responsible  for purchasing  and  processing seed-cotton and  deliv-
ery of seed  throughout  the  country;  although it had  been  intended initially 
that  CAKO  would  take  over these responsibilities in its area of activity, 
this was  not in fact done. 
In  some  years,  performance  of these  functions  was  severely disrupted by  a 
number  of factors: 
1  The  shortage  of fuel,  which  had  been affecting the  country  for  several 
months  at the  time  when  the evaluators made  their visit,  was  not  confined 
to the project area. - 80  -
(i)  purchasing  was  delayed or  suspended  becaus~ of lack of  v~hicles or 
funds,  leading to loss or deterioration of seed-cotton stocks which 
were  not stored under  adequate  conditions  and  causing growers'  incomes 
to fall short of forecasts; 
(ii)  there were  frequent  lengthy ·breakdowns  in ginning plants,  due  to obso-
lescent equipment  and  lack of parts; 
(iii)  there were  delays  in deliveries of seed,  which  had  a  serious effect on 
yields,  given  the shortness of the  optimum  sowing period. 
In  the  case of food  crops,  produce  is bought  by  traders  on  local markets  or 
in the villages.  Prices vary  considerably according to difficulty of access, 
which  is a  serious problem  because  the  network  of tracks receives  very little 
maintenance.  In this  connection,  peasant  farmers  are  aware  that that a  joint 
marketing effort would  enable  them  to sell on  more  favourable  terms,  but this 
would  entail overcoming their individualism. 
Finally,  analysis of prices for  food  crops  shows  sharp  regional variations 
and  a  very steep rise between  the beginning and  end  of the period covered  by 
the project  (particularly in the  case of maize  and manioc),  which  made  cotton 
growing  considerably less profitable,  so that several  farmers  lost interest 
in this crop. 
EFFECTS  OF  THE  PROJECT 
Although  the production objectives were  not fully met,  considerable  improve-
ments  were  achieved  in relation to the  situation prior to the project and  to 
comparable  areas which  did not benefit from  this type  of action  (cf.  Table 
1.07.a).  The  increases were  achieved  by  extension of areas  under cultivation 
(which  was  helped by settlement of peasants in farming  communities  and intro-
duction of mechanized tillage)  and  by  improvement  of yields  (by  the introduc-
tion of new  methods  and  distribution of appropriate  inputs  on  the  farming 
community  blocks). 
The  records  show  that cotton fared  least well  in relation to the objectives 
which  have  been  adopted  (75%  as  against 81%  and  133%  in the  case  of maize  and 
groundnuts respectively).  The  fact remains  that the supervisory staff concen-
trated virtually exclusively on  cotton and it was  the  only crop  for which 
subsidies were  provided  on  fertilizers and insecticides.  Nevertheless,  the 
course  taken by  relative producer prices had  a  more  decisive  influence  than 
the  technical programmes. 
The  objectives for  increasing incomes  and  improving the standard of living 
seem  to have  been reached,  although there were  no  detailed statistics. It is 
estimated that producers'  average  overall returns  doubled,  with their cash 
incomes  three  times  higher  and  their consumption of their own  produce  up  by 
25%.  In real  terms,  however,  these  apparent results were  severely undermined 
by  sharp  increases in the prices of consumer goods  and  school  costs. - 81  -
As  regards  the  food  situation,  the distinct improvement  achieved early on  as 
a  result of the  increase in maize  crops  which  was  a  side-effect of the  super-
visory efforts directed primarily at cotton seems  to be  in  jeopardy,  partly 
because  of the  delays in the purchasing of cotton,  which  means  that farmers 
have  to sell part of their maize  crops  intended for their own  consumption, 
and partly by  losses due  to inadequate  storage  conditions. 
Another  success of the project is the  improved use  of land resources.  Settle-
ment  in farming  communities  has  checked  soil deterioration caused  by itiner-
ant  farming  and  mechanized  tillage has  led to an  extension of good  land suit-
able  for crops. 
In  terms  of the effects of the project  on  the  ~rade balance,  the objectives 
were  largely achieved.  A  net saving of foreign  currency estimated at 
Z  1  450  000  was  made  possible by  (a)  the ginning  of an extra 1  200  t  of cot-
ton  from  the project area and  (b)  the reduction in maize  imports.  The  poten-
tial saving of foreign  currency would  be still greater if all the  additional 
cotton output  from  the  project area was  processed locally;  in this case, it 
would  be  Z  2  150  000  a  year with mechanized tillage and  Z  1  880  000  without 
mechanized  tillage.  Estimating the  average  annual  operating costs of the 
project at 1  350  000  u.a.  and  the potential  annual  saving of foreign  currency 
at 1  BOO  000 u.a.,  the  foreign  currency saving ratio is 1.3. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The  very positive effects of the  project are  attributable in part to the  fact 
that it was  concerned  with  the  resumption  and  expansion of a  development  for-
mat  and  techniques  which  had  already been tried and  tested over several years 
before  independence  in the  same  area.  However,  the  durability of these effects 
is threatened by  serious problems  affecting the viability of the project. 
Its technical viability is being placed in grave  danger by  the  steady deteri-
oration of the  road network  and  a  persistent shortage of essential factors of 
production.  On  the  other hand,  it could  be  enhanced  by  expansion of the  ac-
tivities of CAKO  to include  the  introduction of new  developments  in farming 
community  agriculture  (new  crops,  fertilizers for  food  crops,  improvement  of 
storage  conditions)  and urgent non-farming problems  in the villages  (health, 
training,  water  supplies etc.). 
As  regards  the  economic  aspect,  cotton was  chosen as  a  motive  crop with  a 
view  to obtaining a  return from  CAKO's  substantial  investments.  In the  eyes 
of farmers,  this crop  is subject to competition  from  food  crops,  the prices 
for which  are  more  advantageous;  only  the  compulsory requirement to grow cot-
ton is keeping  production  up  to  a  certain level  while maintaining appropriate 
rotation.  It would  therefore be  essential to raise the producer price for 
seed  cotton in line with  the prices of food  crops  and  everyday consumer  goods. 
Moreover,  the increase  should  be sufficient to enable producers  to meet  the 
full  cost of factors  of production currently receiving subsidies. - 82  -
Table  l.07.a 
Attainment of objectives in 1975/76 
Objectives  Results  Results  as  % 
of objectives 
Production 
Maize  30  BOO  t  .:!:  25  000  ta  .±  81% 
Groundnuts  2  250  t  3  300  ta  _±133% 
Manioc  50  000  t  ?  ? 
Cotton  9  900  t  by 
20  000  growers  8  500  t  (esti- .:!:  75% 
mated)  by  23  200 
growers 
~ 
Maize  600 kg/family/year  ?  ? 
Groundnuts  100  kg/family/year  ?  ? 
Manioc  1  200 kg/family/year  ?  ? 
Cash  incomes  z 93.22  (1972)  per  Estimated at Z  150  125% 
family,  i.e. pur- (1975)  per family 
chasing power  of  per yeara 
z 120  (1975)  in 1976 
a  Estimated  in the  absence  of available statistics on  consumption by produc-
ers  and  family budgets in the area. 
In its present  form,  the project cannot finance  itself.  CAKO  is subsidizing 
all or part of the  inputs  supplied  to  farmers  and  carrying out public utility 
work  which is the responsibility of other  institutions without receiving any 
compensation.  In addition,  the  failure to build a  ginning plant which  had 
been planned  as part of the project upset all the  forecasts  of CAKO  revenues 
and  meant  that a  State  subsidy  had  to be provided. Table  1.  07.  b 
Sources of finance  (in u. a. )a 
Forecast  Actual 
EDF 
Zaire 
ONAFITEX  CAKO  EDF 
Zaire 
ONAFITEX 
CAKO 
budget  resourcesb  budget  resourcesb 
1968/1969  525  382 
1969/1970  603  980  (1  :)00  000) 
1970/1971  1  108  322  16 000  14  736  12  310 
1971/1972  837  776  19  341  70  060 
1972/1973  549  748  19  341  157  334 
Total  1st Ehase  3  750  000  505  000  '3  625  208  (1  054 682)  14  736  239  704 
1973/1974  943  837  162 031  251  744 
1974/1975  650  600  336  509  400  014 
1975/1976  960  707  (1  400  553)  727  023 
Total  2nd  phase  2  619  500  772  900  470  800  1  407 200  2  555  144  (1  899 098)  0  1  378  781 
PROJECT  TOTAL  6  369  500  772  900  470  800  1  912  200  6  180  352  (2  953  774)  14  736  1  618  485 
+  availa-
ble: 
216  230 
a  Amounts  in Zaires have  been  converted at the  exchange rate for the year of commitment  in the  case of commit-
ments  and  the year of expenditure in the  case of expenditure. 
b  Counterpart funds  and  own  resources. 
CXl 
w - 85  -
1.08.  DEVELOPMENT  OF  RICE  GROWING  IN  THE  IVORY  COAST1 
The  EDF  contributed 11  469  177 u.a.  towards  the  financing of the  Ivory Coast 
rice-growing programme  between  1972  and  1977. 
The  project was  aimed at two  central objectives: 
- to place rice growing  on  a  firm  footing  on  a  national basis; 
to improve  and  itensify production in clearly defined areas  located in the 
disadvantaged regions of the  Centre  and  the  North. 
The  overall  objectives of the  rice-growing programme  were  to increase national 
production from  200  000  t  to  295  000  t  and  to reduce  disparties between re-
gions. 
The  project was  aimed  primarily at increasing the  incomes  of farmers  in the 
North,  thus  making  a  start to solving  the major  problems  of regional  imbal-
ance  and rural  depopulation;  a  secondary  aim  was  to reduce  imports. 
This  operation represented  a  relatively large cost to public  finances,  in-
volving substantial  annual  recurrent costs  {CFAF  230  million in 1977;  CFAF 
80  million in 1980-82)  and  a  reduction in equalization fund  levies. 
CONTENT  OF  THE  PROJECT 
The  Societe  pour  le Developpement  de  la Rizicu1ture  (SODERIZ)  was  given over-
all responsibility for  carrying out the  rice-growing programme  by the  Govern-
ment. 
Prior to 1970,  this company's  industrial processing programme  had  been ham-
pered  on  the  one  hand  by  the  price structure which  encouraged  local traders 
to process rice themselves  and  on  the other hand  by  the  inadequate quality of 
the  paddy.  At  the  same  time,  imports  of substantial quantities were  necessary 
to meet  the  constantly rising demand.  The  price structure was  favourable  to 
1  Evaluated  by  G.  La  Cognata,  surveyor,  and  M.  Bousquet,  agronomist,  in the 
context of the  CPDCET  training programme  (Ministere  de  la Cooperation, 
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consumers,  producers  and  traders simultaneously by virtue of the equalization 
between  imported  and  locally produced rice,  but it placed  the  company  respon-
sible for  developing rice growing in a  difficult position since it had  no 
control  over  buying  and  selling networks. 
The  project consisted of various  specific operations: 
(1)  Dams  in the North:  This  operation involved building four  irrigation water 
reservoirs laying out rice-fields offering two  annual  crop  cycles and 
training farmers  in the perimeters. 
(2)  Northern Bouake:  The  action in this area was  aimed  at developing irrigat-
ed rice growing  in the  Bouake  area by  means  of simple  development  work 
not  involving construction of dams  and provision of supervisory services 
for  the  farmers • 
. (3)  Improvement of wet-land  rice growing at Odiene,  by  increasing motorized 
tillage,  extending cultivated areas  and  raising yields. 
This  operation involves training tractor drivers,  setting up  repair fa-
cilities,  organizing work  to increase motorized tillage,  promoting  new 
techniques  and  optimizing selection of land with  a  view  to increasing 
yields. 
(4)  The  rice/cotton operation,  aimed  at combining the growing of rice and 
cotton  and  increasing agricultural productivity by  introducing motorized 
and  animal-drawn  equipment. 
This  action is aimed  at encouraging block cultivation and  selection of 
good  land. 
(5)  The  activities concerned  with  the  general  aspects of rice growing in the 
Ivory Coast  divide  into two  groups.  The  first group  includes  the  estab-
lishment of a  nursery for elite seeds,  production of these  seeds  by  farm-
ers under contract and  distribution of selected seeds and  inputs to grow-
ers at the appropriate  times.  An  accompanying research programme  was  also 
planned. 
In the  second group,  there was  a  training programme  with provision for 
systematic refresher training for all staff,  recruitment  and  training of 
supervisory staff needed  for  new  projects and  a  continuing programme  of 
technical training;  in addition,  the project provided direct financial 
aid to SODERIZ. 
The  local  farmers  were  to meet  the  costs of construction of secondary hydro-
agricultural installations and  contribute by  way  of a  levy to the  maintenance 
of the primary works.  They  had  to meet  the  full  amount  of operating costs, 
for  which purpose  they  could  obtain annual  loans.  To  help deal  with problems, 
the  farmers  were  encouraged  to  form  village groups  with  a  view  to setting up 
cooperatives. - 87  -
EFFECTS  AND  RESULTS 
Examination of the effects and results of the project up  to  mid-1977  revealed 
the  following: 
A.  Activities on  the national  scale 
(1)  SODERIZ,  as  a  national structure,  received  substantial support through 
the project,  in terms  of both finance  and  technical assistance.  Its ef-
forts were  concentrated primarily on  the  development  of land for rice 
growing  and  processing of crops;  it was  less  involved in the production 
of rice  and  the collection of crops,  nor  did it take  a  very great hand  in 
the  development of rain-fed rice which,  given the  Ivory Coast climate, 
still accounts  for  the  bulk of production of this crop.  The  relatively 
large measure  of autonomy  enjoyed by  the  various regional  agencies facil-
itated experimentation with plot layout and  cultivation systems at local 
level, but to a  certain extent hampered  inter-regional  exchanges  of in-
formation  about the  lessons  to be  learnt from  experiments carried out. 
(2)  As  regards  the  technical operations,  the results of the nursery  were  sat-
isfactory,  although the physical  environment  proved  unfavourable  to pro-
duction of rain-fed rice. 
The  work  of the nursery was  supplemented  by  farmers  producing seed  under 
contract.  The  main result achieved is that selected seeds  have  been dis-
tributed widely since  1974,  with very positive effects  on production and 
processing.  However,  production of seed has not  always  matched  demand, 
since growers'  demand  for  rain-fed rice seed  has  been greater than antic-
ipated  and  that for irrigated rice seed has been  lower. 
With  sales  of fertilizers,  the results are still meagre,  apparently be-
cause  they are being directed exclusively towards  farmers  under contract. 
As  for  the  accompanying research,  it has not yet produced usable results. 
The  reasons  for this are insufficient definition of objectives,  lack of 
staff,  clashing with research carried out elsewhere  and  lack of contact 
between  the  research unit and  instructors in the  field. 
(3)  Regarding  the  manpower  resources  needed  for  the  success of the  programme, 
technical  assistance personnel  took over  several positions of responsi-
bility.  This  offered the  advantage  of bringing in  a  wealth of experience. 
However,  by  assuming direct responsibilities,  the expatriate personnel 
were  closely involved in the practical implementation of the project, 
with the result that the  approach  did not always  take sufficient account 
of the  socio-political environment. 
The  takeover of responsibilities  from  the  technical assistance personnel 
passed off smoothly,  thanks  to Ivory Coast efforts to train staff and 
good  cooperation between technical assistance  and  local personnel.  How-
ever,  some  difficulties,  such as  a  supply crisis at the beginning of 
1977,  seem  to have  been  caused  by  the  somewhat  hurried transfer of re-
sponsibility,  coupled with  the precarious financial position of SODERIZ. - 88  -
It had  been planned originally to provide  conventional  further training 
for  SODERIZ  supervisory personnel  in a  purpose-built centre,  but because 
of the  shortage of such personnel,  the  method  was  changed  in 1974 by in-
cluding direct training for rice growers  and  setting up  a  system  of tem-
porary  supervisors;  it was  hoped  by  these  means  to gear the  strength of 
the  supervisory staff to the  level of production and,  as  far  as  possible, 
to avoid  the  danger of an  'elitist' mentality growing  up  among  the  super-
visors.  This  programme  aimed  to strengthen cohesion  among  trainee rice 
growers,  thereby encouraging the  formation  of cooperative groups  among 
them  so  that the  supervisory  system  could eventually be  abolished.  The 
training is given  in three stages,  the first of which  - basic training 
is the  same  for  future  supervisors  and  trainee rice growers.  The  second 
is concerned with  settlement  on  a  farm  holding  and  the  third is designed 
to build  on  the  basic training and  provide  a  grounding  in management 
problems.  The  temporary  supervisors  sign  a  three-year contract,  after 
which  they too are settled on  farms. 
The  level  of training on  the  supervisory staff is higher  than  had  been 
anticipated.  However,  despite the high ratio of supervisors  to growers, 
the introduction of new  methods  was  not as  successful  as  expected.  More-
over,  the  'elitist' mentality is prevalent  among  the  supervisors.  These 
difficulties are  due  mainly to the fact that too many  older supervisors 
have  carried  on  in the  job  and  their attitude has  spread  although their 
training has  not  been  improved  sufficiently.  Once  settled,  the  temporary 
supervisors are  delaying  the  renewal  of staff,  because it is still more 
lucrative to be  a  supervisory than  a  rice grower.  Finally,  little super-
visory  time  has  been  devoted  to traditional rice growing. 
(4)  The  development policy adopted by  SODERIZ  is based  on  a  contractual rela-
tionship  between it and  the  group  of growers  receiving assistance. 
This policy has  produced satisfactory results regarding payment  of levies 
and  repayment  of loans,  but not  in the  case  of improvement of agricultur-
al methods.  The  attitude of the  farmers  to  the  contractual  system is in 
fact guarded;  they often consider the  stipulations of the  contract to  be 
excessive since they grow rice on  only  a  small proportion of their land. 
Moreover,  only the  'young rice growers'  who  have  been settled on  farms 
really operate effective collective associations;  elsewhere,  these asso-
ciations scarcely function. 
(5)  As  regards  the  economic  conditions under  which  the project was  carried 
out,  the  increase  in the  price paid for  paddy  from  23  to  65  francs  in 
1974  led to  a  spectacular rise in production.  Nevertheless,  this policy 
on prices was  based  on political rather than  economic  considerations  and 
it has  to be  recorded  that it had  a  detrimental effect on  the  capacity of 
SODERIZ  to finance its activities from  retained  earnings.  The  company's 
financial difficulties led to an unexpected  switch  by  producers  (the  the-
oretical recipients  OT  the  aid)  to private traders. 
The  incomes  of the producers  themselves  increased slightly,  however,  al-
though  the  evaluation report shows  that  intermediaries  took  a  very sub-
stantial proportion  (about  a  quarter)  of the value  added  corresponding to 
the  additional production.  Another  important beneficial effect of the - 89  -
project is that the  rice processing plants have  been  used to full  capaci-
ty and  under  more  satisfactory technical  conditions.  The  inadequate  stor-
age  capacities nevertheless still pose  a  problem. 
Finally,  because it had  fixed  a  low price to the  consumer,  the  State was 
obliged to subsidize the rice-mills heavily in 1976. 
B.  The  production activities  (see  Table  1.08.a) 
(1)  The  dams  in the  North 
Because  of the  high population density in the  North  and  the shortage of farm-
ing  land which  is not  already overworked,  it is not possible  to meet  demand 
from  growers  for  suitable plots.  The  peasants have  actually parcelled out ad-
ditional  land  on  the  flanks  of the  irrigation canals.  The  areas actually un-
der cultivation behind  some  dams  are greater than initially parcelled out un-
der  the project. 
Unfortunately,  the  success of this operation has  been  limited by  technical 
difficulties: 
(a)  in what  was  to be  the  largest perimeter  (75%  of the total),  the rice-
growing  areas downstream  of the  dam  had  to be  reduced  significantly be-
cause  the  soil was  too permeable  and  had  to be  turned  over to mixed  crops; 
(b)  the water  levels  in  some  small  dams  are insufficient. 
It appears  that these difficulties are  the result of shortcomings  in the pre-
liminary studies. 
(2)  Northern  Bouake 
The  objectives  for  laying  out plots were  exceeded  by  35%  and  the  areas  where 
rice growing  was  actually started were  in line with the  forecasts.  Given  the 
irregular rainfall pattern in this region,  it was  possible to obtain 0.7 of a 
crop  cycle per year  on  these perimeters as water  became  available.  On  the hu-
man  level,  despite  the  substantial  cash  incomes  to be  earned  from  paddy, 
there  are  some  reservations  about the contracts;  the basis of these reserva-
tions is the risk to  which  farmers  are  exposed  because  of the  climate  condi-
tions in the  region.  Finally,  this scheme  gave rise to  a  development  which 
had  socially damaging effects and  became  a  source  of conflict,  namely  the 
gradual  occupation of the  lowlands  by people  from  the  towns  and  other regions 
who  employed  local peasants as  farm  labourers. 
This  experiment  involved great risks; it was  discontinued after two years. - 90  -
The  hope  that efficient rice growing  could  be  promoted  by  the presence of 
jobbing tractor drivers proved unfounded.  Following  a  switch  to  lowland rice 
growing  on  a  contractual basis,  the poor results achieved  were  insufficient 
to arouse  growers'  interest. 
The  results of this operation were  distinctly better in the  case of cotton 
production  (168%  of the  objective)  than  in that of rice production  (52%).  As 
regards  farm  modernization,  the  introduction of animal-drawn tillage was 
highly successful  (263%  of the objective). 
This  programme  includes  a  motorization pilot scheme  on  which  the  bulk  of in-
vestment  and  manpower  resources  were  concentrated.  The  work ist not fully mo-
torized,  however,  and  weeding  and  harvesting are still done  by  hand.  The 
farmers  are inclined to concentrate  on  tending their  'traditional'  fields to 
the detriment of those tilled by tractor,  which  they regard as being in offi-
cial ownership. 
A block cultivation policy was  applied in this operation,  but the  farmers  do 
not regard  the blocks  as  integral parts of their own  holdings;  moreover,  only 
a  privileged minority has  had  access  to the  reclaimed  land,  so that there 
have  been  no  changes  in village life likely to induce  the  young  people to 
stay;  finally,  the  need  for  close  supervision associated with the introduc-
tion of mechanization  and fairly stringent discipline eliminates  scope  for 
initiative on  the part of local  farmers  and  is unfavourable  to any  takeover 
of responsibilities by  their associations. 
Despite  these difficulties, this scheme  has  already produced positive results, 
such as  the increase  in areas  suitable for  farming,  the  improvement of yields 
in dry years  and  a  greater awareness  among  peasant  farmers  of the  problems  of 
mechanization.  Moreover,  satisfactory solutions to the  problems  mentioned 
above  have  been  found  and  a  larger-scale motorization project has  been put in 
hand  on  the basis  of the  lessons  learnt from  the pilot scheme. 
CONCLUSION 
To  sum  up,  the  rice-growing programme,  with its various technical  facets  and 
geographical  components,  has  already succeeded in meeting  some  of the  objec-
tives laid down,  this despite  the  institutional,  technical  and  economic  dif-
ficulties with which it has  had  to contend.  Between  1970/1971  and  1975/1976 
rice  imports  were  reduced by  25%  despite  a  23%  increase  in consumption.  The 
specific projects financed  by the  EDF  provided  11.3% of the additional pro-
duction  achieved over this period  (against 26%  anticipated initially);  the 
general  operations financed  in the  same  context,  and  the policy of high 
prices,  encouraged  or created the  conditions for this overall  increase in 
production. - 91  -
Table  1.08.  a 
Attainment  of Objectives  - the  Ivory  Coast 
Objectives  Results  % 
1.  Dams  in the  North  For  1976  In 1976 
Areas  under  cultivation  1  270  ha  340  ha  27 
Production of paddy  10  604  t  2  191  t  21 
2.  Northern  Bouake  For  1975  In  1975 
Parcelling  1  000  ha  1  365  hq  137 
Area under  cultivation  1  000  ha  1  021  ha  102 
Production  4  400  t  3  750  t  81 
3.  Rice  growing  at OdiEme  Discontinued 
after 2  years 
4.  Rice/cotton OEeration  For  1975  In 1975/1976 
Area under rice  13  275  ha  6  901  ha  51 
Area under  cotton  2  550  ha  6  406  ha  251 
Cotton production  3  825  t  6  406  t  168 
The  farmers  affected by  the project made  considerable progress with  new  meth-
ods,  particularly animal-drawn tillage in the  rice/cotton operation.  However 
the  contract and  block cultivation systems  accentuated  social division in the 
rural world,  which  was  exacerbated by  the  increase in the  numbers  of peasants 
taking  employment  as  farm  labourers. 
Regarding  the  institutional aspects,  SODERIZ  is prevented by its structure 
from  adapting its approach  sufficiently quickly in the  light of results ob-
tained and reactions  from  the rural world,  but has  concentrated heavily on 
hydro-agricultural  schemes  and  the  development of rice growing has  sometimes 
been obstructed by factors  connected with other activities on  farm  holdings. 
Several  of the activities were  experimental  and  some  of them were  adversely 
affected by  insufficient preliminary study,  not only of the  human  environment, 
but also of the physical  environment  and  the  methods  to be  applied.  Except at 
Odiene,  these  experiments were  productive,  provided useful  information help-
ing to adapt activities in line with the general  objectives aimed at and 
marked  the  beginnings of serious efforts to establish a  policy  on water re-- 92  -
sources.  Finally,  the  programme  has  suffered recently as  a  result of an ill-
conceived policy on  prices which  has  given  a  strong fillip to production and 
consumption,  but at a  cost beyond  the  resources of the public finances. - 93  -
1.09.  AGRICULTURAL  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  ATACORA~  BENIN1 
The  two  main  operations  supported  by  EDF  finance  in the  Department of Atacora 
are: 
(i)  'Soil rehabilitation and  agricultural  development  in the  Boukombe  re-
gion'  {1963-69)  - EDF  subsidy:  1  094  000  u.a. 
(ii)  'Agricultural  development  of the Department of Atacora'  (1969-73)  - EDF 
subsidy:  1  084  000  u.a. 
'SOIL  REHABILITATION  AND  AGRICULTURAL  DEVELOPMENT  IN  THE  BOUKOMBE  REGION' 
This first project was  concerned  with  the  development  of an area of 10  000  ha 
by  means  of anti-erosion works  and  modernization of agricultural methods. 
Studies  were  also to be  carried out in preparation for  extension of the proj-
ect to  a  further area of 30  000  ha. 
Severe  rain erosion,  excessive exploitation of arable  land  and  annual  de-
struction of brush by fire  had  created the  need  for  a  campaign  to  combat ero-
sion and  improve  farming methods. 
The  results anticipated were  a  70%  increase  in gross production  and  a  conse-
quent  increase  in gross  annual  revenue  of  CFAF  50  000  000. 
The  method  adopted  as  a  means  of combating erosion was  to build transverse 
terracing,  with ditches  and  drainage  channels.  Other methods  proposed  includ-
ed  walled terraces built along contour lines,  stabilizing reafforestation, 
isohypsal ditches,  legislation banning  running fires and  trespassing by cat-
tle,  and  improvement  of soil structure. 
Regarding rural modernization,  the  agronomical  trials were  to be  aimed  at im-
provement  of yields  from  existing crops  by  means  of a  system of intensive 
cultivation reducing  area~ under  crops  and  extending fallowing,  and  at estab-
1  Summary  by  C.  Ermgodts  based  on  evaluation  re~orts supplied by  the  Bureau 
Central  des  Projets  du  Benin  and  by  H.  Peter, statistician,  and  R.  Pujol, 
agronQmist,  through the  company  Marcomer. - 94  -
lishing  improved varieties offering high productivity.  A large  team  of in-
structors was  employed  to help in the  campaign  against erosion and  introduce 
modern  farming  methods:  selected seed,  water  storage,  compost,  clearing brush, 
planting citrus fruits,  use  of insecticides in barns  and  on  crops,  animal-
drawn  tillage. 
This first project was  extended  by  two  years  and  merged  in 1969  with the  sec-
ond  project,  'Agricultural  Development  of the Department of Atacora'. 
A project of this  type  involves various inherent dangers,  such as dispersal 
of effort on  too many  schemes  and  the risk that,  after the  inevitably limited 
period  during which  fertilizers are  supplied  free  of charge,  the  exercise will 
become  uneconomic  for  the  producer when  he  has  to buy  them  at their true 
price.  This  explains  some  setbacks.  By  contrast,  those activities which  met 
with success  were  those  which  involved no radical  changes  in producers'  hab-
its and  corresponded to their fundamental  aspirations:  to be  freed  from  food 
shortages  and  to earn cash  incomes.  These  included  the  technical  improvements 
in  sorghum  and  groundnut growing,  use of fertilizers,  use  of insecticides in 
barns  and  the building of walled  terraces along  contour lines.  The  efforts to 
encourage  use  of animal  manure  failed because  of the  arduous  nature of the 
work  involved  and  the prestige surrounding the results achieved  with mineral 
fertilizers.  The  success  achieved with  introduction of mineral  fertilizers 
owes  much  to the relative autonomy which  the  EDF  allowed  the  organizers  of 
the  Boukombe  operation regarding annual  loans. 
The  agricultural section of the project was  therefore  reasonably successful 
because  the  methods  introduced were  simple,  efficient and  consistent with lo-
cal  farmers'  aspirations.  The  concrete results were:  a  reduction in food 
shortages,  a  substantial increase in production of groundnuts  and rice,  and 
smooth  operation of credit facilities.  In particular,  by  the  end  of the proj-
ect,  the  outlook for rice growing  on  reclaimed  lowlands  was  looking very 
promising. 
On  the  soil preservation side  (work  was  completed  on  6  000  ha),  considerable 
progress was  made  in reducing rain erosion.  The  local  farmers  appreciated the 
advantages,  but problems  arose  over maintenance  of the  terraces after the  end 
of the project.  Because  of the  destruction by cattle of plantations  on  the 
embankments,  the terraces were  not sufficiently stabilized and,  nine years 
after completion of the project,  they  have virtually disappeared. 
'AGRICULTURAL  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  ATACORA' 
In this second project,  which  covered  a  wider  area than  the first,  three spe-
cific objectives were  envisaged: 
(1)  To  improve  and  increase agricultural production.  With  this in view,  three 
main  types  of action were  envisaged:  introduction of simple,  reliable 
methods,  to be  facilitated by  the block cultivation system,  marketing of 
produce  inside  the  Department  and  beyond,  and  a  livestock health campaign; - 95  -
(2)  To  set up  new  structures for  the  organization of rural  development; 
(3)  To  train local staff,  not only giving  them  technical training but also 
preparing them  to assume  responsibilities  from  the  technical assistance 
personnel  in anticipation of a  takeover  of the  operation and  financing 
from  national  resources. 
The  sectoral activities were  directed at two  food  crops  (sorghum  and  rice) 
and  two  industrial  crops  (groundnuts  and  cotton).  The  main  subjects of in-
struction were:  sowing at the correct dates  and  the correct density;  treat-
ment  of seed;  proctection of harvests;  introduction of sorghum  in rotations 
(to take  advantage  of the after-effects of fertilizers used  for  cotton and 
groundnuts);  weeding;  correct use of fertilizers;  protective treatments for 
crops;  pulling cotton plants after harvesting.  In addition,  rustic hydro-
agricultural works  were  to be built for rice growing  over  a  50  ha area. 
On  the  marketing  side,  an  expert was·  seconded  to  the  operation to set up  a 
system  for collection of produce  and  a  credit system.  The  project also in-
cluded plans for  the  gradual  establishment of village associations whose  role 
would  be  to market  local  produce  en bloc  and  to supply local  farmers  with es-
sential goods. 
As  regards  infrastructure,  there was  a  limited programme  to improve  road  com-
munications  and  the construction of storehouses  was  planned. 
Finally,  the  project included plans to improve  stock-breeding.  The  Department 
offered great potential  (with a  quarter of the country's cattle population), 
but  l~ttle could be  done  to develop  this potential because  of the poor state 
of health of the cattle. It was  planned under  the project to make  improve-
ments  in this area so that it would  become  possible to export livestock out-
side the Department. 
Considered as  a  whole,  the production results fell far short of the objec-
tives,  particularly in the  case of cotton.1  Nevertheless,  real progress was 
achieved in terms  of the  local  farmers'  receptiveness. 
The  main  aims  of the project were  to bring about  a  change  in peasant farmers' 
attitudes and practices and  to adapt the  development  and  trade structures; 
however,  in practice,  the  accent was  placed  on  production and  profitability 
norms,  so that the underlying effects were  not observed while  the project was 
in progress. 
The  large area covered  by  the project with its wide  variations in population 
density,  the  advanced  state of soil erosion,  the poor condition of the  road 
network  and  the  remoteness  of the central administration were  all aspects  of 
the project's environment  which militated against its success.  It would not 
doubt  have  been more  successful if there had  been more  decentralization and 
the project organizers  had  had  exclusive control of the  operational staff. 
1  See  Table  l.09.a. - 96  -
The  efficiency of the  organizational  structure set up  was  impaired  by  another 
set of factors:  the  very  uneven quality of the  supervisory staff,  their in-
sufficient training,  the  inadequate provision for  monitoring their work  and 
the  fact that they were  not paid regularly. 
The  technical  assistance personnel,  who  were  faced  with  the  double  task of 
carrying out  the  regional  production  and  marketing  programme  while  at the 
same  time  training local staff to take  over their own  duties,  did not  have all 
the  technical  and  human  qualities required.  In addition,  the  team  was  not suf-
ficiently integrated into the  structure for management  and  implementation of 
the project. 
Finally,  the  effectiveness of some  members  of this personnel  was  restricted 
by  the  fact that they  did not  spend  long  enough  in the  field;  it was  found 
that movements  of personnel  were  too  frequent. 
The  programme  was  also seriously delayed  by  unfavourable  climate  conditions 
and political upheavals. 
EFFECTS  AND  RESULTS 
What  has  been  the  impact of the  two  projects  on  rural conditions  in the  De-
partment of Atacora  and  the  problems  of its development,  as  they stood in 
1977? 
The  major  problem  in the  Department is the  lack of infrastructure.  The  short-
comings  of the road  system is a  cause  of continuing enclavement;  welfare  cen-
tres,  wells  and  schools are  among  the priority needs  as  seen by  the  local 
population. 
On  the  farming  level,  the  supervisory staff have  a  good  image  with  the peas-
ant population,  but their efficiency leaves  much  to be  desired because  of the 
limitations of their training,  the  content of which  is not differentiated ac-
cording to the sectors in which  they work,  although  the  various sectors dif-
fer widely  in their characteristics and  problems.  The  planning of training 
programmes  and  coherent agricultural  schemes  is being held back by  the  lack 
of much-needed detailed study of the characteristics of agriculture in 
Atacora.  At  the  same  time,  the crucial problem of soil erosion is still con-
ditioning rural  development,  particularly in view of the insistent demand 
from  peasant  farmers  for  new  land suitable for cultivation. 
The  techniques  introduced under  the project are still being applied  to a  very 
large extent,  thanks  to  the  efforts of local  supervisory staff.  Correct use 
is being made  of fertilizers in the  case of cotton only.  On  the  other hand, 
little is being  done  in the  area of protecting seed  and  crops,  because  of 
difficulty in obtaining supplies of the  necessary products.  No  progress has 
been made  in efforts to stop brush fires. - 97  -
Tabl~ 1.09.a 
Agricultural  development  of the Department  of Atacora 
Attainment  of objectives 
1969  1970  1971  1972 
Sorghum 
Areas  (ha) 
- Objective  41  000  - - 44  000 
- Result  50  000  - - 40  000 
Rice 
Areas  (ha) 
- Objective  400  600  - 1  200 
- Result  350  700  - 1  621 
Production  (t) 
- Objective  - - - -
- Result  280  - 1  867  1  320 
Groundnuts 
Areas  (ha) 
- Objective  9  500  - 11  000  12 000 
- Result  8  849  11  393  10  480  11  111 
Production  (t) 
- Objective  7  600  - 9  900  10  800 
- Result  5  700  6  413  7  600  8  000 
Marketing  (t) 
- Objective  4  600  - 6  000  6  500 
- Result  3  548  3  018  3  805  4  875 
Yields  (kg/ha) 
- Objective  BOO  - 900  900 
- Result  644  562  721  720 
Result as 
%of obj. 
in 1972 
91 
135 
93 
74 
75 
80 - 98  -
Table  1.09.a (continuation) 
Result as 
1969  1970  1971  1972  % of obj. 
in  1972 
Cotton 
Areas  (ha) 
- Objective  2  500  - 2  500  4  ooob 
33  (88) 
- Result  980  400  721  1  313 
Production  (t) 
- Objective  990  - 1  825  3  360  40 
-Result  354  513  470  1  328 
Yielda 
- Objective  700  - 850  900  120b 
- Result  374  531  681  1  080 
a  In  the priority zone. 
b  This  objective was  reduced  to 1  500  ha in view of the  slow rate of progress. 
The  development  of stock-breeding and  animal-drawn tillage,  in which  the  lo-
cal population is keenly  interested,  is meeting with various obstacles,  the 
most  serious of which  are  the poor state of health of cattle  (because  of the 
failure of the  second project in this field),  the  limited staff and  resources 
available to Atacora's  Centre  d'Action Regionale  pour le Developpement  Rural 
(CARDER)  and  the high cost of equipment.  As  for the village associations, 
they are  continuing to supply their members  with means  of production and  es-
sential consumer  goods;  they represent  a  foundation for  a  structure of self-
supervision by peasant communities. 
In general  terms,  the effectiveness of these projects suffered from  excessive 
dispersal  of manpower  and  technical resources,  which  were  totally inadequate 
in relation to the scale of the objectives adopted,  given the  wide  variety of 
problems  impeding rural  development  in Atacora. - 99  -
1.10.  AGRICULTURAL  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  COMOE,  UPPER  VOLTA1 
The  EDF  financed  two  successive projects between  1967  and  1976  aimed  at de-
veloping agriculture  in the Department of Comoe;  the total  amount  of the  EDF 
subsidies was  3  145 000 u.a. 
Under  both projects,  technical,  material  and  financial  assistance was  pro-
vided to the  Office  Regional  de  Developpement  (ORD)  for the  South-West. 
In view of the particularly favourable  conditions in the  area covered  by  the 
ORD  (compared with other regions  in Upper  Volta)  from  the viewpoint  of natu-
ral resources,  geography  and population,  the first project adopted  two  objec-
tives:  first,  to mobilize all productive resources  in the  area through mod-
ernization of agricultural methods;  second,  to organize effective marketing 
of produce  by setting up  appropriate structures and  facilities.  The  project 
envisaged gradual  Africanization of staff coupled with gradual  reduction of 
rank-and-file staff and  operating costs,  so that it could  be  taken over by 
the  ORD  and  financed  out of its budget when  the  aid  came  to an  end. 
The  programme  was  based  on  two  fundamental  courses of action:  instruction in 
reliable and  simple  methods  in order to increase yields,  and  rationalization 
of trade networks  to  improve  marketing  of agricultural produce,  thereby en-
couraging peasants to produce  and  sell more. 
The  instruction activities were  aimed  at the  crops  most  commonly  grown  in the 
region:  the traditional cereals  (millet,  sorghum,  maize),  groundnuts  and  rice. 
It dealt with aspects  concerned with  the quality and  protection of seed,  the 
correct dates  for  sowing  and  the correct densities,  proper care of crops,  use 
of organic  and  mineral fertilizers,  animal-drawn tillage.  The  instruction was 
given by supervisors  on  the  ORD  staff supplemented by  schoolteachers  and for-
mer  pupils of rural  schools giving their services voluntarily. 
The  commercial activities were  to be  carried out at two  levels: 
(1)  among  producers,  who  would  be  encouraged to organize  themselves  by  the 
supervisory staff,  and 
1  Summary  by  C.  Ermgodts,  based  on evaluation reports supplied by H.  Peter, 
statistician,  and F.  Lussagnet,  agronomist,  through the  company  Marcomer, 
and  the  study by  the  Ivory Coast bureau,  Bara. - 100  -
(2)  in the  ORD  itself,  which  was  to begin  to operate  as  a  marketing organiza-
tion,  collecting produce  from  even  the  most  modest  producers  and  handling 
storage  and  sales. 
These  activities necessitated substantial  working  capital  - to pay producers 
cash for  their crops  - and  this  was  to be  financed  by  short-term  loans  from 
the  Banque  Nationale  de  Developpement  (BND). 
Finally,  the project  included  a  limited programme  of road  works. 
By  the  end  of the first project,  a  number  of results had  been  achieved in the 
various  fields  tackled: 
(i)  establishment of the regional  structure; 
(ii)  success with  instruction and  an  increase  in production; 
(iii)  some  increase  in production  and  marketing; 
(iv)  an  improvement  in producers'  standards of living. 
However,  the effectiveness of the project was  impaired  to  some  extent by var-
ious internal  or  external factors: 
- the  training of local staff was  not up  to standard,  partly because  of 
shortcomings  in the  technical  assistance personnel  and  partly because  of 
the  insufficient numbers  or high turnover of local  staff; 
- the  management  of the  ORD  did not go  beyond  correct bookkeeping;  it paid 
little attention to cost prices,  depreciation,  forecasts  etc.; 
the  marketing of produce  was  handled  efficiently by  the  ORD  when  it had  an 
official purchasing monopoly,  but  the results  became  rather mediocre  when 
the  monopoly  was  withdrawn;  moreover,  the prices  fixed  for  produce  were  too 
low  compared with those  ruling in the  neighbouring country,  the  Ivory Coast. 
The  positive results already achieved  and  the  considerable potential of the 
South-West  justified continuation of aid  so that  a  more  intensive  phase  could 
be  carried out.  This  second project,  which  lasted three years,  was  again 
aimed  at simultaneously  developing rural production  and  marketed  volumes. 
The  project concentrated primarily on  intensified development  of rice as  a 
motive  crop,  although at the  same  time  continuing the  programme  of instruc-
tion in simple,  profitable methods  throughout  the  area covered  by  the  ORD. 
Two  schemes  concerned  with rice growing  were  planned.  The  first was  the  de-
velopment  of 200  ha for  irrigated rice growing,  to  be  carried out by  the 
State with  the  help of the  local population.  The  second  was  concerned with 
rain-fed rice,  with  a  target of 1  300  ha under  cultivation by  the  end  of the 
project.  The  latter scheme,  which  depended  on progress with  animal-drawn til-
lage,  also included trials with  semi-mechanized working  on  grouped  plots. 
In the  case of groundnuts,  the project planned  to extend  the  instruction pro-
gramme  to  a  larger  number  of growers  in parallel with  a  slight increase  in 
the  areas growing  this crop  in order to reach the  estimated production ceil-- 101  -
ing  for the region.  The  project also called for  intensified instruction in 
connection with cereals  and  sesame -a relatively new  crop. 
The  marketing  of produce  was  to  be  developed  by supplying the  ORD  with roll-
ing  stock  and  building store-houses. 
There  were  also plans  for various  improvements  to  the  basic  infrastructure: 
building of aqueducts,  setting up  of a  road maintenance  brigade,  sinking of 
wells  (1  500  linear metres). 
Although  the  technical  assistance  teams  was  strengthened  during this second 
phase,  the  project called  for  a  small  additional  contribution from  the  State 
and  adhered  to the principle of phased reduction of aid. 
In 1977,  it was  found  that the  supervisory and  marketing activities of the 
ORD  (cf.Table  1.10)  had  been relatively successful.  In particular,  considera-
ble  progress  had  been  made  with  animal-drawn  tillage,  except in those  areas 
where it was  in competition with  semi-mechanized  tractor-drawn tillage. 
The  farmers  are  convinced that they are better off as  a  result of the  initial 
phases  of the  ORD's  development  programme  and  many  of them  are prepared to 
buy agricultural machinery  and  fertilizers as  long  as  favourable  credit fa-
cilities can  be  arranged  for  them.  Despite  these real  successes,  the potential 
of the  South-West  region  (availability of large  areas  of land,  varied cover 
vegetation of good  quality,  advantageous  location for  access  to external  mar-
kets etc.)  is still not being  used  to the full because  or  the  limiting con-
straints which  have  not  been  removed:  the  inadequate  socio-economic  and 
health  infrastructure,  the  lack of manpower,  the survival  of traditional ag-
ricultural  and  stock-farming methods  and  the  low  level  of producer prices. 
Se~ against  the  objectives laid  down,  production  in 1974/1975 was  satisfacto-
ry in the  case  of cereals,  except for rice,  but excellent in the  case  of 
groundnuts.  On  the marketing  side,  the results were  very meagre  in the  case 
of groundnuts  and  rice,  but  excellent as  far  as  the  other cereals were  con-
cerned. 
For  the  objectives laid  down  unde~ these projects to have  been  met  in full, 
it would  have  been necessary to  take  timely action to modify  those  activities 
which  proved non-viable,  such  as  semi-mechanization of rain-fed rice growing, 
and  switch  more  resources  to activities which  promised  to meet  the  most  urgent 
needs  of the  local  population,  especially in the fields of health,  transport 
and  water  supplies,  and  also to  those  which  corresponded to their most  deep-
ly-felt aspirations,  particularly action  aimed  at development  of irrigated 
rice,  intensification of other  food  crops  and  improvement of stock-farming.1 
1  Two  further  programmes  were  started in 1975  to supplement  the  integrated 
agricultural projects:  the first was  aimed  at improving  traditional stock-
farming  with  a  view  to  developing  animal-drawn  tillage and  the  second  was  a 
programme  for  the training  and  organization of young  farmers. - 102  -
Table  1.10.  a 
Agricultural  development in the  Comoe  ORD,  Upper Volta 
Attainment of objectives 
Production 
Millet,  sorghum 
Maize 
Groundnuts  (in the  shell) 
Paddy 
Sesame 
Marketing 
Maize,  millet,  sorghum 
Paddy 
Groundnuts  (in the shell) 
Sesame 
Cotton 
Objectivesa 
1974/1975 
(tonnes) 
33  400 
19  500 
7  500 
6  590 
1  500 
800 
2  000 
5  000 
24.5 
9.2 
Resultsb 
1974/1975 
(tonnes) 
23  580 
18  720 
10  000 
3  760 
(1  400  in 
1972/1973) 
946.5 
240.1 
693.4 
26.4 
1.3 
Results  as % 
of 
objectives 
70.6 
96 
133 
57 
? 
118.3 
I 
12 
13.8 
107.7 
14.1 
a  Source:  Annex  to proposal for finance:  project 3100.333.09.14. 
b  Source:  South-West  ORD. 
To  carry out  such action,  the supervisory services  would  need to be  strength-
ened  and this would require  an  improvement  in the  numerical  strength and  cal-
ibre of the staff. 
However,  it has  to be  acknowledged  that the  ORD  is powerless,  because  of lack 
of resources,  to meet  the  objectives  assigned  to it. The  modernization pro-
gramme  conducted under  the  two  successive projects has not yet reached  the 
threshold of viability,  another objective which  was  set initially. 
The  main  factors  which  are still having  a  direct adverse effect on production 
are:  the  insufficient volume  and  late arrival  of short-term credit provided 
by  the  BND  to finance  the purchase of produce,  the  lack of coordination be-
tween  the  BND  and  the  Office National  des  Cereales  (OFNACER),  the  vulnerabil-
ity of food  and  livestock markets  to speculation  and  the  low  level  of pro-
ducer prices. - 103  -
As  for the actual  structure of the  ORD,  it lacks efficiency in four  of its 
fields of activity:  planning  and  evaluation of action;  instruction,  training 
and  cooperation;  accounting  and  management;  stock-farming. Part Two 
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Rural  development is the result of changes  brought  about  by  the collective 
will  of all the social groups  and  economic  agents  involved in the social  and 
economic  organization of nations.  Participants of four  types  contribute to 
this process:  peasant populations  whose  degree  of organization varies accord-
ing  to their particular way  of life;  public  or quasi-public  institutions, 
whose  technical  and  economic  contributions are  often influenced by political 
factors;  foreign aid institutions,  and in particular the  EDF  and  European 
technical  assistance  organizations;  local or foreign  commercial  or industrial 
firms.  In  the projects evaluated,  the  last-named group  often played  an  impor-
tant role;  they were  able  to exert pressure  - notably  on  certain governments 
- to influence  the directions taken by  the projects.  However,  the available 
information  on  their role  in some  of the projects is insufficient to allow an 
overall  assessment. 
Each  group  of participants acts according to its own  objectives  and  con-
straints,  a  knowledge  of which  is essential when  implementing or evaluating 
rural  development  operations.  The  interests of one  or other group  are not al-
ways  compatible  and  this can  sometimes  lead to open  or latent conflict which 
hampers  the  progress of projects. 
In  most  cases,  the State relies on  the  rural  sector to generate  the  resources 
needed  for  the  development of manufacturing  and service  industries in the na-
tional  economy;  however,  there is evidence that certain populations  - espe-
cially the  young  - do  not consider  the quality of rural  development suffi-
ciently attractive to remain  in rural  areas or to increase production of a 
given  crop. 
A clear distinction must  be  made  from  the outset between  the  'national  econo-
my'  and  'State accounts'.  The  former  embraces  all internal  and  external  eco-
nomic  flows  involving the  economic  agents in a  given  country;  it includes 
subsistence production and  consumption as well  as  trade  flows.  The  State is 
one  of the  agents participating in the national  economy;  its role is some-
times preponderant,  particularly in the  less developed  countries,  but it is 
far  from  being all-embracing;  its accounts reflect only  those  economic  flows 
which  are under its control.  A project benefiting the  State's accounts  may  or 
may  not benefit the  other constituent members  of the national  economy  - and 
agricultural producers  in particular. 
An  important consideration in aid to rural  development is to establish the 
most  effective strategy by  which  to reach the social group  aimed  at:  men, 
womeh  and  young  people  living in the rural  environment. - 108  -
2.1.  PEASANT  PARTICIPANTS 
All  the  projects evaluated had  the  objective  of promoting  the  development  of 
rural populations  living  on  peasant holdings:  small  farms  with little equip-
ment,  organized primarily with  a  view  to meeting  food  subsistence  require-
ments,  as  a  rule not  integrated to  any great extent with  trade  flows  (espe-
cially trade in factors  of production)  and  highly  characterized by  tradition-
al social patterns  and  empiricisms. 
In addition to  the  priority activity of subsistence,  there were  other  econom-
ic activities on  a  scale which  varied according  to circumstances:  activities 
connected with export  crops  (cotton,  coffee,  groundnuts)  or  commercial  food 
crops  (groundnuts,  rice,  maize,  yams,  manioc,  etc.);  livestock breeding; 
craft activities,  often  in decline;  trade,  a  particular case of which  was  the 
sale by  women  of foodstuffs  in the  towns;  hunting,  fishing etc. 
A distinction is made  between  the products generated  by  subsistence activity 
to meet  fundamental  needs  (food,  housing,  health etc.)  and  the  trade products. 
Food  crops  may  be  grown  for  consumption by  the producer  or for  trade.  The 
term  'cash crop'  is applied  to all products  traded against money  on  domestic 
or foreign markets. 
2.1.1.  The  rural world is often seen by  'developers'  in oversimplified terms 
It is clear that the  local  socio-economic  contexts  in which  development 
schemes  are  carried out are difficult to  understand  for  those  with  no  experi-
ence  of living in them,  and  consequently that  'developers'  do  not  know  enough 
about  them. 
Some  'developers',  whether  of local  or foreign nationality,  tend  to regard 
the rural world  as  an  amorphous  world  which  needs  to be  'structured'  in  line 
with development  objectives.  Others  - and  this is particularly true of tech-
nical  assistance personnel  - have  a  tendency to ignore  the  social structures 
and  economic  or political hierarchies forming part of the  context of a  proj-
ect.  The  rural  world  is then  seen by  the  'developer'  purely in  the  light of 
his particular interest; it is viewed  as  a  mass  of coffee  or  cotton growers, 
or in terms  of an  'average  farmer'  controlling all the people  and resources 
on ·his  land.  Others  have  a  tendency to idealize traditional structures and 
impose  their egalitarian theories  on  them,  although  analysis would  show  them 
the  importance  of the  various hierarchical patterns,  some  of which  are  time-
honoured  (gerontocracy,  submission of women  as  a  class)  and  others recent 
(landless peasant classes). 
In their efforts at organization of the  rural environment,  'developers'  often 
graft new  structures on  to the  existing context.  The  efficiency,  not  to  say 
survival,  of such  structures  appears  to  depend  on  the  continued presence  of 
those  who  set them  up  and  on  the  temporary  and  limited interest of farmers  in 
their operation  (for instance,  when  they are  obliged  to join groups  of one 
sort or another set up  by  a  development  company  in order to obtain credit). 
Consequently,  these  superimposed  structures  do  not bring lasting changes  to 
the  environment. - 109  -
Moreover,  because  of lack of a  thorough  understanding of the  environment  on 
the part of institutional officials,  lack of more  than  superficial coordina-
tion between  socio-economic  researchers  and  project institutions,  and  lack of 
appropriate  teaching  of specifically rural African  economics,  sociology and 
technology,  the people  who  deal  with  the  farming  world  often fail  to give it 
proper recognition as  a  full partner in its own  right;  it is regarded  as  a 
minor partner,  even  though  the  success  or failure of rural  development  activ-
ities is entirely in the  hands  of its members. 
In  the  following  pages,  an  attempt is made  to identify the  main  characteris-
tics of the rural  world  affected by  the projects which  have  a  significant 
influence  on  their effectiveness. 
2.1.2.  Multiplicity of decision-making  levels in the rural  world  and  diversi-
ty of objectives 
The  rural world  was  for  a  long  time  considered  - and still is considered  by 
some  -purely in terms  of its capacity to produce  exportable agricultural 
commodities.  It was  believed that subsistence activity left spare capacity 
which  could  be  put  to  work  on  cash  crops.  Development  resources  were  allocat-
ed  to  these  new  crops  and it was  assumed  that subsistence activity would  look 
after itself;  in theory it would  evolve  in line with  the population.  The  term 
used  in projects  to identify the peasant partners was  'planteur':  an  adult 
male  growing  coffee,  cocoa,  cotton or groundnuts,  while  the  women  looked aft-
er the  food  crops. 
It was  subsequently realized that it was  not possible to characterize  farmers 
purely in  terms  of their commodity production activity.  It was  acknowledged 
that farming  could  be  affected by  a  variety of constraints and  that food-crop 
activities  (for  subsistence purposes  or for  trade)  could  overlap with  the 
production of commodities.  The  term  'planteur'  was  gradually superseded  by 
'exploitant agricole'  which,  although more  appropriate,  still does  not  ade-
quately reflect the  complexity of the rural  environment.  The  'exploitant 
agricole'  appears  in the guise of a  man  in control of all the material  and 
human  resources  on  his land.  Subsistence activity is regarded  as  a  secondary 
activity destined to disappear eventually when  agriculture finally becomes 
modernized. 
The  project files generally consider that a  level of overall decision-making 
and  coordinated control  of resources  and  their use  correspond to the status 
of  'farm-head'.  However,  experience with  the projects and  a  number  of other 
specialized analyses  demonstrate  that decision-making  on  a  farm  is a  highly 
complex  process.  Each  individual  in African rural society has  his place in 
differentiated networks  according  to his personal  status  (one  of the young, 
an  elder,  a  woman),  the  type  of work  he  does,  the  nature  of the  decisions  to 
be  taken etc.  The  structures of these networks  are  determined  by  traditional 
and  time-honoured  methods  of social  organization based  on  descent  (rather 
than  family)  and  age  groups. 
Similarly,  there are collective levels of decision-making  and  action:  produc-
er groups,  consumer groups,  groups  consisting of those living  on  the  same - 110  -
concession,  lineage groups,  age  groups etc.  and  each  may  be  represented  by 
one  of its members,  who  may  or may  not  be  accorded  special status.1 
The  multiplicity of collective decision-making  levels is a  reflection of the 
social structure  which  must  be  analysed  individually for  each ethnic group; 
some  develop  community  functions  to a  high degree  (community  fields for  the 
establishment of stocks,  'machete'  associations, 2  community  organization of 
land,  collective housing in  'squares'  or villages,  etc.), whereas  others give 
freer rein to individualism  (scattered holdings  and  housing,  fewer  village 
communities  and  more  sporadic  'machete'  associations,  greater freedom  for the 
young  and  women  etc.). 
It is important  to note  that each  decision-making  level  (individual or col-
lective)  functions  in  the  economy  autonomously  according to its own  status. 
The  resources available  in the  farm unit,  land  and  labour in particular,  are 
not necessarily fluid  from  one  decision-making  level  to another;  the re-
sources of one  level  are not easily transferred to another  level  and  con-
straints  imposed  on  one  side may  determine positive or negative behaviour 
patterns  on  another. 
None  of these  levels is therefore  a  really suitable basis  on  which  to  draw  up 
an  overall  assessment of resources  and  employment  of resources  by all the 
people  living together on  a  given  concession. 
The  evaluation reports  shows  that the action carried out  took little account 
of these differentiations and  that  the  objectives were  generally expressed in 
terms  which  did  not  concern all the  decision-making  levels  involved. 
Young  people,  for  instance,  generally enjoy very great personal  freedom  of 
action,  but remain in heavily  dependent  on  their elders when  seeking to ac-
quire  land.  Similarly,  women  are entitled to  own  property in their own  right, 
but are  obliged to acquiesce  to their husbands'  authority in order to obtain 
arable  land  and,  in  some  cases,  to let it to their husbands if they use it to 
grow  cash crops.  Similarly,  in Niger,  women  meet  with stern resistance  from 
their husbands  when  they take  up  raising beef cattle,  a  highly profitable 
business. 
This  can  lead,  in the  case  of one-man  holdings,  to relatively low fluidity of 
the  means  of production,  especially of labour,  within the  'farm holding'  en-
tity. 
It also means  that the  production objectives  aimed at under projects can vary 
extremely widely  in their  eff~ct on  the different groups  concerned,  to  the 
extent that they may  be  advantageous  for  some  and  disadvantageous  for others. 
1  Ancey  G.,  Niveau  de  decision et fonctions  objectif en milieu rural africain, 
Amira,  No  3  (April-November  1975). 
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Each  micro-economic  decision-making  level  pursues its own  objectives.  Pecuni-
ary gain,  personal  security and  prestige or  the  need  to  secure  food  supplies 
may  be  the motive  behind  the action of individuals who  are at the  same  time 
involved in the  attainment of community  objectives,  such as group prestige, 
medium-term security,  generation of cash resources to pay  for  a  collective 
project etc.  Thus  an  individual's behaviour will  vary according  to whether  he 
is pursuing a  personal  objective or a  community objective. 
In this  type  of structure there are  many  conflicts of interest:  some  'elders' 
monopolize  land,  using their status to personal rather than  collective ends; 
women  come  into conflict with  their menfolk  when  they wish  to develop  their 
cash trade activities;  traditional activities aimed at building up  long-term 
community  stores are  superseded by activities offering an  immediate return, 
and  so  on. 
The  simplification of basing projects  on  consideration of part of a  community 
and  its activities - adult males  and  the  farming  under their control  - can 
lead to serious difficulties in development  operations.  It ignores  the  cir-
cumstances  of other social groups  and  covers  up  the gradual disruption which 
can  arise in the societies concerned. 
In the  absence  of preliminary sociological  analysis  and  especially continuous 
evaluation of their effects,  development operations  can actually strengthen 
the  very social and  economic  hierarchies which  they seek to combat.  For in-
stance,  where  the  credit structure and  supervision methods  constantly favour 
the most prosperous  farmers  as far as  acquisition of animal-drawn  tillage 
equipment is concerned,  it becomes harder and  harder for  the  other men  -
young  men  in particular - to get  land,  means  of production or wives,  so  that 
a  class of landless peasants grows  up  in a  rural  world  traditionally accus-
tomed  to the  concept of collective ownership. 
Similarly,  when  development  institutions deal  exclusively with  heads  of farms 
and  allocate resources to them,  women's  activities suffer. 
In conclusion,  emphasis  must  be  placed  on  the  need,  when  planning development 
operations,  for clear identification of the  social groups  aimed  at and  defi-
nition of their respective positions in relation to the  various objectives: 
in what  ways  will  the elders,  the  young  men  and  the  women  be  involved? 
Which  objective  and  which particular method  will enable  each  of these  groups 
to solve their farming  problems  and  settle tension between  them? 
Projects should also be  planned in relation t9 the functional  objectives at 
each  level  of activity:  an  increase  in cash  income  for young  men;  greater 
economic  independence  for women;  generation of the resources needed  to im-
prove  housing for  the group  of people  living together on  a  concession making 
up  a  'residents'  group';  development  of crops for  long-term  storage by  'con-
sumer groups'  etc.  ~!though such  complex  planning is clearly impracticable,_ 
it is possible,  during  the  shaping  and  continuing evaluation of a  project,  to 
consider the  resources  employed  in the  light of the  complex  conditions in the 
environment  concerned  and  ask whether  they are  appropriate means  of securing 
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2.1.3.  Farmers'  representation and  negotiating powers 
Apart  from  all political and  legal  considerations,  the  reports place  the  ac-
cent  on  relations between  the  farmers  and  populations  affected by  the proj-
ects  and  the  agricultural  development  authorities. 
In general  terms,  it has  been  found  that only rarely in the projects evaluat-
ed  had  institutionalized dialogue  been set up  between  the authorities and  the 
farming  communities.  The  most  advanced  example  of dialogue  seems  to be  that 
of the  cooperative  organization in Niger,  for all the  reservations expressed 
in the evaluation report regarding  the genuinely participatory nature  of de-
cision-making in the  cooperatives  and  the  UNNC.  No  mention  is made  anywhere 
of farmers'  representative structures with real powers  of negotiation over 
the  management  of resources  made  available by  the  State  and  external  sources 
of finance.l On  the  other hand,  all the reports refer to widespread  imposi-
tion,of constraints of varying  scope,  ranging  from  mandatory cotton growing 
in Zaire  and  Chad2  (the rules  were  relaxed  two  years  ago  in the  latter coun-
try)  to technical  constraints,  such as refusal  to deliver inputs  or to grant 
credit unless certain technical  conditions are  fulfilled. 
None  of the  reports refers to  any  direct powers  of negotiation in the  area of 
the pricing and  marketing of export products,  nor  even  in that of the fixing 
of cooperative discounts,  where  they  are available.  It may  be  said that,  at 
the  institutional level,  farmers  are either virtually unrepresented  or cast 
in a  very minor role. 
Many  plans  and projects express  the  intention of securing greater participa-
tion in development  by  the  local people.  It is not  always  stated clearly 
whether such participation is an  objective,  a  strategy or a  condition of suc-
cess of the operations proposed.  In some  cases  'participation'  is obtained by 
coercive means  (compulsory  crops)  while,  in others,  promotional  methods  are 
used. 
In the latter type  of case,  an  objective often expressed by operational offi-
cials is the  'structuring of the  peasant  farming  environment'.  This  objective 
and  the  measures  adopted  to attain it appear extremely ambiguous,  as  is shown 
by  the  Ivory Coast evaluation report in particular. 
Rather  than deal  direct with the  local  farmers  as  they are  actually organized, 
some  projects create their own  interlocutors in the  image  of the action which 
they  intend to carry out.  For  instance,  village groups  are set up  at the in-
stigation of a  development  company  on  the basis of a  contract which it has 
drawn  up  following  a  detailed analysis of the  techniques  which it intends to 
promote.  As  long as  the proposed  'contract'  is economically attractive,  the 
farmers  agree  to play the role assigned to them  in the  new  'structures', 
1  Cf.  Vanhaeverbeke  A.,  p.  215 et seq.  (Doc.  34). 
2 Under  which  each active  person is obliged to grow  cotton  on at le.ast half a 
hectare. - 113  -
since this gives  them  access  to supplies;  however,  the  structures disappear 
if the  advantages  of this arrangement  wear  off. 
The  establishment of new  structures by projects does  not therefore  seem  to be 
the  way  to ensure participation by  the population affected.  Such participa-
tion will  follow  in the first place  from  the  interest taken by  local  farmers 
in the  attainment of national  development  objectives.  It is a  sign that such 
interest exists and,  if this is so,  it does  indeed  become  a  development 
strategy. 
Although  the  peasant masses  are poorly represented  and  lack bargaining  power 
in the processes of development,  several  examples  clearly demonstrate  their 
determination to remain  masters  of their own  activities.  This  determination 
is expressed  through  the regulatory mechanisms  at their command. 
Reference  is made,  in fact,  to their ability to react quickly to economic  in-
centives made  available by  the national authorities.  Conversely,  when  the  in-
centives are  insufficient,  they  can  scale  down  their activities to the level 
of subsistence  farming activities to the  level  of subsistence  farming  or 
switch  away  from  official markets  to  'traditional' markets.  They  may  under-
consume,  freeze  cash resources,  or  allow  stocks  to deteriorate when  their 
purchasing power  on  the  organized  commercial  market  becomes  unsatisfactory or 
trade  conditions  are not to their liking.  If they are  interested,  they also 
have  considerable ability to appropriate  'modern'  structures while still us-
ing their own  traditional methods  of organization. 
This  latter point is particularly well  illustr?ted by  the  Zinder  and  Mayaga-
Bugesera-projects.  The  evaluation report  on  the Niger project recounts  how 
the  cooperative structures were  appropriated  by  the  traditional holders  of 
authority in Hausa society while  that  on  the  Rwanda  project reports  that the 
farmers  have  penetrated the  'rationalized'  framework  of  'farming  communities' 
although  continuing to use  traditional agricultural methods. 
Generally  speaking,  the  'peasant mentalities'  sometimes  accused  of being  a 
cause  of delay in agricultural  development  are  in fact,  to some  extent at 
least,  a  reflection of such regulatory mechanisms.  The  reports provide  sever-
al  examples  of shortcomings  in the  organization and  operation of rural  serv-
ices:  rapid  turnover of supervisory staff,  modification of technical  stand-
ards  or  changes  in prices without clear explanation,  lack of information and 
research  on  traditional production methods  etc.  In such  cases, it often oc-
curs  that the regulatory mechanisms  operate  in favour  of the relative securi-
ty offered  by traditional methods  of production which  have  stood the test of 
time  and,  above all,  are well-known  to the  farmers  themselves,  although more 
hazardous  in some  respects. 
2.1.4.  References  systems;  differentiation and  dualism of mentalities 
There  is often  a  gulf of mutual  incomprehension  between  'developers'  and 
peasant farmers,  the result of such factors  as conflicts of interests,  commu-
nication difficulties  (language  codes),  differences in the  hierarchy of fun-
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Several  experts  have  pointed  out that the  use  of foreign  language  codes, 
technical  codes,  legal  concepts  and  so  on  can  lead  to major  difficulties in 
the assimilation of technical  and  economic  progress.  They  refer for  instance 
to measurement  units  or  concepts relating to  communal  ownership  of land, 
rights to use  land  conferred  by  way  of incorporation of labour,  organization 
of consumption etc. 
Attention  was  already drawn  in the first evaluation report on  the  agricultur-
al sector to the  ethnocentricity of conceptions  of development  operations  in 
the  rural  environment:  'An  ethnocentric  approach  inspired most  of the proj-
ects  examined  and it is the  root  cause  of many  omissions.  It takes  the  form 
of attributing motivations  and  reactions  conforming with  those  of  'homo  eco-
nomicus'  (interest in personal profit and  ever-increasing personal  advantages) 
to  the  social  group  for whose  benefit and  use  the project is intended.  It 
places the  emphasis  on  farming  as  a  job  oriented  towards  the market  and  prof-
it,  and  ignores  or underestimates  farming  as  a  way  of life,  with its alle-
giances,  its social obligations  and  its unifying role within  the  traditional 
social group. 
Hence,  projects underestimate  a  number  of associations which  'the peasant 
farmer  is neither willing or able  to abandon,  although the  projects as  de-
vised make  the  assumption that he  will give  them  up  without difficulty' . 1 
The  lack of dialogue  between  the  real rural  world  and  the  technical  and  econ-
omic  structures benefiting  from  scientific knowledge  is clearly a  crucial 
factor which  must  be  overcome. 
A feature  emerging  from  the  reports is the  influence  of social  or  human  fac-
tors  on  project results;  these factors  are  frequently  lumped  together under 
the  heading of  'mentalities',  the  general  supposition being that these  men-
talities are  the  expression of a  collective rejection of social  change.  On 
analysis it is found  that these  'mentalities'  are often the reflection of be-
havour patterns determined  by  a  series of ecological,  technical  or economic 
constraints as  much  as  of psycho-sociological  factors. 
Substantial differences  can  be  observed  according to  the  regions  in which 
projects have  been  organized  and  the  constraints obtaining in each  environ-
ment.  Some  groups  are  highly individualistic in character,  with  the people 
preferring to live in isolation,  each  family  in the middle  of its own  land 
(Rwanda);  others have  a  more  highly  developed  community spirit and  prefer to 
live together in hamlets  or villages.  Socio-demographic  conditions,  history, 
ecological  factors,  social structures and  factors  connected with  the  manage-
ment  of farming  inputs  are all constraints of decisive  influence  on  the  way 
peasant communities  are  organized  and  on  'mentalities'.  The  'peasant cults'2 
1  A.  Combaz-Fauquel,  Etude  de  synthese  des  evaluations  de  projets de  develop-
pement  agricole  finances  par le FED  (June  1974). 
2  The  complex of religious  concepts associating rural  communities  with  their 
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associated with  community hierarchies are  frequently  a  traditional  component 
of agro-ecological  balances  in subsistence  farming,  whereas  export-oriented 
activity is actuated  by  modernistic  approaches. 
Pelissier,  with  the  example  of the  Serene  people,  has  provided  a  very  clear 
demonstration of the  close  links which  can exist between  'peasant cults', 
collective management  of their farmlands  and  long-term agricultural equilib-
ria.  He  draws  a  contrast between  the  ecologically balanced  farming  practised 
by  those  with  'traditional mentalities'  and  the  'extractive', sterilizing 
farming  of the Mourides  which  is restricted to groundnut  settlement alone.1 
The  same  type  of dualism  can  also be  found  frequently  in legal  structures and 
numerous  problems  connected  with  land  tenure  systems  and  grazing rights are 
mentioned  in the  evaluation reports  as  not  inconsiderable sources of diffi-
culties:  increase  in disputes between graziers  and  crop  farmers,  difficulties 
over allocation of land,  monopolization of property rights  by  headmen,  ab-
sence  of land  on  which  to set up  young  farmers,  etc.  This is an  area in which 
confusion reigns  in many  countries,  even  where  land  reform has  been intro-
duced. 
Economic  constraints can  also affect activities with which  the  'developers' 
are not concerned.  In  such  cases,  their proposals  are resisted by  the  farmers. 
For  instance,  in Rwanda  'it was  economic  considerations which,  for  reasons  of 
profitability,  directed programmes  exclusively  towards  coffee-growing to  the 
detriment of other objectives which  were  more  modest  but much  closer to  the 
preoccupations of the  Rwandese  rural  community  for  whom  coffee's place  in the 
scale of values  was  well  below  those  of the  beer banana  and  foodstuffs  essen-
tial to the  family's  survival'.  Moreover,  this  same  report finds  on  the  one 
hand  that foodstuffs  and  especially beer provide  the best cash returns  and  on 
the  other  hand  that the  subsistence  economy  in  Rwanda  is remarkably stable. 
Its stability is closely bound  up  with  the ecological role  of the  banana 
plantation,  an essential  factor  of long-term  food  security,  despite  the  fact 
that  a  high proportion of banana output  is consumed  in  the  form  of beer.  The 
introduction of coffee  in areas  traditionally given  over  to banana-growing is 
clearly a  cause  of de-stabilization of the agricultural  ecosystem,  since  the 
mineral  substances  exported  by  way  of coffee  production cannot  be  restored to 
the  land for  economic  reasons.  In  these  circumstances  the  farmers  have  to re-
concile their own  interest in maintaining subsistence equilibria with  the  ad-
vantages  of increasing coffee production.  However,  they  have  fallen far short 
of what  the agricultural promotion  services would  like to see. 
Too  many  project administrators  forget  that their  own  inherent shortcomings 
can  create characteristic bottlenecks which,  when  perceived objectively by 
peasant  'mentalities',  lead  to  a  low  level  of association with  the  actions 
suggested  on  the part of the  local  farmers.  For  instance,  as  will  be  seen  in 
section 4.6,  uncertainty surrounding the resources placed at farmers'  dispos-
al  by  the  development  institutions  can be  a  major factor.  The  peasant  farming 
community  cannot  afford to make  mistakes,  because  they  can place its very 
1  Pelissier:  Les  paysans  du  Senegal,  CNRS,  1966  (Doc.  35). - 116  -
survival  in  jeopardy;  its primary  concern is to  secure continuity of the re-
sources  which it needs  to carry  on  farming. 
When  institutions attribute difficulties or failures  experienced with proj-
ects exclusively to  'peasant mentalities', it usually means  that they  lack 
the  ability to analyse  the  environment of peasant  farming  and  in particular 
the  ability to  analyse  obstacles which  they may  create  by their  own  actions. 
2.1.5.  Priority given  to activities connected with subsistence:  rural  commu-
nities'  aspirations to control  their technical  and  economic  future  in 
food-crop  farming 
In  a  peasant country,  subsistence  farming  activities have priority:  food  re-
quirements  cannot  be  covered  satisfactorily by purchases  from  traders,  on  the 
one  hand  for  reasons  of security of supplies  (unreliability or absence  of lo-
cal  trade in foodstuffs)  and  on  the  other hand  because  of cost considerations 
(high prices of foodstuffs  bought  from  traders  in relation to the  logic of 
producing one's  own  food). 
In  the past,  regular supplies of subsistence  foods  were  maintained  by  the 
balanced  working of local  ecosystems,  in contexts  where  external  contribu-
tions of inputs  were  non-existent,  hypothetical  or unreliable because  of non-
integration with  trading  economies,  lack  of finance  to pay  for  them  and  the 
non-existence of organized distributive structures. 
Each  type  of crop  has  it.s  own  'status'  and this determines priorities in 
farmwork. 
For instance,  some  rural activities are  seen as  'pivots'  around  which  others 
revolve.  Establishing a  prosperous banana plantation is an  absolute priority 
in Rwanda;  it provides basic  subsistence products  (bananas  and  beer),  it 
safeguards  the  owner  against the risk of famine,  it performs  a  fundamental 
psychological role  and provides  a  regular  income.  Elsewhere  the pivotal ac-
tivities may  be  efficient management  of a  large herd,  or alternatively rice 
growing,  Well-run banana plantations or rice-paddies,  large herds  or barns 
well  stocked with maize  or millet are reflected very directly in the  social 
status of their owners. 
On  the other hand,  industrial  crops  (cotton,  coffee,  etc.)  were  frequently 
seen as  'tax-raising crops'  rather than as  the  means  of developing trade. 
It is clear that considerations of gaining prestige and wealth in the  commu-
nity context provide  stronger motivations than  the prospect of paying tax, 
the latter being the peasant's translation of such  objectives as  'increasing 
the State's budget resources',  'improvement of the  trade balance',  'increas-
ing foreign currency revenue',  etc. 
Several  of the reports refer to the difficulties,  some  of which  lead to seri-
ous  consequences,  arising out of the  technical planning of programmes  to in-
troduce  new  methods  where  such programmes  concentrate exclusively on  export 
crops  (especially as regards fertilizers,  which  are  currently  among  the  most - 117  -
decisive  factors  in the  improvement  of agricultural productivity).  These  dif-
ficulties arise specifically out  of the  differences  in  approach  to priorities 
of the  various  participants in agricultural development  and  out of the  fact 
that the  introduction of new  methods  on  a  farm  holding necessarily entails 
disruption which  does  not automatically bring appreciable  improvements  in all 
aspects of productivity. 
Analysis  of the  status of each  crop  in the agricultural  system which it is 
intended  to modernize  can  be  seen  as  the prerequisite of successful  advisory 
work.  The  farmer,  unlike  the  promoter  of agricultural methods,  cannot afford 
to content  himself with  incomplete  working  of his holding. 
In  the  case  of subsistence  food-crop  agriculture,  there is a  tendency  to as-
sume  that the  farmers  are  capable  of meeting their own  needs,  given their em-
pirical knowledge.  In many  projects,  it was  quite  simply  supposed  that food-
crop production would  increase prorata to population growth.  However,  popula-
tion pressure  has  disrupted  the  traditional pattern of crops  and  fallowing, 
access  to land  and  storage of reserves  of foodstuffs.  In many  cases,  there-
fore,  there  are  shortages  or  endemic  famines  which  are not being  combated  by 
efficient redistribution systems.  Although  acute  problems  (such as  the  Sahel 
famines)  do  not break  out frequently,  it does  seem  that most  subsistence 
farming  is in decline,  whether qualitatively  (trend  towards  less  demanding 
crops  such as  tubers  or bananas rather than cereals or vegetables)  or quanti-
tavely  (fall in yields,  reduction  in strategic stocks  sold by individual 
farms,  etc.). 
Whenever it occurs,  disruption of subsistence activities will  sooner  or later 
have  repercussions  on  commercial  crops,  whether  intended  for  export  or urban 
consumers.  The  development  of commercial  crops is therefore directly linked 
to  improvement  of productivity in the subsistence  sector;  however,  the latter 
receives  very little support in the  form  of official development  resources. 
As  indicated by  the  evaluation reports  on  the  Zinder  and  Togo  projects in 
particular,  the  technical  agencies  have  little idea how  to tackle this sector 
because  they  lack detailed  information  about it. Confronted with  the  need  to 
'do  something',  they  opt for crops  which  are  more  familiar to  them  (ground-
nuts,  cotton etc.),  thus  departing  from  the  initial aim  which  was  to adopt  an 
integrated approach.  This  explains  why  the  3M  (Zinder)  project took  the 
course  of organizing  'pilot zones',  whose  activity became  highly sectoral. 
Self-sufficiency in food  in the countries  concerned is another problem  very 
directly linked to State economic  policy.  In fact,  in most  of the  cases  exam-
ined,  it was  found  that it was  necessary  to  import  in order to supply  the 
towns  and  that the  needs  of regions  with  food  deficits were  often inadequate-
ly met  by  trade  with  those  having  surpluses. 
The  agro-economic  policies pursued  by  State basically revolved  round  export 
crops,  the  only type  of production offering the possibility of substantial 
revenue  for  the public coffers,  in view  of the  tax  systems  currently enforced. 
In the  case of food  crops,  they are generally geared  to the needs  of urban 
consumers  and  unfavourable  to producers  (very  low official prices,  obligation 
to sell within  a  given geographical  area etc.),  so that they  themselves  tend - 118  -
to make  for  shortages.  Governments  have  not  always  been  successful  in estab-
lishing policies which  promote  the diversification  and  development of domes-
tic trade while at the  same  time  securing budget revenues. 
The  commercial  infrastructures,  particularly those  for  storage,  are  rarely 
organized with  food-crop  trade  in mind  and if they are,  they are  inefficient. 
Where  there  are  such  infrastructures,  it is often difficult for  the  rural 
population to buy  in the quantities they  need if they run  out  of supplies be-
tween  seasons  or  in the  event of a  shortage.  In fact,  the projects  evaluated 
in Rwanda  tackled this problem  with  some  efficiency. 
Several  of the  reports  (Niger,  Chad,  Ivory  Coast)  explain that,  when  price 
levels are  satisfactory,  the  traditional sector rapidly becomes  able  to meet 
demand.  For  instance,  the  substantial increase  in paddy prices  in the  Ivory 
Coast  led to  a  sharp  rise in rice production  and  caused difficulties for 
SODERIZ,  which  did  not  have  sufficient funds  to pay  for  the quantities of-
fered  for sale. 
The  absence  of outlets for  food  crops is often  advanced  as  an  explanation for 
the  lack of structured policies in the  field of food-crop  agriculture.  There 
is much  evidence  against this argument,  however. 
The  evaluation reports  record  a  relative increase  in food  crop prices  com-
pared  with export crop  prices.1  In relative terms,  the  share  of export  crops 
in economies  is falling,  a  situation which  raises serious budgetary risks  for 
some  States  which still rely  on  customs  revenue  (export duties  on  cotton, 
coffee  and  groundnuts  can  be  as  much  as  30%  of  the  FOB  price)  or profits made 
by  stabilization funds. 
It now  appears  that farmers  have  already reacted to  the structural  changes  in 
domestic  agricultural markets  and  that,  coercive measures  apart,  only  the 
normal  operation of market  forces  will persuade  farmers  to opt for  export 
crops. 
Other  evidence.points  to a  sharp  increase  in outlets for  food  crops:  the 
scale of food  imports,  whether purely  commercial  or channelled  through inter-
national  food  aid;  the growth of urban  and  industrial centres;  the bidding-up 
of prices at certain inter-State frontiers  etc. 
2.1.6.  Conclusion 
Analysis  of the projects evaluated brings  home  the  complexity of the  mecha-
nisms  governing  the  farming  activities of the  populations affected by  devel-
opment  schemes.  This  complexity  can  by  no  means  be  defined purely  in  terms  of 
reactionary mental  attitudes;  on  the  contrary,  all  the  reports point to pro-
found  and  fast-moving  dynamism  among  the producers.  The  complexity  derives 
from  the  empirical  but determined  attitudes of peasant  farmers  operating 
1  With  the  ex~eption of the case  studied in  Chad:  cf.  2.2.3  and  3.3.2.3. - 119  -
within  the  constraints of technical  and  economic  factors  perceived  in terms 
of conditions  on  their  farms  and  in the  light of their interest in social 
change.  It can  often be  misunderstood  in the rigid and  often simplified 
frameworks  of regulations  or projects designed  by  officials  from  outside  the 
rural  community  often unfamiliar with  the  country itself. 
To  be  truly  'integrated',  rural  development  must give  very  flexible  encour-
agement  to the progress  of  the  complex  of limiting factors  and  incentives. 
The  age  when  it was  thought that rural  development  and  progress  for  the  most 
disadvantaged  populations  would  follow  as  the result of accelerating  indus-
trial growth  has  come  to an  end.  Improvement  of the  circumstances  of disad-
vantaged populations  can  only be  achieved if rural  development  operations  are 
aimed  very directly at the  'target groups'  whose  wellbeing it is intended to 
enhance  from  the  points  of view of economic  conditions,  health,  education etc. 
Moreover,  experience has  confirmed  that lasting results cannot  be  expected 
unless  development  schemes  are  taken over  completely  by  the groups  concerned. 
Any  number  of projects have  attempted  to achieve rural  development  'in spite 
of the  local  farmer',  without his cooperation,  irrespective of the  context of 
his skills,  imagination,  priorities and  even his  methods  of working  the  land. 
In order to increase the effectiveness of resources given  over to rural  de-
velopment,  it is necessary to enquire  into the  fundamental  thought processes 
underlying peasant mentalities  and  the  technical,  economic,  social  and  cul-
tural  behaviour patterns which  they  determine. 1 
2.2.  PUBLIC  PARTICIPANTS 
In all negotiations  on  the  use  of EDF  funds,  the  Commission  deals with  the 
State concerned,  which  entrusts overall supervision,  support  or execution of 
projects  to specially set-up bodies  with responsibility for either a  region 
or  a  sector. 
The  table 2.2.a shows  the public,  parapublic  and  private bodies,  apart  from 
Government  departments,  which  have  been  involved  in the projects;  these  bod-
ies have  been  classified according to function. 
2.2.1.  Problems  of integration of rural  development at institutional level2 
Table  2.2.a contains many  examples  of dispersal  of responsibilities between 
national institutions,  which  is in evidence  in  the  logic of both vertical in-
1  On  this subject,  see:  P.  Thenevin,  Planification et comportements  des  cen-
tres de  decision  en  milieu rural  (Doc.  20)  and  Reflexions  nouvelles  sur le 
developpement  rural,  quatrieme  partie  (Doc.  15). 
2  In connection with 2.2.1,  see  The  Design of Rural  Development,  pp.  196-199 
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Table  2.2.a. 
Marketing 
Supervision  Credit 
Industrial  Food 
Chad  ONDR  (COTONFRAN)  Departement  BDT 
COTONTCHAD  Cerealier/ 
CFDT  FDAR 
Togo  SORAD  Centr.  SOTOCO  TOGOGRAIN  CNCA 
SORAD  des  OPAT 
Plateaux 
SOTOCO 
SRCC 
(SONAPH) 
Rwanda  OBM  OCIR  OBM  Banque 
Cooperative/  populaire 
OBM 
RWANDEX 
Niger  UNCC  SONARA  OPVN  CNCA 
CODETEP  UNCC  UNCC 
Central  African  ORDOHK  UCCA  ON CPA 
Republic  AGROPROGRESS2  ENPROCAF  SICP!I.D 
Buyers 
Zaire  CAKO  ONAFITEX  ONACER  CAKO 
I 
Benin  CARDER  CARDER  CARDER  BBD 
SONAGRI  SONAFEL  CNCA 
SONACEB  RGA  CARDER 
SONAFOR 
Ivory  Coast  SODERIZ  SODERIZ  BNDA 
Upper  Volta  ORD  ORD  OFNACER  BND 
CFDT 
1  In  the  interests of readability,  the  meanings  of the  acronyms  have  not been 
given  in full  in the  text;  they  can  be  found  in Annex  1. 
2  Since  1974. - 121  -
Institutional participants in the  execution of the  projects evaluated, 
apart  from  national  Government  agencies! 
Studies/  Technical  services/  Price  support  Research  Technical 
parapublic  assistance  bodies 
CSSPC  IRCT  CFDT  DEFPA 
DEA 
OPAT  IRCT  INSTRUPA  SON A  COM 
IRAT 
ISAR  SOC IN CO 
SEDES 
AESED 
ITC 
AIDR 
CSSPN  IRHO  CFDT  SDRAT3 
IRCT  SOGETHA  OFEDES 
GRONTMIJ  CES/DRS 
CSPC  INRTV  EUROPREDE 
IRCT  AGROPROGRESS 
IN ERA  INDACOM  CAKO 
SORCA 
P.  FYOT 
CFDT 
IRAT  BDPA 
CFDT 
GRONDMIJ 
AGROTEC 
IRAT 
BEI-AGRER 
LOTI 
SEDES 
CFDT 
3  COTEDEP  embracing agriculture,  livestock farming,  education,  health,  water 
resources  and  forestry,  'animation',  the  SDRAT. - 122  -
tegration or operations  (supervision,  credit,  marketing,  research etc.)  and 
horizontal  integration  (agricultural problems  connected with  cash crops  and 
food  crops,  health problems,  water  supply etc.)  (cr.  5.1.2). 
While  one  cannot  presume  what  would  be  the  conclusions  of more  detailed ana-
lyses  than  those  which  could  be  made  in the  reports,  the  impression  was 
gained  in  a  number  of cases that competition between  specialized institutions 
or between special  interests within  a  single institution was  quite  common. 
In  Chad,  ror instance,  there is a  notable  contrast between  the  prosperous 
COTONTCHAD  and  the  relatively  impecunious  ONDR.  The  CFDT  acts not  only  as 
technical  adviser  (ONDR,  COTONTCHAD),  but also as  commercial  agent  on  behalf 
of  COTONTCHAD,  in which it is a  shareholder.  The  IRCT  is largely financed  by 
the  GERDAT,  whereas  the  DEA,  an  administrative department,  is responsible  for 
food  research,  but has  only  scant means  for  this task.  As  for  the  FDAR,  it 
appears  to be  active  in the  rield without  cooperating  in any  way  with  COTON-
TCHAD  or the  ONDR.  It has  to negotiate its annual  credits with  the  EDT,  which 
is bankrupt,  whereas  COTONTCHAD  enjoys all the  necessary  bank  support,  as  the 
N'Djamena  banks  are  shareholders in the  company. 
In  Togo,  there has  been  a  movement  away  from  structures of the  broad-based 
regional  type  (SORADs)  towards  structures of the specific sectoral  type 
(product  companies:  STOTOCO,  SONAPH,  SRCC):  this trend  was  motivated  by  hopes 
of greater technical  and  economic  efficiency.  However,  it was  difficult to 
judge  the  efriciency of broad-based  intervention structures since their ac-
tivities had  not  been  based  on  overall  approaches  to rural projects.  The 
SORADs  had  concentrated their activities on  export  crops  rather than  on  bot-
tlenecks affecting  farmwork  and  the  hierarchy of crops  as  perceived  by  farm-
ers  (cf.  table 5.1.3). 
Apart  from  concepts  which  hold  true  in relation to action designed  to affect 
'agricultural systems',  how  could  regional  structures be  more  efficient than 
sectoral structures,  particularly where  the  only criterion or development is 
the  criterion of increased production? 
The  SORADs  were  also inefficient because  of their inability to achieve genu-
ine  decentralization of their strategy and  resources  to the rural  community. 
This  shortcoming was  evident in their relations with  the  cooperatives,  for 
instance,  with  the  latter being  looked  upon  rather as  agencies  for  the  im-
plementation of  SORAD  directives than as partners with  whom  it was  necessary 
to cooperate effectively.  Such  an  attitude could not fail  to foster tension 
between rural  communities  and  the  institutions and  seriously undermine  the 
impact  of projects. 
In this particular case,  however,  it must  be  added  that the  intervention 
structures were  changed  as  much  as  a  result of strong political  influences  as 
on  the  grounds  of technical  considerations. 
In  Rwanda,  Zaire  and  Niger,  on  the  other  hand,  the  institutions  seem  to have 
been more  successful  in integrating the  various functions  required  for  the 
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The  Bugesera-Mayaga Office  was  given responsibility simultaneously  for  organ-
izing the  division of land into plots,  receiving migrants,  technical  instruc-
tion  and  marketing  through its cooperatives.  The  Office  has  thus  played  a 
broad-based role.  However,  it has  not  really taken  an  interest in all farming 
activities,  particularly instruction,  since its agricultural  propaganda has 
been virtually restricted to coffee-growing. 
The  Commission  agricole  du  Kasai  oriental  (CAKO)  in Zaire  was  also planned  as 
a  broad-based  organization with  a  fair  degree  of autonomy  which  would  be  ca-
pable  of sustraining overall agricultural development  in the  region entrusted 
to it. However,  the  integration of resources left much  to  be  desired:  pur-
chasing of seed-cotton,  supplies  of cotton seed,  ordering of fertilizers,  in-
secticides etc.,  applied  agronomical  research  and  industrial  development  of 
maize  were  all left in the  hands  of other public  institutions or private op-
erators.  What  is more,  the  CAKO  virtually restricted its activities to  farm-
ing  community  fields growing  cotton  and  maize  as  the first crop.  The  peasant 
farmers'  other crops  and  activities were  left to fend  for  themselves. 
The  3M  project in Niger is the  most  clear-cut example  of an  integrated ap-
proach  to  intervention by institutions.  The  cooperatives  have  had  a  role  to 
play in both agricultural training  ('auto-encadrement')  and  marketing.  They 
have  been  able  to operate within  a  powerful  association with  a  strong nation-
al  structure.  The  horizontal  coordination required for the  execution of mul-
ti-sector programmes  has  been carried out under  the auspices of the Prefect 
by  a  Departmental  Committee  (COTEDEP),  with  the  UNCC  as  the  executive  agency. 
Even  though  the great ascendency  of the  central  UNCC  agencies  over  the  local 
cooperatives is open  to criticism,  it may  be  said  in the  case of the  3M  proj-
ect that there has  been  an  effective blend  of three factors:  vertical  inte-
gration of operations  through  the  UNCC  (training,  credit,  marketing);  hori-
zontal  integration through the  COTEDEP  (in which  the  four  services most  con-
cerned with regional  development  are  brought  together);  at least partial de-
centralization of decision-making  and  the  'auto-encadrement',  marketing  and 
credit functions  to the  cooperatives,  with  decision-making at Departmental 
rather than central  level. 
This  institutional structure  makes  it difficult to separate out the effects 
of the external  aid,  but it ensures that the  institutions are viable without 
aid  and  that the  decisions  on  operations planned  have  remained entirely inde-
pendent of all foreign  assistance. 
2.2.2.  Governments  and  their institutions depend  to a  large extent  on agri-
cultural production 
The  profusion of public  institutions in  some  countries,  the burden  of direct 
and  indirect taxes  on  the  most  important trade  products,  the polarization of 
resources  towards  a  limited field of very specific types  of farming,  the  mo-
nopolistic  tendencies etc.  sometimes  give  the  impression that the  capacity of 
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Broadly  speaking,  it would  seem  that  the  fundamental  characteristics of these 
institutions can be  described  as  follows: 
(i)  their activities are specific  and  centralized,  whereas  the  agrarian 
systems  are  complex  and  decentralized; 
(ii)  they are  dependent  in character  compared  with  the relative  independence 
of farm  holdings,  which  have  the  option  to  concentrate exclusively  on 
subsistence  farming,  which  affords  them  the necessities of life.  The 
development  institutions,  on  the other hand,  depend  on  the resources 
which  they are  able  to derive  from  farming,  either through  taxation or 
through  levies at intermediate  levels  (referred to as  'self-financing'); 
(iii)  lack of continuity of the  institutions and  their representatives as 
compared  with  the  structural stability of farming  communities. 
By  concentrating excessively on  the  State's objectives,  such as  'increasing 
the State's budget resources',  'improving  the  trade balance  and  increasing 
foreign  currency earnings'  or  'achieving self-financing in the  farming  super-
vision structure',  institutions can  sometimes  actually hold back the  sponta-
neous  development  of certain types  of production  and  trade  from  which  they 
would  benefit indirectly themselves  as  much  as  the  farmers.  The  rural popula-
tions have  different objectives.  Under  these  circumstances,  there is real  in-
compatibility when  institutions lose sight of the differences  between  their 
role  in the national  economy  and  their role vis-a-vis their farming  community. 
For  instance,  in the  context of the growing  food crisis in Africa and else-
where  in the world,  the  Togolese  SORADs  were  obliged  from  1971  to pursue  the 
objective  of financial  self-sufficiency.  This  led  them  to concentrate  more 
specifically on  cotton which,  because  of the  monopoly,  enabled  them  to be 
self-financing.  This  obligation increased  competition against  food  crops  and 
indirectly accentuated  the crisis. It therefore  seems  that the  objective  of 
making  the  SORADs,  and  later SOTOCO,  finance  themselves  actually worked 
against the interests of development  and  diversification of trade in the 
Togolese  national  economy. 
The  institutions in Central  African Republic  have  not concerned  themselves 
with  food  crop  development  to  any  appreciable  extent.  The  town  of Bangui  suf-
fered  from  sporadic  shortages  during  the period of the project.  In the  rural 
areas  cotton was  competing with cereals  and  favouring  manioc,  whose  nutri-
tional value  is lower.  What  chance  was  there  of building  a  prosperous  cotton-
growing  industry  on  a  foundation  of food  shortages? 
In many  cases  the  institutions'  interventionism,  or  indeed  authoritarism, 
vis-a-vis  the  farming  community  seems  to be  inversely proportional  to their 
success  in establishing confidence,  offering appropriate  economic  incentives 
and  performing their own  role satisfactorily in the  fields  of marketing,  pro-
visioning,  credit,  research  and  training. 
Mutual  confidence  and  institutional stability emerge  as  two  important factors 
determining  the  success  of the  public participants in  the process  of develop-
ment.  It is essential to establish such  confidence  and  stability so that 
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tions.  This  twofold  conclusion is particularly well  illustrated by  the evalu-
ation studies  of the Niger  and  Chad  projects,  in the  case  of the  former  be-
cause relations between  farmers  and  officials were  established through con-
tacts at various  levels  in which  the officials gave  no hint of looking  down 
on  the peasant  communities;  in the  case of the latter because stability of 
economic  incentives  and  reliable marketing  of cotton meant  that the  farmer 
enjoyed  relative security of  income. 
2.2.3.  Economic  policies expressed  through  development  programmes  wilt when 
coming  into contact with  the realities of projects in the  rural  envi-
ronment 
Each  country defines its agrarian policies in the  light of specific circum-
stances.  However,  some  common  aspects  can  be  identified,  although it is not 
always  possible to draw  generalized conclusions;  indeed not all the  evalua-
tion reports discuss  the  economic  policies underlying  the projects in explic-
it terms.  Moreover,  only in  few  cases  was  the  relationship between  economic 
policies  and  the  aims  and  objectives of projetts established at the outset. 
Evidence  is also provided  of inconsistency between the general  aims  of na-
tional plans  and  the  way  projects were  handled  in practice.  In  some  cases, 
ill-conceived  economic  measures  led  to dislocation of incentives essential to 
the  successful  development  of farming. 
The  clearest examples  of dislocation are  to be  found  in farm  price policies, 
which  often militate against the achievement  of the  general  aims  and  objec-
tives of diversification of agricultural production. 
Niger,  for  example,  wished  to  'diversify production'  and  'raise nutritional 
standards  for its people'.  When  production of cowpeas  increased in response 
to favourable  regional  and  inter-State market  conditions,  the official price 
was  reduced  by  25%,  resulting in an  immediate  fall in the production  and  the 
marketing of the  crop. 
Food  crop prices rise at the  expense  of traditional export  crops:  it is im-
possible  to  aim 1simultaneously at  improving nutritional  standards  for  the 
population  and maintaining the  level of fiscal  revenue  from  cotton unless 
there is a  significant overall  improvement  in productivity. 
In more  general  terms,  much  evidence  was  brought  to light of lack of coordi-
nation between  the  ideals  of policies  aimed  at agricultural diversification 
and  nutritional  improvement  and  actual practice in the  field of market  regu-
lation which,  almost without  exception,  appears  to exert  a  depressive influ-
ence  on  food  crop  production for various reasons: 
(i)  prices are  regulated  according to the  interests of the urban  consumer 
rather than  those  of the producer; 
(ii)  action in the field of food  marketing is frequently  accompanied  by  mo-
nopoly  powers,  but the  monopoly  institutions often lack the flexibility 
and  resources of private traders; 
(iii)  the  working  capital  for  food  price regulation operations is always  in-
adequate,  which  is very serious when  there is a  commercial  monopoly; - 126  -
(iv)  regulations  do  not  take  account of the  context of inter-State trade; 
(v)  action to  exclude  intermediaries is sometimes  taken  inopportunely at 
local  level. 
If the  State  lacks  the  resources  to replace  private intermediaries  by  more 
efficient organizations,  ill-judged measures  can  lead  to shortages  or  econom-
ic qifficulties which  are  worse  than those  caused  by  the  intermediaries  whose 
excesses  they  are  designed  to combat. 
In  Chad,  for  instance,  there is every reason  to believe  that  the  food  price 
policies pursued  are  largely responsible  for  domestic  shortages  and  the fre-
quent  'frauds'  with Nigeria.  Urban  consumers  buy  FDAR  cereals at speculative 
prices  a  few  yards  away  from  FDAR  shops;  the  populations affected by  the 
drought,  on  the  other hand,  are entitled to receive  their meagre  diet of ce-
reals free  of charge.  Sub-prefects prevent traders  from  taking  foodstuffs 
outside  their areas;  cooperative  farmers  dispose  of stocks  in their local 
villages because  they are prevented  from  selling them  at the  market price by 
authorities  insisting on  compliance  with  FDAR  rules;  world  food  aid  agencies 
import  foreign  foodstuffs  instead of buying cereals produced  locally,  etc. 
In  view  of their precarious  food  supply  situation and  demographic  pressures, 
several  countries are  anxious  to re-establish the  balance  between  population 
and  soil resources.  This  can  only  be  achieved  on  a  national  scale if there is 
balance at local  level  in the  many  farming  areas.  However,  it has  been  found 
that these  agronomical  balances  are  not being maintained  where  cash  crops  are 
being grown,  whether  cotton,  groundnuts  or coffee,  and  that they  cannot be 
restored  on  the basis of the present input/output price structure. 
If the  agronomical  balance is to be  maintained,  all the minerals  taken out of 
the soil by cultivation must  be returned.  In  the  case  of land  farmed  in a 
closed cycle  (subsistence crops),  the  minerals  are  retained in the  ecosystem, 
even if they  are redistributed  from  one  field  to  another.  On  the  other hand, 
where  export  crops  are grown,  the  balance of the  ecosystem is broken  down  un-
less what  has  been  taken  out of the  land  is at least matched  by equivalent 
external  inputs. 
None  of the projects has  managed  to solve this problem.  It may  therefore be 
said without  too  much  exaggeration that  the  demographic  pressure  on  land 
which  is already underproductive  and  overpopulated  is being  increased by  the 
demands  of a  foreign population  (cotton users,  coffee drinkers etc.). 
It is impossible  to disregard  the risks which  such uncompensated  excess pres-
sures represent to the  future  of African  farming.  Land  whose  productivity is 
low  and  which  is still being cultivated extensively is having  to support: 
(i)  the  demands  of the  local population  (subsistence  crops), 
(ii)  the  additional  demands  of the  domestic  urban population, 
(iii)  the  additional  demands  of foreign  consumers. 
In addition,  the holdings  on  this land  are  required  to operate profitably and 
to generate  the  funds  required  to finance  the  supervisory services.  Many  of - 127  -
the project agreements  contain stipulations  on  financial  self-sufficiency, 
for  instance the reinvestment  fund  planned  in Rwanda,  the  SORADs  in  Togo, 
CAKO  in Zaire. 
Most  developed  nations  subsidize their highly productive  farming  with re-
sources  drawn  from  non-agricultural  sectors.  In  the  countries benefiting un-
der the projects  evaluated,  the  situation is reversed:  despite its low pro-
ductivity,  the  farming  sector is required,  not  only  to  feed  the national pop-
ulation,  but also to support  the  institutions  and  finance  national  develop-
ment,  and  this in contexts where  there is little or no  organization of input-
output trade. 
2.2.4.  Constraints  accepted  by  States 
The  wilting of economic  policies expressed in development plans  when  they 
come  into conT.act with the realities of operating in the rural  environments 
can  be  explained  in  terms  of the  various  constraints within which  context the 
national  and  public institutions have  to operate,  particularly in the  case  of 
the poorest States  and  those  least able  to rely on  industry or mining  for  the 
budget resources  they  need  in order to survive. 
There  are  many  cases in which political constraints or ethical constraints 
condition  the activities of institutions.  States  are  frequently  confronted 
with  problems  of nation-building which  foreigners  are  not  in  a  position to 
understand.  It is nevertheless wrong  to blind oneself to these realities, 
particularly in the  way  that some  technical  assistance personnel  do,  pretend-
ing that they can  carry  on  as if they did  not exist.1 
Several  of the projects evaluated were  very directly affected during the 
course  of operations by politics in the  technical  institutions themselves. 
This  factor is generally more  influential  in institutions with  a  relatively 
centralized structure of responsibilities than it would  be  if the  organiza-
tion were  more  decentralized  and  more  fully  integrated with  the  population 
directly concerned. 
The  influence  of such political factors  appears  to be  inversely proportional 
to  the  number  of economic  factors  generating the  cash resources  and  foreign 
currency  needed  for  the  survival  of public institutions. 
In essentially agricultural  economies,  'tax bases'  are highly specific and 
related to monopolizable  trade:  cotton,  coffee,  cocoa  and  groundnuts  in the 
cases  studied.  As  mentioned  above,  a  relative ·reduction in export  crop  agri-
culture must  inevitably lead to a  relative fall in budget revenues  and  for-
eign currency earnings. 
1  See  for  instance certain types  of assistance to the  SODERIZ  in the  Ivory 
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It has  to be  noted  that this is  a  'structural'  situation,  because  there has 
been  very little investment by  States in the  organization or domestic  or in-
ter-regional  trade,  which is another potential source  or tax revenues  for na-
tional economies  and  would  be  more  broadly based  and  more  varied. 
Helping  States to create the  cond~tions for this  type  or environment  (aid to 
policies on  strategic stocks,  provision or working capital,  intensification 
or research etc.)  is a  desirable  objective for  future  aid operations  in so 
far as  States gradually  come  to expect less  from  export  crops  and exert less 
pressure  on  farmers,  while  at the  same  time  action is taken  to  improve  cover-
age  or local  rood  requirements  and  diversify domestic  trade  - action which 
would  accord  with  the present priorities and  interests or the  farming  commu-
nities concerned. 
States also have  to deal  with  a  permanent  problem or urban population growth. 
Urban populations,  an  appreciable proportion or whom  rely directly  on public 
funds  for their subsistence,  generally carry political weight  which makes  it 
difficult to apply  economic  measures  which  favour  rural producers. 
Many  attempts  have  been made  to bring markets,  infrastructures and  organiza-
tional structures under  control  through  the  establishment of more  or less mo-
nopolistic institutions,  but  these  do  not produce  lasting improvements  bene-
fiting trade between producers  and  consumers. 
One  finds  - in the  case  of Chad  and  Zaire,  for  instance  - that the State 
finds  itself in the position of having  to assume  increasing proportions of 
production costs,  with  or without  foreign  aid.  Sometimes  payment  of these 
costs is made  through  the  intermediary of stabilization funds.  However,  the 
growth rate for expenditure  on  inputs  needed  for agricultural intensification 
is raster than the growth  in revenues  derived  from  the activities to which 
stabilization measures  are  applied.  Consequently,  public  institutions are  on-
ly able  to balance their accounts  by  exerting increasing pressure  on  produc-
ers or by  recourse  to foreign  aid.  If they adopt  the  former  course,  their ef-
forts are hampered  by  indifference  on  the part of producers;  with the latter 
course,  they place  themselves  in  a  position of dependency  on  foreign aid 
which is by definition temporary. 
The  Stabex  system set up  in 1976  deals with only  one  aspect of the  problem: 
the revenue  side;  the  other aspect,  expenditure,  could only be  solved if 
there were  also a  stabilization fund  for  imports  of essential inputs espe-
cially fertilizers and  insecticides. 
2.3.  FINANCIAL  PARTNER:  THE  EDF 
Farming  families  are  the ultimate beneficiaries of EDF  rural  development aid. 
This  aid is always  channelled  through public institutions whose  priorities 
are  determined by  the recipient States,  either through  the promulgation of 
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Aid  for the rural populations of the African countries  under consideration 
here  may  be  compared  up  to  a  point with the  aid granted  by  the  Community  to 
its own  farmers.  However,  the  farmers'  associations in the  Common  Market  have 
real  powers  of negotiation enabling  them  to defend  the  economic  interests of 
their members.  Nothing similar exists in the countries mentioned  in this re-
port.  Direct evaluation of effects of aid  on  farm  holdings is therefore dif-
ficult,  since it is carried out  by  outside officials. 
In this connection,  there  may  be  some  ambiguity  in interpretation of the  eco-
nomic  results of aid.  The  fact that aid is beneficial in terms  of income  gen-
erated by  the  'projects'  or of the State's budget revenues  does  not necessar-
ily mean  that it is beneficial in terms  of the wellbeing of rural populations. 
If the people  affected by  projects are not  involved  in evaluation of their 
results,  there is always  the risk that  the  evaluation will  be  biased, 
2.3.1.  Influence of the  Community  on  projects  financed  with EDF  aid 
The  influence  of the  Commission,  and  of the  EDF  in particular,  on  the plan-
ning  and  execution of projects is seen as  variable,  circumstantial and  always 
limited in duration. 
On  a  more  general  level,  by  virtue  of its existence  and  the general policies 
which it applies within  and  beyond  the  frontiers of the  Common  Market,  the 
EEC  influences agricultural  development  in the countries where  the projects 
evaluated were  carried out.  In the  discussions which  have  taken place in the 
North-South dialogue,  much  attention has been given to the overall pattern of 
beneficial  or detrimental  influences  on  conditions in the poor countries  ex-
erted by policies applied  by  the  rich countries.  The  topics of discussion 
have  included  the  organization of international markets,  the deterioration in 
the  terms  of trade between  commodities  and  manufactures  (including factors  of 
production essential to farming),  the transfer of technology  and  competition 
between agricultural  commodities  and  synthetic products. 
To  a  certain extent,  the effect of temporary  subsidies channelled  through 
projects are  marginal  in relation to those  which  could be  produced by  more 
fundamental  policies such  as  those  for which  the  Third World  countries have 
been pressing in the North-South dialogue.  For instance,  it would  be useful 
to make  a  comparative  analysis of the  effects which would  be  produced by in-
dex-linking agricultural  commodity prices to the prices of manufactured  goods 
needed  for their production,  in relation to the effects of structural aid  as 
organized currently through projects which  are  limited to specified sectors 
and  geographical  areas  and also limited in duration. 
If the  consumer countries paid  more  for  agricultural commodities,  there would 
be  an  appreciable structural  improvement.  However,  this would still leave  the 
need  to work  towards  the  improvement  of productivity in African agriculture. 
As  has  been  mentioned  in connection with  Chad  (cf.  1.05),  an  increase  in pur-
chase prices leads to  a  greater relative  improvement  in returns  on  extensive 
farming  than  in those  from  intensive  farming.  This  holds  true only at the 
lowest levels of productivity.  However,  as  the  evaluation of the  Ivory Coast - 130  -
project suggests,  it seems  that an  increase  in the  price of a  product  can 
have  an  impact  on  production or incomes  leading to such interest amongst 
farmers  that there is a  substantial  increase in their demand  for  intensive 
farming  technology.  Higher prices for agricultural  commodities  and  stabiliza-
tion of the  terms  of trade between  inputs  and  outputs are  included  among  the 
demands  of the Third  World  countries.  In so far as  there were  real  improve-
ments  in the  prices  and  price ratios benefiting the national  economies  of 
these  countries,  it is probable that structural aid would  have  to take  on  new 
forms.  Although  of crucial  importance,  these  themes  cannot be  developed  fur-
ther  on  the basis of the  information available in the  evaluation reports.  A 
specific study is called for. 
This  said,  it is necessary  to examine  the  influence which  the  EDF  can bring 
to bear in the more  immediate  future  on  the  direction  taken by  rural  develop-
ment  operations. 
A first type  of incluence is that exerted  through the  image  of the  Funds'  aid 
as  seen  through  the  eyes  of African States.  Hitherto,  this aid  has  been 
granted more  on  the basis of the  economic profitability and  financial viabil-
ity of projects than  on  the basis  of more  structural objectives connected 
with  land utilization schemes,  encouragement of domestic  economic  flows  be-
tween diversified regions  and  social categories,  organization of the  rural 
environment  by  local populations etc.;  moreover,  this basis of judgment has 
been  compatible with  the  most direct interests of the  African States. 
Although  the basic design of projects  always  comes  from  the government  of the 
recipient countries,  sometimes with inspiration from  technical  assistance 
sources,  the  history of some  of the projects evaluated  shows  the  decisive  in-
fluence  which  the  EDF  had  on  the definition of objectives,  on  decisions  about 
resources  to be  employed  or  even  on  the definition of institutional responsi-
bilities. For  instance,  it is reported that advice  from  the  EDF  had  a  strong 
influence  on  the  decisions  on  integration of an  'animal-drawn tillage'  se~­
tion in Ivory Coast  and  'livestock'  and  'food-crop'  sections in Chad. 
This  EDF  influence is nevertheless of limited duration:  once  an  application 
has been  examined  and  the  finance  agreement  has  been signed,  the  EDF  plays  a 
supervisory role only.  The  limited resources for  evaluation,  which is the 
means  of monitoring the real  impact of projects on  the rural  environment, 
contrast with the scale of the  tasks  involved in preliminary negotiations,  in 
the  supervision of expenditure  programmes  and  trade regulations,  the  drawing 
up  of contracts,  etc. 
The  EDF  also exerts influence  through its standards for planning of the  con-
tents of projects.1  Projects are  always  planned  over  a  period not exceeding 
five years.  With  such short and  demanding  periods,  there is little hope  that 
schemes  started with  aid will  be  taken  over  by  the  recipient States,  which 
1  Not  indicative planning of aid for  an  entire country,  but detailed sched-
ules of expenditure  and  operations to be  carried out,  with  the  correspond-
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can  never  be  certain that it will  be  possible to  add  a  further phase  to the 
work  completed  through another project  following  a  few  years later.  Planning 
rural  development  over  an  insufficient number  of years  makes it necessary  to 
telescope objectives.l Simultaneous efforts are  made  to  'increase production 
significantly',  'revolutionize peasant farming',  'Set up  institutional facil-
ities',  'train the necessary staff',  'make  farms  and projects profitable in 
order to generate the resources needed  to cover running  costs'  when  the ex-
ternal  finance  is discontinued.  The  desire to operate to such time-scales  for 
so many  substantial objectives does  not  always  seem  to be  compatible with  the 
time-scales possible in farming,  in the  organization of rural societies or in 
the  lengthy processes of education  and  training.  The  peasant  farming world 
does  not react favourably  or unfavourably  to innovations proposed  from  out-
side until at least two  crop-years  have  passed;  the  time  needed  to train ex-
perienced staff is proportional  to the  complexity of their responsibilities; 
setting up  and  running in institutions necessitate political and  technical 
gestation periods which  are  also very long.  The  same  applies  to the estab-
lishment of marketing  and  supply infrastructures,  which  have  to have  been 
seen to operate efficiently over  a  considerable period before  they are ac-
cepted  by  farmers. 
In some  cases,  technical  assistance can be  a  decisive  factor making  for  such 
telescoping;  either the organization responsible  for technical  assistance 
lays  down  unduly  short time-scales  from  the  outset or technical  assistance 
becomes  essential if the  time-scales laid down  by  the authorities are to be 
kept;  however,  the results achieved  are  often short-lived. 
The  situation would  be  different if aid could be  implemented  over longer 
time-scales  and  according to general  economic  policies rather than according 
to very detailed  timetables  and  conditions. 
However,  it should not be  denied  that relatively inflexible scheduling of 
projects can offer advantages  in particularly difficult cases.  In the  Central 
African Republic,  there  can be  no  doubt that,  without this  type  of scheduling 
of EDF  aid,  it would  have  been very much  more  difficult to sustain cotton 
growing  in view of all the  disruption  caused  by  the  land reforms. 
When  time-scales are  too  short  and  objectives are  telescoped,  States are ob-
liged to apply for  further aid at the  end  of each period,  either to the  EDF 
itself or to other sources.  Some  programmes  date back ten or fifteen years, 
having been renegotiated  from  phase  to phase,  sometimes  for several years, 
but other  times  for  only  one year.  Under  these  circumstances,  government of-
ficials and  the  farmers  themselves  are kept in  a  permanent state of uncer-
tainty.  Sometimes  the transition from  one  'phase'  to  the  next is accompanied 
by  abrupt  changes  in conditions for  farmers,  who  are  then  obliged to work  out 
their accounts afresh.  Because  the  farming  community  is not regarded as  a 
full partner,  it is not kept  informed  of plans  laid down  for the  execution of 
projects which  affect it. 
1  On  this subject,  see  FAO.  Examen  des  programmes  de  terrain;  1974/1975 
(pp.  120-123)  (Doc.  24). - 132  -
The  lengthening of time-scales of economic  and  financial  aid  {for instance, 
periods of ten years  or successive phases  lasting four  or  five  years)  would 
give institutions more  motivation to  aim  for  action which  is well  structured 
in time  and  space,  since  they would  have  longer guarantees.  Moreover,  there 
is no  reason why  time-scales  should  not be  longer for  some  types  of aid 
{structural aid  or aid  for  infrastructure)  than for  others  (aid for  organiza-
tion of the rural  environment)  (cf.  6.1). 
2.3.2.  Problems  connected with the  formulation  of project objectives1 
The  main  factors  taken into account by  the  Commission  in deciding whether  or 
not  to finance  a  project are  the levels and  realism of the  objectives pro-
posed.  An  important consideration is that these  factors  must  ensure  coherence 
between the project to be  financed  and  other development activities completed 
or  contemplated  by  the  State concerned. 
Examination of the projects evaluated nevertheless  showed  that the  objectives 
laid  down  were  not attained in the majority of cases,  although  there were 
others in which  they were  exceeded  by  a  very  wide  margin;  in  a  number  of in-
stances,  they were  modified  during the  course of the project in order to 
maintain contact with real  developments  where  peasant outputs are  concerned. 
Several  questions arise regarding the  manner  in which  these objectives are 
fixed.  It does  seem  that they are being pitched higher and  higher in order to 
justify applications for  aid;  by being deliberately optimistic - and  unreal-
istic - in forecasts  of yields  and  areas actually under  cultivation, it is 
possible to hold  out fine  prospects  of the production figures  and profitabil-
ity which projects could  offer.  Political decisions  can  also lead to  the pro-
posal  of objectives which  are manifestly unattainable.  It also occurs  that 
technically realistic objectives are  laid down  in  the  knowledge  that very un-
certain economic  parameters outside  the  control  of the project itself could 
modify its feasibility radically. 
In actual fact,  the realism of objectives is frequently made  unreliable by 
the  economic  environment.  A given objective is valid in a  given price context; 
if there are  changes  in the price system,  the  objective can  lose its realism, 
not only  for  the peasant producer,  but also in terms  of optimum  allocation of 
the resources of the national  economy  as  a  whole. 
For  instance,  it was  found  that,  in the  Ivory Coast,  the  rice-growing  schemes 
planned  in 1972  by  SODERIZ  were  necessary mainly  because  the producer price 
for paddy  had  been  fixed  too  low.  When  the price was  doubled,  paddy  was  pro-
duced  the  following  year in such  large quantities that SODERIZ  was  unable  to 
buy it all,  for  lack of working  capital.  The  main  factor  accounting for  the 
low  level of rice growing  in the  Ivory  Coast  in 1972  was  the  price offered  to 
producers,  which  was  low because  of competition  from  imported rice;  the pro-
1 Cf.  Part Six  on  the methodology of project-based operations. - 133  -
ducers'  limited ability to master rain-fed or irrigated rice growing  methods 
was  only  a  secondary  factor. 
The  decision  to  take  action to modify  either the first or  the  second  factor 
is a  strategic choice  which  the  States concerned  take  explicitly or implicit-
ly.  For  this reason  the  arguments  submitted in support of project files  would 
always  have  gained in clarity and  relevance if they  had  been presented more 
systematically in  terms  of  'constraints - incentives - objectives'  for  each 
economic  agent  - the  farmer,  the institution responsible  for  the project and 
the  State  - and  for  the  national  economy  as  a  whole.  This approach would  en-
sure  a  better understanding at the beginning and  end  of projects of the real 
impact of subsidies  on  the  rural population  aimed  at and it would  make  for 
better use  of available resources  in combating  the  causes of agricultural un-
derdevelopment rather than the pursuit of objectives inevitably based  on  hy-
pothetical projections. 
Moreover,  it is not unimportant  that the  EDF,  when  appra1s1ng proposed proj-
ects,  should  be  able  to base its decisions  on  a  presentation of production 
objectives set against the  corresponding  areas under  cultivation,  yields etc. 
or a  presentation o·f  structural  aims  based  on  analysis of the  economic  and 
technical  constraints and  incentives  influencing the pattern of farming. 
States,  as  the public partners,  prefer formulations  expressed in terms  of 
production objectives because  they  enable  them  to calculate  the  revenues 
which  they would  derive  from  their attainment;  peasant  farmers,  on  the  other 
hand,  are  more  responsive  to planning of fundamental  economic  incentives  and 
measures  to ease  the  various constraints affecting their farming  activities 
(for instance,  constraints in the  areas  of supplies of inputs,  the  cost of 
inputs etc.). Part Three 
ECONOMIC  POLICIES  AND  INTEGRATED  RURAL  DEVELOPMENT 
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3.1.  RURAL  DEVELOPMENT:  THE  INFLUENCE  OF  LIMITING  FACTORS  AND  INCENTIVES 
Agriculture is the  'art of the possible'  as practised by  the  farmer  within 
the constraints of available resources,  the general  environment,  ambient 
technical  knowledge  and  uncertainty.  These  constraints or factors  function 
according  to the principle of the  'law of minima'  or  law  of limiting factors, 
the  effect of which  is that the  most  limiting factor determines  the  level  of 
activity.  Agricultural  development  consists in gradually unblocking  each of 
the bottlenecks restricting improvement  in production and well-being in the 
farming  world. 
In agriculture,  each  factor  (cf.  Part Four)  or constraint is to some  extent 
conditioned by  the  laws  of uncertainty.  This  means  that the  minima  change 
from  one period to another  and  the  farmer  has  to take  decisions  about  the 
technical  and  economic  options which  will bring him  optimum  results in his 
uncertain universe;  as has  been  seen  above,  more  considerations are  involved 
than  mere  maximization of cash profits. 
Any  change  in one  or more  constraints which  is more  or less  random  and poten-
tially only  temporary may  lead to opportunistic behaviour  (taking advantage 
of a  situation)  without necessarily leading to any  fundamental  change  in 
technical  behaviour.  The  random  nature of the  influence of constraints  and 
factors  accounts  for  the  slowness  of farmers'  reactions to the  technical  in-
novations  proposed  to  them;  their efficiency always  has  to be  demonstrated  in 
the  various  different sets of circumstances which  can arise.  An  innovation 
will  not  be  accepted  by peasant farmers  as  'reliable'  and  'viable'  until it 
has  been put to the test of climate variations,  economic  fluctuations  and  the 
various risks to which  supplies of inputs are subject.1 
The  factors  limiting rural  development are manifold  and  specific to  each ru-
ral context.  In so far  as  development  consists in the gradual elimination of 
bottlenecks,  it is essential  to identify bottlenecks as  and  when  they  occur. 
Hence,  continuing evaluation needs  to go beyond  the  mere  collection and  proc-
essing of statistical,  economic  or technical  data  (areas,  yields,  numbers  of 
growers,  volume  of credit etc.); it must also involve analysis  in the  light 
1  In this  connection,  see  P.  Thenevin,  Planification et comportement  des  cen-
tres de  decision en  milieu rural  {Doc.  20). - 138  -
of a  wide  range  of criteria embracing  rural  economics  and  sociology,  ecology, 
agronomy,  law etc.  on  a  broader basis than that offered by  the  'operational' 
logic  of projects,  which  often  imposes  simplications  which fail to  take  into 
account,  for  the  farmers  involved,  the  interplay of limiting factors  and  ~n­
centives  in relation to the  requirements  of development. 
Although  the  level of farming  activity is determined  according to the  princi-
ple  of the  law  of minima,  peasant  farmers'  willingness  to participate in de-
velopment is aroused  by  the attractions and  incentives which it offers. 
Although is known  about  them  by  the  development  institutions,  the  incentives 
which  have  encouraged efforts  on  the  part of peasant  farmers  are numerous  and 
diverse:  meeting  food  needs;  increase  in cash resources  (often  in connection 
with specific objectives;  social obligations,  medical  care,  education costs, 
housing etc.);  improvement  in purchasing  power;  reduction in work  load;  so-
cial prestige;  control  over  economic  resources  (land  and  manpower  in particu-
lar).  These  incentives differ according to the  social categories  and  deci-
sion-making  levels  described  above  (2.1.2).  Increasing effort is needed  to 
formulate  rural  development  strategies  founded  on  research into policies of-
fering real  incentives which  can be  appreciated at the  level  of the economy 
of the  individual  farm  holding. 
The  'project-based'  approach  involves  simplifications which fail  to  take  full 
account of the real complexities of the  interplay between  incentives  and  con-
straints in rural  development.  Although  no  attempt has  been  made  to  draw  up 
an  exhaustive  inventory,  a  list has  been  made  of factors directly affecting 
practical choices  made  by  farmers  in the  light of economic  or  technical  con-
straints during  the  course  of the projects evaluated.  This list is largely 
confined  to technical  and  economic  factors;  it should be  supplemented  by  the 
series of social  and cultural factors  entering into the  way  of life of the 
populations  concerned,  which  should not  be  dismissed as leisure activities, 
wastes  of time  or folklore  (this tends  to be  the  attitude of  'developers'). 
The  factors  underlined in this fairly  long list warrant  more  systematic  ana-
lysis by  the organizers  and  evaluators  of projects. 
(i)  Prices  and  incomes.  The  level of incomes  is a  dominant  consideration: 
The  desire  to obtain more  satisfactory prices  was  expressed everywhere. 
The  problems  raised  in the  context of the projects were  considered at 
various  levels:  the  absolute  level of prices of trade products,  the 
relative  level of prices of export products  and  food  products,  the rel-
ative  development  of prices of inputs  and  outputs,  the  terms  of trade 
and  purchasing  power  etc. 
In addition,  the reports stress the  role of subsidies  on prices and  on 
the geographical distribution of subsidies. 
Stability of prices for export products  is no  longer  a  fundamental 
problem  for  farmers  insofar as  there are stabilization funds  for these 
products.  However,  a  degree  of uncertainty regarding producer prices 
for  groundnuts  and  coffee  was  reported by  the  evaluators of the  proj-
ects in Niger,  Central  African Republic  and  Togo. - 139  -
(ii)  The  level  of production-related expenditure is also cited as  a  con-
straint in relation to either the  level  of incomes  or  the  level  of 
credit available. 
(iii)  Where  supplies of consumer  goods  cannot be  relied upon,  purchasing pow-
er is insufficient,  given  the  level  of disposable  incomes.  There  is a 
tendency  to hoard  money  or tie up  resources  in various ways:  buying 
cattle,  increasing dowries,  prestige  spending to develop  business etc. 
What  is sometimes  called  'tying up  assets'  is in fact  often saving  and 
investment in the particular context of the  agrarian system. 
(iv)  The  return  on  labour is quoted  as  a  decisive factor  in farming.  It is a 
major  criterion in the  evaluation of the projects  financed  out of Third 
EDF.  The  average  productivity of labour  over  the year is the criterion 
most  commonly  used. 
One  report stresses the  importance  of the marginal  return  on  labour at 
peak periods,  measured  on  the basis of average productivity of one 
day's  work  in the  various periods  of the  farming  calendar  (ten-day pe-
riods,  for  example).  This  latter criterion may  explain the  poor results 
obtained by  advisory services  introducing  new  methods  in connection 
with early  sowing,  weeding  or  the protection of cotton crops 
(cf.  3.3.1). 
(v)  Many  important constraints arise in connection with the  management  of 
farm  labour:  low  labour productivity in sowing,  hoeing,  harvesting, 
preparation for  market  and  carting.  The  underemployment  observed is 
generally seasonal  and  inherent in all farming activity.  The  references 
to seasonal  migration  found  in the  evaluation report on  the  3M  project, 
for  instance,  are  evidence  of the efforts made.to  find  other paid em-
ployment. 
Frequent references are  made  to specialization of work:  division be-
tween  men  and  women,  community  jobs,  individual  jobs,  jobs for  children 
etc.  This  is accompanied  by  a  degree  of rigidity in the organization 
of work,  with each individual  having his  own  priorities  (see 2.1.2). 
There  is evidence,  however,  of gradual  change  in the pattern of spe-
cialization as  a  result of the  increasing conversion into cash of food 
products which,  by  trqdition,  used  to be  the  exclusive perserve  of the 
womenfolk,  but now  seem  to be  attracting increasing interest from  men. 
Another decisive  factor  in  farming activity is the availability of cas-
ual  labour for  peak periods.  In this connection,  a  degree  of complemen-
tarity between  regions within  a  country or  in neighbouring countries 
has  been  noted. 
Mention  should  also be  made  of the benefits to the  farmer  of diversify-
ing his crops  as  much  as possible  and  diversifying varieties according 
to growth cycles  in order to spread  the workload  more  evenly over  the 
year. 
Mention  is also made  of the  savings of time  which  can  be  achieved  in 
some  cases by growing  companion  crops,  particularly as  regards hoeing. - 140  -
The  complexity of factors  relating to the organization of work  is prob-
ably not fully reflected  in the  above  enumeration based  on  the  evalua-
tion reports.  Specific detailed analyses  should  be  carried out  on  the 
determinants of  farm  labour  and  on  farmers'  attitudes in this sphere, 
including  the  legal aspects  (rights attaching to work).  They  would  of-
fer  the  advantage  of allowing  'developers'  to  concentrate  and  special-
ize  their activities in the  light of the  specific circumstances of the 
various  categories  of members  of the rural  community  defined  above 
(2.1.2). 
(vi)  Regarding  land use,  the first observation called for  is that population 
pressure  has  created fundamental  imbalances  everywhere,  although  these 
are  more  acute  in  some  project areas  than others,  with  a  particularly 
worrying situation in Rwanda,  given  the  small  area of  land  available 
for  each  family  and  the  low  productivity of this land,  a  relative abun-
dance  of available  land  in southern Chad,  etc.  However,  nearly all the 
reports mention  the  breakdown  of traditional rotations of crops  and 
fallowing.  This  situation in fact  indicates  local  land  shortages.  Under 
these conditions,  it is common  for  farmers,  who  are  no  longer  able  to 
move  their homes  from  place  to place  as  in the past,  to  farm  fields 
further  and  further  away  from  their villages,  thus  increasing cartage 
times  within their holdings.  Many  farmers  react to this problem  by 
building their homes  in the  middle  of their land rather than  in vil-
lages. 
Similarly,  the  scarcity of land  is gLvLng  rise increasingly to monopo-
lization and  harrassment.  Examples  are  quoted of young  men  who  are un-
able  to find  land  to  farm  and  of women  who,  in some  regions,  are 
obliged to lease  land  to their husbands  because  of the monopolization 
of land rights.  There  are  also frequent reports  of harrassment of gra-
ziers,  as  farmers  encroach  on  grazing  land,  sometimes  resulting in vio-
lent disputes. 
The  quality of soil is an  extremely disturbing problem raised by  farm-
ers as  well  as  by  researchers  and  advisory staff. It is nevertheless 
clear that the  level  of investment  in this area is far  from  sufficient 
since most  of the  reports refer to  the  problem  of the  continued prog-
ress of gradual  exhaustion caused  by  the  removal  of minerals  from  the 
soil without replacing  them  with fertilizers  and  by  the acceleration of 
erosion phenomena.  Efforts to improve  the quality of soil with organic 
inputs are  often hampered  by  the  problems  of carting within the  holding, 
while  the purposes  for which mineral  fertilizers  can be  used  are  gener-
ally defined very restrictively and  they are not usually available for 
crops  whose  immediate profitability is not guaranteed whithin  the  com-
mercial circuits controlled  by  the  State. 
(vii)  Risk  factors.  Risk is an  essential factor  in agriculture  and  has  a  de-
cisive  influence  on  farmers'  behaviour patterns.  Uncertainty  comes  into 
play at various  levels,  the  main  factors being climate,  crop  diseases 
and  finance.  Efforts  to reduce  risks  are  made  within the constraints 
imposed  by  the  environment  and  many  traditional methods  are used  to 
this  end,  often based  on  combinations  of species  and  varieties. - 141  -
Clearly  the  technical  improvements  proposed  through  the projects  (in-
tensive  methods)  lead  to significant reductions  in climate  and  health 
risks.  However,  these intensive methods  are  applied primarily to com-
mercial  crops  and  they  involve  considerable financial risks. 
The  reduction of uncertainty is in fact  a  generalized  concern  on  the 
part of farmers,  who  do  not dissociate risks affecting their cash 
crops ·from  those  affecting their subsistence  crops.  This generalized 
concern  explains many  aspects  of farmers'  attitudes to advisory serv-
ices  (cf.  4.6). 
(viii)  The  management  of supplies of factors  of production is an  important 
part of agricultural  development.  The  constraints influencing farmers' 
options  include:  volume  not  always  satisfactory;  quality not always  up 
to standard  (especially in the  case  of agricultural machinery  and 
seed);  inflexibility of the pattern of supply;  ill-defined instruc-
tions for  use;  the  timing of supplies. 
Other  serious constraints for  farmers  derive  from  their dependence  on 
external  trade factors  and  budgetary or financial  procedures.  In  some 
cases  the  organization of supplies  and  the price structure are  so  con-
ditioned by official subsidization that they  make  it difficult, if not 
impossible,  to obtain supplementary  supplies  from  the private sector 
or after-sales service  (cf.  3.3.4). 
{ix)  The  volume  of credit available  and  the  methods  by which it is provided, 
the profitability of jobbing work  and  opportunities  to control  more 
land  are  other considerations which  may  act as either constraints or 
incentives,  as  is demonstrated  in Part Four. 
This  lengthy enumeration illustrates the  coJnplexity of the  interplay of in-
centives  and  disincentives which  can  influence peasant  farming.  It contrasts 
with  the  apparent simplicity  and  high degree  of specialization of most  of the 
agricultural development projects evaluated.  It throws  light on  the real  con-
tent which  should  be  embodied  in objectives,  whereas  they are often expressed 
in very vague  terms  such  as  'combating rural depopulation',  'improving rural 
life',  'diversifying production',  'combining  farming  and  livestock breeding' 
etc.  It demonstrates  that agro-economic  development  is achieved  through  fun-
damental  incentives offered in the context of clearly formulated  economic 
policies rather than through more  or less successfully organized action de-
signed  to persuade  or force  farmers  to take part in  schemes  which  do not take 
account first and  foremost  of their priorities and  the  many  constraints with-
in which  they have  to operate. 
Analysis  in terms  of limiting factors  and  incentives - a  necessary part of 
the process of formulating rural  development  strategies - generally involves 
more  than purely agricultural  considerations,  as  several projects demonstrate: 
the  psychological  attitude of the  SORAD  staff was  partly responsible  for the 
failure  of efforts to introduce  animal-drawn tillage in Togo;  women's  depend-
ence  on  their husbands  is holding back  the  development  of stock-fattening in 
Niger,  because  the  men  tend  to monopolize  cash-earning resources;  the  lack of 
supplies of consumer goods  in the  villages is limiting purchasing  power,  thus 
reducing  the  incentive to produce  for  the  market. - 142  -
The  conclusion which  follows  from  this section is not that the  EDF  should 
have  financed  everything.  Overall  responsibility for rural development  lies 
with  the State concerned.  In  order to give  them  the  best possible help,  the 
EDF  should  be  able  to  supply  the  means  with  which  to take  a  very flexible  ap-
proach  to tackling bottlenecks when  and  where  they  occur.  The  internal plan-
ning  of projects according  to production objectives  should  be  accompanied  by 
provision for  less specific  trouble-shooting to ease  the  main  constraints af-
fecting  farming  and  provide  appropriate  incentives to encourage  latent dyna-
mism.  Structural aid  and  organizational aid  should be  complemented  by  the 
provision or· facilities to support  the efforts of rural groups  in the light 
of their problems  and  in response  to requests  from  them,  as  described above 
(2.1). 
3.2.  RURAL  DEVELOPMENT  STRATEGY  IN  THE  LIGHT  OF  THE  SOCIO-ECONOMIC  CONTEXT 
The  African rural world,  as  has  been  seen above,  is a  highly differentiated 
world  which  economic,  social  and  cultural  change  is dividing more  than before 
into broad groups:  men,  women,  young  people,  children,  elderly people,  mi-
grants,  non-migrants  etc.  Each  of these groups  has  its own  specific problems, 
some  inherent in its own  status and  others  concerned with its relations with 
the  other groups.  Rural  development  often gives rise to conflicts which,  if 
they are not settled by  the establishment of a  'modus  vivendi'  or legal rules, 
develop  to  the  extent of blocking social relations and  production relations 
or  even  leading to  open hostilities  (between  elders  and  young  men,  who  leave 
the villages,  between  farmers  and graziers etc.). 
The  projects evaluated concentrated  on  non-migrant adult male  farmers  growing 
commercial  crops  regarded  as  'heads of farm  holdings'  and  holders  of rights 
to use  land.  Although  other projects in other geographical areas have  been 
concerned with  nomad  graziers or training for young  people  in rural areas, 
none  of the projects evaluated had  any  overall strategy aimed at dealing with 
the  specific problems  of each of the groups,  based  on  analysis of their spe-
cific constraints  and  incentives likely to encourage  them  to participate in 
national  economic  development. 
When  they are planned with  a  view  to attaining very specific objectives  (pro-
motion  of a  single  farming activity),  without  any  overall analysis of the 
factors representing constraints or  incentives for farmers  and  in the  absence 
of·any consultation with  the  farmers  concerned,  projects are powerless  to 
eliminate  obstacles  such  as:  monopolization of land  and  means  of production 
by  elders,  flight  from  the  country by  young people,  partly as  a  result of 
this monopolization,  ageing of rural populations  as  a  result of abandonment 
by  the  young with all its consequences  on  farming,  productivity and  disrup-
tion of the equilibria which  in the past enabled  communities  to survive;  ex-
cessive  workload  on  women  remaining  in the village,  increasing conflicts be-
tween  farmers  and  graziers,  disappearance  of  non-f~rming rural occupations  in 
the  absence  of clear regulations  on  land use. 
When,  because  of lack of detailed analysis  of the rural societies aimed  at, 
aid channelled through national  institutions reaches  too  limited a  socio-eco-- 143  -
nomic  group,  it exacerbates  socio-economic  imbalances  and  militates against 
the settlement of disputes,  thereby preventing  the rural populations  con-
cerned  from  taking over  the  work  which  has  been given  financial  support. 
The  integration of the various  socio-economic  groups  with  one  another is not 
a  matter of social needs  only.  It is an  economic  need  as  fundamental  as  the 
integration of regions of different types  and  diversification of economic 
flows  in.the countries  concerned.  It is in fact  impossible to place  any  hope 
in  agro-economic  development  planned  on  a  basis which  excludes real partici-
pation by  important groups,  particularly the  young  who  could  be  expected to 
be  the  most  dynamic  and  best disposed  to accept  change. 
Experience  outside  the  cases evaluated  shows  that it is possible  and  desira-
ble  in rural projects to plan specific strategies to suit the particular 
problems  of each  socio-economic group.l 
In most of the  cases  studied,  the States are heavily dependent  for their ex-
istence  on  exportable  produce  from  peasant  farming;  farms  on  the  other hand 
are  completely unaffected  by  the constraints which  come  into play at State 
level. 
At  the present stage,  moreover,  it may  be  said that,  in most  cases,  the  share 
of agricultural activity taken  by  industrial crops is as  large as it could be, 
given  the  available resources  and  the  level  of productivity  (of land  and  la-
bour  in particular).  In  order to concentrate more  heavily  on  industrial crops, 
it would  be  necessary to divert resources  from  other types  of work,  especial-
ly subsistence activities,  which still have  priority in peasant farmers'  eyes. 
It is therefore not possible under practical  farming conditions  to dissociate 
improvement of cash  crop productivity from  improvement  of subsistence crop 
productivity. 
To  put this another  way,  as  long  as  overall  productivity remains  at a  low 
level while  States generally depend  exclusively on  levies  on  farming  incomes 
for their revenues,  'improving the people's nutritional conditions'  (which 
entails developing activities connected with subsistence)  conflicts with in-
creasing the  State's budget  revenues  and  foreign  currency earnings'  (which 
involves  developing export agriculture,  which  is already very heavily taxed) 
(3.3.2.2). 
Given this situation, it would  be  advisable for  States  to adopt agricultural 
development  strategies consistent with their rural populations'  systems  of 
priorities,  which  may  be  summarized  as  follows. 
The  most  fundamental  priority is to meet  the  subsistence requirements  of the 
family  group.  It can be  seen at work  at the  most micro-economic  level,  with 
farmers  allocating inputs  to this priority first and  to cash-earning activi-
1  See,  for  instance:  'Central  Region  Lakeshore  Development Proiect"  (Salima), 
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ties afterwards. 1  Only  when  the  necessary has  been  done  (sometimes  several 
times  over)  are  inputs allotted to  commercial  crops  according to the  best ex-
pectations  of earnings.  A few  years  ago,  farming  for  cash  income  was  more  or 
less limited  to  export crops  and,  among  annual  species,  to the  'motive'  crops 
(cotton,  groundnuts etc.).  Today  several alternatives to export crops  are 
proving more  profitable;  the world  food  crisis,  the various  regional  crises 
and  famines,  the  development  of demand  from  major  centres,  world  inflation 
affecting the prices of inputs  in particular,  thus  depressing  income  obtained 
from  the  traditional  export  crops,  and  finally the  heavy  insistence of offi-
cial farming  agencies  on  export  crops  accounts  for  the general rise in the 
relative prices of agricultural produce  other  than  the  traditional cash crops 
and  farmers'  incomes  from  this type  of activity,  with  the  logical  consequence 
for  farmers  of more  clear-cut competition between  crops  and  wider opportuni-
ties.  This  means  that the  rural  world  enjoys greater independence  vis-a-vis 
the  supervisory structures. 
This  point  can be  illustrated by  one  of several examples:  The  following fig-
ures  from  the  Togo  evaluation report are estimates of the  daily return  on  la-
bour with various  crops  in 1975  or thereabouts: 
Sorghum  CFAF  343 
Maize  CFAF  417  to  495 
Groundnuts  CFAF  367 
Beans  CFAF  289  to 494 
Irrigated rice  CFAF  280  to 470 
- Cotton  CFAF  239  to 293 
Planning agricultural  development  on  the  basis of strategies built around  the 
priorities and  micro-economic  interests of the  rural world is a  way  of secur-
ing  the  identification of the  local people with the  attainment of national 
objectives  and,  in the  longer  term,  reducing  the  dependence  of States  on  ex-
port  crops.  Intensification of complete  agricultural  systems  can  therefore be 
seen as  a  necessary alternative to intensification of limited  components  of 
these  systems. 
A fact  to  emerge  from  the  evaluation reports is that  a  rural  development in-
stitution and  technical  assistance  agencies  are sadly  lacking in the capacity 
to formulate  and  implement  such strategies,  because  they  do  not know  enough 
about peasant  farming  systems  and  have  not carried out sufficient research 
and  investigation into them.  Serious effort should  be  made  to bridge  these 
gaps,  not with  a  view  to telling the peasant  farmer  how  to do his  job,  but 
rather to find  out  why  he  does  what  he  does. 
1  Some  cases were  noted  of excessive  development of cash crops,  with  farmers 
reducing  subsistence activities below the strict minimum  to allow stocks to 
be  stored  and  provide security for future  years. - 145  -
3.3.  MAJOR  IMPORTANCE  TO  THE  SUCCESS  OF  DEVELOPMENT  ACTIVITIES  OF  STRUCTURED 
ECONOMIC  POLICIES 
The  evaluation reports  show  that the  success of agricultural  development  as 
conceived by  the  planners  and  organizers of projects is conditioned to  a  very 
large extent by  the  economic policies pursued  by  States.  Where  these policies 
meet  with growers'  approval,  the difficulties of supervisory services  seem  to 
be  reduced  to keeping abreast of and  coping with the  technical  requirements 
of the  farmers.  On  the  other hand,  where  economic policies are  indecisive  and 
unstimulating,  the  supervisory services'  greatest problem is to persuade 
farmers  to do  things  which  they have  no  wish  to do. 
In very  many  cases,  projects have  underestimated  the  importance  of economic 
policies and  directed their efforts at the effects rather than  the  causes of 
agricultural underdevelopment. 
They  have  failed  to appreciate that the peasant farming  world is capable of 
assessing its economic  interests  and  understanding the workings  of the  trade 
systems  of which  they  form  the base,  in which  they have  only three options: 
to do  what  they  are  asked  to do  efficiently,  inefficiently or not at all. 
3.3.1.  Productivity of farm  labour 
The  criterion of improvement  of returns on  labour was  generally applied when 
the  subjects evaluated were first considered for aid.  In  some  cases this cri-
terion was  the  main  justification for  the project judged at the  level  of the 
individual  farm  holding.  In retrospect,  this criterion needs  to be  both 
broadened  and  defined in greater detail. 
(i)  The  return on  labour should be  evaluated  on  an  overall basis in  terms  of 
the agricultural system',1  which  includes both subsistence  and  cash-
earning activities,  and  not in terms  of only one  of these activities. 
(ii)  Farmers  organize  their work  options in the  light of various  opportuni-
ties and constraints.  The  return  on  labour is always  relative  and  can-
not be  assessed  in absolute  terms. 
1  This  'agricultural system'  consists of all the material  and  human  resources 
and  ways  of production  involved  in farming  a  given area of land,  together 
with the prevailing constraints and  the  interrelationships between  them. 
The  agricultural  system exists in  a  context of social relationships  and 
production relationships between  human  beings,  the modalities of which  may 
be  simple  or complex.  The  agricultural system is not  to be  confused with 
the  'exploitation agricole'  (farm holding)  which  is a  part of the  system 
controlled by  an  individual  farmer,  but is in turn part of a  rural  system 
which  also includes other activities not  concerned with  farming. - 146  -
(iii)  The  return  on  labour criterion comes  into play  'on the  margin'  during 
the  few  peak periods  for  farm  work  as well  as in terms  of the  average 
over  the  whole  crop  cycle. 
These  three  aspects are worth  examining  in detail. 
Labour productivity  and  the return  on  labour  are  the essential criteria on 
which  farmers  assess  the  price  system.  They  are  assessed  in different ways  in 
relation to subsistence  crops,  the marketing of which  is contemplated as  a 
possibility or  as  a  necessity, 1  and  products  destined exclusively for  sale. 
Productivity is evaluated  in the  former  case  in  terms  of domestic  food  stocks 
and  in the  second  case  in monetary  terms.  When  labour productivity is as-
sessed in terms  of food,  it may  be  in  some  cases that it is in farmers'  in-
terests to concentrate  exclusively on  commercial  crops  and  buy  their food. 
This  is the case,  for  instance,  of  some  rice growers  in Chad  who  prefer to 
grow rice for sale  and  then buy millet for  their  own  consumption.  More  fre-
quently,  however,  the passage  via a  commercial  crop  to secure  the  means  of 
paying  for  food  supplies  involves  the producer in a  substantial  loss  of pro-
ductivity  in food  terms,  as  the  table  on  the  next page  shows.  This  table 
compares  the quantities of food  which  Togolese  farmers  could  earn in  1975  or 
thereabouts either by growing  food  crops  themselves  or by  growing  cotton. 2 
Food  productivity of one  Food  productivity of one 
Food  crops  CFAF/kg  day's  work  in subsistence  day's  work  in cotton-
farming  growing 
kg  per day  l 
%  kg  per day  J 
% 
Rice  30  11.5 to 16.6  100  8.8 to 10.8  53  to  108 
Beans  60  9.2  100  4.4 to  5.4  48  to  59 
Groundnuts  50  8.7  100  5.3 to  6.5  61  to  74 
Sorghum  30  17.1  100  8.8  to 10.8  51  to  63 
Maize  25  20.8  100  10.6  to  13.0  51  to  62 
As  this table  shows,  the  farmer  who  grows  cotton  and  buys  his  food  with  the 
proceeds  needs  to work  approximately  50%  longer for  a  unit of foodstuffs. 
This  loss of productivity in terms  of food  purchasing power  increases sharp-
ly if the  food  has  to be  bought between  seasons  or during  a  shortage. 
1  Need  to sell as  a  result of a  deterioration in stored crops;  need  to sell 
in order  to obtain money  for  unforeseen requirements,  etc. 
2  1  000  kg/ha at  CFAF  39.3 net/kg for  148 or 121  days'  work,  or 265  to  324 
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It stands  to reason  that as  long as  the  farmer  is faced  with  a  risk of short-
ages  or difficulties in bridging the  gap  between  seasons,  economic  logic dic-
tates that he  will give priority in his  farming  calendar to the  growing of 
food  crops.  Development  operations  which  limit their objectives  to generation 
of cash-earning activities must  be  regarded  as  unbalanced,  since they view 
productivity exclusively in monetary  terms  and  disregard productivity seen in 
terms  of food  purchasing power. 
This also means  that projects  aimed  wholly  at encouraging  farmers  to produce 
commercial  crops  can  lend  impetus  to the  development,  sooner or later,  of 
shortages  and  the  concomitant  economic  dependence. 
The  return  on  labour has  to be  considered,  on  the  one  hand,  in relation to 
the  diversity of regional  farming  options  and  the  work  opportunities avail-
able  (casual  labour,  migration,  leisure etc.)  and,  on  the other hand,  in re-
lation to market  structures  and  prevailing true prices. 
The  farming  community,  and  its younger,  less settled members  in particular, 
reacts rapidly to economic  opportunities as  they arise,  either simultaneously 
or  in turn. 
In the  Badeguicheri  Valley,  for  instance,  the  young  men  work  to  a  pattern 
which  follows  the  crop pattern:  if the  season storts well,  cotton  sowing fol-
lows  upon  sorghum  sowing  and  the  work  involved  in tending  the fields  is 
enough  to keep  growers  in their villages.  In  a  bad  season,  however,  if the 
first cereal  sowing fails,  it has  to be  repeated,  with  detrimental effects on 
cotton growing.  If the  second  sowing  is also unsuccessful,  there remains  the 
last resort of seeking work  elsewhere,  hence  migration. 
Where  subsistence conditions are  less precarious,  the  response  times  for 
switches  from  one  type  of work  to another  are  longer.  For instance,  farmers 
in  Chad  appear to base their decisions  on  the extent to which  they will  grow 
cotton  on  the  technical  and  economic  results  of the previous  two  years. 
With  annual  crops,  a  change  in the  pr~ce system  can lead to  a  rapid  switch 
from  one  type  of crop  to another.  This  is borne  out  by  the  sharp rise in pad-
dy  production in the  Ivory  Coast  in  1976  following  upon  an  appreciable  in-
crease  in the price. 
Similarly,  cultivation of cowpeas  increased substantially in Niger  in re-
sponse  to exceptionally favourable  trade conditions with Nigeria,  but this 
increase  was  curtailed by  a  25%  reduction in the officially fixed price. 
These  examples  give  an indication of the  importance  to be  attributed to farm-
ers'  capacity to react quickly to market  conditions affecting the return  on 
their labour either favourably  or unfavourably. 
The  criterion generally used  in analysis of the projects is the  average  re-
turn  on  labour.  However,  in many  cases,  a  more  refined analysis is necessary 
in order to understand peasant farmers'  behaviour patterns.  The  labour bot-
tlenecks  occur at certain specific periods in the  farming  calendar.  During - 148  -
these periods,  the marginal  return on  labour is the  decisive  factor in the 
choice of farming activity,  since  the  farmer's  main  concern is to establish 
which crop will  offer the  best return  on  the  manpower  resources at his dis-
posal  when  there is most  work.  The  law  of limiting factors  dictates that it 
is at these particular times  that the  farmer  can  obtain the greatest advan-
tage  from  improving his techniques,  since  this is when  his working  hours 
yield the highest returns. 
The  Chad  evaluation report provides  a  good  illustration of the  fact that rea-
soning  in terms  of marginal  return is the key  to  the  dynamics  of the  spread 
of animal-drawn tillage,  not reasoning in terms  of average productivity. 
As  an  initial conclusion,  it must  be  emphasized  that the return on  labour is 
the criterion according to which  farmers  assess  economic policies  and  action 
conducted by  development  institutions.  Evaluation of projects calls for  de-
tailed assessment of: 
(i)  overall  labour productivity in the  peasant system,  considered  on  the 
basis  of food  productivity as well  as  cash productivity; 
(ii)  the relative productivity of various possible types  of work:  farming 
work  or  employment  on  construction sites,  work  on  one  crop  or another 
crop,  work  rewarded  by  cash  income  or in the  form  of prestige,  etc.; 
(iii)  average  and  marginal  labour productivity,  the  former  governing  the 
overall  advantageousness  of a  given kind  of work,  the  latter the  spe-
cific attractiveness of a  particular type  of activity at a  certain time 
of the year. 
Nor  must  the  importance  of decisions  about  the  use  of land be  underestimated, 
however.  Where  land is becoming scarce,  it imposes  constraints which  weigh 
more  heavily than  manpower  constraints,  as  may  be  seen  in the  case  of Rwanda 
in particular. 
The  second  conclusion is more  directly concerned with  the  need  for  close  co-
ordination between  development projects and  economic  policies.  Linking plan-
ning  aimed  at incomes  from  peasant  farming  to traditional planning concerned 
with  areas  under  cultivation,  yields  and  output  seems  to be  a  fruitful policy. 
3.3.2.  Domestic  price  systems  and  policies 
In all the  countries visited by  the evaluators,  the price  systems  are  to a 
greater or lesser extent artificial: 
Export products are generally subject to  commercial  monopolies,  strict regu-
lations and  stabilization measures; 
Local  products are  sold  on  free  markets  which  the  States attempt -without 
great success - to regulate by edicts on prices,  rules restricting transport 
and  measures  to restrict the activities of intermediaries or monopolies.  In 
most  cases there is little or no  infrastructure for evacuation,  preparation 
for market,  storage  and  distribution  (cf.  section 3.3.2.2). - 149  -
Because  of lack of investment in research on  food  and  subsidence  crop  systems, 
the  technical  coefficients of production have  become  unbalanced within farm 
holdings  (cf.  section 3.3.2.3). 
Subsidization policies,  and  structural  aid  in particular,  are  contributing to 
the artificiality of price  systems.  Subsidies  can lead  to structural problems 
at the  stage  when  the  aid  comes  to  an  end if the  'natural'  price system  does 
not allow farming  to finance  itself (cf.  section 3.3.2.4). 
Further explanation of these  various aspects is called for. 
3.3.2.1.  Export products  ---------------
In the  case of export products marketed  through public or mixed  companies, 1 
the States determine  the  level of producer prices,  the  intermediary's margin 
and  the  taxes applicable.  The  difference  between  the selling price  and  cost 
represents  the profit of the equalization fund,  part of which  goes  to cover 
production costs  (subsidies  on  inputs). 
The  following  table  shows  the  average  structure of prices  calculated on  the 
basis of producer prices  in three  countries. 2 
in % 
Producer  Interme- Direct  Profit on 
diary  Taxes  exporta 
Togo 
Cocoa  1970/1971  to 1972/1973  100  16.7  25.8  n.d. 
Coffee  1970/1971  to 1972/1973  100  26.3  46.5  n.d. 
Cotton  1971/1972  100  38.2  17.6  n.d. 
Central  African  Ref!ublic 
Coffee  1974  100  22.9  28.9  n.d. 
~b 
Cotton  1971/1972  to 1973/1974  100  84.4  22.9  70.5 
Cotton  1974/1975  and  1975/1976  100  72.2  16.7  47.5 
a  Profit on  export:  this is the profit of the  stabilization fund,  part of 
which  is used  to pay production  costs  (insecticides,  fertilizers etc.). 
b  Including  COTONTCHAD  estimates for 1975-76. 
1  Except  in Central  African Republic,  where  the  ONCPA  has  been replaced  by  a 
consortium of four private buyers  (ENPROCAF). 
2  The  other reports contain no  data  on  this subject. - 150  -
The  calculation in relation to the  CIF  selling price has  been  made  over  a 
relatively  long period  in the  case  of  Chadian  cotton: 
in % 
Percentages 
FOB  selling price  (fibre)  100  100  100  100  100 
Producers'  share  38.4  38.3  28.0  48.1  38.3 
Direct taxes  8.9  8.7  6.3  8.0  6.4 
Intermediate costs  36.1  38.3  29.3  39.9  36.1 
Profit  a  16.9  14.7  36.2  4.0  19.2 
a Profits distributed,  after provision for  reserves,  to the  shareholders of 
COTONTCHAD  (20%)  and  to  CSSPC  (80%).  A part of these profits goes  towards 
production costs not met  by  farmers. 
Several  comments  need  to be  made  regarding  the  structure of prices: 
The  fiscal pressure,  whether  direct  (taxes)  or indirect  (revenues  of interme-
diary  institutions or stabilization funds),  is always  heavy.  In  view of the 
dependence  of these  activities on  international markets,  States wishing  to 
improve  farming  incomes  in the  export sector have  no  alternative but to alle-
viate  the  tax burden  on  them,  thereby  reducing their own  budget  revenues. 
This  situation is all the  more  critical in cases where  the  agricultural  trade 
economy  is lacking in diversity and  farming  productivity is improving  only 
very  slowly. 
It should be  noted  that the  situation is not comparable  to that found  in the 
industrial countries,  where  it is  common  for  the  institutions to intervene  to 
support  farming  income;  in the  cases  evaluated,  it is the  farmers  who  finance 
the  institutions  and  aid is only  provided  over  limited periods  to ease  the 
pressure  on  farming  incomes. 
In  the  case  of export crops,  the  long-term growth rates  in production costs 
were  consistently higher  than the  growth rates in prices of commodities.  The 
oil crisis in 1974  led to  a  substantial  increase  in the prices of fertilizers, 
insecticides  and  their transport.! 
Only  stabilization of the  input/output terms  of trade  on  international mar-
kets  can  create  the  structural conditions allowing savings to be  made  and 
invested  in new  activities. 
1  Some  prices  inclusive of local delivery  increased fourfold. - 151  -
3.3.2.2.  Products for  domestic  markets 
In the  cas~ of products  for  domestic  markets,  the  problems  are  very different. 
The  governments'  concern is to strike  a  balance  between  consumer prices  and 
producer prices.  With  this intention they  issue orders  laying down  certain 
producer and/or  consumer  prices. 
These  orders  enable official purchasers  to buy  on  local markets  without  need-
ing  to negotiate.  Private intermediaries pay little attention to  them  and 
operate  freely or virtually freely  on  the  markets,  paying  more  than the offi-
cial price  (so that official purchasers are  only able  to buy products  of low-
er quality at the official price)  or below  the official price  (when  supply 
exceeds  demand,  or in remote  areas without  easy  access  to markets). 
Governments  tend  to let local  trade find its own  level  and  to control  region-
al,  national  and  international markets.  These  policies  seem  to  be  guided  by 
objectives or  two  types: 
(i)  to provide  cheap  food  for urban  populations  (a high proportion of whom 
are  dependent  on  the  budget resources  of the  administration and public 
services; 
(ii)  to prevent the  development  of food  crop  farming  from  jeopardizing cash 
crop production,  which  is the  only  form  of production which  produces 
fiscal  revenue. 
These  two  types  of objectives work  against each  other when  they are pursued 
in the short  term  through  the  application of regulations  and  sanctions.  They 
would  be  complementary if they were  pursued  in the  medium  term  through  the 
introduction of incentives to production  which  would  themselves  lead to an 
improvement  in productivity in both  subsistence  farming  and  cash-crop  farming. 
Regarding  the  second  type  of objective mentioned  above  (not to  jeopardize 
taxable  export production),  attention should  be  drawn  to an  implicit economic 
policy option,  which  may  be  summed  up  as  follows:  'Agricultural  development 
is achieved  according  to the  commercially most  favourable  trade structure.  In 
so far  as it is commercially  more  advantageous  to  import  foodstuffs  and  ex-
port agricultural  raw materials,  this option is the  most  advantageous  to the 
national  economy.  To  the  same  extent,  improvement  of subsistence  agriculture 
is not  an  objective  in itself. This  type  of agriculture is regarded  as  being 
"residual",  since it only  concerns  that part of the population which  is out-
side trade circuits and  therefore requires  no  special effort,  the  assumption 
being that this section of the population will  decline gradually.' 
This  is definitely an  implicit economic  policy option,  since in most  of the 
countries visited neither national production nor  imports  of foodstuffs  are 
managing  to achieve genuine  improvement  in the  level  of food  supplies or nu-
tritional conditions  of the rural populations,  some  of which  are entirely de-
pendent  on  international  food  aid.  Other options  were  possible,  as witness 
conditions  in other countries not  covered  here,  where  economic policies based 
on  food  self-sufficiency have  been given priority. - 152  -
The  data provided  in the  evaluation reports give  the  impression that,  in 
practice,  the  economic  policies pursued  as regards  subsistence  farming  have 
had  a  depressive  effect on  production.  The  institutions generally aim  at mo-
nopolization of trade in food  products rather than  the  establishment  and  man-
agement  of buffer stocks  in competition with private traders.  Where  they  en-
joy monopolies,  they  lack the  organization and  working  capital needed  to make 
purchases  to the extent warranted  by their monopoly position.  Under  these 
conditions,  they  encourage  the  creation of black markets  in opposition with 
themselves  and  the speculative nature of these black markets is heightened in 
relation to the free  markets  whose  structure  they were  set up  to  improve. 
When  the institutions do  not  enjoy  a  monopoly,  they have  to  cope  with strong 
competition  from  local markets  and  the application of the official prices be-
comes  illusory. 
It would  appear that the  institutions are disinclined to take  action to en-
courage  production:  they would  seem  to consider the  encouragement of abundant 
supply  and  free  movement  of goods  between  regions  as  no  more  than  a  secondary 
method  of bringing about  a  real reduction in consumer  prices. 
Except in the  case  of the  OBM  in Bugesera-Mayaga,  the  reports contain no evi-
dence  of encouragement  of local stockpiling which  would  have  offered the 
threefold benefit of helping to regularize prices  on  local  and  national  mar-
kets,  developing  complementary activities in the  cooperatives  and  giving real 
support to  food  crop  schemes  set up  under  the  projects. 
Regarding  the  problem of outlets for  food  crops,  it has  to be  admitted  that 
some  of the policies pursued  are  far  from  suited to circumstances.  For  in-
stance,  urban  consumers  are  sometimes  encouraged  to  consume  foodstuffs  which 
are  not produced  by  the  farmers  in their own  country  or to demand  standards 
of quality which  home  producers  cannot meet.  An  example  of this is provided 
by  the  Ivory Coast.  This  country's rice policy was  evolved  on  the basis of an 
analysis of urban  consumption patterns and  the  structure of the relative 
costs1  of  'rice calories'  and  other  sources  of calories which  could  be  pro-
duced  locally.  The  cost of transport within the  country was  such  that local 
produce  was  inevitably more  expensive  than rice delivered direct to the port 
of Abidjan.  This  situation clearly changed drastically when,  following  sharp 
increases in rice prices  on  international markets,  rice was  produced  in Ivory 
Coast  and  had  to be  transported at the  same  cost as  other crops.  Rice  calo-
ries then  became  more  expensive  than other calories,  but the  policy pursued 
had  left its mark  on  consumer habits. 
Mention is also made  of lack of coordination between  food  aid  and  aid  to ru-
ral development.  Over  the past decade,  countries with  shortages  in  some  areas 
and  surpluses  in others have  received substantial  imports  of food  under  food 
aid programmes.  At  the  same  time,  these  countries have  complained  of the  lack 
of outlets for their food-crop  output.  Clearly,  the  respite provided  by  food 
1  Relative costs of rice calories bought  on  international markets  (distorted 
by  dumping  around  1970/1972)  and  other sources of calories produced  in the 
Ivory Coast,  inclusive  of transport  and  distribution costs. - 153  -
aid  should  be  used  to  take action to  improve  the  infrastructures for the 
storage  and  preparation of food  crops. 
Short of any  clear perception of the  economic  policies needed  to interest 
peasant farmers  in producing  food  for the  towns  and  to encourage  urban  popu-
lations  to  consume  more  local products,  one  school  of thought believes that 
the  solution to the  problem  of meeting national  food  requirements  lies in the 
development  of vast agro-industrial  complexes.  Solutions  of this  type  are 
open  to criticism on  the grounds  that they are soft options,  of marginal ef-
fect  in relation to  the  food  problem  needing to be  tackled  and entirely de-
pendent  on  foreign  technology,  and  that they divert national resources  or 
foreign aid  from  solutions better suited to  the  maintenance  of rural  employ-
ment. 
These  agro-industrial  solutions cannot  compare  with  the  advantages  and  effi-
ciency offered to the national  economies  by  those  which  consist in promoting 
the  development  of the  capacity for  work  and  resources  of the rural world, 
where  the  potential  for  increases in productivity  and  value  added  is high, 
the maintenance  of employment is easier and  development of trade  among  peas-
ant  communities  makes  a  greater contribution to the  expansion of domestic 
markets,  thereby benefiting non-agricultural sectors of national  economies. 
The  failure  of the  large-scale rice-growing project at Richard-Toll  (Senegal), 
the  mechanized  maize-growing project in Shaba  (Zaire)  and  many  others  confirm 
that solutions of this type  are not effective in dealing with  the rising 
problems  of hunger. 1 
3.3.2.3.  Inconsistency between  levels of productivity in export agriculture 
~~=~~~~~~~~~~~=~~~~~~~!~~~---------------------------------------
Another  feature  which  has  to be  recorded  is the  frequent  inconsistency be-
tween  the respective  levels  of productivity and  prices  in  the  two  major  types 
of agriculture:  export  crops  and  domestic  food  crops. 
This  inconsistency has  its origins in dualistic conceptions of domestic price 
systems  and  is being exacerbated  by  the  uneven  development  in technical  im-
provements  achieved  with  the  two  types  of crop. 
A brief analysis based  on  information supplied  by  the  GCDAC 2 and  the techni-
cal  data  from  the  Chad  evaluation report provides evidence  of this  type  of 
inconsistency.  It considers  the  recorded  average yield  for cotton and  sorghum 
under extensive  ('traditional')  cultivation and  intensive  ('high productivi-
ty')  cultivation.  Taking  the officially fixed  cotton price as  the  benchmark, 
the  analysis calculates the  sorghum  price which  would  enable  the  farmer  to 
grow either crop  on  his  land  and  earn the  same  net  income  per hectare.  This 
1  In connection with  the  whole  of 3.3.3.2,  also see:  Ouma  Lele,  'Design of 
Rural  Development',  pp.  181-182  (Doc.  19). 
2  Groupe  de  Conseillers  en Developpement  d'Afrique  Centrale:  'Production et 
commercialisation des  cereales  au  Tchad',  July 1974,  Yaounde. - 154  -
'break-even price'  is then  compared  to  the  actual price at which  sorghum  is 
sold  on  the  free  market.  These  figures,  although only estimated,  demonstrate 
how  the  fact  that  sorghum  has  lost ground  technologically means  that cotton 
growing  offers  a  distinct advantage  to  the  farmer  opting  for  intensive culti-
vation. 
Yield per hectarea 
Price of cotton seed 
Average  price of 
sorghumb 
Gross  income  per 
hectarec 
Break-even price  of 
sorghum  per kg 
Intensive  cultivation, 
without fertilizers 
or insecticides 
Cotton 
349  kg 
43  F/kg 
15 000  F 
I Sorghum 
700  kg 
30  F/kg 
21  000  F 
21.4 F/kg 
Intensive cultivation 
(fertilizers and 
insecticides on  cotton, 
urea  on  sorghum, 
suitable varieties) 
Cotton 
953  kg 
43  F/kg 
40  979  F 
I 
Sorghum 
1  000  kg 
30  F/kg 
30  000  F 
41.0  F/kg 
a  For cotton:  average  for  1974/75;  for  sorghum,  average  as  estimated by  Chad 
officials for  the  same  period. 
b 
Averag~ price for  1974:  30  francs.  Minimum  price:  21  F/kg. 
c  This  is gross  income  per hectare,  supposing that the  cost of intensive  cul-
tivation is the  same  for  the  two  crops. 
So  long as cultivation is extensive,  the  farmer  is better off growing  sorgh-
um  at least enough  to  cover his  own  needs  and  to meet  demand.  However,  where 
cultivation is intensive,  cotton-growing is much  more  profitable because 
sorghum yields  vary  very little,  no  matter which production  system  is used. 
The  reason  for this is that there  was  much  greater  improvement  in the  techni-
cal  coefficients in the  case  of cotton  than with  sorghum,  as  can  be  seen  from 
the  following  table,  which  compares  average yields achieved  in peasant  farm-
ing using  extensive  anq  intensive  methods. 
The  slower  technical  improvement  with  sorghum  is attributable in particular 
to the  fact that investment in research  on  rain-fed cereals was  on  a  much 
smaller scale  and  started much  more  recently than  investment  in cotton re-
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Yields per hectare  Coefficient of 
I 
improvement 
extensive  intensive  % 
Cotton  349  953  +173 
Sorghum  700  1  000  +  43 
The  consequence  of this  imbalance  in the  technical coefficients of production 
was  that cotton  became  structurally over-profitable in relation to food  crops 
as  well  as  already being privileged by  the  institutional environment  (price 
stabilization,  subsidies,  commercial  organization,  supervision,  credit,  re-
search,  etc.)  (5.2).  Imbalance  in these  technical  coefficients at farm  hold-
ing level,  like  lack of organization in the  institutional environment  and  in 
food-crop  markets  (3.3.2.2.),  is  a  factor explaining the  increase in this 
country's national  food  deficit:  the  farmers'  economic  intuition led  them  to 
turn  away  from  the  food  crops most.needed  by  urban  consumer. 
In this particular case,  although it is desirable to continue  the  structural 
improvements  benefiting cotton,  the  most  important requirement  is to bring 
the  technical  conditions in agricultural  systems  back  into balance  by  provid-
ing structural  and  institutional support for  other crops  on  the  same  scale as 
for  cotton. 
This  observation also holds  true,  with  differences of degree,  in the other 
countries  considered  in this evaluation exercise.1 
New  strategies are called for  in tackling the  problems  involved  in achieving 
balanced overall  development of peasant  farming.  Disrupting agricultural sys-
tems  to  encourage  food  crops  is no  less risky  than  similar actions in favour 
of export crops.  The  objective must  be  to work  towards  overall  improvement  of 
the  technical  coefficients of production which will eventually create the 
conditions  for genuinely integrated  farming  providing  scope  for  a  wide  range 
of possibilities in the pattern of rotations,  fallowing  and  companion  crops 
(cf.  5.1.3 on  the  'motive  crops'  strategy). 
3.3.2.4.  Policies  on  subsidization  and  structural  aid 
Subsidization policies modify  certain components  of domestic  price  systems. 
1  In  the  case  of Eastern Kasai  (Zaire),  the project evaluated could  have  met 
a  higher proportion of maize  requirements if efforts at least on  the  same 
scale as with  cotton had  been  made  to increase yields  {through  the  use  of 
specific fertilizers in particular).  There  could  have  been  a  larger fall in 
imports  of maize. - 156  -
Depending  on  the  circumstances,  Community  aid has  made  it possible to: 
(i)  support prices  (period  1965-1968)  (aid  to production); 
(ii)  subsidize  annual  inputs  (such  as  fertilizers,  insecticides  and  fungi-
cides)  (section 4.5)  and  spraying equipment  (section 4.4); 
(iii)  subsidize  equipment  such  as  animal-drawn  tillage equipment,  carts,  etc. 
(section 4.4). 
These  various  forms  of subsidy provided direct benefits  to  the  farm  holdings 
concerned. 
At  the  same  time  Community  aid  has  provided  means  for  the  support of agricul-
tural  supervisory services,  especially the  strengthening  and  stabilization of 
technical  advisory  services  and  input supplies.  This  type  of subsidy was  ap-
plied direct to public budgets  and  brought  indirect advantages  to farm  hold-
ings  by  promoting  a  favourable  environment  for  them. 
Little information could  be  gathered  on  the  subject of the  aid to production 
policies pursued  under  the first Yaounde  Convention.  It' is already  some  time 
since these  operations were  carried out  and  few  traces  of them  remain;  they 
did  not  form  a  coherent whole,  but were  merely parts of national  programmes, 
so that it was  difficult to pinpoint their effects. 
Mention is made  of the  fact that,  in Chad,  such  subsidies helped  to prevent  a 
fall in nominal  producer prices of cotton,  with the  result that a  relatively 
high but greatly fluctuating level  of cotton production was  sustained.  It is 
clear that stability created the  conditions for  the  steady development  of in-
tensive  farming  und  use  of animal-drawn  equipment,  whose  progress  was  inter-
rupted  only  by  the  adverse  climate  conditions during  the  early 1970s. 
During  the  Second  and  Third  EDFs,  the  Community's  aid was  aimed  specifically 
at structural  improvement of farm  holdings. 
The  objective  was  to  improve  the  competitive position of the  main  export 
crops,  those  whose  role  was  to provide  the motive  force  to stimulate agricul-
ture  in general  (cf.  5.1.3  and 6.1).  This  was  to be  achieved  by  improving  the 
productivity of agricultural factors  of production  (land,  varieties cultivat-
ed,  fertilizers,  health factors,  random  factors etc.)  so that incomes  from 
these  crops  would  be  at least stable, if not  on  the  increase.  This  moderniza-
tion was  to be  achieved  through  the  introduction of new  farming  methods  com-
bined with  the  use  of inputs  and  small  machinery  in the  case  of annual  crops. 
It was  intended to continue  this structural aid until it had  produced irre-
versible technical  and  economic  results.  In view  of its limited effects,  it 
was  strengthened,  with  the Third  EDF  funds,  by  a  wider  range  of aid  to  the 
agricultural environment:  supervision,  technical  assistance,  storage infra-
structure,  accompanying research,  zootechnical projects,  village water sup-
plies,  roads  etc. 
In the  cases evaluated,  four  crops  were  regarded  as  having  a  'motive'  role 
(cf.  5.1.3),  depending  on  the  circumstances of the  country concerned:  coffee 
(Central  African Republic,  Togo,  Rwanda),  cocoa  (Togo},  cotton  (Chad,  Central - 157  -
African Republic,  Niger,  Zaire,  Upper  Volta),  groundnuts  (Upper  Volta,  Niger, 
Togo);  these  crops  played  a  'motive'  role in terms  of either economic  or 
technical  development,  or both.  On  the  economic  plane,  it was  hoped  that the 
high productivity of the  'motive  crop'  would  enable  the  rural  environment  to 
generate  the resources it needed  for its own  development  and  more  especially 
for  productive  investment.  By  marketing the  whole  of their output,1  farmers 
would  be  able  to buy  some  of the  inputs needed  for structural  improvement, 
the  prohibitive initial costs of which  were  heavily  subsidized  (free issue  in 
some  cases,  subsidies  of 20%,  50%  or  70%  in others),  while  further help  was 
available through credit policies. 
In  view of the  'motive'  role  of the  crops  mentioned  above,  it was  considered 
rational  to maximize  investment in their development  on  the  premise  that,  in 
the  long  term,  their profitability would  generate  finance  for technical  im-
provements  in food-crop  farming.  However,  there is a  difference  between  per-
ennial  and  annual  crops;  competition with  food  crops for  labour is very much 
less of a  consideration with  the  former  than with the  latter. 
It is very difficult to make  any  overall  assessment of the effects of this 
work  because  of the  major  changes  in the  economic,  political  and  ecological 
environment  which  occurred  during  the  period evaluated: 
(i)  the oil crisis and its effects on  the prices of chemicals  (fertilizers 
and  insecticides),  transport costs and,  indirectly,  international tex-
tile commodity prices; 
(ii)  the  world  economic  crisis,  the resultant inflation which  had  a  particu-
larly marked  effect on  all  imported  goods  and its consequences  on pur-
chasing power  in the rural  environment; 
(iii)  the  world  food  crisis and,  more  specifically,  the African  food  crisis 
caused  by  drought  (Sahel  countries),  by population explosion in areas 
where  the  land  was  still relatively unproductive  (Rwanda),  or by rapid 
urban growth; 
(iv)  political  changes  in a  number  of countries,  which  led to shifts in so-
cio-economic  policies and  institutional reorganization. 
The  most  clear-cut negative effects of these  changes  were  in the  most  depend-
ent countries  (Niger,  Chad,  Rwanda,  Upper  Volta). 
The  profitability of structural aid needed  to be  demonstrable  at  two  levels: 
in individual  farm  holdings  and  in the project itself. It was  naturally nec-
essary to convince  the  farmers  that it was  profitable to ensure their contin-
ued  cooperation.  As  for  the  State,  it was  obliged to think in terms  of break-
ing  even in the  medium  and  long  term,  since  the  aid  was  being provided for  a 
finite period. 
At  the  level  of the  individual  farm  holding,  structural aid  has  produced  pos-
itive results insofar as  conditions  have  allowed it to  be  effective. It has 
1  Except  for groundnut crops,  a  proportion of which  is consumed  locally. - 158  -
not given results where  institutional  shortcomings  have  prevented it from 
being  implemented  at the  appropriate  time,  as  was  the  case  in  a  number  of 
countries  (shortages  of supplies  in Central  African Republic  and  Zaire, 
blockage  of fertilizers  for  Niger projects  in Nigerian ports),  or  caused it 
to be  inappropriate  to  requirements  (e.g.  equipment  in Togo). 
Maximum  benefits have  not necessarily been  obtained,  partly because  of  such 
shortcomings  ~nd partly because  farmers  do  not  always  use  inputs  according to 
the  recommended  instructions. 
According  to  the  principle of the  'law of minima',  continuing efforts  should 
have  been made  to adjust operations  to  the  most  limiting factors  affecting 
farming  conditions.  In most  of the  projects,  however,  the  most  limiting fac-
tors were  to be  found  in the  areas of subsistence  farming,  health and  educa-
tion,  so  that,  for  the  effectiveness of the projects  to have  been  maximized, 
micro-economic  objectives  (subsistence,  profitability of peasant  farm  hold-
ings)  should  have  been given  due  importance  in relation to macro-economic 
objectives  (budget  revenues,  balance  of payments,  foreign  currency  earnings 
etc.).  The  backlog suffered by  the  former  has  been  a  serious obstacle to at-
tainment  of the latter. 
Although directed at selected  farming activities  ('motive'  crops),  structural 
aid  is a  general  form  of aid  designed  to influence  a  range  of factors  deter-
mining  the  productivity and  profitability of the  crops  concerned.  To  make 
this type  of aid effective,  it is necessary to  apply  a  series of efficient 
techniques  (technical  package)  and  to determine  output/input ratios which  are 
favourable  to farmers. 1 
It was  found  that the  technical packages  were  generally presented coherently 
in the  case  of  'motive'  crops,  but  the  same  cannot be  said of output/input 
ratios. 
In Central  African Republic,  there  were  frequent  changes  in producer price/ 
operating cost ratios and  in credit conditions.  In Niger,  major  fluctuations 
in groundnut prices meant  that the  effectiveness of structural aid was  deter-
mined  by  events  occurring outside  the  environment  (notably market  conditions 
in Nigeria).  In  Togo  and  Zaire,  the  absence  of a  regular pattern in coffee 
purchasing  had  the  effect of undermining  the  efficiency of the  structural aid 
programme.  By  contrast,  in Chad,  the  producer price/operating cost ratio was 
particularly stable  and  improved  sharply to the grower's advantage  in  1974. 
It would  seem  that stability of the  producer price/operating cost ratio, 
which is to  be  achieved  through  long-term control  of structural aid,  is a  de-
cisive factor  determining efficiency of these operations. 
Certain  minimum  reaction times  obtain in the  farming  environment.  The  first 
effects of a  stable structural aid programme  will not be  felt before  the 
1  A  'technical package'  is defined  as  a  group  of  farming  methods  which  are 
promoted  jointly,  as  none  of them  would  be  fully effective if not  accompa-
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third year  in  the  case  of annual  crops  and  it takes  considerably  longer for  a 
pattern to emerge.  These  reaction  times  would  perhaps  be  shorter if price 
structures were  planned  in a  way  which  enabled  farmers  to make  a  rough esti-
mate  of their prospective  incomes  when  deciding which  crops  to grow.  This  is 
generally not the  case;  at best,  prices are  announced  at the start of the 
buying period. 
A  number  of instances are noted  in which  subsidies  have  led  to  the  decline  of 
some  types  of rural  employment,  whether  in trade  or craft work.  For  example, 
the  50%  subsidy  on  industrially produced  carts  from  Cameroon  killed off arti-
san production  in  Chad.  The  sale of axles  at 50%  of their real  cost made" it 
more  attractive for  farmers  to buy  a  new  axle  than to have  worn  hubs  or bro-
ken  spokes  repaired.  Similarly,  the  subsidy  on  animal-drawn  equipment  sup-
plied to  farmers  by  the  ONDR  reduced  the  prices of this  type of equipment  to 
such  levels that it put all possibility of supplies  from  the private sector 
out  of the  question.  In fact,  set against  the  overall  cost of the  team  and 
equipment  {oxen,  plough,  weeder),  the  subsidy is not very significant  {~10% 
in the  case  of Chad).  At  some  stages,  the  tendency of farmers  in  Chad  to ob-
tain equipment  was  probably discouraged  because  the  overall  volume  of the 
subsidy automatically determined  the  number  of parts made  available to farm-
ers.  The  opposite  occurred  in Togo,  where  the  subsidy provided  led to pur-
chases of equipment  far  in excess of the  farmers'  real  scope  to use it, re-
sulting in great waste  of resources  which  could  have  been used  elsewhere if 
appropriate  strategies had  been  applied. 
Structural  aid  and  subsidies  on  equipment  were  therefore  a  very  appreciable 
encouragement at farm  level,  but more  thorough  research  into methods  of im-
plementing subsidies  could  have  given  more  stimulus to secondary effects, 
such  as  development  of rural  skills,  improvement  of distributive trade net-
works,  use  of local materials,  etc.  {cf.  3.3.3). 
In conclusion it may  be  said that the  effects of structural aid at  farm  level 
have  always  been positive. 
It has  made  for distribution of cheap  inputs,  which  are  now  well  known  and 
appreciated  by  farmers,  as  is borne  out  by the  surveys. 
Where  national  economic  policies allow,  it has  enabled  the  levels of produc-
tion  and  cash  incomes  to be  maintained  or increased. 
A  variety of factors limited its  effectiveness~ 
Its excessive concentration  on  export crops  (in all the  cases  evaluated),  and 
lack of interest on  the part of farmers  in the  crops  towards  which  structural 
aid  was  directed,  on  account of the worsening  food  supply situation and  the 
rise in food  prices. 
Difficulties in getting inputs to the  locations  (Central African Republic, 
Niger,  Togo,  Zaire),  connected with  the  economic  environment  or with  incoher-
ent policies on  subsidies  (e.g.  relative subsidies  on  fertilizers  and  insec-
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A fundamental  problem at present  in all cases is the  transfer of financial 
responsibilities.  Indeed,  it is clear that the  farm  economy  has  nowhere  at-
tained  the kind of balanced position which  would  simultaneously meet  subsist-
ence  needs,  enable  net  incomes  to be  maintained  or  increased  (without  which 
there  can  be  no  socio-economic  development),  provide  a  level  of profitability 
allowing  the  full  operating costs to be  assumed  in the  long  term by  the  farm-
ers and  recipient States. 
Only  substantial  increases  in agricultural  commodity  prices  - not  followed  by 
rises in the cost of imported  inputs  - would  enable  producers  to meet  their 
full  production costs  themselves,  but  such increases,  if affecting export 
products  only,  would  create  competitive  pressure  on  subsistence  crops,  with 
the result that there would  be  added  price  increases  on  these  crops  as well. 
Moreover,  they would  favour  extensive  farming,  which requires  less  labour  and 
often pays better wages. 
Regarding  the effect on  State budgets  and  balances  of payments,  one  can  do  no 
better than to  summarize  the  assessments  of the various evaluators. 
In the  3M  project  (Zinder  Department  - Niger)  the  development  in groundnut 
production cannot be  measured.  At all events,  the balance  of payments  has  not 
been affected.  The  only attributable result is a  reduction in the  country's 
dependence  on  food  aid. 
The  Badeguicheri  valley development project  (Tahoua  Department  - Niger)  had  a 
beneficial although  only marginal  effect,  through  the  marked  improvement  in 
cotton production,  on  State revenues  and  the  balance of payments.  However, 
the  action taken  led to the  beginnings of trade with the  neighbouring country, 
Nigeria,  notably  through trade  in cowpeas. 
The  improvement  of cotton-growing productivity in the  southern  zone  of Chad 
has  produced positive results for  the  State,  with exports producing regular 
direct revenue  (duties)  and  satisfactory indirect revenues  which  have  been 
growing  (CSSPC  revenues  and  indirect taxes).  The  'cotton plan'  has  achieved  a 
balance  between State revenue  and  expenditure,  without taking into account 
the  external  subsidy  which  has  thus played  an  important role  as  a  catalyst 
and  stabilizing influence. 
In parallel with this,  COTONTCHAD,  through  steady management,  has  refurbished 
the industrial installations which  had  been  allowed  by  COTONFRAN  to  run  down 
somewhat  during the  1960s. 
In  the  agricultural  development of the  Central  and  Plateaux regions  in Togo, 
the  objective  on  the  cotton-growing side had  been  to make  a  marginal  profit. 
However,  since production did not rise as anticipated while  costs  increased 
sharply,  the cotton development operation represented  a  loss to the State 
from  1973/1974 and  the deficit increased  when  the  ~DF subsidy  towards  the 
operating costs of the  SORADs  came  to  an  end. 
However,  the  accounts  of the  OPAT  showed  substantial profit margins  during 
the  period  1965-73.  In general  terms,  margins  were  substantial in the case of - 161  -
coffee  and  cocoa,1 while  annual  crops  (cotton,  groundnuts)  showed  slight 
losses between  1965  and  1970  and  marginal profits in 1970/1971  and  1971/1972. 
The  relevant data on  which  to make  a  complete  assessment  are not yet availa-
ble,  however. 
In  the  case of the  communities  in Bugesera-Mayaga  (Rwanda)  it has  not  been 
possible  to calculate the  Rwandese  State's foreign  currency earnings  for  the 
whole  of the period.  It is estimated that in 1971  and  1976  they increased by 
one-third  and  one-half respectively of the  amounts  anticipated when  the proj-
ects began. 
The  increases  in the State's budget revenues  and  the  equalization fund's  rev-
enues  were  also  about half as  much  as  forecast. 
The  coffee plantations established within farming  communities  produced  a 
greater rise in  State revenue  than outside  the  communities,  but  as  there were 
virtually no  imports  of inputs to counterbalance coffee  exports,  the  increase 
in State revenues  was  achieved partly at the  expense  of already precarious 
soil resources. 
The  establ~shment of a  reinvestment  fund  as  originally planned  was  not pro-
ceeded with,  as  the  project could  not  be  self-financing. 
The  continued  low  level  of cash  incomes  meant  that no  increase was  possible 
in direct income  tax revenue. 
The  projects aimed  at agricultural  development  of the Central African  cotton 
zone  (OUAKA  and  the  integrated project)  did bring  an  increase in public reve-
nues  and  foreign  trade,  through coffee,  but  they did not bring about  any  sub-
stantial  improvement  in the  social  circumstances of the rural masses.  Never-
theless,  the  two  projects made  it possible to  avoid  the  decline  in the  cot-
ton-growing  economy  which  would  have  happened  without help  from  the  EDF. 
Given  the  extremely unhealthy state of public  finances,  it is a  positive 
achievement  for  aid to have  maintained  the  level  of supplies  and  inputs  and 
arrested the  steady fall in cotton production,  which is virtually the  only 
source  of cash  incomes  for  a  large proportion of the rural population. 
3.3.3.  Civersification of rural activity and  promotion of employment 
All  the projects make  more  or less explicit reference  - by  way  of demonstra-
tion of their usefulness  - to aims  concerned with diversification of rural 
activities and/or  action to  combat rural  depopulation.  However,  the  inclusion 
of such  aims  in national  development  plans  smacks  of  'catch-all'  justifica-
tion as  long  as  they are not given  substance  in the  former  operational  objec-
tives  and  detailed means  of attaining them,  this either for methodological 
1  A small deficit was  recorded  on  cocoa in one  year only. - 162  -
reasons  (for example  the  'motive  crop'  approach)  or  simply  for  want  of a  suf-
ficiently  firm  political will  for rural  development. 
The  diversification of activity and  the  promotion  of rural  employment  are  two 
closely linked problems,  given  the  need  to  combat rural  depopulation.  Little 
information is available  on  this subject,  because  of a  lack of detailed ana-
lysis before  and  during projects. 
The  problem  of rural  depopulation is common  to all the  countries under  con-
sideration,  but it is more  acute  in some  than  in others.  Of  the  many  factors 
which  cause migration,  the most  fundamental  are  as  follows: 
(i)  the poverty in rural  areas,  in particular the  lack of money  to pay 
taxes  and  meet other needs; 
(ii}  the  inadequacy  of economic,  social  and  cultural  infrastructures; 
(iii}  the  low  level  of productivity in farming  and  of the  corresponding pur-
chasing power; 
(iv)  the  unfavourable effect of production relationships  and  social rela-
tionships  on  young  people  when  the  means  of production  are  monopolized 
by traditional or modern  social hierarchies; 
(v)  the  almost  complete unsuitability of education  systems  to conditions 
and  requirements  in the rural world; 
(vi)  young  people's great lack of means  with  which  to invest in acquisition 
of skills or  new  activities; 
(vii)  the attraction of an  apparently easier life in the  towns. 
When  viewed  from  within the  contexts  in which  they are carried out,  rural 
projects such as  those  evaluated for this report can  be  seen to have  a  poten-
tial for  encouraging  trends  towards  rural  depopulation.  Examples  of how  this 
can  happen  are given below: 
(a)  when  projects make  it easier for  those  peasants  who  are  most  prosperous 
and  best placed in traditional  or  modern hierarchies to monopolize  fac-
tors of production,  as  for  example  in the  case  of the  introduction of an-
imal-drawn tillage  (cf.  Part 4); 
(b)  when  the  technical  methods  proposed  in projects are  too sophisticated  and 
cannot be  assimilated in the  peasant context; 
(c)  when  projects do not  encourage  the  emergence  of para-agricultural rural 
occupations outside  the official institutions; 
(d)  when,  as  described  above,  price manipulation  or subsidies create  condi-
tions which  cause  the  decline  of craft occupations rather than stimulat-
ing  them  (3.3.2.4); 
(e)  when  general  or vocational  training is too theoretical,  so that it gives 
young  people  hopes  of going into the public  service rather than  encourag-
ing  and  equipping  them  to set up  in the  local  context of production  and 
trade  in goods  and  services; 
(f)  when  projects fail  to  take  account  of the  complexities of prevailing con-
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socio-economic  problems  to be  tackled  (examples  of this are  provided  by 
projects which  disregard  land  tenure  conditions or relations between 
farmers  and  graziers,  or  again  by  those  which  are  directed exclusively at 
a  small  proportion of an area and  disregard  the rest,  as  was  the  case  in 
the  Ivory Coast,  wh~re SODERIZ  attempted to find  solutions to the  land 
tenure  problems  in the  lowlands  recently laid out for  growing rice, 
whereas  the  land  tenure  problems  of the  villages concerned related to the 
land  for  rain~fed crops); 
(g)  when  the criteria of  immediate  economic  and  financial  profitability are 
given  such  overwhelming priority that they exclude  other criteria such  as 
secondary effects in the  short  and  medium  term,  the  amount  of employment, 
the  consequences  on  the  institutional environment,  the ability of the 
groups  concerned  to cope  with  the  social  and  cultural  implications of 
change. 
It may  be  thought  that the projects evaluated  could  have  adopted  a  more  con-
structive approach  to the problems  of employment  and diversification.  It has 
to be  recorded  that,  formal  declarations apart,  they  took little positive ac-
tion to encourage  diversification of rural activities,  which  would  have  been 
particularly useful  in the  area of craft occupations  which  are  complementary 
to agriculture  and  livestock-breeding.1  The  main diversification attributable 
to the  projects was  in the  commercial  sector,  taking  the  form  of regional 
trade  in food  crops:  rice,  groundnuts,  cowpeas,  maize  etc.,  but it was  not 
always  sufficient to eliminate  the need  for  recourse  to imports  (cf.  2.1.5). 
Within agriculture itself,  action  along the  following  lines  could help  to-
wards  economic  diversification and  job creation: 
(a)  Relating the planning of technical  measures  to local agricultural  systems 
as  a  whole  rather than  to a  limited number  of commercial  crops  and  in-
vesting in food  crops,  an  approach which  calls for  depolarization of the 
institutional environment  and  supervisory structures,  which  are  by  and 
large still heavily committed  to cash crops. 
(b)  Diversification of action taken according to zonal  potentialities and 
socio-economic  categories so that  a  trade  network  can be built up  gradu-
ally. 
(c)  Investment  on  a  far greater scale than  during the periods  completed  in 
agronomical  research directly related to  local agricultural  systems,  sub-
sistence activities and  food  crops  suitable for  sale to urban markets. 
(d)  Organization of activities around  the  idea of land use  distribution,  this 
is conjunction with the peasant communities  concerned,  especially where 
problems  regarding  farming  and grazing rights are  concerned. 
In  the  case of the  various  types  of work  which  are  connected with agriculture 
or  complementary to it, the  following  types  of action  could help  to  develop 
diversification: 
1  An  exception is the  southern  Zinder project in Niger,  in which village 
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(i)  investment  in local infrastructures  (tracks,  springs,  store-houses, 
etc.)  and  carting equipment; 
(ii)  investment in facilities for preparation and  storage of produce  in the 
villages; 
(iii)  upgrading  of rural  occupations  by  means  of appropriate  training with  a 
view  to the  development  of  'integrated'  occupations  in the  villages: 
land  managers,  craftsmen,  well-sinkers,  first-aiders etc.  (cf.  4.2); 
(iv)  encouragement  of occupations  connected  with  the distribution of goods, 
a  natural  concomitant of which  would  be  the  development of ethical 
standards in private small  trade  and  improvement  of its efficiency. 
There  would  also be  scope at national policy level  for  encouraging diversifi-
cation by  various  means: 
(i)  action in the  field of storage  and  market regulation which  would  be  in-
tegrated with rather than  in opposition to the existing structures of 
intermediaries; 
(ii)  action to encourage  inter-regional  and  inter-State trade,  since all 
trade within a  given country or between  neighbouring countries 
strengthens economic  independence  and  creates its own  secondary effects; 
(iii) restructuring fiscal  systems  to reduce  the  dependence  of public budgets 
on  export crops; 
(iv)  encouraging urban populations to  consume  local produce  rather than  im-
ports. 
Clearly,  other suggestions  could  be  added  to this brief list of possible  ways 
of encouraging diversification.  The  purpose  here  was  to make  the point that 
due  consideration should be  given  to these  aspects  in conjunction with  those 
concerned with areas  under  cultivation,  yields,  outputs  and  returns  on  labour. Part Four 
DEVELOPMENT  STRATEGIES  LINKED  TO  THE  MANAGEMENT 
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The  various projects evaluated were  presented  in turn in Part One.  The  format 
of their presentation followed  the  logic according  to which  the projects were 
carried out;  the results achieved were  described  in relation to the  objec-
tives  which  had  been set and  assessments were  made  of the effectiveness of 
the  resources used. 
The  evaluator cannot restrict himself to  observing  a  project in terms  of its 
own  internal  logic.  He  must  seek to establish how  well  the  project fits into 
its environment  and  ask whether  alternatives are not possible.  Adoption of an 
analytical grid  on  the basis  of which  to  consider, in turn the  various  factors 
of production in agriculture  and  the  various  functions  of organization of the 
rural  environment helps  the  observer to  take  a  broader  view. 
This  fourth part of the report considers  the  economics  of each  of the essen-
tial factors  of production1  in the  cases studied:  land,  labour,  biological 
capital  (plant and  animal  life),  fixed  assets  (equipment,  tools,  store hous-
es),  floating assets  (fertilizers,  insecticides)  and  uncertainty factors. 
In addition,  Part Five will consider the  various functions  appertaining to 
the  economic  and  institutional environment  of farm  holdings:  training,  organ-
ization of the  rural  environment,  marketing of produce,  supplies  and  distri-
bution,  credit.  It is important  to understand  the  extent to which  action tak-
en  led to  improvements  in these various  functions  and  how  structural  improve-
ments  themselves  contributed to rural development. 
4.1.  LAND 
Land  tenure  problems  are  assuming  increasing  importance  in all the  countries 
visited  and  in  some  cases  they are  becoming  a  crucial  factor.  They  take vari-
ous  forms: 
(i)  disappearance  or modification of traditional  systems  of land  management 
and  soil preservation,  especially systems  including restoration by 
means  of fallowing; 
1  The  term  is used  here  in the broadest sense,  without  any  attempt  to place 
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(ii)  soil exhaustion caused  by  erosion,  by  excessive  farming  or grazing  or 
by  lack of compensation for  minerals  taken  out of the  land; 
(iii) monopolization of land  by  some  headmen,  who  assert private property 
rights over  common  land or use it for  commercial  gain,  with the result 
that young  people  are experiencing increasing difficulty in finding 
land  to work. 
The  belief that  'there are  no  land problems'  in Black Africa is very  largely 
out of  date~On the  contrary,  land  tenure  problems  are  becoming increasingly 
acute.  In  mos~,cases, however,  very little information  on this subject is 
available. 
In  two projects  (Rwanda  and  Badeguicheri),  resources  were  concentrated  on  ob-
jectives directly linked to the  maintenance  or restoration of soil fertility: 
combating erosion,  construction of terraces,  development of flood  areas,  or-
ganization of  kitchen~gardens around  wells.  The  only  examples  of these objec-
tives being pursued  in conjunction with  land  tenure  reform  were  the  cases 
where  'farming communities'  were  established,  a  reform which  did not inter-
fere  with traditional concepts.  The  evaluation reports state that these 
schemes  achieved  only  limited results.  They  were  concentrated  on  local  areas 
and  heavily dependent  on  external  finance.  Moreover,  there  was  no  specific 
effort to promote  them  through group  instruction or advisory work,  which 
would  have  encouraged  the  farmers  to organize  themselves  so  that they  could 
take  over responsibility.  No  mention of them  is made  in connection with  the 
training  and  advisory services provided  by  the  supervisors. 
Apart  from  the  two  projects in Niger  and  the  'farming  communities'  (Rwanda 
and  Zaire),  no  mention is made  of specific objectives relating to soil ex-
haustion,  except for the  use  of fertilizers.  The  Chad  report points  out that 
fertilizer inputs  are  not yet sufficient to re-establish the pedological  bal-
ances  and  also mentions  that there  may  be  a  certain itinerancy of cotton-
growing plots and  the  application of intensive  methods,  the effect of which 
would  be  to obscure  the real situation regarding soil exhaustion. 
When  the  soil is exhausted after some  years of cotton-growing,  the cotton-
plots move  on  to new  land.  So,  two  factors  should  be  studied more  carefully. 
First, it seems  that the  cotton-plots move  to less and  less fertile soil,  be-
cause  the best  land is used at the  outset.  Second,  when  the plots are  aban-
doned,  they  are not followed  up  by  any  government  service.  Yet,  agricultural 
research  (IRCT)  shows  that even prolonged  fallow  does  not restore initial 
fertility when  cotton has  been grown  for  too  long  on  the  same  land. 
The  evaluation reports highlight the  importance  of thorough  analysis of land 
tenure  problems  arising in connection with projects  and  it is clear that this 
is an  area where  much  planning  work  is needed. 
In the  Bugesera-Mayaga  'farming communities',  plots were  allocated  on  the ba-
sis of clearly defined population  norms  and  technical  standards.  Although 
these  arrangements  held good  for  the first generation,  population growth is 
causing the  norms  to be  exceeded.  Not  all members  of the  second  generation 
are  finding  other plots on  which  to set up,  or employment  outside  farming. - 169  -
Some  farmers  are being  obliged  by  lack of space  to put  some  of their children 
off their farms;  this  does  not  solve  the  problems  of achieving  a  balance be-
tween population  and  resources,  but merely shifts them  to other overpopulated 
areas. 
Another  type  of problem is the  contradiction between  the  system of collective 
ownership  proclaimed  by  the  Rwandese  State  ('the land  belongs  to the  State') 
and  the  individualistic approach  of the  information  and  advisory services, 
which  have  not raised the  problems  of soil preservation and  restoration with 
the groups  of farmers  living on  neighbouring plots.  Action  to combat  erosion 
{in the  same  way  as  the regrouping of farm  land in Europe,  for  instance)  can-
not be  organized  on  farms  of two  hectares  or less in size;  it is necessary  to 
tackle  entire hill slopes at a  time. 
In  Chad,  the policy on  block cultivation of cotton interferes very directly 
with  the  traditional  land  tenure  system,  although without bringing about  any 
progress  in these  systems  in the  longer  term.  When  a  cultivation block is 
abandoned,  it will probably revert to  the traditional  system,  but  the  quality 
of the  land will  undoubtedly  have  changed  considerably and  the  value  of cus-
tomary  farming  rights will not  be  the  same  at the  end  of the period as at the 
beginning.  The  policy of block cultivation is therefore  likely to give rise 
to  inextricable  land  tenure problems  with  the  pa~sage of time. 
In  Ivory  Coast,  SODERIZ  has  endeavoured  to solve  certain land  tenure  problems 
in the  lowlands  being developed  for rice.  The  plan was  to distribute land 
among  villagers  int~nding to grow rice.  However,  as in the  two  cases  quoted 
above,  the  land  tenure  problems  which  this  involved were  of marginal  interest 
to the  villagers  (since  the  lowlands  have  never  been  the  subject of farming 
rights),  whereas  far  more  serious problems  arose in connection with  the rain-
fed  farming  land  and  were  impeding progress  in  th~ area.  Again,  SODERIZ  met 
with no  land  tenure  problems  when  carrying out major clearance of land  for 
cultivation,  but  many  such  problems  arose  two  or three years  later when  it 
came  to expand  the  areas under  cultivation.  Thus,  the  development of land for 
cultivation quickly  led to claims  to farming  rights over neighbouring  land 
from  those with the  opportunity or responsibility to lay such claims.  In  some 
cases,  neighbouring  farmers  prevented  lowland  'beneficiaries'  from  growing 
any  highland  crops if they happened  to be  strangers. 
Because  of lack of information  on  this subject,  there is very general under-
estimation of the  disputes which  can  arise in the  medium  or  long  term  as  a 
result of land policies formulated  on  the basis  of objectives which  are  too 
narrow  (cultivation of cotton or rice,  stabilization of peasant families etc.) 
in the  absence  of overall negotiation or anticipation of the  long-term ef-
fects  on  the  communities  concerned.  The  advisory staff do  not  have  sufficient 
knowledge  to analyse  the  problems  involved,  nor  do  they  have  authority to 
propose  solutions.  The  world  does  not offer many  examples  of land  tenure  sys-
tems  in which  there is no clear-cut responsibility regarding  the  management 
of land;  in  some  cases,  however,  the responsibility of the  'chefs  de  terre' 
in the  community  context is no  longer recognized  or has  been misapplied  in 
pursuit of personal  interest.  There  is growing  confusion in the  rural  and 
institutional world  on  this subject:  on  the  one  hand,  peasants  have  no  under-
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stitutions are  applying  - none  too discriminatingly - the principle whereby 
land  belongs  to the  State  and  can  be  distributed to private  individuals.  The 
interprenetation of customary  and  modern  concepts  may  be  necessary,  but it 
would  seem  to entail grave  risks  for  the  future  insofar as  there is no  arbi-
tration authority at local  level. 
The  evaluation reports also raise  a  number  of more  specific problems. 
For  instance,  they  show that the  problems  of access  to  land  for certain so-
cial groups  (young  people  and  women)  are  becoming  increasingly acute.  Because 
of increasing population pressure,  some  headmen  are  asserting their farming 
rights.  Another  factor is the  development  of export crops,  which  is encourag-
ing  farmers  to  expand  their holdings;  this is an  option which  is generally 
only  available  to  the  richer farmers  who  are  able  to purchase  animal-drawn 
equipment.  Under  such  circumstances,  young  people  are  finding it increasingly 
difficult to set up  on their own  land  and  have  to  choose  between  moving  else-
where  or taking  employment  as  farm  labourers working  for  the  new  owners. 
Is it not  anachronistic  today  for collectively owned  land to be  passing  into 
private  hands  when,  by  common  consent in national  and  international organiza-
tions,  it is necessary to  find  collective solutions to the  major  problems  of 
abandonment  of rural  areas  by  the young,  soil preservation and  restoration, 
organization of land use  according to the  needs  of each  socio-economic  group, 
increasing famine  and  so  on? 
Soil exhaustion is another  very disturbing problem;  its consequences  are re-
flected in falling yields1  and gradual  reduction in the  number  of species 
cultivated,  with  a  trend  towards  those  species  which  are  least demanding  in 
agronomical  terms,  which  are also often the  least beneficial  in nutritional 
terms.2 
Soil exhaustion is the result of excessive  working  of the  land without  com-
pensation.  Fallow periods,  which  with traditional methods  allowed  the  soil to 
recover after crops  had  been  grown  on it, have  been  shortened  and  in some 
cases eliminated  from  rotations.  They  have  not been replaced  by  other effi-
cient methods.  Pure  crops,  sown  in high  densities  and  weeded,  have  superseded 
more  sparsely  sown,  'dirty'  mixed  crops,  which  made  for  fuller  and  more  var-
ied  cultivation of the  land.  Despite  the  intensification of growing methods, 
improvement of protection of crops,  in some  cases  mechanization of tillage 
and·  so  on,  'motive'  agriculture  has  not  adhered  to the principle whereby  what 
has  been  exported  from  the  land3  by  a  crop  must  be  compensated  for  by corres-
ponding  imports.  Programmes  to promote  the  use  of fertilizers have  achieved 
excellent results  on  a  local  scale where  climate  and  crop protection condi-
1  Falls in yields  should  be  assessed in relation to the  agricultural  systems 
in use.  For  instance,  yields  from  the  cotton fields under  intensive culti-
vation in southern  Chad  have  been  falling  for several years. 
2  For  instance,  extension of manioc  at the  expense  of cereals,  extension of 
bananas  at the  expense  of beans,  etc. 
3  From  the  stratum which  feeds  the roots  of the  species  cultivated. - 171  -
tions have  been  satisfactory,  but nowhere  have  they  led  to balanced  long-term 
patterns of use  of agricultural  land.  Such  balanced patterns can  only  be 
achieved  by  overall  management  of the  factors  of production which  have  the 
most  direct influence  on  the  quality of land,  with rotation and  fallowing 
which  takes  account  of ecological effects as  well  as  immediate  productivity; 
in this connection,  no  accounts  are  given  in the  reports of research  on  bio-
mass  management  aimed  at increasing volume  (for instance,  by  growing  appro-
priate  companion  crops)  and  taking  advantage  of special  ecological properties 
of companion  crops  for  the  most  directly productive species.  Except  in Rwanda, 
where  the  ISAR  is concerned  with all peasant  farming  activities,  the  research 
institutes have  not given  enough  attention to integrated research on  agricul-
tural systems,•concentrating  on  easing  farming  constraints  and  establishing 
long-term balances rather than  on  increasing productivity with  a  limited  num-
ber of specific crops  (cotton,  groundnuts,  rice etc.).  There  is no  reason why 
one  of these  lines of research  should  have  excluded  the  other. 
Soil  exhaustion is also caused  by  erosion,  which  can  be  combated  by  mechani-
cal  means  (terracing,  anti-erosion ridges,  ditches,  laying out plots along 
contour lines etc.)  or by biological  means  (a particular covering of vegeta-
tion).  In peasant  farming  (micro-plots),  individual efforts are not very ef-
fective;  a  collective  campaign must  be  waged  over  a  fairly large area if any 
significant improvement  in water  economics  is to be  achieved.  Action  to com-
bat erosion therefore calls for  instruction in appropriate  techniques  com-
bined with  a  collective effort on  the  task of restructuring rural  space.  For 
this type  of work,  as well  as  the necessary political will,  there must  be  su-
pervisory staff trained  to instruct groups  of peasant  farmers  and  able  to or-
ganize  operations  in conjunction with  them. 
None  of the projects evaluated  included plans to promote  elementary soil pro-
tection and  restoration methods  traditionally used  by  local  farmers:  compan-
ion  crops  with different cycles,  introduction of perennial  species  in fields 
under  annual  crops,  as  is done  with bananas  in Rwanda  or acacia albida -
whose  presence  improves  soil quality - in West  Africa,  arrangements  between 
graziers  and  farmers  etc.  Such  practices,  however  rudimentary,  could  in some 
cases  have  provided  a  background  for  integrated action to  combat  erosion, 
which might possibly have  been more  efficient than mechanical  methods. 
Problems  concerned  with  the  structure of rural  space  also arise in areas 
where  farmers  and  graziers  come  into contact.  Complementarity between agri-
culture  and  livestock-breeding,  is recognized  among  the  general  objectives  of 
development  plans.  In practice,  some  of the  projects evaluated  included  among 
their aims  the  integration of livestock  into individual  agricultural holdings 
(animal-drawn tillage in  Chad,  the  'fermette'  system  in Rwanda).  The  results 
achieved  have  been  encouraging  insofar as  the  breeding of draught  animals is 
gradually leading on  to breeding for  slaughter and  mixed  breeding.  Neverthe-
less,  there are still very many  areas  where  farming  land is crossed  by  nomad-
ic graziers with their flocks  or herds.  The  organization of land to  take ac-
count  of the  movements  of nomadic  graziers has  become  essential,  partly in 
view of the  growing risks  of conflicts arising out of the  extension of areas 
under  cultivation,  but mainly because  of the  advantages  to be  derived  from 
the  development  of fruitful  interchange between  farmers  and  graziers. - 172  -
Two  important aspects  of soil management  need  to  be  developed,  given  the re-
alities of practical conditions  in tropical  climates:  biomass  management  and 
agricultural water  management. 
The  biomass  produced  is  an essential  factor1  in agricultural production under 
tropical  climate  and  soil conditions.  This  is the  mass  of substance of vege-
table or  animal  origin produced  on  an  area of land  which  is either exported 
from  that land  in the  form  of consumable  products  or restored  to the  soil in 
the  form  of organic wastes. 
Production  of a  substantial biomass  is the  objective pursued  by  fallowing  in 
rotative agricultural  systems.  The  purposes  of fallowing  are to  improve  soil 
texture  through  the  incorporation of organic constituents into the  sand-clay 
mineral  complex  and  to  improve  soil structure  (physical  and  chemical)  through 
the  redistribution of minerals  among  the various strata of the  soil and  modi-
fication of ionic  complexes. 
The  traditional balance of subsistence  agriculture has  been preserved as  a 
result of the  maintenance  of production/reconstitution rotations by  communi-
ties  and  the  maintenance  of the  corresponding population balances  (migration 
and  high mortality rates). 
In  some  cases,  the  combination  of livestock-breeding and  various  forms  of 
'fertilizer management'2 has  enabled  farmers  to keep  land permanently under 
cultivation while  at the  same  time  improving the soil. 
However,  population pressure,  in some  cases  coupled with  the  demands  on  the 
land  made  by  the  livestock population,  has  definitively broken  down  the bal-
ance  of agricultural systems  in most of the regions  under  consideration and 
this process  has  been accelerated  by  the  development  of commercial  crops. 
The  'farming  community'  system set up  in Zaire  and  Rwanda  organized  land use 
so  that the  crop/fallowing cycles  could  be  maintained  on  each  farm.  As  the 
Bugesera-Mayaga evaluation demonstrates,  however,  for these  cycles  to be 
maintained,  it would  be  necessary for  the population to be  kept steady by mi-
gration to other areas,  which  is no  longer possible  in Rwanda. 
Under  such  conditions,  a  fundamental  problem  in  farming  is the  need  to re-
place  the traditional system of soil rehabilitation by  other techniques  which 
are  more  efficient than  fallowing  in regard  to both soil texture  and  struc-
ture. 
It be  may  be  that,  as  suggested  by  analyses  carried out  by  the  IRCT  in Chad, 
the use  of mineral  fertilizers is accelerating the deterioration of the or-
ganic  complex  in that they are being applied selectively and not enough  is 
1  A  'sub-factor',  since  the  biomass  is the  product of the  land  and  biological 
constituent. 
2  Tethering of cattle on  plots to be cultivated,  return of cattle to central 
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yet known  about  the  limiting factors  of the  ionic  complex  in relation to each 
species. 
The  use  of mineral  fertilizers is not  to be  regarded  as  a  substitution for 
fallowing,  but  as  an essential  complement  to  techniques  for  the  maintenance 
of the soil's organic balances;  modern  farming practice in Africa has  not yet 
perfected  these  techniques. 
Only  two  references  to biomass production are to be  found  in the  evaluation 
reports: 
(i)  introduction of manure  barns  under  the  cotton plan in Chad  and  in the 
Rwandese  'fermettes'  system; 
(ii)  research at the  IRCT  stations in Chad  on  'dolique'  and  the role of fal-
lowing. 
In both Rwanda  and  Chad  the  advantages  of building manure  barns  are restrict-
ed  by  carting limitations.  In  Rwanda,  it is pointed out,  the problem of cart-
ing  organic  wastes  - a  traditional task for  the  local  farmers  - has  been ac-
centuated  in the  farming  communities  by  the construction of anti-erosion 
ridges;  this is quoted  as  an  example  of the  failure in the  planning of agri-
cultural  development  methods  to take  account of real obstacles.1  Zootechnical 
schemes  connected with  the production of manure  have  therefore  enjoyed limit-
ed  success  only. 
As  for  the research on  'dolique', it is as yet not sufficiently advanced  and 
probably not sufficiently well understood for  promotion  to be  put in hand  for 
the  time being.  However,  it represents  a  potential development  of traditional 
methods  applied  in the  African environment,  where  there is no  reluctance to 
grow ecologically useful  species as  companions  for  productive species. 
In  the  area of the biomass  factor,  the  evidence  points to  an  absence  of fun-
damental  knowledge  and  rational  objectives going  beyond  general  affirmations 
along  the  lines of  'livestock breeding must  be  combined with crop  farming'. 
The  lack of knowledge  in this field suggests that there is scope  for major 
efforts and  a  fundamental  revision of agricultural  thinking in relation to 
this factor  of production. 
Control  of water resources  was  not  a  major  feature  of the projects evaluated, 
apart  from  a  few  specific  instances:  development  for agriculture of land  sub-
ject to flooding,  laying-out of kitchen gardens  around  wells,  under the proj-
ects in Niger.  (We  deliberately excluded predominantly hydro-agricultural 
projects in order to concentrate  on  the subsector under  consideration.) 
It seems  regrettable that.more  schemes  connected with water  economy  in raid-
fed  crops  were  not pursued  through  research  or advisory services under  any of 
1  According  to the  evaluation report,  this problem  of carting and  the plough-
ing problem would  have  been  eased if plots  had  been laid out along contour 
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the projects.  In  fact,  only  schemes  connected with action to  combat  erosion, 
either by  the  construction of terraces  or the planting of hedges,  have  been 
tackled.  These  are far  from  being the  only methods  of promoting water  economy; 
there  are  other methods  which  have  proved  effective  and  an  examination  could 
be  made  of  the  possibility of introducing  them  alongside  measures  to prevent 
erosion:  methods  based  on  the  ecolo~ical role  of certain species  such  as  the 
banana trees,  acacia and  'dolique';  introduction of techniques  to  avoid 
stripping the  land  of protection;  protecting crops  with shrubs;  combinations 
of  long  and  short-cycle crops;  selection of deep-rooted  species etc. 
Water  is a  major  limiting factor  in rain-fed agriculture.  Training  schemes 
connected with  water  resources  could  be  developed  with  as  much  emphasis  as 
those  connected with mineral  fertilizers or  animal-drawn  tillage. 
This  evaluation exercise has  demonstrated  that  land  tenure  is a  subject about 
which  too little is known  and  that its importance  was  underestimated  in most 
of the  projects.  Several conclusions  follow  from  what  was  found: 
Identification  and  study of land  tenure  problems  is a  necessity both during 
the  planning of projects and  during their execution.  It is necessary  in par-
ticular to appreciate  how  action carried out will effect the  distribution of 
land  between  the  various  socio-economic  groups. 
It is extremely desirable  for projects to  adopt  a  strategy of overall plan-
ning of village  land,  in close association with the various groups  of occu-
pants  and  the  members  of the  community  responsible  for  land  management. 
Similarly,  it is necessary for  advisory  services to  aim  for  collective solu-
tions  to land management  problems,  to facilitate not only  the  detection of 
soil exhaustion  and  erosion,  but also remedial  action. 
Research  and  advisory services should  also broaden their horizons  to include 
soil protection,  maintenance  and  restoration techniques  or  combinations  of 
techniques  which  can  be  assimilated readily into local  technical  and  economic 
contexts;  biological methods  of combating  erosion could be  as promising as 
methods  based on mechanical  means. 
More  attention should  be  paid to biomass  management.  The  production of the 
plant and  animal  organic matter needed to maintain soil fertility and  the 
protection of soil against erosion by  means  of the  densest possible covering 
of plants are both essential in tropical climates,  but the  conversion  to 
'pure'  crops  has  too  often caused  these practices to fall  into disuse. 
Similarly,  water  management  in rain-fed agriculture deserves  the  closest at-
tention,  not  only  in agricultural research,  but also in the presentation of 
techniques  proposed  to farmers. 
1  A very deep-rooted  slow-maturing species  which  may  be  a  suitable companion 
for  cash crops.  The  results of the  IRCT  in  Chad  point to the desirability 
of pursuing research both  on  quick-maturing varieties  and  on  some  slow-ma-
turing species._ - 175  -
A possible suggestion is that all agricultural projects  submitted  to the  EDF 
could  be  subjected  to  a  preliminary assessment of the  land  tenure  problems  in 
the  areas  concerned  and  that the  application file  should  be  required  to give 
details of the  fundamental  balances  which  the project intends to establish -
ecological  and  agricultural balances,  socio-economic  balances  and  balanced 
structures in the  organization of rural  space. 
4.2.  LABOUR 
There  are  many  problems  concerned with  farm  labour.  Several  of these  were  an-
alysed in Part Three  (3.3.2  and  3.3.3):  labour productivity in food  terms  and 
in cash  terms,  average  productivity and  marginal  productivity at peak periods 
in the  farming  calendar,  work  options  in relation to the  market,  diversifica-
tion of rural activities,  promotion of rural  occupations etc. 
Seasonal  unemployment  (inherent in all seasonal  farming),  low labour produc-
tivity  (especially at peak periods)  and  the  combined  effects of both  these 
factors  are  structural causes of the poor  level  of annual  incomes  in the ru-
ral areas  concerned.  The  value  of these  incomes  is further  deflated by  the 
meagre  purchasing power  they  command. 
It was  seen  how,  in this  type  of situation,  much  can  be  achieved  by well 
planned  economic  policies  aimed  at stabilizing and  gradually improving re-
turns  on  labour.  The  importance  of coupling  employment  objectives with pro-
duction  objectives was  also illustrated.  Only  aspects not discussed earlier 
are  analysed  here:  technical  improvements,  initiation and  financing  of rural 
employment,  technologies  which create employment,  vocational  training  and 
health  problems  associated with agricultural  work. 
In  the projects evaluated,  three types of action had  direct effects  on  labour 
productivity:  introduction of new  techniques  (raising peasant skills);  en-
couragement  of animal-drawn tillage  (improving productivity of work  in the 
fields  and  reducting carting times);  mechanized  ground  clearance,  tilling and 
weeding  carried out  for  farmers  on  a  jobbing basis in Zaire,  the Ivory Coast 
and  more  recently Togo.  Vocational  training is analysed  in Part Five.  Other 
technical measures,  such as  the  use  of fertilizers,  protection of crops 
against disease,  protection of land  against erosion  and  so  on  also helped  to 
improve  labour productivity,  but in indirect ways.  They are  accordingly  con-
sidered in connection with  the  factors  which  they  influenced directly. 
In half of the  cases evaluated,  efforts were  made  to encourage  animal-drawn 
tillage on  a  wider  scale.  The  results achieved varied considerably:  failure 
in Togo,  considerable success  in Chad  and  the  Ivory Coast,  less than satis-
factory results in the  other countries:  Benin,  Niger,  Upper  Volta  (cf.  4.4). 
The  dynamics  of the  introduction of animal-drawn tillage are  complex  and  not 
enough  is yet  known  about  them.  What  is known  with certainty is that improve-
ment  of farm  labour productivity is not  a  farmer's  main  motive  in acquiring 
the  necessary  equipment.  The  investment  in  an  animal-drawn  tillage and  cart-- 176  -
ing unit is always  very  large  in relation to farmers'  incomes  (4  to 6  times 
the  average  annual  income  in the  areas under  consideration).  This  investment 
must  therefore  be  highly profitable for  the  farmer,  who  can  make  it pay  in 
several  ways: 
(i)  by  extending  areas  under  commercial  crops  (the  scope  for  this is in 
general  limited according to the  availability of labour  for  harvesting 
and  weeding,  or  indeed  there  may  be  no  scope  for  extending  farming 
rights).; 
(ii)  by hiring out  the  equipment  for  doing  jobbing work  or carting for  oth-
ers; 
(iii)  through  the  substantial increase  in weight  of draught  oxen  which  can  be 
achieved if they are  looked  after properly. 
Other  more  minor  factors  also enter into the  dynamics  of this process:  secu-
rity,  prestige,  manure  production,  hope  of eventually building up  a  herd  in-
cluding breeding stock or even,  as  was  found  in Niger,  the purely financial 
advantage  available to farmers  buying  oxen  on  credit and  immediately selling 
them  off to traders at a  profit. 
Not  only is the  purchase  of animal-drawn  equipment  a  substantial  investment, 
it is also highly risky.  It is only really within the pockets of those who 
are  already fairly well established both economically  and  in  terms  of land. 
Where  agricultural credit arrangements  are  available,  poorer  farmers  also 
manage  to obtain equipment.  However,  their position is particularly precari-
ous  since,  if they  have  no  resources other than  their small  farms,  they will 
be left with debts for  the rest of their lives in the  event of a  setback. 
Hence  the  suggestion  from  some  of the  evaluators  about setting up  animal-
drawn  equipment hire  companies  or insurance  schemes  covering the risks  in-
volved  (death of the  oxen  in particular). 
Even  where  successful results have  been achieved,  the supervisory staff can-
not be  said to have  really understood the  logic  leading to the  spread of ani-
mal-drawn tillage or to have  shown  an  ability to  encourage it other than  in 
the  limiting context of the  crop  which it is their job to promote. 
Another  aspect of the  spread of animal-drawn tillage which has  a  bearing  on 
the  problems  of rural  employment  is tool-making  and  tool maintenance.  This  is 
a  field which offers many  opportunities for para-agricultural  employment  and 
varied  scoped  for  technical training.  This  aspect was  not given  due  impor-
tance  during the  periods  now  completed.  The  equipment distributed was  always 
bought  in large quantities  by  way  of invitation to tender;  it was  always  in-
dustrially produced  and  was  sometimes  of good  quality,  but in other cases it 
was  of substandard or unsuitable  quality.  The  organization of vast farming 
equipment  programmes  could have  been  taken  as  an  opportunity to attempt  to 
develop  rural woodworking  and  metalworking crafts.  If only part of the re-
quirements  for ploughs,  carts,  weeders etc.  had  been met  by  local  craftsmen, 
even if unit costs had  been higher,  the  secondary effects on  employment  and 
vocational training,  as well  as  on  local trade,  would  have  been  appreciable. 
It has  to be  recorded  that what  happened  in practice was  different:  in  some - 177  -
cases,  the  subsidy  on  equipment  actually killed off all possibility of pro-
duction by  craftsmen  (cf.  3.3.2.4)  and it was  not until  a  very  late stage 
that some  projects  turned  to training rural blacksmiths to maintain equipment 
in the  village. 
In the  rural world,  the  creation of any  new  agricultural  or para-agricultural 
job entails appropriate  vocational  training,  but it also presupposes  an  in-
vestment,  an  economic  environment  and  recurrent costs.  For  the  job to be  sus-
tained,  these  three factors  must  be sufficiently under  the  control  of the 
village  economy.  If the  investment cost is too high,  the  amount  at risk will 
be  disproportionate  to the potential gain.  If there are  shortcomings  in the 
economic  environment,  especially in the  supply of raw  materials,  the  job can-
not  be  done.  Finally,  if the  local  community itself is not in a  position to 
meet  production costs  and  pay  for  labour,  the  job  cannot be  kept  in existence. 
When  a  job is created with artificial resources  in  an artificial environment, 
it has  very little chance  of surviving,  since  the resources  and  environment 
will  eventually disappear.  This  is what  would  happen  to  a  blacksmith who  was 
set up  in a  forge,  provided with  long-term  supplies by  the  organizers of a 
project and  trained by  an  expert who  also attended to sales of his products 
and  other such matters.  He  would  be  so dependent  on  such  an  environment that 
its disappearance  would  mean  the  disappearance  of his  job. 
Hence  the  need  to integrate efforts to create  employment  into the  rural  con-
text,  paying particular attention to: 
(i)  sustaining economic  initiative in the village  context, 
(ii)  sustaining initiative in close  liaison with  the groups  concerned,  who 
alone  will  be  able  to finance  the recurrent costs  of the  job created; 
(iii)  avoiding  the  danger  of corrupting initiative by  making  too many  re-
sources  available or by providing tools which  are  too sophisticated for 
the  ambiant  economic  and  technical  context. 
The  creation of rural  employment presupposes  complete  mastery - in cultural, 
social  and  economic  terms  - of working  conditions by  the  communities  con-
cerned.  Upgrading  technical skills already present in the  local  environment, 
training skilled men  without holding out any  hope  of their being  financed  by 
the public institutions,  remuneration of work  in its natural  context rather 
than  in the  artificial context of projects of short duration - these  are 
among  the  conditions  needed  to ensure that newly  created employment  can be 
mastered  by  the groups  which it is designed  to serve. 
Whereas  concern to diversify production and  trade  in the  rural  environment is 
often expressed by planners,  the  choice  of technologies  in the  primary proc-
essing factor is not  always  compatible with this concern.  Mention has  been 
made  above,  in connection with the distribution of animal-drawn  equipment,  of 
the  opportunity missed  to establish an artisan craft sector to produce  and 
maintain  some  such  equipment which,  apart  from  a  few  components,  does  not in-
volve  very  complex  technology. - 178  -
In  another  example  taken  from  the  Ivory  Coast,  SODERIZ  has  invested in a  se-
ries of large rice-husking plants  (capacity:  160  000  t).  In parallel with 
this,  the  authorities placed  a  ban  in  1972  on  trade  in  low-capacity husking 
machines  used  by  small  operators.  This  dual  development  inevitably led to 
tension  among  the  very large  numbers  of small  operators  who  were  cut off from 
all but very local  customers  for  rice processing because  of theoretical rea-
soning  dividing trade  into three  types  of network  (local,  regional,  national) 
and  laying  down  clearly defined  quality requirements  for  each  of these net-
works. 
Apart  form  the  co~flicts of interest which  arose  in this connection  and  con-
tinued until the crisis in  1976,  it is necessary to ask  the  relevant ques-
tions in order to assess  the political option which  consists  in encouraging  , 
units of large rather than  small  capacity.  The  following  questions  should  be 
asked  when  projects  are  considered initially: 
(a)  How  many  jobs will  each  solution maintain?  Which  of these  jobs will pro-
mote  vocational  training  and  responsibilities  in the  rural  world  itself? 
(b)  To  what  extent is each  job at risk because  of dependence  on  industry, 
foreign  technical  assistance  and  working  capital which  may  or may  not be 
available? 
(c)  What  is the  advantage  in terms  of production costs,  taking  account  in 
particular of the  opportunity cost of labour  and  capital? 
(d)  What  are  the  advantages  from  the  viewpoint of overall organization of do-
mestic  trade:  secondary effects  on  technical  occupations,  trade networks 
etc.? 
The  SODERIZ  example  and  other cases1  have  demonstrated  that the production 
costs of  'modern'  food-crop  marketing  and  processing sectors,  in their pres-
ent  form,  are rarely  and  then  only marginally  lower  than those  in the  'tradi-
tional'  systems.  This  being  the  case,  it is not clear what  economic  reasoning 
lies behind  the  establishment of industrial primary processing units  which 
eliminate  large  numbers  of existing  jobs  and  provide  employment  for  only  a 
few.  Centralization of economic  power  in this primary processing sector gen-
erally militates against the officially expressed  objectives of economic  di-
versification when  it goes  further  than  the  level  required  for the  purposes 
of price regulation. 
Whether  one  considers  the first of these  cases  (animal-drawn tillage and 
carting equipment)  or  the  second  (primary processing),  it has  to be  found 
that the  development  of the  most  elementary rural  occupations  has  been  ob-
structed by  the  adoption  of policies favouring  centralized units. 
The  evaluation exercise points to a  number  of conclusions.  Although the proj-
ects were  generally  aimed  at improvement  of returns  on  labour in the  peasant 
world,  they  were  based  on  insufficient knowledge  of the  conditions  influenc-
1  See  for  example  the  reports  from  the  MIDEVIV  (Mission  de  developpement  des 
produits vivriers)  in Cameroon. - 179  -
ing  the  pattern or work  in this environment:  the  justi!ication !or certain 
types  or work,  the  social  basis or work-sharing,  the !arming calendar,  con-
straints or various  types  etc.  It is clear that more  needs  to be  done  in  the 
!ield or analysis  or work  in relation to the context or rural  systems,  taking 
in  rood  crops  as well  as  cash  crops  and  para-agricultural activities also. 
Analysis  along  these lines is the  only basis !or a  sound  understanding  or the 
!actors which  encourage  peasant  !armers to modernize. 
Given  the  problems  or migration which  arise in  the  areas  concerned  and  having 
regard  to  the  hopes  or diversi!ying domestic  trade,  it is necessary  to adopt 
an  approach  leading to speci!ic objectives !or the  activation or rural  em-
ployment.  Project strategies should  aim  at encouraging  technical  solutions 
which  are highly labour-intensive,  promote  vocational  training  and  entrepre-
neurial responsibilities,  and  solutions which  are  most  readily mastered  by 
the  local  communities  concerned,  particularly in regard  to their ability to 
cover  recurring costs  and  their cultural capacity !or taking  over projects. 
In this connection,  support !or the  development  or rural  occupations,  which 
should be  as  numerous  and  varied  as  possible,  is as necessary as  support !or 
agriculture.  There  are  very many  occupations  which  are  essential  to rural 
lire and  appropriate training can  be  provided !or all or  them  as  long as  the 
need  !or them  is recognized;  they  include  woodworking  and  metalworking 
cra!tsmen,  millers,  mechanics,  traditional healers,  !irst aiders,  'che!s  de 
terre',  well-sinkers,  small  traders,  carriers,  !armers,  nursery !armers,  barn 
builders,  brick  and  tile makers  and  so on. 
The  rural  occupations  which  have  developed  under  the  stimulus or the projects 
evaluated are  administrative  in character:  supervisors,  demonstrators,  coop-
erative book-keepers,  marketing  company  o!!icials and  so  on.  Little or none 
or the  money  needed  to pay  them  is being provided by  the  local population and 
the  secondary e!!ects or their activities are  con!ined  to limited areas or 
agriculture. 
Another !eature is the distrust !elt by  the  development  institutions !or any 
initiative not  inspired by  administrative concepts,  as witness  the  discon-
certing ease  with  which  traders,  cra!tsmen etc.  are  equated with  de!rauders 
and  thieves;  however,  in replacing  them,  the  public  authorities have  railed 
to acquire  the  resources  which  would  be  necessary,  even given  the  monopolies 
which  they have  established for  themselves. 
4.3.  BIOLOGICAL  CAPITAL1 
Very  satis!actory results  have  been  achieved  in the  improvement or cotton, 
groundnut,  rice  (Ivory  Coast)  and  co!!ee varieties.  The  distribution or se-
1  The  term  'biological capital'  is used  here  to cover all living elements 
(basically plant and  animal  lire)  entering into agricultural production, 
having regard  in particular to their genetic properties. - 180  -
lected  cowpea  seed  seems  to have  gone  smoothly in Niger.  On  the  other hand, 
less reliable or unsatisfactory results have  been  achieved  in the  case of 
cereals  (maize,  millet and  sorghum),  tubers,  such  as  yams  and  manioc,  and 
beans  (Rwanda  and  Togo). 
The  seed varieties selected  on  the  basis of agronomical  research  on  food 
crops  are  finding it difficult to prove  their worth  in peasant  farming.  The 
reasons  for  this  are  complex. 
In the  case  of industrial  crops  - and  cotton in particular - selected seed 
varieties are distributed  through  marketing  companies  which  obtain their sup-
plies  from  sources heavily  supported  by  foreign  finance  and  controlled by  the 
research stations  (notably the  IRCT). 
Moreover,  these  seed varieties are not subject to competition  from  local va-
rieties which  have  been tried and  tested by  farmers. 
In the  case  of food  crops,  the problems  are  much  more  complex  and  little re-
search effort has  been  devoted  to  them. 
The  most  conventional  selection criteria  (high yields,  short stalks,  quick 
maturing etc.)  do  not  seem  to convince  the  local people  in the  present state 
of agricultural  development.  Other criteria must  also be  taken  into consider-
ation:  qualities for brewing,  long stalks to meet  building requirements,  har-
diness  for  use  as  companion  crops,  tender maize  to avoid  lengthy grinding or 
cooking,  groundnuts  for  family  consumption rather than  the oil-mill etc. 
Selection  on  the basis of marketability of products  has  been given preference 
over criteria based  on  the productivity of subsistence farming,  the  low  level 
of which is holding  back  the  development of trade activities.! 
The  comments  on  the difficulties experienced  in gaining acceptance  for  the 
food-crop  varieties proposed  under  the  projects generally tend  to attribute 
the  blame  to  'peasant mentalities'.  Such  explanations  do  not reflect any 
thorough knowledge  of the  constraints  involved  in production activities, 
packaging methods  and  consumption habits.  No  detailed study of this subject 
is mentioned. 
Further explanations  for  the difficulties encountered  are to be  found  in the 
insufficient reliability of the  food-crop  seeds  offered by  the  selection 
services  and  the unreliability of supplies.  The  agricultural  services have 
not always  shown  interest,  selection programmes  have  sometimes  lacked  contin-
uity2 and  have  often been  hampered  by  rapid  turnover  of research staff. 
Improvement  of livestock resources  was  not  a  specific subject of study in the 
projects evaluated,  except in relation to requirements  for  draught  animals. 
1  See  also:  Uma  Lele:  The  Design of Rural  Development,  p.  180  (Doc.  19). 
2  Only  Rwanda  has  an  integrated agronomical  research structure in the  ISAR, 
to which  the  OBM  was  able  to refer  on  a  regular basis. - 181  -
The  only specific action referred  to  in the  reports is the  livestock section 
of the cotton plan in Chad,  which  led to  a  distinct  improvement  in the  stock 
of draught  animals  through  the efforts of the  GDSs  (groupements  de  defense 
sanitaire- animal  health protection groups),  coupled with  more  widespread 
action to  improve  breeding  livestock  through vaccination  and  parasite control 
campaigns.  According  to  the  evalu~tors,  the  formation  of the  stocks  of  (male) 
draught  animals  will gradually  lead  to expansion  into stock-breeding activiv-
ities associated with agriculture.  This,  then,  would  be  a  distinct improve-
ment  in the  'livestock capital'  within the  agricultural context,  opening up 
prospects  for  forage  development.  However,  draught  animals  have  not  thus far 
been  regarded by farmers  as  'capital'  for  meat  or dairy production,  despite 
the  fact that they have  witnessed  the  rapid growth  of draught animals receiv-
ing proper veterinary treatment  and  feeding. 
There  are  no  reports of improvement  of livestock associated with agricultural 
development  in the  other project regions. 
The  dissociation of agricultural,  grazing and  livestock-breeding activities 
is virtually universal.  It implies  a  failure  by  the projects  to give  due 
weight  to  the  fundamental  interrelationships between edible agricultural  spe-
cies,  forage  species  and  animal  species,  and  to manure  production which  is of 
such  importance  in tropical agriculture.! 
4.4.  FIXED  CAPITAL 
In the  area of improvement of equipment  in farming,  the  main  emphasis  has 
been placed  on  animal-drawn  equipment  (ploughs,  hoes,  ridger-weeders),  trans-
port equipment  (carts)  and  hand-held  sprayers. 
The  success  of efforts to  improve  equipment  for  animal-drawn tillage and 
carting varied  from  region  to region  (see section 4.2). 
The  causes  of success  or failure varied widely  and  cannot  be  generalized: 
different degrees  of interest in the  distribution of these  techniques  on  the 
part of the  official agencies;  hopes  of motorization,  and  their psychological 
effects  (the  farmers  preferred work  in the fields  to be  done  by motorized 
units);  local  customs  in livestock breeding;  the  level  of the  cost of main-
taining a  team  and  availability of credit;  organization of supplies of equip-
ment;  existence  or non-existence  of a  cattle market;  scope  for hiring out 
teams  for profit;  scope  for  increasing areas under cultivation etc. 
Drought  seems  to have  been  a  factor restricting the  scope  for  development  of 
animal-drawn  tillage:  on  the  one  hand,  prices for  oxen  have  risen sharply 
following  the  death  of large  numbers  of animals  and  as  a  result of increasing 
1  In this connection  see  Hochet  (Doc.  25). - 182  -
demand  from  consumer  markets  such  as Nigeria;  on  the other hand,  surviving 
animals  have  been  too weak  to work. 
The  quality of animal-drawn  equipment  seems  to have  been  relatively satisfac-
tory,  despite  some  local difficulties  (very bad  selection in Togo).  On  the 
other hand,  maintenance  of this equipment  seems  less satisfactory,  if not en-
tirely unsatisfactory. 
The  essential  advantage  of animal-drawn tillage lies in the  improvement  of 
labour productivity at certain times  of the  year  and  the  scope  which  this af-
fords  for  expansion of areas  under  cultivation  (cf.  section 4.1).  It is not 
readily accepted  by  farmers  who  have  no  scope  for  expansion,  either because 
land  is not available  or  simply  because  some  of their  land  is given  over  to 
perennial  crops  (coffee,  cocoa,  etc.)  or other activities,  except in cases 
where  they  are  in  a  position to hire out their equipment  and  other  local 
farmers  have  the  means  of payment. 
The  use  of hand-held  sprayers  has  been  adopted  very widely  as  a  result  of 
promotion  by  supervisory staff in the various  cotton-growing areas.  The  re-
ports record  a  number  of criticisms regarding the quality  and  maintenance  of 
this  type  of equipment. 
The  most  important  comments  are  concerned with  the  design of the  equipment 
and  modifications  made  on  the  basis  of practical experience:  fragility of 
some  parts,  adjustment  of nozzles  to reduce  inhalation of insecticides  by  the 
user. 
The  most  fundamental  development mentioned  in connection with  the use  of this 
type  of equipment  is the  introduction of  ULV1  spraying,  which  relieves  the 
farmer  of the  need  to carry  large quantities  of water to his cotton fields. 
The  speed  with which this type  of equipment  was  adopted  in Togo  and  Chad  (in 
the vicinity of Bebedja)  demonstrates  the  keen  interest among  farmers,  who 
will probably be  much  less reluctant to carry out  the  fourth  and  fifth treat-
ments  recommended  by  the  supervisors.  This  equipment  should  be  successful  as 
long  as  reliable supplies of batteries are  maintained  and  the  sprays  do  not 
prove  harmful  to health. 
None  of the projects  made  any  major effort to  introduce  other  types  of equip-
ment  suitable for  adoption  on  peasant  farms:  threshers,  shellers,  pulpers,2 
presses,  mills,  motorized ploughs etc.  The  importance  of promoting  such ma-
chinery is perhaps  underestimated,  given the  many  hours  of manual  labour that 
go  into  the  work it can  do.  In  a  farming  system,  easing the  workload  in  one 
area  automatically provides  new  scope  for  improvements  in others. 
1  Ultra-low volume:  this type  of sprayer has  a  miniaturized electric motor 
which  runs  off a  battery and uses  very  low  quantities of liquids  (1.5  to 
2.5 litres per hectare).  With  conventional  hand-held  sprayers,  the  farmer 
needs  to use  100  to  150  litres of water per hectare which  he  has  to carry 
to  his  fields.  This  innovation  thus  makes  for substantial  savings  of cart-
ing  time  on  farms. 
2  Except  in Rwanda. - 183  -
4.5.  FLOATING  CAPITAL  (or current purchases  by  farms) 
Major efforts were  made  in all the  projects evaluated to encourage  farmers  to 
use  bought  inputs  such  as  fertilizers,  insecticides  and  fungicides.  The  dis-
tribution of these products attracted substantial subsidies,  since it is very 
difficult for  farmers  operating at a  low  level  of productivity to  meet  the 
costs  of intensive farming  without  a  transitional period.  The  evaluation re-
ports  and  surveys  show  that  the  advantages  of these  inputs  have  been  appreci-
ated  by  the  farmers.  However,  the  reports mention major difficulties which 
fall  into two  groups,  one  connected with  the  characteristics and  quality of 
the  products supplied,  the  other with  the  problem of supplies itself. 
As  a  general  rule,  the  evaluation reports  found  that the  inputs offered to 
farmers  were  virtually exclusively formulated  with  export  crops  in mind, 
whether  composite fertilizers or protective treatments,  since  they all had 
very specific properties.  Suitable  inputs  for  food  crops  were  not available 
from  the official agencies,  Only  urea  (a fertilizer which  provides  crops  with 
nitrogen only}  was  promoted  by  some  of the  projects as  a  homeopathic  treat-
ment.  Elsewhere,  food  crops benefited only  through  side-effects,  the  extent 
of which  has  yet to be  assessed,  and  received  no  specific protective treat-
ment.! 
The  difficulties encountered  in the distribution of insecticides were  mainly 
in the  areas of toxicity  (headaches at spraying  times),  and  dosage  problems. 
The  effectiveness of these  products  was  not  always  sufficiently thoroughly 
tested  in experimental  stations before  they  were  introduced  and  promoted 
among  peasant  farmers.  In  some  cases,  formulations  or solvents were  modified 
and  the  farmers  were  not given  the  necessary  information  about  the  new  dos-
ages,2 with  the  result that yields fell  sharply. 
Disinfectants  for  seeds  (such as  Thioral)  were  distributed without difficulty, 
apart  from  some  instances of incorrect dosages.  They  have  acquired  a  reputa-
tion for efficacy far  in excess  of the  uses  anticipated by  their promoters; 
some  cases  of poisoning of humans  and  livestock have  been recorded. 
Dosage  problems  also arose  in the  livestock section of the  cotton plan in 
Chad.  The  dosages  required for  treatment were  not  always  indivisible,  nor  was 
it easy for  stock-breeders  to  check  them,  so that some  veterinary assistants 
would  use  only part of their supplies  and  sell the  remainder  for  personal 
profit. 
1  The  limited scope  of programmes  did  not prevent  farmers  from  using  some  of· 
the  fertilizers provided  for  their export crops  on  their food  crops;  how-
ever,  this did not give particularly satisfactory results  and  was  generally 
discouraged  by  supervisory staff. 
2  For  instance,  Wally,  following  treatment with  Prepothion,  was  to be  sprayed 
in  double  dose  using ten-litre sprayers.  Because  they  were  insufficiently 
informed,  the  farmers  used  only half of the  quantity required  and  attribut-
ed  their disappointing results to the  shortcomings  of the  insecticide. - 184  -
There  were  many  difficulties connected with supplies.  They  derived  from  the 
slowness  of invitation to tender procedures,  the  length of delivery periods, 
transport difficulties in Africa  (congestion of ports  and  railways),  delays 
in local deliveries,  inflexibility of arrangements  for  distribution to  farm-
ers and  lack of stocks.  In  some  cases  (Niger,  Central  African Republic, 
Zaire),  the evaluators report that there were  years when  inputs  did not reach 
their destinations  in time,  causing losses of yields  and  discouraging farmers. 
In  the  cases evaluated,  most of the  supply difficulties were  unrelated to the 
projects  themselves,  but derived  from  the  dependence  of the  countries con-
cerned  on  foreign markets. 
Nevertheless,  some  of the  evaluators  commented  that greater flexibility could 
be  achieved if formulation  and  storage facilities were  set up  locally in the 
countries  themselves.  Storable supplies would  be  more  readily available lo-
cally,  while  those  with  a  short life could  be  imported  as  and  when  required. 
It would  be  desirable  to link local  formulation  more  directly to promotional 
programmes  and  to  avoid  changes  in foreign  suppliers'  instructions for  use, 
since  they  tend  to  cause falls in yields.  As  matters  stand,  projects  lack fa-
cilities for  carrying out  the necessary quality control procedures. 
It should  also be  noted,  particularly in relation to  Chad,  that the specifi-
cations  accompanying  invitations to tender  can  be  so detailed that they se-
verely restrict the  numbers  of potential suppliers,  thus  increasing depend-
ence  on  a  limited number  of suppliers  and  limiting the  influence of price 
competition. 
The  viability of inputs is clearly conditioned  by their prices.  There  was 
relative stability until  1973,  but production  and  transport costs shot  up  in 
the  wake  of the  oil crisis.  In  1975/1976,  the prices of some  insecticides 
were  four  times  as  high as  in  1970. 
The  rise  in the  prices of inputs has  never been passed  on  as  such  to  the  in-
dividual  farmer;  using  Community  aid,  States have  met  a  substantial propor-
tion - and  in  some  cases  the greater part - of the costs of inputs for  cotton 
and  groundnut  crops.  Although  the  selling prices of these  commodities  have 
also risen as  the  production costs of textiles  and  oils in the  industrialized 
countries  have  risen,  they  have  not increased to  the  same  extent.  This  being 
the  case,  the  aim  of structural aid for  export crops,  which  was  to bring 
farms  up  to levels of productivity and profitability which  made  them  competi-
tive with  farms  in other regions of the world,  was  not readily attainable 
within the period  specified in the projects.  Hence it is not surprising that 
the  assumption  of production costs cannot  be  relied upon  in the  future  when 
external  aid comes  to an  end.  Although  peasant farmers  have  appreciated  the 
value  of inputs  they will not necessarily be  prepared to meet  the  costs  of 
intensification if they  do  not  find  that it offers  a  reasonable  return  on 
their labour  (cf.  3.3).  When  aid  comes  to an  end,  it is the  farmers  who  have 
to meet  production costs,  either directly or indirectly,  since  the State is 
only able  to redistribute resources  drawn  from  the  national  economy,  in other 
words  from  farmers  in countries where  agriculture is the  only major produc-
tive  industry. - 185  -
4.6.  UNCERTAINTY  FACTOR  AND  RISK 
Uncertainty is the  factor  which  weighs  most  heavily in the  farming  economy. 
It obliges  farmers  to organize  their working  lives around  constraints or lim-
iting factors  which prevail  or may  arise in random  fashion  (cf.  3.1).  In many 
cases uncertainty accounts  for  the  inflexibility and  halting development  of 
agricultural  systems.  It is influential at various  levels which  interact in 
the  short,  medium  and  long  term.  In  some  cases it can affect matters  of life 
and  death,  in others it may  be  purely financial. 
Uncertainty can  be  the result of unpredictable climate conditions  or out-
breaks  of disease.  It is also inherent in technical  innovations  (new  farming 
methods,  new  varieties,  new  inputs)  inasmuch  as  they have  not  been  tested 
over  a  sufficiently long period  and  tried under various  farming  conditions 
and  their direct and  indirect effects are not fully  known. 1  From  the  farmer's 
viewpoint  other factors  of uncertainty are  the  duration of the  aid provided 
(it may  depend  on  EDF  calendars,  for  instance)  and  the reliability or other-
wise  of supplies of inputs for which  he  has  paid.  The  prices of export crops 
and  inputs  can  also be  uncertain for  farmers,  either because  they are entire-
ly dependent  on  international markets or because  they are manipulated  in line 
with stabilization or subsidization policies. 
This uncertainty about  the prices of inputs derives  from  the policy of arti-
ficially low  introductory prices  followed  by gradual  reduction of subsidies. 
The  farmers  know  nothing  of the  subsidy covering part of the  cost of inputs, 
but  they are  very  alive  to the  prices which  they have  to pay  themselves.  This 
system  of  a  declining scale of subsidization means  that farmers  have  to face 
considerable  increases  from  one  year to the  next  (up  to  30%  in a  single year). 
Uncertainty is materialized quantitatively or qualitatively by  a  more  or  less 
immediate risk which  the  farmer  perceives  and  decides his course  of action 
accordingly.  Introducing  an  ad  hoc  innovation over  a  limited period  (a pesti-
cide,  a  fertilizer,  a  new  variety)  may  be  a  relatively easy matter,  but inno-
vations often fail to stand  the  test of time.  Farmers'  response  times  are al-
ways  at least  two  to three  years,  since  they  need  this long to experiment, 
compare  and  evaluate results under actual  conditions  (risks associated with 
climate  and  disease).  This  is a  long  time  in relation to  the  three to five 
years  of a  project's life.2  Even  in a  case  where  the  technical  innovation is 
intrinsically interesting to the  farmers,  there still remains  the possibility 
that conditions in the  economic  environment  (supplies,  prices etc.)  may  be-
come  so uncertain that it is preferable  for  the  farmers  to continue using 
less modern  methods  over which  they  have  greater control. 
1  P.  Thenevin  calculates that the  cash advantage  of an  innovation needs  to be 
three  times  greater than its cost to  induce  the  farmer  to  accept  the risk 
involved  (cf.  Doc.  20,  p.  53). 
2  Even  if it is extended  by  one  or  several  other phases  of the operations  (or 
projects)  already under way. - 186  -
When  capital  and  operating expenditure  is increased  (for  instance  when  a 
farmer  buys  a  team  and  accepts  a  'progress  contract'  offered  by  a  development 
company),  the  risks  associated with  climate  and  disease are mitigated  and 
yields  increase,  but  the farmer's  risks switch  to  the  financial  level,  to his 
return  on  labour,  which  is no  more  than  the  balance left out  of his selling 
price having  met  his  production costs.  A  farmer  who  borrows  large  sums  to  buy 
equipment  and  then  suffers  two  or three years  of bad  harvests  can  find  him-
self in debt for  the rest of his life,  especially when,  if he  does  not  repay 
his  loan,  the  development  company  cuts off the supplies  he  needs  to carry on 
with  the  adoption of intensive methods.l Under  such  circumstances,  it is not 
surprising that farmers  generally  do  not  go  beyond  taking  advantage  of oppor-
tunities as  they  arise  through  the  implementation  of a  project while at the 
same  time  being reluctant to  abandon tried  and  tested methods  before being 
convinced  that the  conditions under  which  innovations  are  introduced will be 
maintained  on  a  lasting basis.2 The  impression given  by  the  evaluation re-
ports is that efforts were  directed at remedying  the  effects rather than the 
causes  of uncertainty.  Action was  taken against  farmers  who  did not  repay 
their loans,  but  the  risk of their running into debt  as  a  result of being of-
fered  credit had  been underestimated  (cf.  5.2.5).  Efforts were  made  to reduce 
the risk of disease  through  the  distribution of effective protective treat-
ments  whose  short-term effects are  universally acknowledged,  but efforts to 
establish distribution systems guaranteeing regular supplies  were  not always 
successful.  Farmers  were  put under  pressure  to  experiment with  new  techniques, 
but  the  end  of the  experimental  periods,  when  the  financial  support  was  dis-
continued,  brought  abrupt  changes  in the  ambient  conditions under  which  ex-
periments  were  carried out. 
Several  types  of intervention designed  to have  a  direct effect on  factors 
making  for uncertainty have  been carried out under the projects under consid-
eration. 
In  the first place,  there is action to  improve  agricultural productivity, 
based  on  the  introduction of technical packages:  early sowing  and  sowing  in 
rows,  weedin~, protection from  disease  and  use  of mineral fertilizers.  Appli-
cation of this range  of techniques  increases yields.  The  influence of climate 
and  disease hazards  is greatly reduced  and  they  weigh  less heavily in compar-
ison with the risks  involved  in extensive  farming. 
These  methods  are  only applied  to cash crops.  Their effects are  therefore on-
ly limited,  since  the  package  is not  designed  for  complete  farming  systems. 
For  instance,  if the  farmer  sows  cotton early,  he  increases  the risk of bad 
harvests of sorghum  and millet whereas,  if he  sows  the cereals first and  they 
fail,  he  may  well  be  able  to start again  in time  for  the  seed to mature. 
1  Because  of this,  SODERIZ  decided  to cover the risk of crop  failures itself. 
However,  SODERIZ  was  not in  a  position to act as  an  insurance  company, 
since  any  deficit it incurred  could  only be  made  good  from  budget  sources. 
2  Cf.  Doc.  37,  p.9,  on  how  difficult it is for  small  farmers  to  join a  Ujamaa 
village in Tanzania,  because  of the  subsistence risks  involved. - 187  -
A number  of instances  of action  aimed  at saving water:  irrigation of kitchen 
gardens  in Niger,  construction of terraces  in Niger  and  Rwanda. 
This  type  of action is important in relation to the uncertainty factor;  con-
trol of water  resources  is  a  very  important  aspect of agricultural develop-
ment  in arid  zones. 
We  should also mention  action aimed  at producer prices:  stabilization funds 
to maintain  the  level  of prices  to  the  producer  are  an  important  means  of re-
ducing  the  uncertainty factor.  These  funds  are  concerned  with export  crops 
only,  however,  and  there  is nothing  comparable  for  food  crops,  as  the  cereal 
offices generally  lack  power  and  pursue  policies which  tend  to have  a  depres-
sive effect on  production  (section 3.3.2.2). 
Finally,  there is action  aimed  at the  prices of inputs:  structural aid  from 
the  EDF  has  led to  an  appreciable  improvement  in the  conditions  on  which  in-
secticides and  fertilizers for  cotton-growing are  supplied to  farm  holdings. 
Subsidization of these  inputs  has  enabled  farmers  to obtain  them  cheaply. 
However,  this does  not  make  any  direct impression  on  the  farmer,  who  is con-
cerned  only  with  the  subsidized price which  he  has  to pay. 
The  main benefit of EDF  aid is that it has  made  for stability of supplies  -
in terms  of both quantity and  prices - over periods of varying  length  and 
that this,  coupled  with  stability of producer  pr~ces, has  reduced  the  unpre-
dictability of farmers'  incomes. 
The  degree  of stability or instability in these  areas  may  well  account  for 
the  differences between  the  increase of cotton production  in  Chad,  its de-
cline in Central  African  Republic  and  its stagnation in other countries. Part Five 
STRATEGIES  CONCERNED  WITH  ORGANIZATION  OF 
THE  INSTITUTIONAL  ENVIRONMENT  OF  RURAL  DEVELOPMENT - 191  -
The  efficiency of the  structures forming  the  environment of farm  holdings 
should  be  assessed  in relation to  each  of the  functions  on  whose  satisfactory 
operation development  of farming  depends.  There  are  many  such  functions  and 
they are generally blocked together under  the heading of  'supervision':  in-
formation,  training,  support for  the  organization of the  rural  environment, 
marketing,  supplies,  distribution,  credit. 
This  part of the  report is concerned with strategies for  the  organization of 
the  institutional environment,  which it considers first from  a  general  view-
point  and  then  in relation to  a  number  of specific aspects. 
The  first section  (5.1)  is concerned  with general  considerations: 
(i)  centralized or decentralized management  of operational  facilities; 
(ii)  type  of supervision:  sectoral  or broad-fronted;  type  of institutional 
structure:  a  public service,  a  product  development  company,  regional  or 
1  national  offices; 
(iii)  promotion  of a  'motive  crop'  or overall  improvement  of peasant  farming 
production  systems; 
(iv)  involvement  of local  communities  in rural  development; 
(v)  technical  assistance strategy. 
The  second  section considers  the  organization of each  of these  various  func-
tions  in turn. 
5.1.  STRATEGIES  FOR  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  INSTITUTIONAL  ENVIRONMENT:  GENERAL 
5.1.1.  Centralized or decentralized management  of operational  environment 
The  first question  of fundamental  strategy which  has  to  be  asked  in each case 
is:  what  is the  appropriate balance  to be  established between centralized and 
decentralized management  of operational  services? 
The  manner  in which  this question is answered  involves serious political  im-
plications since,  where  a  decentralized structure is adopted,  the peasant 
participants acquire  increasing influence  over rural  development  and  greater 
control ·over  institutions.  For instance,  where  villagers manage  their  own - 192  -
cotton market,  the  cotton company  is relieved of some  of its functions  and 
the  farmers  enjoy greater bargaining power.  To  give  another  example,  a  veter-
inary assistant sponsored  by  a  GDS1  will risk administrative  sanctions if he 
is negligent.  Similarly,  an  instructor paid  by  his  own  community  cannot af-
ford  to show  the  kind  of lack of interest or incompetence  often seen  in offi-
cials paid  by  the  institutions. 
The  choice  between  centralized and  decentralized management  of the  institu-
tional  environment also has  a  direct  influence  on  the  assumption  of responsi-
bility for  rural  development.  Centralized management  involves  the State in 
budgetary contributions at all levels,  although it will not  always  have  the 
necessary resources  to monitor the  effectiveness of its expenditure;  on  the 
other hand,  centralization helps  to ensure  that efforts are directed at the 
State's priority objectives.  It is unrealistic to expect that operations 
originally planned  in a  centralized manner  will  subsequently  be  taken over  in 
a  decentralized manner;  this  would  only  happen  where  the  respective priori-
ties and  interests of the State  and  its rural partners coincided,  which  is 
rarely the  case,  and  then  only  to a  limited extent  (cf.  2.1  and  2.2). 
With  decentralized management  of the  institutional environment,  a  share of 
functional  responsibilities  (markets,  cooperatives,  mutual  credit,  supervi-
sion etc.)  has  to be  assumed  by village communities  or groups  of farmers  up 
to  a  certain level  (local,  zonal,  regional).  At  the  same  time,  however,  de-
velopment  support activities have  to be  geared  to the  objectives  and  priori-
ties of the groups  concerned.  With  this  approach,  the role  of the  institu-
tional partners  (at regional  or national  level)  is to cater to  demand  from 
the  rural world,  which  may  be  concerned  with  technical matters  (farming  meth-
ods,  selected varieties etc.),  commercial  matters,  health etc.  By  opting for 
decentralized management,  the  State is not necessarily relieved of responsi-
bility for  the  costs of rural  development,  but  simply delegates part of its 
management  responsibilities and  the  corresponding resources  to local  communi-
ties  (for instance,  by  organizing price differentials on  a  different basis, 
by  topping up  the  wages  of development  officials employed  by  villagers under 
farming  programmes,  or by setting up  village development  funds  to  lend  sup-
port to the  efforts made  by  peasant communities  themselves etc.). 2 
It follows  therefore that the  choice  between centralized and  decentralized 
management- like that between sectoral or broad-fronted  supervision  (cf. 
5.1.2)  - is not merely  a  matter of the  location of decision-making functions 
in institutions.  Another  important factor is the  manner  in which  the various 
participants in a  project can  influence  the  decision-making process.  An  in-
stitution may  be  called  'decentralized'  because  certain decisions  can  be  tak-
en  locally or regionally while at the  same  time,  the  representatives of the 
farmers  concerned  have  no  say in proceedings. 
1  Groupement  de  defense sanitaire  (animal  health protection group)  (Chad). 
2  On  the field covered  by  5.1.1,  see  Uma  Lele,  Design of Rural  Development, 
pp.  186-189  (Doc.  19). - 193  -
Can  it be  said,  for  instance,  that  the  SORADs  in Togo  were  more  decentralized, 
being  established at regional  level,  than  SOTOCO,  a  national  company  subdi-
vided  into sectors  and  zones  for  operational  purposes?  The  rural participants 
had  no  more  influence  on  decision-making  in one  case  than  in the  other. 
COTODEP,  a  Departmental  committee  made  up  of representatives of four  services, 
which  was  given responsibility for  coordinating  the  3M  project in Zinder, 
provides  an  example  of a  more  thoroughly decentralized structure  (in this 
case,  decentralization of the  public services only).  In  COTODEP,  decisions 
genuinely  flowed  from  consultation between  several participants. Decentrali-
zation could  have  been  taken  further  by  allowing the  farmers  themselves  to 
take  part in decision-making  affecting the project.  If the  SORADs  (regional 
agencies)  in Togo  or the  ONDR  (national office)  in  Chad  had  adopted  this ap-
proach,  they could  have  been  considered decentralized in the proper sense. 
This  was  not  the  case.  There is not  a  single  instance in  any  of the projects 
evaluated of decentralization allowing  farmers  an  opportunity to participate 
in decision-making affecting projects. 
5.1.2.  Sectoral  or broad-fronted  supervision? Administrative structure? Prod-
uct development  agencies  or broad-fronted regional  or national  of-
fices? 
A second strategic option is the  choice  between sectoral  superv1s1on  (product 
by product)  or broad-fronted  supervision  (all agricultural products  and  non-
agricultural activity,  i.e.  an  administrative  structure  {public services) 
consisting of product  development  agencies  {such as  SODERIZ,  SOTOCO  and 
COTONTCHAD)  or broad-fronted regional  or national offices  (like the  OBM,  ONDR, 
UNCC  and  the  SORADs). 
Theories  on  the  integration of rural  development1  have  abounded  since  the 
1960s,  when  intervention  companies  or quasi-public  companies  began  to  take 
over  from  the  colonial agricultural administrations.  With  variations  from 
country to country and  depending  on  circumstances,  two  schools of thought  on 
rural  development  emerged:  the  'sectoral'  and  the  'integrated'  approaches. 
The  former  aimed  primarily at the  development  of specific  crops  which it was 
hoped  would  stimulate  the rest of the  economy  and  bring social  change;  the 
latter sought to achieve  balanced progress  on  a  range  of problems  of vital 
importance  to the populations  concerned. 
The  'sectoral'  approach2  consisted  fundamentally  in making all the  arrange-
ments  to increase production of a  given crop:  supplying growers  with  inputs, 
supervision,  marketing,  packaging,  exports.  With this approach  the  only 
course  was  to  maximize  resources given  over to promoting  the  crop  in question 
1  On  the  subject of integration in rural development,  see  G.  Belloncle:  'De-
veloppement  integre et pedagogie  de  !'innovation en Afrigue noire'  (Ecole 
Pratique  des  Hautes  Etudes,  1974),  particularly pp  314  to  321. 
2  Sometimes  called  'vertical integration'. - 194  -
on  the principle that the  increase in revenues  generated  by  this  crop  would 
subsequently finance  the  attainment of non-economic  objectives. 
By  contrast,  the  'integrated'  approach! consisted  in seeking  to establish so-
lutions to  a  range  of interconnected or  complementary  problems  through  the 
promotion  of regional  or  zonal  multi-sector projects:  supervision of agricul-
tural production,  village water  supplies,  cooperatives,  rural  'animation', 
literacy,  health projects,  transport etc. 
In fact,  the strategies adopted  were  very specifically related to  local situ-
ations.  They  were  either stable  (Chad,  Upper  Volta,  Zaire,  Ivory  Coast, 
Rwanda,  Niger)  or  changeable  (Togo,  Central  African Republic);  in  some  cases 
they  were  very heavily influenced  by  technical assistance  from  abroad:  CFDT, 
INSTRUPA,  AGROPROGRESS,  SODERIZ  technical staff etc. 
None  of the projects evaluated  can  therefore be  regarded  as  a  typical  and re-
producible  exemplar of any  of the  possible strategies.  For  instance,  the 
SORADs  in Togo  had  been set up  to promote  regional  development  (the integrat-
ed  approach),  but in fact,  until 1973,  they concentrated  on  promoting cotton. 
SOTOCO,  on  the  other hand,  is  a  sectoral body,  but  OPAT,  SONACOM  and  the  IRCT 
are  also  concerned with  cotton. 
The  UNCC  in Niger is an  'integrated'  body,  having  overall responsibility for 
cooperative  and  agricultural promotion  and  credit,  but it also has  a  sectoral 
role,  being responsible  for marketing  and  packaging cotton  and groundnuts  for 
delivery to the  export organizations. 
In fact,  discussions  about integration of rural  development  appear  to  lack 
relevance  when  they fail  to go  beyond  the  institutional aspects of the  sub-
ject. It is necessary to find  the essential  components  of integrated rural 
development  outside  the  logical  institutional structures as  such,  this in the 
light of analysis  of the  participants  (Part 2),  their constraints  (3.1),  the 
prevailing economic  policies  (Part 3)  and  the  problems  involved  in the meth-
odology of project-based aid  (Part 6). 
With  rural  development  which,  as  in all the  cases  studied,  is based  on  delib-
erate modification of various individual  and  collective behaviour patterns  on 
farm  holdings,2 it may  be  said that the  most  fundamental  strategic problem 
confronting institutions is appreciation of conditions,  responsibilities 
(personal  and  social),  competences  (technical  and  economic)  and  aspirations 
for  change  in rural  communities.  If institutions are  successful  in coping 
with  the  problems  presented by  the rural  environment  and  in coordinating 
their solutions, it seems  to matter little whether  institutions are sectoral 
or broad-fronted,  regional  or national. 
In the projects evaluated,  such  conceptions of the role  of the  institutional 
environment  were  rare. 
1  Sometimes  called  'horizontal  integration'. 
2  As  opposed  to agriculture  in plantations or collectivized farming,  which 
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The  absence  of structures for consultation between  the  communities  affected 
by  development  and  the  institutions  implementing it is common  to all the 
projects for  which  EDF  finance  was  requested  and  which  are  discussed in this 
report.  This  lack should  probably  be  considered  a  serious obstacle to prog-
ress in so  far as  - in the  absence  of such structures - rural  communities 
and  institutions exist in two  very different logical worlds  which  meet  only 
rarely,  but  are  often in opposition. 
Cooperatives  have  been  set up  in most  of the  countries covered  by  this re-
port,  but  the  evaluation reports  find  these  cooperatives  to be  remote-con-
trolled and  limited in scope.  Their functions  are generally restricted to 
basic marketing  tasks  and their negotiating powers  are  limited  (2.1.3). 
The  reports  on  the  projects  in Niger  and  Rwanda  describe  the activities of 
local debating assemblies:  an  assembly  of cooperatives  in Niger,  rural dis-
cussion groups  in local  communities  in Rwanda.  These  assemblies  operate  inde-
pendently of the projects financed  by  the  EDF,  but discuss  them.  In Chad,  the 
formation  of animal  health protection groups  under  the  livestock section of 
the  cotton plan has given  farmers  some  control  over  the work  of veterinary 
staff. 
It cannot be  claimed  that farmers'  decision-making powers  over  the planning, 
development  and  management  of projects are really commensurate  with  the re-
sponsibilities as  contributors to national  production,  or with  the  responsi-
bilities  (takeover of development)  which  the  developers  would  like  to  see 
them  assume  for  the  success of projects. 
The  reports provide evidence  of the  ignorance  of researchers,  advisory  and 
supervisory staff regarding traditional  farming  methods,  this despite  the 
fact  that the  majority of farming  decisions are  taken  on  the basis  of such 
methods  which  are at present the  only  methods  which  enable  farmers  to provide 
for  their subsistence with  a  minimum  degree  of security. 
Traditional  farming  systems,  unlike  'modern'  systems,  are  fully  integrated 
with  the cultural,  economic  and  social  contexts of their local  communities; 
as  has  already been mentioned,  these  contexts are  extremely  complex  and  are 
often  changed  only marginally by projects. 
The  application of integrated development  concepts  is unlikely to be  success-
ful if the  organizers  are not familiar with these contexts.  The  decision to 
integrate  an  innovation into  a  rural  system  can  only  come  from  those  in con-
trol of the  system  in question.  In this  connection,  it has  to be  reported 
that the  planning of projects generally involves authoritarian measures  leav-
ing little scope  for experimentation or initiative on  the part of skilled 
farmers.  Under  such  circumstances  a  'progressive attitude'  is ascribed  to  the 
farmer  who  slavishly follows  the  instructions of the  advisory staff,  rather 
than to the  farmer  who  controls the  constraints affecting his  farm  and  makes 
improvements  in relation to his overall  needs  (subsistence  and  cash needs) 
and  the  technical,  economic  or  commercial  opportunities which  arise. 
This  type  of approach  can barely be  described  as  consistent with the  princi-
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Similarly,  in many  cases  the  technical  planning of projects  was  defined  by 
organizations without direct experience of the  rural  environment  and  dictated 
by  State  objectives rather than  farming  objectives. 
The  importance  of technical  or regional  studies  and  surveys  such  as  those 
carried out during  the various projects  (regional  studies  in Togo,  EUROPREDE 
studies  in Central  African Republic,  aerial  surveys  in the  Badeguicheri  Val-
ley,  surveys  for  the  settlement of Bugesera-Mayaga etc.)  should  not  be  under-
rated.  However,  this work  has  not  been  as  useful  as it could  have  been  in so 
far  as  farmers  have  been  obliged  to  take  decisions not  according  with  the 
technical  framework  or  time  scale  called for  in  such  studies.  To  quote  some 
examples: 
The  aerial  survey  of the  Badeguicheri  Valley was  carried out to provide  a  ba-
sis for  allocating  land  according  to potentialities as  determined  by  the  CFDT: 
cotton  on  the  alluvial  land,  cereals  on  the  plateau  land  after development 
for  agriculture.  The  farmers,  however,  preferred to  grow  cereals  on  the allu-
vial  land,  since  they attached priority to these  crops.  As  a  result of this 
conflict of interests,  the  CFDT  requested the  application of sanctions. 
The  SORADs  were  set up  in 1965.  The  studies  intended  to  form  the basis of 
their action were  not available until 1975,  by  which  time  their role  had  been 
very much  reduced.  It is therefore certain that these  studies  had  no  influ-
ence  on  the  programmes  of action. 
There  are  even  cases,  as  for  the  project in Zaire,  where  the  preparatory 
studies  only took  account  of the  technical  and  financial  aspects of the  envi-
ronment  to be  developed  and  the  projects  to  be  carried out  there,  while vir-
tually ignoring the  people affected,  their villages,  their existing farms, 
their systems  of values  and  their aspirations. 
Projects reflect the  methods  applied in planning  them.  Studies  carried out  on 
a  given rural  environment,  but without regard  to the reference  system  of that 
environment,  without  any  participation on  the  part of the  local  community  and 
in  some  cases without regard  to  the  requirements  to which it attaches  the 
greatest priority,  cannot  be  expected  to meet  with  a  willing response. 
'The  projects set up  an  interplay between  the national  authorities,  foreign 
sources of finance,  technical  assistance offices  and  the  farmers.  The  nation-
al  authorities~  the  EDF  and  the research office  have  ample  scope  for  express-
ing  themselves,  they  can  submit reports,  carry out  fact-finding missions, 
negotiate modifications etc.  They  have  at their disposal  records  containing 
all their partners'  documentation.  By  contrast,  the  farmers  have  no  opportu-
nity to  make  their voice  heard despite  the  fact that there  are  some  things 
which  only  they  can  know  and  say.•1 
While it is true  that it is the  local  communities  who  'integrate'  development 
according  to their economic,  social  and  cultural contexts  and  their responsi-
1  Extract  from  the  Togo  evaluation report  (Bertrand report). - 197  -
bilities in  the  national  economy,  it is equally true that  such  integration 
also calls for measures  on  the part of the  State:  not only  economic  measures 
such  as  those  described  above  (Part Three),  but also social  or cultural meas-
ures. 
The  projects evaluated offer virtually no  examples  of social action  (apart 
from  the  women's  programme  in Niger),  although this is a  field  where  action 
is called for  in many  areas:  water  supplies,  welfare  centres,  perinatal care 
etc.  Without  suggesting that Community  aid  should  be  used  to finance  every-
thing,  it is necessary to point out that projects  could  deal  with  such mat-
ters according  to  a  strategy aimed  at motivating productive effort with this 
type  of objective  in view.  The  socio-economic  structures described in section 
2.1  seem particularly well  suited to this  type  of approach. 
In  the  cultural  field,  attention must  be  drawn  to the  influence of educati-
cial policies.  At  present general  education is exacerbating rural  depopula-
tion.  It is therefore  a  factor  in the disintegration of the rural  environment, 
militating against integrated development  strategies.  In parallel with this, 
agricultural vocational  training is giving little instruction which  is of 
relevance  to the  peasant  farming  world;  it generally refuses  to  acknowledge 
that peasant  farmers  have  any  technical  competence  and  gives  students little 
opportunity to acquire  an  understanding of peasant  farming  before  they set 
out to modernize it. 
The  integration of agricultural  development action also calls for education 
policies consistent with  'integrated'  conceptions.  This  is an  important  sub-
ject which  warrants  special  study in greater detail. 
5.1.3.  Promotion of a  'motive  crop'  or of peasant productive  systems? 
A third strategical consideration lies in the  choice  between  organ1z1ng de-
velopment  action around  a  'motive  crop'  (cf.  3.3.2.4)  or  aiming  at overall 
improvement  of peasant productive  systems. 
Most  of the  projects evaluated were  based  on  the  motive  crop  strategy,  al-
though  this observation  should  be  qualified in regard to  the  projects in 
Niger  and  Rwanda,  which  adopted  a  more  general  approach  and  also in relation 
to rice growing  in Ivory  Coast,  since  SODERIZ  was  only  one  agency  among  oth-
ers  operating in the  rural environment. 
This  type  of objective is characteristic of the  projects carried out in  Chad, 
Niger  (Badeguicheri),  Zaire,  Central  African Republic,  Togo  and  Upper  Volta. 
The  expressed  objectives  and  the planning of operations  are  fundamentally 
bound  up  with  the  development  of marketable production which  is expected to 
lead to  an  increase  in economic  flows  in the  zones  concerned.  The  annual  cash 
crops  (cotton,  groundnuts)  are  considered  to be  the  'motive'  forces  behind 
the rural  economy.  It is hoped  that their high profitability and  the  high 
yields  which  can  be  expected  from  them  will  provide  the necessary finance  for 
improvements  in  the  productivity of other crops  and  for general  development. - 198  -
The  organization of trade  in export products,  the distribution of specialized 
factors  of production  (fertilizers,  insecticides,  spraying equipment  etc.  for 
cotton)  or non-specialized factors  of production  (ploughs,  carts,  hoes etc.), 
the  stabilization of producer prices for  these  products  through  compensation 
or subsidy  and  agricultural  credit are generally highly developed,  despite 
practical difficulties recorded  in many  cases. 
This  type  of organization is associated with  the  monopolistic  concept  of 
farming  activity and  trade  in its products  making  for  the  maintenance  of a 
stable level  of producer prices,  fiscal  returns  (revenues  from  exports,  taxes 
on  the profits of intermediary  companies,  capitation tax)  or parafiscal re-
turns  (revenues  from  State holdings,  revenues  from  stabilization funds)  and 
regular  supplies  of inputs related to the  'motive'  activity,  including agri-
cultural credit. 
Two  cases  are  good  examples  of a  strategy based  on  a  motive  crop:  the  'cotton 
plan'  in Chad  and  the  development of the  Central  and  Plateaux regions  in Togo. 
The  'cotton plan'  in  Chad,  despite failing to attain its quantitative objec-
tives,  has  led to the  establishment of technically coherent and  financially 
balanced activities, 1  through  the  introduction of a  number  of constraints: 
(a)  the  compulsory requirement  to grow  cotton  on  1/2 ha per worker until  1975. 
This  had  an  indirect effect on  improvement  of productivity,  since it led 
to  a  substantial build-up  in cotton production before  the structural  im-
provements  were  put in hand; 
(b)  the  marketing  monopoly  of  COTONFRAN,  and  later COTONTCHAD,  allowing 
prices to be  stabilized  and  budget  revenues  to be  collected; 
(c)  the block cultivation system,  a  land allocation system  which  farmers  have 
to  join in order to receive  intensive  farming  facilities; 
(d)  the  ONDR's  de  facto monopoly  of supplies of inputs  and  agricultural 
equipment  resulting  from  COTONTCHAD's  heavy  seed  subsidies; 
(e)  the  agricultural credit system based  on  levies automatically recovered  by 
ONDR  officials assisted by  the  local authorities  on  markets  organized  ex-
clusively by  COTONTCHAD. 2 
The  cotton plan has  had  an  appreciable effect on  cotton production  and  the 
standard of farm  equipment.  The  EDF  subsidy  produced  an  increase  in monetary 
flows  and  additional  budget  revenues  for  the  Chadian  State which  were  roughly 
equivalent to the  subsidy. 
1  The  evaluation report  shows  that  a  financial  balance  could  have  been 
achieved  on  the  cotton productivity  improvement  operation without  the  ex-
ternal  subsidy,  but that the State probably could not  have  assumed  the risk 
of this operation on  its own. 
2  Matters  of detail apart,  this description could  also be  applied  to the 
project evaluated in Eastern Kasai  (Zaire)  (see§ 1.07). - 199  -
However,  the  evaluation report points  to  the  limited  extent of the  effects 
produced  in the  rural  environment  by  the  increase in production:  domestic 
trade  in  a  state of lethargy,  craft industries in decline,  virtually no  ef-
fect  on  housing,  food  shortages etc.  Farmers'  purchasing power,  which  had 
been  slipping until  1972,  improved  following substantial  increases  in cotton 
prices in 1974/75,  only to deteriorate again as  a  result of steep  increases 
in the  prices of imported  goods.  The  Chadian State is being  obliged to  assume 
an  increasing proportion of cotton production costs  in order to maintain  the 
level  of growers'  incomes.  The  fact that the  State rather than  the  farmers  is 
meeting  these  costs is unhelpful  to efforts to reverse  the  unfavourable  trend 
in the  nation's terms  of trade. 
The  'motive'  crop,  cotton,  is therefore producing only very slender results 
in  a  national  economy  whose  primary agricultural  problems  are  food  develop-
ment  and  self-sufficiency,  development  of exchanges  between  livestock breed-
ers,  graziers  and  crop  farmers,  development  of productive  employment  in para-
agricultural activities,  movement  of goods  between regions,  regional  integra-
tion,  establishment of food  reserves,  and  so  on. 
This  example  highlights  the restrictive nature  of agricultural policies based 
almost exclusively  on  the  hope  of inducing rural  development  through  the ef-
fect  of efforts limited to  'motive'  crops  alone. 
The  Zaire evaluation shows  virtually the  same  thing.  Cotton,  regarded  as  the 
motive  crop  has  held  back  production of maize,  for  which  there  were  excellent 
outlets. 
The  second  example  shows  how  schemes  which  concentrate  too exclusively on  a 
limited number  of crops  which  are  considered to be  the  'motive'  crops  can 
easily become  remote  from  the  farmers'  main priorities.  This  creates  a  funda-
mental  difference of outlook  between  the  supervisor and  the  supervised.  The 
farmer  recognizes  the  value  of the  supervisor's  advice1  in  the  field with 
which  the  latter is concerned,  but his  own  priorities differ from  those  which 
the  supervisor  seeks  to  impress  upon  him.  Hence  the supervisors'  many  disap-
pointments  in activities which  hamper  the  farmers'  priority tasks:  early sow-
ing of groundnuts  or cotton,  weeding,  latest protective  treatments  for  cotton 
plants,  care of coffee plants etc. 
The  evaluation of the  work  done  in two  SORADs  in  Togo  shows  that all re-
sources  and  supervisory facilities were  directed at cotton  and  coffee.  The 
broad-fronted  supervisory staff allocated to the  SORADs  were  disbanded fol-
lowing  the  setting-up of SOTOCO  and  the  SRCC,  which  were  put in charge  of 
cotton  and  coffee respectively and  were  entrusted with  most  of the resources 
available,  including  the best supervisory personnel  from  the  SORADs. 
1  All  the  surveys report that relations between  farmers  and  supervisory staff 
were  good  and  point out that the  farmers'  failure  to  adopt new  methods  de-
monstrated  to  them  was  attributable to factors unrelated to the  supervisory 
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The  survey carried out  among  farmers  shows  that,  although  coffee  and  cocoa 
still provide  growers  with  very satisfactory incomes  where  conditions  are  fa-
vourable,  cotton  and  groundnuts  are  not giving such  good  results. 
The  table below  shows  how  the various  crops rank  in the  eyes  of producers, 
according to a  survey  in which  1  075  producers  were  interviewed. 
Ranking  of crops  ac-
cording  to  income 
produced,  in the past 
Ranking  of crops  ac-
cording to  income 
produced,  today 
Central  Region 
Sorghum 
Yams 
Rice 
Manioc 
Cotton 
Groundnuts 
Sorghum 
Yams 
Manioc 
Groundnuts 
Cotton 
Maize 
Rice 
Plateaux Region 
Coffee 
Cocoa 
Maize 
Yams 
Beans 
Cotton 
Groundnuts 
Sorghum 
Manioc 
Rice 
Palm-oil 
Cocoa 
Coffee 
Maize 
Manioc 
Yams 
Beans 
Sorghum 
Rice 
Cotton 
Groundnuts 
Palm-oil 
If this is a  true reflection of the  situation,  it is easy to understand  the 
farmers'  covert opposition or mere  indifference  to sectoral  supervision which 
is planned,  not with  a  view  to development  of domestic  trade within  the  coun-
try  (diversification of crops,  internalization of economic  flows),  but with  a 
view  to  increasing trade  outside the  country or region  (monoculture,  exter-
nalization) • 
This  same  conclusion may  be  drawn  from  the  fact that the  sectoral  programmes 
put into effect under policies to promote  'motive'  industrial  crops  are  im-
plemented  uniformly  over vast regions without regard  to local potential  and 
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Several  of the reports point out,  for  instance,  that cotton-growing or . 
groundnut-growing  areas  should,  according to  the  local officials,  have  been 
confined  within limits corresponding to the potentialities offered  by  the 
soil  and  climate.  Such  measures  appear rational  from  the  agricultural point 
of view,  but  why  then  should  those  unlucky  enough  to find  themselves  outside 
the  areas with  a  high potential  for growing cotton or groundnuts  be  left to 
their  own  devices?  In practice,  supervision policies concentrating exclusive-
ly on  export  crops  are  far  from  conducive  to flexible  development  of local 
agricultural potentialities and  diversification of production. 
To  considBr  the  technical  aspects,  it has  to be  observed  that the  effective-
ness  of the  'motive'  crop  in boosting  farming activities is only very  limited. 
The  projects made  the  assumption that the  techniques  used  for  intensive pro-
duction of cotton or groundnuts  (single  crops  in rows,  high  densities,  ani-
mal-drawn tillage etc.)  were  equally applicable  to the  'motivated'  crops  (ce-
reals,  tubers etc.).  However,  in the  absence  of data  from  tests, it is not 
certain that intrinsic  improvements  in traditional  farming  systems  can  be 
achieved prior to the  introduction of methods  to  improve  the efficiency of 
labour  (selection of varieties,  manure,  densities of companion  crops,  plant 
protection,  biomass  and  water  economy etc.).  For  example,  the  techniques  of 
growing  companion  crops  (with each other or with  arborescent species)  do  not 
seem  to have  been  studied in sufficient depth  for it to be  possible to claim 
with certainty that intensification methods  which  have  been  tried and  tested 
with  cotton are  intrinsically more  efficient than  traditional methods  when 
applied  to food  crops.1 
The  effect of motive  crops  as  a  stimulus for  other  farming  activities is not 
clear;  investment  and  the propensity to technical  change  result from  a  varie-
ty of incentives,  which  are  found  as  much  outside  as  within the  sectoral  con-
text of these  crops. 
We  have  seen,  for  instance,  that in  Chad  the  spread  of animal-drawn  equipment 
has  been  encouraged  by profitability at several  levels  (cotton  +  hiring out  + 
carting+ fattening+ cereals);  we  have  also  seen that investment in this 
equipment  has  been  made  possible by  reasonable  returns  on  factors  of produc-
tion  (land  and  labour)  and  that,  as  in Zaire,  Rwanda,  Togo  and  other regions, 
returns  on  factors  were  often better with  food  crops  (bananas,  maize,  sorghum, 
yams  etc.)  than  with  those  considered  to be  motive  crops. 
From  the  technical  viewpoint  the  logic of healthy  farm  management  dictates 
that  one  activity should not exclude  another  and  that all the  technical  coef-
ficients  should  evolve  simultaneously  (cf.  3.3.2.3).  It is difficult to see 
how,  in an  agricultural  system affected by constraints and  limiting factors 
of various  types  (cf.  3.1),  an  essential  crop  (sorghum,  yams  etc.)  can  be 
relegated  to  an  insignificant status.  This  nevertheless is what  has  been  done 
1  This  can  be  illustrated by  the  example  of striga,  a  weed  which  causes great 
damage  to  sorghum  grown  as  a  single  crop  in  Chad,  but  which  can  be  severely 
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in several  intensification schemes  aimed  exclusively at motive  crops,  with 
food  crops benefiting- at best- from  'fall-out'. 
The  Gandajika  and  Bugesera-Mayaga  farming  communities  and  the  Badeguicheri 
Valley  and  Zinder  Department  projects  were  aimed  at wider  objectives,  in par-
ticular achievement  of better balances  between population  and  available re-
sources  in the  areas  concerned. 
These  projects contain  elements  of land utilization and  development policy: 
establishment of a  rational  structure for  land  occupancy  (in  farming  commu-
nities),  campaign against soil erosion  (Rwanda  and  Niger),  terracing etc. 
Projects carried out in pursuance  of such policies are  subjected in  a  very 
direct way  to  the  test of traditional behaviour patterns,  since  they are 
closely bound  up  with  the  subsistence of the  populations concerned.  They  have 
to meet  such major difficulties as  the  lack  - sometimes  total - of resources 
to pay  for  factors  of production,  the  limited availability of manpower  for 
investment  in human  resources, 1  the  lack of organization or disruption of 
trade  in foodstuffs,  the  lack of information  on  traditional  farming  methods, 
the  poor quality of agronomical  research findings,  particularly in relation 
to the  practical  scope  for  their implementation. 
In Rwanda,  considerable work  has  been  done  in research,  but  the  small  farm 
model  proposed  does  not  seem  to satisfy local  farmers,  who  prefer to carry  on 
using their traditional methods  within the  systematized  land  tenure structure. 
This  model  was  based  on researchers'  observations  and  not  on  an  analysis  of 
the  needs,  aims,  potentials  and  limitations of the  farmers  in which  they  were 
consulted. 
Detailed  ~nalysis of the  action carried out  shows  that it often lacked  the 
general vision of a  comprehensive  policy aimed  at satisfying national  food 
requirements  and  establishing a  balance between  the  population and  resources. 
By  way  of example,  the  evaluation report  on  the  Badeguicheri  project draws 
attention to  a  number  of fundamental  constraints,  such  as  overpopulation in 
relation to  resources,  competition between  cotton  and  sorghum  on  alluvial 
soils,  competition between grazing  and  cotton growing,  shortages of cash  to 
pay  taxes,  deforestation and  abandonment  of fallowing resulting in erosion of 
slopes  and  silting of valleys,  abandonment  of traditional terracing systems, 
decline  in animal  feed  resources,  lack of firewood,  a  high  level of seasonal 
migration  caused  by  lack of paid  work  and  the  consequent  lack of manpower  for 
investment  in human  resources  during  the  dry season,  shortcomings  of the  com-
munications  network  and  health infrastructure. 
Set against this series of problems  and  constraints,  the  action put in hand 
aimed  at:  an  increase  in cereal  production coupled .with its gradual  transfer 
1  Especially in Niger,  where  the population is obliged to emigrate  during  the 
dry season  to  work  in regions  where  conditions  are  more  favourable. - 203  -
from  alluvial soil to terraces,  an  increase  in cotton production  on  alluvial 
soil,  an  increase  in kitchen-garden crops  helped  by  construction of  50  wells, 
distribution of seed,  improvement  in small  livestock breeding,  a  campaign 
against soil erosion  (1  500  ha)  and  extension of arable  surfaces,  organiza-
tion  of participation by  farmers  through  the  setting-up of cotton growers' 
cooperatives,  development  of the  cotton storage  infrastructure,  roads,  vil-
. lage pharmacies etc. 
No  mention  was  made  of objectives concerned  with balancing crop  distribution, 
reafforestation,  replacement of fallowing  by  other methods  of soil regenera-
tion,  relations between graziers  and  crop-farmers,  reduction of migration, 
marketing  and  storage of foodstuffs. 
It appears  that projects aimed  at meeting  food  requirements  are  apt to be 
distorted by  the  •strategic'  option according  to which  the  development  of 
cash  crops  is considered  the  only  way  to  achieve  an  increase in subsistence 
crop  production.  This  is very advantageous  for  those  who  live  from  the  cash 
crop  in question,  but it is not necessarily the best way  of modernizing  agri-
cultural  systems.  By  way  of comparison,  one  may  ask what  would  become  of a 
European  farmer  with  a  mixed  farm  (livestock,  wheat,  rye,  forage,  beet,  peas 
etc.) if a  'project•  imposed  on  him  limited technical  investment,  use  of fer-
tilizers,  protection of crops  and  so  on  to beet only,  this because  of the 
special attractions of the  sugar  market  from  the viewpoint of the  public  in-
stitutions  and  certain powerful  industrial interests. 
5.1.4.  Participation strategy 
A fourth strategic option is concerned  with  the  approach  to  involvement of 
local  communities  in rural  development.  Their participation can be  visualized 
either as  an  obligation  (compulsory work)  or  as  interest shown  by  them  in 
changes  proposed  by  the  'developers'. 
Rank-and  file  involvement  in development  is not  an  end  in itself,  but is 
aimed  at as  a  means  of attaining specific objectives.  However,  it i~ clear 
that it can  have  completely different meanings  depending  on  the priority at-
tached  to  the  objectives  by  the  communities  concerned.  The  extent of this 
type  of involvement  can  also be  considered  a  barometer  of the  interest taken 
by  peasant  farmers  in  a  particular project  .. 
Of all the  projects evaluated,  only the  3M  project  (Zinder)  set itself the 
task of pursuing  a  strategy of voluntary participation by  the  local  community 
in the  development  process.  It was  deliberately set up  as part of the pre-ex-
isting cooperative context.  The  cooperative  aspect does  not appear  to be  the 
decisive  factor  in this intervention policy.  There  are  cooperatives  in Togo, 
the  Central  African Republic,  Rwanda  and  Upper  Volta.  In fact,  the essential 
feature  seems  to be  the  combination  of several  factors: 
(i)  the deliberate affirmation of the  competence  of local  farmers  and  offi-
cials to take  decisions  on  action to  be  carried out  and  methods  to be 
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(ii)  the  constant  emphasis  on  dialogue  between  farming  communities  and  offi-
cialdom; 
(iii)  the  cooperative policy. 
In contrast with  the  other evaluation reports,  which  frequently  stress the 
shortcomings  of the  operational  agencies  (supply  delays,  poor  quality or 
equipment  provided,  insufficient supply of seed etc.)  or the  refractory char-
acter of peasant mentalities,  the  3M  project evaluation report attributes its 
success  to  the  assumption of certain activities by  the  local population:  the 
takeover  of cooperatives by  the traditional Hausa  hierarchies,  the  major 
scale  of traditional  trade,  the  development  of cowpea production when  market 
conditions  are  favourable,  the  fact  that complete  responsibility for  the 
project was  in the  hands  of indigenous  officials etc. 
Similar examples  are also to be  found  in the  evaluation· report  on  the  Bade-
guicheri  project:  the relative  success with  the  construction of terraces be-
cause  this  work  corresponded  to traditional skills,  the  workers  employed  to 
build the  walls  were  able  to negotiate  their rates of pay etc. 
Consequently,  in project evaluation in relation to  this fourth  policy objec-
tive,  the  criteria for  takeover of responsibilities  by  the  local population 
may  be  regarded  as  decisive  contributory factors  of success  or failure.  The 
criterion for  takeover is linked  to the  'social control'  or  'cultural control' 
enjoyed  by  the  local population over agricultural  development.  The  most  im-
portant requirement  seems  to be  for  the  farmers  to master  new  techniques  and 
to integrate  them  into their farming  system,  without having  to go  against the 
concepts  and  economic  and  social  relationships characterizing their group.1 
The  most  important factors  in the  takeover of new  methods  are  as  follows: 
(i)  maintenance  of existing levels  of economic  responsibility on  farm  hold-
ings  ( 2 .1.  2) , 2 
(ii)  compatibility between  innovatory concepts  and  traditional  concepts; 
more  specifically,  scope  for  employing peasant skills in the  schemes 
envisaged, 
(iii)  adherence  to  the  cultural machinery  for  assimilation of change,  espe-
cially through  community  teaching  methods  (commonly  referred  to  as 
'palabres'  -parleys), 
(iv)  assurance  of the durability of reliable supplies of the  resources  need-
ed  to put  changes  into effect. 
The  takeover  of  a  scheme  by  a  community  indicates that it has  every  chance  of 
remaining viable  since,  in so  far  as  the  changes  introduced have  been  assimi-
1  Outside  the  context of the  projects evaluated,  mention  can  be  made  of the 
case of the  traditional groups  of young  farmers  (Nam)  in Yatenga  (Upper 
Volta)  which  have  evolved  towards  collective modernization  of farming. 
2  In this  connection,  see  for  example  the  case  of the  'Farmers'  Councils'  of 
Ingalaland  (Nigeria),  a  private project evaluated by  G.  Bertrand  (Doc.  29). - 205  -
lated and  mastered,  there is no  reason  why  they  should fall  back  on  their old 
methods,  unless  some  of the  resources  required  are  so dependent  on  outside 
sources of supply that they  suddenly cease  to be  available. 
This  type  of takeover  may  concern  some  social categories more  than  others.  In 
some  cases,  only  one  category  (generally adult males)  will  be  involved.  Under 
such  circumstances,  a  participation strategy will probably  lead  to disruption 
of social relationships within  communities. 
The  choice  of a  strategy of voluntary participation has  implications going 
beyond  social philosophy  alone.  It is a  matter of efficiency,  some  aspects of 
which  have  been analysed  above  (centralized or decentralized management)  {cf. 
5.5.1).1  In  communities  which  are  so  complex  and  varied  when  it comes  to eco-
nomic  decisions  (2.1.2)  and  capable  of cutting  down  their work  to  the  minimum 
level  needed  for  their own  subsistence  (2.1.3), it is difficult to  see  how 
any  scheme  or innovation  can make  a  significant and  lasting contribution 
without  the willing participation of the  farmers  concerned.  Conversely,  clear 
advantages  are  to-be  derived  when  local  communities  contribute their material 
and  financial  resources  and  their work  to  supplement  the material  and  finan-
cial contributions of institutions.  Where  there is no  such  response,  action 
undertaken  with  foreign  aid  cannot  be  taken over at national  economy  level; 
peasant  farmers  back  out  when  they are  asked  to pay  running costs  and  jib at 
tasks  imposed  upon  them  unless  they  are  offered  substantial  advantages  in 
terms  of remuneration. 2 
5.1.5.  Technical  assistance  strategy 
All  the  projects  evaluated  have  recourse  to European  technical  assistance. 
Except  in the  'aid to production'  programmes  under  Second  EDF  and  the  3M 
(Zinder)  project,  technical  assistance played  an  important part in the vari-
ous  phases  of planning  and  execution  (as  may  be  seen  from  the  table given in 
2.2).  In  a  few  cases,  the  development  company  supplying technical  assistance 
1  The  extent to which  considerable  improvements  can  be  made  in efficiency 
through participation is illustrated by  another project financed  by  the  EDF, 
currently in hand  in Niger:  the  hydro-agricultural  development  of Toula. 
The  Groupements  Mutualistes  de  Producteurs  (producers'  mutual  groups)  were 
entrusted with  the  management  of such  equipment  as  they were  qualified  to 
manage  and  with  the  planning of their working  and  production schedules.  In 
relation to  comparable  developments  in neighbouring areas,  it has  already 
been  found  that 
(a)  the  level  of levies  for  maintenance  of infrastructures has  fallen by 
50%, 
(b)  much  less difficulty has  been encountered  in collecting levies  and 
(c)  there  has  been  as  considerable reduction in the  administrative facili-
ties needed. 
2  Regarding  this section,  see  the  following  references:  Docs.  15,  17,  19,  28, 
30,  31,  32  and  33,  and  more  specifically:  E.  Morss,  Strategies for  Small 
Farmer  Development  (Doc.  26). - 206  -
had  a  financial  interest in  the  marketing  institutions  (e.g.  the  CFDT  holding 
in  COTONTCHAD). 
Technical  assistance played  an  important role  in  the projects as  determined 
by  a  variety of factors: 
(i)  the  desire of States to achieve  rapid results in agricultural production; 
(ii)  the  lack of local  technical  staff and  the  hope  of training replacements 
for  them  so that  they  could  be  assigned  to medium-term  work. 
Some  projects resorted massively  to technical  assistance  (Ivory  Coast,  Chad, 
Central  African Republic,  Togo).1  In  Central  African Republic,  it may  be  said 
that AGROPROGRESS  has  been  a  substitute for  an  agricultural  administration 
since  1974.  Other projects had  less massive  recourse  to technical  assistance, 
which  was  more  specifically limited to certain technical  aspects  of planning 
or studies.  The  3M  (Zinder)  project was  alone  in restricting technical  as-
sistance to a  supporting role,  without direct operational  responsibilities. 
The  dynamics  of technical assistance  should  be  studied in relation to  the  ob-
jectives assigned  to it on  the  one  hand  and  the  possible alternative solu-
tions  on  the other.  As  the  evaluation reports  show,  technical assistance per-
sonnel  are  constantly confronted with various  dilemmas. 
Technical  assistance  personnel are  frequently  placed  in the position of hav-
ing to  assume  executive responsibilities.  Under  these conditions,  since  they 
are  judged  on  immediate  quantifiable results  (agricultural output),  they  do 
not  find  enough  time  for training staff to  take  over  from  theselves  or for 
planning and  setting up  methods  and  organizational structures suited to the 
level  of competence  of the staff due  to  take  over  from  them.  By  doing  this, 
they  are  working efficiently in the  short term,  but can  sometimes  compromise 
the  medium  and  long  term future  of projects. 
Some  evaluation reports  (Ivory Coast,  Togo)  state that the  changeover  took 
place without major difficulties,  with expatriate staff being replaced gradu-
ally or hastily by  nationals.  However,  replacement  of foreign staff by  local 
staff is only  a  limited aspect of the  takeover process.  Once  the  takeover has 
been  completed,  it is necessary to observe  the progress of activities over 
the  next  few  years before  drawing  conclusions.  Changes  in management,  the 
volume  of operational  resources,  investment  capacity,  political  commitment  of 
st~ff and  the  'system'  of technical relationships can  often lead to a  reduc-
tion in  the  level  of activity.  The  level  of activity after national staff 
have  been  in charge  for  two  or three years  should be  compared  with the  level 
which  would  have  been  achieved  by  the  same  stage if the  technical  assistance 
role  had  been  less pervasive  and  concentrated  on  training,  research and  advi-
sory services rather than performance  of operational  tasks. 
1  In  1973,  SODERIZ  had  119  technical assistants,  22  from  the  West  and  97  Chi-
nese;  8  consultancy bureaux were  involved in the  preparatory phase. - 207  -
SODERIZ  provides  a  good  example  of project organization which relies heavily 
on  technical  assistance  personnel  in positions of responsibility at  head  of-
fice  and  in the field,  themselves  assisted  by  several  Consultancy bureaux. 
The  evaluation report sets out  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of such  mas-
sive recourse  to technical  assistance. 
The  advantages  listed included  competence  and  efficiency - monitored  by  Ivory 
Coast officials!  - thanks  to which  much  successful  technical  work  was 
achieved.  SODERIZ  was  able  to call  on  the  experience  of a  large  number  of 
rice specialists who  had  worked  in other regions of the  world. 
Among  the  disadvantages,  the  report notes that expatriates occupied all the 
key positions of responsibility right up  to the  end  of the period.Under  these 
circumstances,  the  technical  assistance  personnel  were  unable  to  perform 
their advisory  and  training functions  with  the  necessary objectivity.  In par-
ticular,  they did  not  always  display  a  clear understanding of the  socio-po-
litical context in which  SODERIZ  had  to operate.  They  did not realize how 
dangerous it was  for  the  company's  future  for it to  become  too  'technically 
minded'  or  'redevelopment oriented',  having  regard  to the need  for  economic 
analysis.  It did not appreciate that,  quite apart  from  the  company's  own  ca-
pacity to invest  {construction of dams,  hydro-agricultural developments), 
there was  also  the practical question of whether  the  local staff due  to  take 
over  from  them  and  the rural  world  were  willing and  able  to assume  control  of 
the  schemes  they  had  developed.  The  excessive polarization of the  technical 
assistance  personnel  at SODERIZ  and  their short-comings in the  field of eco-
nomic  analysis  emerged  as  major factors  leading up  to the difficulties expe-
rienced  by  the  company  in 1976. 
The  3M  (Zinder)  project provides  an  example  of a  different type  of technical 
assistance strategy.  In this case,  the  technical  assistance personnel  never 
assumed  executive responsibilities.  All project activities were  therefore de-
terminded  in the  light of the  regional staff's appreciation of the  rural 
world  and  their ability to carry out  the  tasks assigned  to  them.  It is diffi-
cult to make  useful  comparisons  between  these  types  of strategy,  since the  3M 
project did not  involve major  investments  on  a  scale  comparable  with  those 
carried out  by  SODERIZ. 
When  they exercise  executive responsibilities in projects,  technical assist-
ance  personnel  can  be  placed in  a  second  dilemma:  they may  find  themselves 
taking over  from  the  local  staff rather than supporting  them.  Acting accord-
ing to their commercial  logic,  consultancy bureaux will  accept  the  assistance 
contracts offered to  them,  whatever  the effects  on  future  development  work. 
In  Central  African  Republic,  the  State put AGROPROGRESS  in charge  of all as-
p~cts of the project.  This  arrangement  compromised  the  role of the public in-
stitutions,  so  much  so  that,  when  the  project came  to  an  end,  the  local  su-
pervisory staff were  not  absorbed  by  any national institution.  In this case, 
1  Several  expatriates who  were  considered  incompetent  were  dismissed  and  re-
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the  consultancy  bureaux  had  been called  upon  to work  in  a  way  which  offered 
no  prospect of continuity through  the  training of nationals  to  take  over re-
spons~bilities. It had  to  operate  in  a  context which very directly determined 
the  difficulties of the  project  (difficulties of transport,  land  reform,  de-
ployment  of rural  workers  etc.)  and it had  no  means  of incluencing this con-
text.  On  the  other hand,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that without its contribution, 
there  would  have  been  a  sharp fall  in crop  production.  In this  case,  it would 
be  necessary  ~o make  a  detailed examination  of the  advantages  for  each of the 
participants  involved  in the  field:  the  peasant  community,  the  State  and  the 
technical  assistance  agency. 
If the  commercial  logic of Consultancy bureaux  requires  them  to  seek out con-
tracts  and  prolong their life,  the  logic  followed  by  staff recruited to work 
in the field is very different.  The  reports record very rapid  turnover of ex-
patriate personnel, 1  particularly when  the  organization  and  socio-political 
environment  of a  project are unstable  (fine  examples  of this  are  provided  by 
Central African Republic,  Togo  and  the  livestock section of the  cotton plan 
in  Chad).  The  consultancy bureaux,  recruiting their personnel  specifically 
for  the  purposes  of these contracts,  are  not  always  able  to provide satisfac-
tory professional  working  conditions for their staff.  Consequently,  expatri-
ate personnel recruited in this way  often  lack experience  and  motivation. 
They  are  ill-equipped to gain a  thorough  understanding of the  peasant world 
and  have  very little time  in which  to evaluate  the  operations  in their charge 
or to  innovate. 
Several  of the projects  engaged  ~he services of  CFDT  (Zaire,  Niger,  Chad)  or 
staff from  this  company  (Central African Republic,  Togo).  As  its name  implies, 
the  function  of this  company  is the  promotion of textile crops;  its working 
methods  and  relations with  research agencies  are  accordingly ordered  around 
this object.  It is therefore difficult for  this  company  to  avoid polarization 
towards  cotton growing.  Consequently,  although  technical assistance  from  this 
source  proved efficient in the field of cotton growing,  it lacked  the  experi-
ence  as  well  as  the  physical  and  intellectual resources  to promote  the  devel-
opment  of overall  farming  systems rather than that of cotton alone.  Hence, 
the  selection of CFDT  implied in itself a  shift in the  intended  balance  of 
project objectives. 
The  evaluation report  on  the  Badeguicheri  Valley  (Niger)  notes,  for  instance, 
that  the project placed particular emphasis  on  cotton whereas it was  sup-
posed  to have  been  concerned  with all peasant  farming  crops.  The  CFDT  applied 
for  penalties to be  imposed  on  farmers  using their richest alluvial  land  to 
grow  sorghum rather than cotton. 
In Chad,  the  supervisory staff of the  Office National  de  Developpement  Rural 
have  been given  the  nickname  'boy-eaton'.  The  peasants  associate  them  exclu-
sively with  the  promotion of cotton,  although  the  Office  is supposed  to be 
concerned  with all crops. 
1  In  Togo,  expatriate staff,  excluding  the  head  of the  project,  stayed for  an 
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In  Zaire,  there were  two  separate agricultural  programmes  in neighbouring 
areas  in the vicinity of Gandajika.  One,  financed  by  the  UNDP,  was  concerned 
exclusively with promotion  of maize  while  the other,  financed  by  the  EDF  with 
technical  assistance  from  CFDT,  concentrated mainly  on  cotton. 
The  choice of a  specialized technical  assistance  agency  like  CFDT  amounts  to 
an  option  such as  those  described in earlier sections,  particularly those  on 
the  motive  crop strategy and authoritarian supervision.  It can  lead  to  the 
consequences  described  in sections 5.1.3 and  3.3.2.3 on  the dissociation of 
agricultural activities and  the  disruption of technical  coefficients.  It has 
the  secondary effect of concentrating the  strengthening of institutions  on 
those parts concerned  with  cotton,  to the  exclusion of all else. 
Other  problems  arose  in connection with technical  assistance. 
Attention is drawn  to the difficulties experienced  by  some  national  institu-
tions  in making  use  of reports' on  studies carried out  by  technical  assistance 
agencies.  It is probable  that studies carried out at  a  lower  level  by nation-
al staff,  involving the  rural  communities  concerned  and  with  support  only 
from  expatriate personnel,  would  be  of more  practical use.  It was  found  that 
the results of major  studies carried out in Niger,  Togo  and  Central  African 
Republic  were  either not used or  became  available  too late. 
Mention is also made  of a  tendency  on  the part of technical assistance agen-
cies  to oversophisticate technical  proposals rather than  adapting  them  to am-
bient  economic  and  cultural conditions.  The  Ivory Coast rice-growing pro-
gramme  should  be  studied  in greater detail  from  this viewpoint.  The  Ivory 
Coast authorities,  influenced  by  Italian industrial interests,  invested  in 
several high-output  technologically advanced rice-mills.  In 1972,  these  were 
operating at between  10%  and  20%  of capacity because  of competition  from  ar-
tisan rice-millers.  The  technical  experts'  response  was  to recommend  vast hy-
dro-agricultural developments  to  supply  the  paddy  needed  to get the rice-
mills operating at full  capacity.  The  decision to act  on  this recommendation, 
with enthusiastic  encouragement  from  technical  assistance quarters,  caused 
the  management  of the  company  to  lose interest in rain-fed rice,  which  had 
provided  between  90%  and  95%  of the  entire crop  in 1972,  and  led to increased 
competition with traditional rice-millers,  who  found  themselves  faced  with  a 
ban  on  imports  of artisan rice-husking equipment. 
Another characteristic of technical  assistance is a  common  tendency to insu-
late itself. It sets up  its own  network of technical  and  scientific facili-
ties;  it operates  according to its own  system  of remuneration;  it has  its own 
operational  resources.  When  recognizing the  need  for  technical assistance in 
projects, it is necessary to take  account  of the  conditions  under  which it 
will  be  provided;  these  conditions may  be  unfavourable  from  the  viewpoint of 
psychological  and  social relations between expatriates  and  local staff. In 
this  connection,  there is reason to doubt  the efficiency of the  system  of 
training by  opposite  numbers  or peers.  There  is in fact very little parity 
between  a  technical assistant and  his opposite  number;  they generally have 
little in  common  culturally,  in  terms  of training and  experience,  in terms  of 
responsibilities,  pay  and  benefits,  or in  terms  of socio-political con-
straints.  As  the  expatriates are better placed  in all these  respects,  their - 210  -
opposite numbers  are generally inclined to  leave  them  to  do  the  work.  Moreo-
ver,  when  expatriates  leave  and  their opposite  numbers  inherit some  of their 
advantages,  this often creates  a  gulf between  senior local staff and  their 
subordinates. 
The  3M  (Zinder)  project succeeded  in avoiding  this difficulty.  Although  paid 
at the  level  of expatriate staff,  the  technical  assistance personnel  confined 
itself to  an  advisory role.  No  attempt was  made  to set up  a  structure of op-
posite numbers  and  the  Comite  Departemental  de  Developpement,  which  was  in 
charge  of the  project,  was  able  to  take  decisions without reference  to  'par-
allel'  technical  assistance  systems. 
In the Eastern Kasai  project in Zaire,  there  were  no  local opposite  numbers 
working  alongside  expatriate staff.  The  expatriates were  generally replaced 
by their most  competent subordinates,  who  had  originally learnt their jobs at 
lower  levels and  shown  outstanding  industry,  adaptability and  competence. 
This method  seems  to have  given better results than the  'opposite numbers' 
system. 
Technical  assistance strategy needs  to be  studied carefully at the  outset of 
projects. It is not certain that all projects require substantial technical 
assistance  from  the  outset.  Efforts could  be  made  to find  more  flexible ar-
rangements  under which  nationals  could  be  put in positions of responsibility 
immediately  (allowing for prior training).  The  immediate  objectives  assigned 
to technical  assistance must at all  times  be  seen  in relation to the  longer-
term  objectives of autonomous  development. 
However,  due  weight  must  be given to the  fact that States do  not  always  pro-
vide  the  staff needed  for projects in good  time.  Moreover,  when  local staff 
are  transferred frequently,  continuity of training and  preparation for  take-
over  of responsibilities become  impossible. 
The  evaluation reports  do  not provide  a  basis for  further  discussion of tech-
nical assistance strategy.  This  is a  difficult problem  which  should  be  ana-
lysed in greater detail  in the  light of several criteria:  objectives in the 
short,  medium  and  long  term;  institutions;  cultural contexts;  political con-
texts. 
5.2.  STRATEGY  FOR  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  INSTITUTIONAL  ENVIRONMENT  OF  RURAL  DE-
VELOPMENT:  ASPECTS  SPECIFICALLY  CONNECTED  WITH  THE  VARIOUS  SERVICES  AND 
FUNCTIONS 
The  term  'encadrement'  (supervision)  is generally used  to describe  the range 
of services provided  for  farmers  by  development  agencies  and  companies.  This 
term  covers  a  wide  variety of activities ranging  from  training of farmers  to 
initial marketing  of produce,  from  organization of producers'  associations to 
collection of annual  loan repayments,  from  organization of supplies of inputs 
to instruction in methods  of combating soil erosion  and  so on.  The  'encadreur' 
(supervisor)  is generally seen  by  local  farmers  as  the  representative  in - 211  -
their village  of technical  and  economic  authorities about whose  hierarchies 
and  organization little is known  except  that they are  subject to frequent 
changes.  It is therefore necessary  to study the various  supervisory functions 
separately in order to assess  the  effectiveness of their contribution to ru-
ral development. 
5.2.1.  Information,  instruction,  training 
All  the projects  evaluated  employed  rank-and-file staff at village or local 
area level  known  as  supervisors,  monitors  or instructors,  whose  job  was  to 
familiarize  farmers  with  methods  proposed  by  the  research  agencies.  Broadly 
speaking,  credit is due  to the  industry of these workers,  who  are  generally 
of a  low  educational  level  and  have  to work  in unfamiliar  environments,  using 
languages  of which  they  may  not  have  a  perfect command  and  often inadequate 
resources  (particularly for  travelling around  their areas).  Their status is 
at the  lower  end  of hierarchies with little hope  of promotion,  they  have  no 
security for  the  future  and  sometimes  compare  their circumstances with  those 
of school-friends  who  have  found  stable  and  better-paid work  in the  police, 
the  army  or  the  public service. 
The  evaluation reports  indicate that village communities  are  generally well 
disposed  towards  supervisors,  since  they  are all aware  of their need  for 
technical  information. 
It would  seem,  however,  that the  advisers'  information role is generally re-
strictive and  limited to  a  few  techniques  which  farmers  are  asked  to  adopt 
without regard  to overall  conditions  on  their farms. 
The  reasons  for  this are: 
(i)  the  very heavy  emphasis  on  cash  crops,  and  sometimes  export crops  only, 
in the  planning of advisory programmes; 
(ii)  the  advisers'  level of training,  which  is not of a  sufficient standard 
to  enable  them  to master  the  whole  range  of agricultural  problems 
raised  by  farmers; 
(iii)  failure  to give  due  weight  to the  farmers'  own  skills and  activities 
and  a  tendency  on  the part of advisers  to  address  them  'as if they  had 
nothing else  to do  but listen to what  they  had  to say'. 
Although  the  farmers'  need  for technical  information is great,  the official 
response  is often weak.  The  restrictive nature  of the  advisory services  has 
the  following  consequences: 
(i)  Farmers  adopt  an  'ala carte'  approach to technical  advice,  picking what 
interests them  and  following  the  advice  insofar as  conditions  on  their 
farms  permit.  For  instance,  a  farmer will  apply the  cotton-spraying pro-
gramme  up  to  the  third treatment,  but  abandon  the  subsequent stages  to 
attend to work  falling  due  on his  other crops. 
(ii)  The  limitations of advisory  work  are  quickly  exposed  when  the  whole 
range  of constraints preventing farmers  from  adopting  the  techniques - 212  -
proposed  are not  appreciated.  For  example,  the  Chad  report states that, 
in 1974/75,  there  was  no  longer  any  correlation between  the  numbers  of 
ONDR  supervisory staff and  the results  obtained with  cotton-growing  in-
tensification  (areas  under  intensive cultivation and  yields). 1  As  are-
sult of their own  working  experience,  the  farmers  were  in fact better 
informed  in  some  areas  than the  supervisors.  Under  these  circumstances, 
the  advisers'  role is limited  to  organizing certain activities  (marking 
out plots,  distributing sprayers etc.)  in association with  the  village 
authorities. 
The  same  situation is  found  in Eastern Kasai  (Zaire),  where  the  farmers 
have  long experience  of growing  cotton. 
The  technical  advisory services  are  generally unsuccessful  at adapting to the 
new  situations which  they themselves  create;  this is attributable to  a  lack of 
overall investigation and  basic training,  which  enable  them  to appreciate  the 
realities of peasant  farming  and  continually adjust their advice  to  take  ac-
count of them. 
It is clear that  information about peasant  farming  conditions  is generally 
inadequate,  and  in  some  instances  rudimentary.  The  reports  record  the  absence 
of direct tests in the  field  to determine  the  technical coefficients of pro-
duction  and  the  inadequate provisions for  continuing evaluation of socio-eco-
nomic  conditions.  They  also note  the  supervisory agencies'  difficulties in 
absorbing data gathered  through  studies  or  economic  analyses  when  available 
and  the resultant low  level  of support given to officials in  the  field. 
It also  emerges  that the  supervisory agencies  generally have  a  tendency to 
authoritarianism.  All  the  reports refer to the various  degrees  of pressure 
and  sometimes  coercion  which  they exert  on  farmers,  as  mentioned  above.  How-
ever,  there is no  suggestion of any  relationship between  the  extent  and  in-
tensity of pressure of this type  of supervision and  the  productive results 
obtained. 
Depending  on  circumstances,  authoritarianism  in its various  degrees  leads  to: 
(i)  indifference if not opposition  on  the  part of farmers  to certain activ-
ities,  especially the  'boss's crop'  and  techniques  associated with it; 
(ii)  lack of interest among  supervisory staff in their work,  which  becomes 
boring  and  repetitive in an  environment  which  is sometimes  progressing 
more  rapidly than  they are  and  where  their responsibility for  enforcing 
directives  and  applying  sanctions puts  them  in  a  bad  light; 
(iii)  frequent  tension between  institutions and  communities  or cooperatives 
which,  when  they are  dynamic,  strive to safeguard their technical  and 
economic  independence; 
(iv)  reaction against supervisory services  when  a  project fails:  when  they 
are authoritarian,  peasant communities  readily hold  them responsible 
1  E.  Morss  reports  the  same  thing in  'Strategies for  Small  Farmer  Develop-
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for  setbacks;  when  they give  support  and  advice  and  encourage  construc-
tive  thought,  the  farmers  c~ accept failures  and  learn from  them. 1 
Authoritarian tendencies  are  also prevalent within the  supervisory agencies 
themselves,  where  they  have  the  twofold effect of restricting capacity for 
innovation in the  advisory services offered  (technical fields  and  methods), 
especially in relation to  the  wide  range  of subjects of concern to farmers 
~d hampering  the internal  training of staff. 
The  status of being  'alien to the  environment'  attached to supervisors  by  au-
thoritarian approaches  which  are  themselves  concerned exclusively with  the 
externally oriented activities of farms  tends  to guarantee that the  develop-
ment  schemes  proposed will  not  be  taken over  by  peas~t communities  and  will 
in many  cases  be  ineffective. 
Various  other problems  connected with  the  organization of technical  supervi-
sion were  mentioned  by  the  evaluators. 
As  regards  education,  attention was  drawn  to  the  very  low  level  of training 
among  supervisory staff and  to  communication difficulties arising out of the 
use  of French  or  some  other lingua franca.  When  young  supervisors  are re-
cruited  from  outside  the  peasant  community  or  from  outside  the  region where 
they are  to work,  they  are unfamiliar with  the  local  language  and  socio-eco-
nomic  and  cultural context.  It is difficult for  them  to gain  acceptance  from 
the  community  without going  through  the  local  authority  and,  when  they  do 
this,  they shoulder local conflicts in the  same  way  as  the  authorities do. 
When  they are  drawn  from  the  community  itself,  they are  familiar with  the 
language  and  social context,  unless  they  have  been culturally alienated by 
their schooling;  however,  if they  are  too young,  their status  (they are 
classed  among  the  young  men,  as  described  in section 2.1)  deprives  them  of 
the  necessary authority. 
The  training which  they receive  is generally very narrowly based  on  the  lim-
ited technical  themes  to be  introduced  through  the projects to which  they 
will  be  assigned.  It does  not  equip  supervisors to analyse  the  full  range  of 
constraints affecting a  farm.  Should  they  happen  to be  called upon  for infor-
mation outside their  'official'  field,  they have  none  to offer.  Under  these 
circumstances,  the  supervisor is out of his  depth;  farmers  know  more  about 
his  job  than  he  does,  regard  him  as  no  more  than  someone  through  whom  they 
have  to pass  in order to obtain inputs  and  equipment  and  only  adopt  those  of 
his proposals which  they find  interesting.  This  remoteness  between  the  super-
visor and  the  farmers  whom  he  is supposed  to  train is increased further when 
he  is entrusted with  duties calling for  the  direct exercise of authority: 
demarcation  of cultivation blocks,  superintendence of village markets,  col-
lection of loan  repayments  etc. 
1  In this  connection,  see  'Bilan  de  !'animation rurale masculine,  juillet 
1966 a juillet 1969'  in the  prefecture  of Kibungo  (Rwanda)  AIDR,  1969,  pp. 
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Far  from  enough  was  done  in the  sphere  of training in instruction techniques 
for  supervisors.  They  worked  individually with farmers;  in most  cases,  and 
especially in Upper  Volta,  they  concentrated their attention on  those  whom 
they thought to be  progressive,  or  'leaders'.  The  'communal'  approach was 
tried as  a  lever  in some  areas  (credit for  instance),  but it could certainly 
not be  said to have  been  a  training strategy.  This  would  have  needed  training 
for  supervisors in the  techniques  of teaching  individuals  and  groups  and  in 
the  scope  for  applying  them  flexibly  to suit the  various  categories which 
they need  to reach  (men,  women,  young  people,  headmen  etc.). 
However,  it would  be  misguided  to set too  much  store by  teaching methods. 
They  would  have  been  powerless  to influence  the  lack of economic  interest in 
the  technical  proposals put  forward  by  supervisors which  was  often displayed 
by  farmers. 
Quite  apart  from  the  need  to train supervisors  in instruction techniques, 
there is  an  urgent  need  to redesign  the  content of agricultural training. 
In Zaire  and  Chad,  for  instance,  the  evaluators  comment  on  the bookish,  im-
practical  and  biassed nature  of technical  training.  Agricultural  subjects are 
studied in relation to specific crops  and  in the  light of modern  farming  con-
ditions.  They  are not placed  in the  context of the  prevailing farming  condi-
tions  familiar  to peasant farmers.  Very little attention is given  to agrarian 
economics,  rural  sociology,  teaching methods,  land  development  techniques  and 
so  forth.  The  situation may  be  summarized  by  saying that agricultural college 
students are  taught very much  more  about  the  modern  agriculture which peasant 
farmers  will be  applying  in the  future  than  about  what  they are  doing  at 
present. 
With  the  exception of the  3M  project,  the  supervisors  working  on all the 
projects evaluated were  paid out of public funds. 
There  are  grounds  for  doubts  about this arrangement,  common  to all French-
speaking African countries,  which  requires  centralized management  of develop-
ment  personnel  with all the  risks of inefficiency which it involves:  homoge-
neous  application of technical  methods  throughout  heterogeneous  areas,  unsat-
isfactory response  to questions raised by  local  communities,  absence  of real 
control  over work  in the field etc.  When  he  is not subject to any  control  by 
the  community  he  serves,  a  supervisor finds it relatively easy to circumvent 
some  of his responsibilities or interpret them  in his  own  fashion,  which  he 
would  clearly not be  able  to do if his career were  subject to control  by  the 
groups  for  whose  training he  was  responsible.  A step  in this direction has 
been  taken  in Chad,  where  the  GDSs  monitor  the  work  of veterinary assistants. 
For its part,  the  'auto-encadrement'  (self-supervision)  aimed  at in the  3M 
project was  planned with  this sort of problem  in mind.  It is nevertheless 
highly  demanding  and  requires  a  higher  standard of training at levels of re-
sponsibility in the rural  development  institutions.  Development  staff need  to 
be  capable  of coping with  more  varied requests  from  diverse  socio-economic 
groups. 
Constant references are  made  to the difficulties experienced  by  the  agencies 
in meeting  farmers'  demands  in certain areas which  are  of concern to  them  and - 215  -
to the repetitive nature  of advisory work  limited exclusively to crops.  Irre-
spective of the  technical  competence  of  t~ farmers,  the  same  technical mes-
sages,  the  same  instructions  on  the  use  of inputs,  the  same  equipment  and 
sometimes  the  same  norms  for  areas  under cultivation,  the  farming  calendar, 
credit etc.  seem  to  be  proposed.  If the  advisory staff offered instruction at 
various  levels,  with rising scales of complexity,  financial  cost  and  workload, 
they  would  be  providing  a  service more  in keeping with  the heterogeneous  na-
ture  of the  farming  world  and its various  socio-economic  subdivisions  (cf. 
3.2). 
Another difficulty reported  in connection with  the projects evaluated is the 
fact that the  staff structure  and  policy are unfavourable  to the  promotion of 
experienced rank-and-file staff. It always  seems  easier for  a  young  boy re-
cently out of school  than for  an  experienced trainer from  a  rural  background 
to obtain  a  position of responsibility  (in charge  of an area,  a  crop etc.). 
Unfortunately,  trained supervisory staff at middle  and  senior levels are 
sometimes  much  more  concerned  with their administrative careers than with 
their responsibilities in the  rural  environment. 
Finally,  mention  should  be  made  of the  limited capacity for initiative,  inno-
vation and  investment of the  supervisory agencies.  The  national institutions 
often find it easier to  absorb  operating aid than  to  deploy  funds  for capital 
investment.  This  means  that they readily have  recourse  to foreign enterprise 
or technical  assistance,  not only at the  preliminary study phase,  but also 
during  the  course  of projects.  However,  when  exhaustive studies have  been 
carried out  by  foreign  consultants,  the  national  institutions have  not  always 
been  able  to assimilate  them,  so that they have  been  of only doubtful  useful-
ness.  The  same  applies  to other types  of capital  investment  (roads,  store-
houses,  housing,  cattle-pens,  small  dams  etc.)  responsibility for  which  is 
often entrusted to foreign  companies. 1  Limiting  the  extent of such recourse2 
and  linking operating aid  to  the efforts made  by  agencies  to invest in rural 
development  on  their  own  account could  be  a  very  instructive solution.  This 
point is raised by  the  3M  report  (Niger)  in particular.  The  fullest possible 
takeover  of decision-making  and  implementation of capital  investment projects 
by  the staff of the  agencies  concerned  from  the  outset of projects offers an 
assurance  of continuity.  It is possible that,  in order to do this,  the  proj-
ects  should  include preliminary phases  of intensive training for staff and 
take  steps  to ensure  their permanency.  In  the projects  evaluated,  there  were 
no  such phases  of intensive training geared  to the  working  environment.  There 
is no  doubt  that the  availability of aid  funds  at short notice under simple 
procedures  would  be  very favourable  to the  development  of capacities to in-
vest. 
Other  training strategies can  be  adopted  in the  rural world,  as  witness  the 
wide  variety of schemes  in operation in Black Africa,  outside the  context of 
major projects financed  by the  EDF.  All  are based  on  local  communities'  abil-
1  This  is particularly true of Togo,  where  foreign contractors were  brought 
in to build tracks  and  wells. 
2  If necessary,  by  modifying procedures  for  access  to finance. - 216  -
ity to  assume  responsibility for training of their members  and  pay  the  costs; 
the training must  be  of direct  in~est to them  and  they  have  to be  able  to 
find  suitable instructors from  the  institutions. 
The  first priority is to establish clearly who  is to be  the  recipient of 
training:  an  adult male  grower  who  will unfailingly  comply with technical di-
rectives  in order to maximize  production of clearly defined  crops under  opti-
mum  land  and  input productivity conditions,  or  a  member  of a  rural  community 
integrated with his  own  socio-economic  context,  earning his  living by working 
the resources  on  his  land according to their varied potential  and  his best 
interests,  playing his part in the national  economy's  domestic  or foreign 
trade  and  contributing to  the  best of his ability to  the  development  of his 
local  and  national  community  as  long as  he  benefits by  such  development? 
In  the  interests of effective overall  development  operations,  the  choice  must 
go  to the  second  'target'  for  reasons  largely explained  above,  which  may  be 
summarized  as  follows: 
(i)  the multiplicity of economic  decision-making,  levels in the rural  world 
and  the  need  for  a  specific  approach  to each group  to  take  account  of 
its particular interests and  aims; 
(ii)  the fact that it is impossible  to  develop  a  single agricultural activi-
ty in isolation without quickly running  into the bottlenecks  inherent 
in other equally  important activities; 
(iii)  the  increasing trade  in local agricultural produce,  resulting in  a  rel-
ative  improvement  in returns  on  labour available  from  food  crops  com-
pared with  cash crops; 
(iv)  the  need  for measures  aimed  at finding  new  ways  of establishing the 
various social categories  {young  people  in particular)  in the rural  en-
vironment,  which  can  only  be  done  by  negotiations  conducted within  com-
munities  themselves  and  going beyond  the  scope  of cash-crop  production 
alone;  in the  absence  of such measures,  cash-crop  farming  is likely to 
be  jeopardized in the  same  way  as  food-crop  farming,  in villages lack-
ing  manpower  because  of rural depopulation; 
(v)  the need  to deploy  maximum  manpower,  technical  and  financial  resources 
in efforts to  improve  rural  life,  hence  the  need  for  as  many  different 
types  of initiative as  possible. 
The  socio-cultural  and  economic  viability of projects undertaken with  EDF  aid 
necessarily depends  on  the  choice of strategy aimed,  not merely  at the  'pro-
ducer',  but at the  'rural inhabitant'  working  the resources  of his  land  and 
cooperating with  the  technical,  economic  and  cultural authorities in  a  com-
bined effort towards  the  achievement of development through  optimum  mobiliza-
tion of all physical  resources  and  manpower  in the rural  environment. 
Moreover,  the  evaluation reports  show  that groups  of farmers  are  increasingly 
assuming responsibility for their own  training and  paying  for it themselves. 
Some  nominate  'their'  agronomist  whose  role is very similar to that of the 
traditional  'chef de  culture';  others  pay  for  the  training they  need  to learn 
how  to manage  their own  cotton markets;  others  hold  discussions  in associa-- 217  -
tions of men  and  women  on  the  training programme  which  they  would  like to see 
organized  by  the  CFPA  (centre  de  formation  professionnelle agricole  - agri-
cultural training college);  young  people  form  farming  study and  work  associa-
tions;  local  farmers  and  officials form  associations working  for  improvement 
of living  and  farming  conditions in the  village etc.  This  wealth of local  or 
regional  initiatives which  owe  nothing to official aid provides  ample  evi-
dence  of the rural  community's ability to organize training for its members 
and  indeed  to pay  for it. This  facility is not often matched  by the  develop-
ment  institutions;  on  the contrary,  their technical officials,  programmes, 
procedures  and  teaching methods  are generally inflexible and restrictive. 
The  evaluation reports point up  the  need  to review the  supervisory role  in 
terms  of the  calibre of men  and  women  required.  They  should be  experienced 
people  recruited  from  the  rural  world  itself on  the  basis of their knowledge 
of the geographical  and  human  context  and their overall  technical  competence 
in subsistence  farming,  cash crops  and  stock-farming.  Their training would 
concentrate  on  analysis of farming  systems  and  the  conditions under which 
they have  to operate  and  they would  become  members  of teams  of  'technicians' 
(technical auxiliaries)  able  to talk with  the  various  categories of peasants 
and  their womenfolk  about  their problems  and  to cooperate with  them  and  the 
technical  institutions  in finding  the  most  suitable solutions.  Their work 
would  concentrate  on  vocational  training,  which  would  be  based primarily on 
programmes  gradually evolved  in the  course of discussions  among  farmers  on 
the particular requirements of their own  groups.  Their role  would  be  confined 
to training and  instruction only,  while  other officials would  be  responsible 
for  overseeing duties.  They  would  be  subject to  a  considerable  degree  of con-
trol  from  the  farmers'  groups  concerned,  on  the  one  hand  through  organization 
of their work  and  on  the  other hand  by virtue of the  fact that the villagers 
would  be  paying all or part of their wages.  Since  they  would  have  to use dif-
ferent methods  when  dealing with different categories of the peasant communi-
ty,  they would  need  to be  trained in instruction techniques suited to  each  of 
the  main  categories. 
These  trainers would  be  part of a  local  and  regional  institutional system ca-
pable  of responding rapidly to requests  for  assistance  from  the  peasant  com-
munity or referring  them  to the regional  or national  institutions. 
This profile presupposes  fundamental  reforms  in technical  training,  in the 
institutions and  in the attitudes of  'developers';  these  would  be  long-term 
reforms  and  there  may  be  some  lessons to be  learnt from  several  experiments 
already being conducted  outside  the  context of the projects evaluated. 
5.2.2.  Support  for organization of the rural  environment 
Rural  development  officials are all agreed  on  the need  for  action  aimed  at 
organization of the  rural  environment.  They  refer to  'organizing',  'structur-
ing'  or  'restructuring'  the  environment. 
Referring back  to Part one,  we  find  the  following  activities along  these 
lines  in the various projects evaluated:  the  OBM  cooperatives  in Rwanda; 
'auto-encadrement'  and  the  UNCC  cooperatives  in Zinder  (Niger);  the  village - 218  -
groups  and  GMPs  (producers'  mutual  groups)  in the  Badeguicheri Valley  (Niger); 
the  GDSs  (animal  health protection groups)  in  Chad.  There  were  several  in-
stances of lack of coordination between projects and  cooperative organiza-
tions  which  predated  them:  in Central  African  Republic  the  cooperatives were 
allowed  to  run  down,  in Zaire  they were  dismantled  and  in Togo  they operated 
in competition with  the  project. 
In addition,  there were  other structures which  were  unconnected  with the 
projects but  whose  dynamism  influenced  the  course  they took:  work  associa-
tions based  on  lineage  and  age  groups  in Central  African Republic;  independ-
ent producers'  groups  in Togo  (CETA,  FERMAPRATO,  DANYI-ATIGBA  group);  local 
development  associations  in Ivory  Coast;  village  associations  for  the  manage-
ment  of CFPAs  (agricultural training centres)  in  Chad. 
It is clear that the  organizational projects set up  by  the  more  dynamic  rural 
communities  bear little resemblance  to  those  established under  the projects; 
this suggests that it would  be  fruitful  to make  a  closer study of the  sponta-
neous  dynamics  of rural organization.  In many  cases,  moreover,  when  such or-
ganizations are genuinely set up  and  run  by  the  rural  community,  they  are  not 
called cooperatives.  Peasant  farmers  are  suspicious of cooperatives,  which 
have  been  imposed  on  them  in the past by  the  State  and  they  have  unfavourable 
memories  of them,  including being cheated frequently by unscrupulous offi-
cials.  A study  of schemes  organized by rural communities  should provide  an-
swers  to the  important questions  set out below in greater detail than  in the 
earlier parts of this report: 
Can  independent  farmers'  structures be  developed  from  projects whose  objec-
tives are  defined outside  the  local environment  and  without  adequate  knowl-
edge  of its main priorities  and  preoccupations? 
Can  no  role be  played  by  traditional structures in the  organization of rural 
development?  If not,  how  can  such structures develop  to strengthen  the  proc-
ess  of rural  development? 
What  economic  and  social  advantages  and  disadvantages  can arise  from  the  in-
dependent  development of local negotiating powers,  which would  enable  farmers' 
groups  to acquire  a  better understanding of  the  services provided  by  the 
technical  agencies  (after the  example  of  'auto-encadrement'  in the  3M  project 
or the  GDSs  in the  stock-farming  schemes  in Chad)? 
To  what  extent could  the  attribution to local structures of certain technical 
and  financial  resources  and  the  corresponding decision-making  powers  improve 
the  efficiency of projects?  (remuneration of selected supervisors by villag-
ers,  optional  investment  programmes  according to the  needs  of a  cooperative 
or village,  etc.). 
In relation to these questions,  the  evaluation reports  indicate first of all 
that,  in the dirigistic framework  of the  projects  and  public or quasi-public 
schemes,  it seems  difficult to  encourage  the  development  of real  powers  of 
negotiation,  since local initiatives rarely receive  support  from  the  public 
agencies,  which  are often ill-informed or unresponsive  to evidence  of dyna-
mism  coming  to light outside the objectives planned  by  the national  authori-
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In  Rwanda,  for  instance,  membership  of the  cooperatives  run  by  the  OBM  is 
compulsory  for all  farmers  in the  farming  communities.  However,  the  condi-
tions available  to members  are  no  different  from  those  available  to  non-mem-
bers,  which  means  that members  have  no particular reason  to  take  an  interest 
in the  development  and  management  of their cooperatives. 
The  survey  carried out  among  local  farmers  in the  area covered  by  the  COMOE 
(Upper  Volta)  ORD  revealed  that community  development  schemes  are perceived 
as  extensions of activities decided  upon  by  'those  above'. 
In Niger  and  Chad,  when  the  cooperatives  seek to  organize  themselves  with  a 
view  to marketing  their food-crop  produce,  they are  forced  to comply with  the 
administrative regulations,  which  are primarily designed to protect consumers. 
Cooperatives  are  obliged  to sell  on  the  open  market,  but  are not  allowed  to 
take  advantage  of market  fluctuations  working  to their benefit  (for instance, 
by  stockpiling in order to sell between  seasons). 
At  all events,  the participation process  is limited to the  marketing of ex-
port products;  as yet it is considered at the  lowest level  only  and  falls 
short of real  economic  negotiation.  Given  the  heavy drain of taxation,  the 
cooperatives  (and  indeed  other types  of intermediary)  have  only very  limited 
scope  for  negotiating discounts,  which  therefore afford  them  only small  sav-
ings.  Under  these  circumstances,  there  seems  no reason  why  farmers  should  be 
interested in establishing any  more  than  the  formalistic  appearance  of par-
ticipation. 
As  a  general  rule,  the African peasant world  is not  intimidated by  a  multi-
plicity of structures  (cf.  2.1).  Farmers  are not worried  about going along 
with rules  and  joining groups  imposed  upon  them  by  development  companies,  as 
long  as this gives  them  access  to the  technical  and  financial  resources 
available  through  such  companies.  However,  these rules only hold good  for  as 
long  as  the  new  structure is sustained by its promoter  and  the  financial  ben-
efits still hold  good,  since  the  structure has  no  meaning  to  them  otherwise. 
Unfortunately,  the  instability of the  institutions'  operational  methods  and 
resources contrasts with  the  stability of peasant life. 
Farmers  are  called upon  from  time  to  time  to  take part in new  projects or de-
velopment policies  involv~ng membership  in a  succession  of new  types of group 
or association.  Since  they are never  consulted  and  receive  very little expla-
nation of the  reasons  for  these periodic  changes,  how  could  they have  any 
confidence  in them? 
Attention was  also drawn  to a  number  of cases  in which  the  local  community's 
opinion  of the relative importance  of various  crops  was  greatly at variance 
with that of the  development  company,  which  invested all its resources  in a 
particular crop which,  initially at least,  was  considered of only marginal 
importance  by  the  farmers. 
Two  examples  will  serve  to illustrate the points made  in the  preceding para-
graphs.  To  facilitate management  of the  lowlands  developed  for rice,  SODERIZ 
organized rice-growing groups  which  received aid under  the  terms  of a  'pro~ 
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of loans etc.  With  two  crops  a  year,  satisfactory yields per hectare  could  be 
achieved.  From  the  SODERIZ  viewpoint,  the  lowland  crops  were  essential  and 
necessitated  the  permanent  presence of the  farmers  working  in  the  rice fields. 
From  the villagers'  viewpoint,  however,  this was  a  marginal  activity;  the 
lowlands  had  never  been  farmed  and  their farming  activity centred  around  the 
land  for rain-fed crops.  There  may  have  been  scope  for  lowland  rice-growing, 
but in their view  this  was  no  justification for  the  complete revolution in 
their ways  demanded  by  SODERIZ,  which  entailed working  300  days  a  year on 
rice-growing  alone. 
Similarly,  CFDT,  when  formulating  the  technical  programme  which it intended 
to pursue  in  Chad,  decided  to set up  producers'  groups  as part of the  'block 
cultivation• 1  policy in order to facilitate  supervision and  action against 
crop  disease.  Demarcation of blocks is the  responsibility of local  supervi-
sors.  It is done  without reference  to village  land  tenure rules,  the  only 
criterion being whether  or not cotton is grown  on  the  land.  The  procucers' 
groups  therefore exist exclusively for the  purposes  of CFDT's  field activi-
ties,  and  possibly also to facilitate enforcement  of constraints  imposed  by 
it (compulsory  cotton-growing).  The  local  farmers,  for  their part,  often jib 
at the block cultivation policy,  since it leads  to dual  standards in the  man-
agement  of land.  If they go  along with it out of opportunism  or because  they 
have  no  option,  they  do  not  carry it on  on  their  own  account.  Consequently, 
when  the  ambient  conditions under which  CFDT  set up  its organization disap-
pear,  the  organization itself will  disappear also. 
In the  Koumra  region in Chad,  the  'promotion  humaine'  ('operation Mandoul') 
programme  run by  BDPA  organized  farmers'  groups  which  received  substantial 
resources.  Three  years after the  departure of BDPA,  the evaluators tried in 
vain  to find  any  trace of these  groups.  Memory  of them  had  not  lasted long, 
either among  the  local  institutions or among  the  farmers. 
This  raises  a  fundamental  issue of rural  development  strategy:  why  seek  to 
support rural  organizations set up  from  scratch in connection with  a  develop-
ment project rather than promote  and  support  the  efforts of existing struc-
tures based  on  local  communities'  own  conceptions?  Although it is true that 
these  communities  should  be  preparing to  assume  responsibility for  local  and 
national  development,  they cannot be  expected  to do  so  in the  context of a 
normative  framework  applied uniformly to all  (men,  women,  young  people,  dif-
ferent regions)  according to the  specific objectives of one  or  more  develop-
ment  agencies. 
In  order to  ensure its efficiency in the  medium  and  long  term  (assumption of 
responsibility for  development by rural people),  aid  for rural projects must 
allocate  an  increasing proportion of its resources  to support  for  local ini-
tiatives  and organization which  already  have  the  necessary  independence  as 
soon  as  they are  set up.2 
1  Combining  all  a  village's fields  into a  single  'cultivation block'. 
2  On  the ground  covered  by  5.1.1  and  5.2.2,  see  E.  Morss,  Strategies for 
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5.2.3.  Marketing 
Marketing problems differ according  to whether  the  produce  is to be  exported, 
processed  by  local  industry or traded  for  immediate  consumption.  Similarly, 
it is necessary to distinguish between  the various  stages:  collection of 
crops,  evacuation,  preparation for market  and  storage. 
In  the  case  of export products,  the  specialized agencies  and  companies  enjoy 
monopolies  and  handle all transactions  from  village markets  to export ports, 
operating within  the  ranges  of margins  laid down  by  government regulation. 
Depending  on  the  individual  case,  these  agencies either restrict themselves 
to marketing  and  processing  (COTONTCHAD,  ONAFITEX)  or  combine  commercial 
functions  with technical  advisory services  (UNCC,  OBM,  SOTOCO).  As  a  general 
rule,  there  are cooperatives,  which  may  or may  not  be  connected with  the 
projects,! to handle  local  operations  (organization of local markets,  weigh-
ing,  book-keeping,  loading  and  possibly transport to  the  place where  the 
goods  are to be  processed).  Only  Niger  has  a  cooperative structure which 
handles  exports itself. 
In  most  cases,  the  companies  or agencies  have  retained responsibility for or-
ganization of market villages.  In  some  cases,  markets  are  organized  by  the 
villagers  themselves,  in which  case  they receive  rebates.  Examples  are quoted 
from  Chad  where  there  are  a  few  self-managed markets,  Ivory  Coast,  where 
SODERIZ  paid rebates for  paddy  offered  in substantial quantities,  Benin  and 
Central  African  Republic. 
In  the  projects under  consideration,  no  major  EDF  finance  has  been provided 
to  fund  marketing  operations,  apart  from  a  few  supplies  of rolling stock  for 
Togo  and  Zaire.  However,  the  EEC  did  intervene between  1965  and  1968  to sup-
port cotton  and  groundnut prices in the associated countries  no  longer enjoy-
ing  French price subsidies.  This  support  was  an  important factor in the main-
tenance  of export production during  that period. 
Over  the past ten years  several of the  countries under  consideration have  had 
export product price stabilization agencies,  some  of which  have  been set up 
during this period:  OCIR  in Rwanda,  OPAT  in Togo,  CSSPC  in  Chad,  ONAFITEX 
(which  took  over  from  COGERCO)  in Zaire,  CSSPPA  in Ivory Coast. 
Others  have  not had  this essential tool at their disposal  or have  failed  to 
make  it work at times  when  international prices have  fallen,  with the result 
that producers  have  been  distrustful during  subsequent years. 
STABEX  was  set up  too recently to have  influenced  the  results of the  projects 
evaluated;  in the future,  it could facilitate the  implementation of policies 
to offer producers  economic  incentives  as  long  as  Governments  pass  on  the 
benefit of the  corresponding subsidies to producers rather than channelling 
them  into their budgets. 
1  Cooperatives  associated with projects:  OBM  and  UNCC. - 222  -
The  regularity of dealings  on  village markets  is a  particularly sensitive 
subject  in  the  eyes  of farmers.  Establishing cooperatives  has  been  seen in 
several  countries  as  the  means  of alleviating tension.  However,  the  evalu-
ators of all the projects  where  there  has  been  action to promote  cooperatives 
draw  attention to either the  cooperatives'  lack of independence  (OBM,  Bade-
guicheri,  UCCA),  or  the  tensions  arising out of the  desire  for  independence 
expressed  by  cooperatives  (Togo,  Zinder). 
The  cooperatiyes'  lack of  independence  is evidenced  on  the  one  hand  by  the 
fact that  they are  concerned  with  export  crops  only  and  on  the other hand  by 
their limited powers  of negotiation. 
Since governments  are  anxious  to  encourage  farmers  with  the highest possible 
producer prices while  at the  same  time  maintaining the  level  of budget  reve-
nues,  intermediaries'  margins  are kept very  low,  a  fact  which  makes it diffi-
cult for  organizations at this  level  (cooperatives,  quasi-public  and  private 
intermediaries)  to operate. 
State levies in the  form  of taxes  and price support  fund  revenues  are  in-
creasing steadily in relative terms.  States  see  the  marketing  of export prod-
ucts  as  the  ideal  channel  through which  to establish  a  solid tax base.  Their 
anxiety  to  avoid  any  reduction  in this  tax base  is in  some  cases  the  explana-
tion underlying  the pressures  exerted  on  food-crop  markets  (price control, 
monopolistic rules)  or,  more  directly,  on  farmers  themselves.  There  is little 
suggestion of proposals to review traditional fiscal  structures  (cf.  3.3.2.1). 
The  marketing of food-crop  produce  poses entirely different problems  from 
those  which  arise with export products.  All  the  countries visited have  set up 
agencies  to handle  the  marketing of these  products  (OFNACER,  OPVN,  FDAR, 
ONCPA,  ORDs,  ~OGOGRAIN). 1 However,  none  of these  agencies  has  yet achieved 
convincing results,  for  reasons  analysed  above.  Unlike  the export product 
marketing agencies,  they  come  into very direct competition or conflict with 
a  whole  range  of types  of intermediary whose  economic  efficiency is growing 
and  whose  speculative or fraudulent  tendencies  are  fostered  by  certain eco-
nomic  policies:  determination of prices  on  the  basis of the  level of urban 
wages  rather than  the objective of encouraging producers;  monopolistic rather 
than regulatory prices;  failure to provide  the  agencies with  enough  or any 
working  capital with which  to purchase  and  store produce;  in the  event of a 
crisis in one  region,  purchase  of foodstuffs  abroad  rather than  on  the  domes-
tic market;  policy of giving free  supplies to certain categories of under-
privileged consumers;  compartmentalization of regions  etc.  (cf.  3.3.2.2). 
5.2.4.  Supply  and  distribution of factors  of production 
The  supplies organized under  the  projects evaluated were  limited to factors 
directly required  for  the  purposes  of the agricultural production programmes. 
1  In  Upper  Volta,  Niger,  Chad,  Central  African Republic until  1974  (approved 
purchasers thereafter),  and  Togo  respectively. - 223  -
Only  the  3M  and  Bugesera-Mayaga projects  included supplies of consumer  goods: 
pharmaceutical  products  in the  former  case  and  essential products in the lat-
ter.  Without  suggesting that foreign  aid  should  support projects aimed at 
supplies of consumer  goods,  it should  be  mentioned  that rural  areas  in most 
of these countries are  extremely poorly served  by  the  consumer  sector.  It is 
very often impossible  to obtain such basic supplies as oil,  soap,  sugar, 
matches  and  so  on.  In order to remedy  this situation,  the  local  Governments 
need  to give  more  encouragement to the  establishment of a  network  of interme-
diary structures  which  would  enable peasant communities  to purchase essential 
goods  at reasonable  cost:  organization of local markets,  encouragement  for 
shopkeepe~s to set up  in villages or for  consumers'  cooperatives,  establish-
ment  of regional  wholesalers  to supply shopkeepers  and  consumers'  coopera-
tives etc. 
In most  cases  the plans  for  supplies of factors were  narrowly defined:  the 
aim  was  to provide  farmers  with  the fertilizers,  insecticides,  equipment  etc. 
which  they needed  to apply the  techniques  proposed  to the  crops with  which 
the  projects were  concerned,  while  no provision was  made  for  other factors 
which  the  farmers  may  have  requested.  In  some  cases  there  were  great diffi-
culties in ensuring  that supplies actually kept pace  with  the  introduction of 
new  methods.  For  instance,  delays prevented the distribution of fertilizers 
and  insecticides for  the  1975/1976  crop year in Central African Republic;  the 
resultant loss of cotton production during  that year may  be  estimated at 30%, 
in addition to which  the  supply agencies  suffered  a  loss of credibility in 
the  eyes  of farmers. 
In  Zaire also,  late arrival of fertilizers caused  an  estimated  35%  drop  in 
cotton yields  in 1974/1975. 
As  a  result of the  congestion of Nigerian ports,  supplies  of fertilizers have 
failed  to get through  to the  farmers  in Zinder,  etc. 
5.2.5.  Credit 
Credit facilities were  available under all the projects in one  form  or anoth-
er,  ranging  from  'flexible'  forms  of conventional  agricultural credit to 
'rigid'  forms  of credit recovered  through the  system of levies charged  on 
wholly  controlled markets_,  the  latter being the  more  common. 
The  difficulties referred to  most  often were  as  follows: 
(i)  the  lack of security,  causing the  credit banks  to ask  supervisory agen-
cies to  take  over the organization of credit from  them; 
(ii)  the  low profitability and  in particular the unpredictability of yields 
which  farmers  are  able  to obtain from  their holdings,  leading to irre-
gularity of repayment  of credit (cf.  4.6).1 
1  See  also:  US/AID,  'Small  Farmer  Credit',  Vol.  XX,  June  1973  (No  SR  120), 
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The  success  of credit policies  seems  to be  very closely bound  up  with  the 
more  widespread  application of stable,  structured policies in the  sphere  of 
prices  (inputs  and  outputs)  and  returns  on  labour.l 
Given  the  low  level  of productivity at which  the  farmers  work,  the risks of 
non-profitability of operations  financed  by  credit are high.  Moreover,  it 
cannot  be  expected  that debts  not repaid one  year  (as  a  result of unfavoura-
ble  climate conditions,  for  instance)  will  be  reimbursed  the  following year. 
This  is a  structural difficulty which  cannot be  resolved  by  any  form  of sanc-
tion.  The  solutions  are  to be  found  in the  improvement of the  input/output 
terms  of trade  and  must  be  closely geared  to the general  system of prices. 
In this connection,  the overall  policy pursued  in the  cotton region of Chad 
during  the  course of the  cotton plan offers  an  interesting example  of results 
obtained  in  terms  of production  (cotton production  only,  unfortunately): 
(i)  a  strong rise in the  producer price  of cotton accompanied  by relative 
stability of the  levy  (credit per hectare),  resulting in a  slower rate 
of increase in operating costs than in gross  incomes,  making  for  a  sat-
isfactory and  improving return  on  labour; 
(ii)  credit for  the  adoption of intensive methods  linked to  a  series of con-
ditions  and  factors  having  a  significant influence  on  yields  (early 
sowing,  insecticides,  fertilizers,  treated seed etc.); 
(iii)  encouragement  for  the  acquisition of animal-drawn  equipment,  through 
purchase  subsidies. 
Such  conditions  are clearly favourable  to the  development  of production since 
they reduce  the  likelihood of underproductivity considerably.  Positive re-
sults are  encouraging  for  the  farmers,  who  have  an  incentive  to repay  their 
loans  in order to have  access  to further credit the  following year. 
The  organization of agricultural credit is still heavily committed  to activi-
ties of interest to the  State,  to  the  exclusion of others.  Consequently, 
credit policies are  meeting  with  the  same  type  of resistance  from  farmers  as 
the  new  techniques  introduced under advisory programmes.  Few  attempts  seem  to 
have  been  made  to direct credit towards  activities which  the  farmers  them-
selves  consider  more  essential2  and  to  channel it through mutual  organiza-
tions set up  for  their benefit. 
The  high  level  of unpaid  debts  (leading to difficulties and  even bankruptcy 
for  the  agricultural credit organizations)  appears  to be  attributable to the 
inadequate profitability of farming.  Improvement  of the return on  labour  to  a 
1  In this connection,  see  UMA  LELE- Doc.  19),  especially pp.  97  to 99. 
2  See  for  example:  'Farmers  Councils  of Ingalalandl  in Nigeria,  G.  Bertrand 
(Doc.  28).  The  evaluation carried out  by  US/AID  also concluded with this 
question:  is it not preferable  for  the  credit system  to cover peasant  farm-
ers'  consumer  and  other needs  as  well? If this were  done,  the peasant would 
not  need  to hoard his savings  to protect himself against  such risks,  but 
could  invest  them  in production  (cf.  Doc.  18,  p.  24). - 225  -
level at which  the  financial risk represents  only  a  marginal  proportion of 
income  would  increase  the  acceptability of credit in  the  eyes  of farmers  to a 
considerable  extent.  To  illustrate this point:  if the  financial  risks corres-
pond  to between  10  and  20%  of the  farmer's  net  income,  he  will still find 
credit attractive  and  take  care to preserve his chances  of obtaining further 
facilities the  following  year.  However,  if the  financial  risks  amount  to  50 
or 80%  of his net  income,  the benefits of credit become  very hazardous  and 
some  farmers  will  only  find it attractive as  a  means  of making  a  quick profit 
without regard  to  long-term prospects. 
Project organizers  tend  to use  community structures as  a  lever for  the  allo-
cation of agricultural credit:  for  instance,  collective liability of an  en-
tire village where  there are  too many  personal  debts outstanding, .the  whole 
village being refused further credit;  another example  is the  obligation to 
form  a  group  in order to obtain loans for  animal-drawn  equipment. 
There  is a  contradiction between this attitude  and  the  man-to-man  methods 
generally used  by  supervisors.  Why  should  a  farmer  trained by the  supervisory 
staff with  the  sole purpose  of increasing his personal  income  suddenly  be 
placed  on  the  same  footing  as his  neighbours  when  they  do  not repay their 
loans  (or  vice versa)?  This  approach would  be  more  understandable if it were 
applied  on  a  wider  basis,  in the overall planning of proposed  operations:  de-
finition of action to be  taken,  demand  for training,  establishment of mutual 
savings  and  credit banks,  discussions  about  layout of plots etc. 
Several questions  regarding agricultural credit remained unanswered  after 
this evaluation exercise.  They  would  need  to be  tackled  by specific studies 
and  experiments  in the  context of operations  financed  by  the  EDF  and  in the 
light of experience  elsewhere. Part Six 
PROBLEMS  CONNECTED  WITH  PROJECT-BASED  METHODOLOGY - 229  -
As  mentioned  in the evaluation reports,  the  EDF  has  provided aid in various 
forms:  product price maintenance  and  STABEX  aid, 1  structural aid production, 
aid  for  infrastructure,  aid  for organization of the rural  environment.  The 
three  last-named  forms  of aid have  been provided  through  the  medium  of  'proj-
ects•.2 
The  project-based method  consists in seeking to control,  within  a  given  area 
and  time-frame,  the  action  and  resources  needed  to achieve  specified objec-
tives  of interest to certain participants. 
The  provision of aid within the  context of a  project-based methodology  is a 
methodological  option  which  has  to  be  assessed  in relation to the  fundamental 
variables of changes  in rural life:  self-sufficiency,  returns  on  labour,  pur-
chasing power,  social relationships,  health,  housing,  education,  information, 
bargaining  power  vis-a-vis  intermediaries etc.  Virtually all the  evaluation 
reports find  that,  on  the  one  hand,  initial objectives were  hardly ever at-
tained and,  on  the  other hand,  that the  actual  effects of projects other than 
those  associated with quantified objectives  could  only be  assessed  by  de-
tailed analysis of the  agro-ecological,  economic  and  sociological conditions 
which it was  intended  to  influence. 
The  project-based method  involves risks of various types,  which  may  be  summa-
rized  as  the risks of  'foreignness',  enclavement  and  inflexibility.  These 
risks  stem primarily from  the fact that the planning of operations takes 
place  outside  the  peasant world  which  is supposed  to be  the  main  beneficiary. 
National  administrations experience difficulties - sometimes  serious - in ad-
justing their action to  changing conditions  in the  rural world.  These  diffi-
culties can  be  heightened by  the  complexity of the  cooperation reports pas-
sing between  the  recipient States  and  the  Commission.  Projects extend  over 
several years  and  are  planned  according to precise  schedules  and  organiza-
tional procedures.  Major  changes  can occur during  the  course of these  periods, 
such  as  the  increase  in prices of inputs  following  the  oil crisis,  rises in 
1  These  two  forms  of aid were  not  included  in the  scope  of this evaluation. 
2  Some  structural aid was  also included,  in conjunction with price mainte-
nance,  in the  'aid for  production'  programmes  financed  out  of EDF  2;  in the 
absence  of data,  they  were  only  included  in the evaluation reports in  a 
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agricultural  commodity  prices  in response  to favourable  market  conditions, 
shifts in relative prices  following  changes  in the  pattern of domestic  or 
foreign  outlets,  or erratic climate  factors.  Peasant  farmers  may  react to 
such  changes  by  changing  their own  behaviour  in relation to projects,  whereas 
it may  be  impossible  to adjust project strategy  and  content quickly to meet 
new  situations. 
6.1.  THE  CONTENT  OF  RURAL  DEVELOPMENT  PROJECTS 
The  evaluation exercise  was  directly concerned  with  three  forms  of aid: 
structural aid,  aid  for  infrastructure  and  aid for  organization of the  rural 
environment. 
Structural aid intervenes at micro-economic  level,  meeting  a  greater or  les~ 
ser proportion of running costs,  notably  inputs  (fertilizers and  insecticides) 
and  equipment  (spray guns,  ploughs etc.).  It accordingly  improves  returns  on 
farm  labour  by  providing the  means  for  crop intensification and  volume  in-
creases  in production. 
Structural aid is  a  fundamental  incentive.  It is an  instrument of economic 
policy and  can  be  provided direct to farmers  without passing  through  the  su-
pervisory agencies  as  long  as  the  farmers  are  properly  informed  of the  uses 
to which  subsidized factors  can be  put. 
Hitherto,  structural  aid has  been  directed  almost exclusively at industrial 
crops  (groundnuts,  cotton etc.)  for  which  favourable  economic  and  commercial 
environments  have  been  created  (marketing  companies,  monopolies,  supervisory 
agencies,  stabilization funds  etc.).  There  is no  reason why  structural aid 
should not  be  planned  for  other crops  which  are of importance  to national 
economies  and  designed  to promote all aspects of farmers'  agricultural acti-
vities. 
Structural aid  has  been associated very directly with supervisory staff,  who 
have  been given responsibility for  distributing subsidized factors  and  moni-
toring their correct use.  The  information  about  these  factors  provided  by  su-
pervisors is generally assimilated quickly  by  farmers.  Failure to follow  the 
methods  and  practices  recommended  in connection with  structural aid  is not 
entirely a  matter of insufficient information;  it can  also be  determined  by 
the  mass  of constraints affecting peasant  farm  holdings  (cf.  3.1). 
Aid  for infrastructure is concerned  with the provision of the  infrastructures 
needed  for  the  smooth  functioning of technical  or  commercial  operations: 
roads,  tracks,  storehouses,  cattle pens,  agricultural  stations etc.  It goes 
towards  meeting regional  or national  requirements  which  necessarily fall 
within the responsibility of public institutions. 
The  planning of aid  for  infrastructure cannot  be  'neutral'.  For this reason, 
it must  be  tied in with  structural  aid  and  aid for  organization of the  rural 
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on  local  industry and  employment,  it is not  a  matter of indifference whether 
a  track is built using  machinery or  local  manpower.  Similarly,  whether  to 
plan  a  storage  infrastructure according  to a  centralized or decentralized 
format  (Rwanda),  whether  to build modern  wells at  CFAF  300  000  each or to 
sink traditional wells at  CFAF  3  000  every year  (Niger)  are not neutral  deci-
sions  from  the  point of view of regional  employment.  The  construction of 
buildings  in cement,  steel frames  and  sheet metal  does  not  have  the  same  ef-
fects  on  the  economy  of a  region  as  construction with  bricks,  timber  and 
tiles. 
It is necessary to  involve  local  communities  in decisions  concerning capital 
investment  schemes  giving rise to running costs  and  maintenance  which  they 
will  have  to  finance,  whereas  other types  of capital  investment  (regional 
roads,  central  warehouses  etc.)  do  not call  for  such  consultation. 
The  heading of aid for  organization of the  rural environment  covers  a  wide 
variety of forms  of technical  or financial  support for  the  activities of ru-
ral populations  and  institutions outside  the  scope  of structural aid  and  aid 
for  infrastructure. 
These  include  aid  towards  capital  spending  or operating costs of rural insti-
tutions,  aid  to cover  technical assistance  for  these  institutions,  incentive 
premiums,  support for rural education,  research etc. 
The  efficiency of this aid  in  the  medium  and  long  term  depends  on  the  extent 
to which  action is taken over by national  or  local  communities.  It would  be 
inconceivable  for  a  state to  take  over  the  running costs of a  projects which 
it had  not accepted;  the  same  applies  to rural  communities  where  farmers  are 
unlikely to take  over projects on  which  they were  not  consulted or directly 
involved. 
Where  selected seeds  are  in heavy  demand  from  farmers  and  the  seed  supply 
services are able  to carry on  supplies,  it may  be  said that a  seed project 
has  been  efficient.  Similarly,  if cooperatives are  managed  autonomously with 
the  approval  of their members,  it may  be  said that  a  programme  to promote  co-
operatives has  been  efficient.  Again,  if the  practice of building terraces 
and  combating erosion has  been  adopted,  it may  be  said  that  a  soil protection 
and  preservation service has  been efficient. 
In the  organization of the  rural  environment,  there are  many  aspects of local 
conditions  which  are difficult for  the  administrative authorities to assess. 
In  one  form  or another,  consultation between participants is necessary;  it is 
the  only  way  of ensuring reasonable  prospects of projects being  taken over by 
local people  in the  medium  or  long  term. 
The  project in Chad  provides  the  most  characteristic example  of highly organ-
ized structural aid,  benefiting cotton  only  and  supported  by  a  complete  in-
stitutional environment:  technical  supervision,  supply services,  a  monopoly 
of cotton marketing,  price stabilization,  very advanced  agronomical  research 
on  this crop.  By  contrast,  the  Bugesera-Mayaga project received no  structural 
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It is clearly desirable  to  combine  these  various  forms  of aid,  since  each op-
erates at a  different level:  fundamental  economic  incentives  (price mainte-
nance  and  structural aid),  infrastructure  (aid for  infrastructure),  agricul-
tural  environment  (organizational  aid).  However,  the  inter-relationship be-
tween  these various  forms  of aid must  be  flexible,  since it is impossible  for 
the  development  institutions to maintain control  over all the parameters  and 
constraints affecting the  development  of the  rural world. 
6.2.  THE  FIXING  OF  OBJECTIVES  AND  THEIR  SIGNIFICANCE 
The  project-based method  as  applied  in the  cases evaluated calls for  the fix-
ing of specific,  clearly defined  objectives expressed in terms  of quantifia-
ble  indicators such as  output volumes,  areas  under cultivation, yields,  num-
bers of farmers  to be  catered for  by  supervisory services,  numbers  of mi-
grants to be  settled etc.  These  objectives are  fixed  according to macro-eco-
nomic  data. 
Comparison  of the results achieved  by  the  end  of projects with  the  objectives 
fixed  initially shows  substantial differences - usually  on  the  wrong  side  -
which call for  some  explanation.  Some  results achieved by  the  end of projects 
were  not of a  lasting nature.  Moreover,  the effects of action carried out 
were  not  always  those  which  had  been  anticipated initially,  although not nec-
essarily to the  disadvantage  of rural  development. 
In fact,  a  clear distinction needs  to be  made  between  analysis  of the effects 
of aid  and  comparison  between objectives  and  results.  The  aid  had  beneficial 
effects in all cases,  even  where  some  objectives were  abandoned  during  the 
course  of projects or not  achieved.  In  Central  African Republic  for  instance, 
the  output objectives  were  far  from  being reached,  but it seems  clear that 
cotton production  would  have  collapsed without  the  aid  from  the  EDF;  in  Chad, 
the transit cattle markets were  allowed  to run  down,  but this was  because  the 
farmers  had  bought cattle elsewhere;  in Zinder,  the  objectives  for groundnut 
production were  not reached,  but  the project enabled  the institutions to or-
ganize  themselves  to manage  their development activities. 
An  objective is a  projection into the  future  which  serves  the  purposes  of 
concentrating the  mind  and  guiding action.  As  with all projections,  such  ob-
jectives have  a  substantial built-in margin of uncertainty,  particularly in 
farming.  Another  factor  which  comes  into play is unrealistic optimism:  polit-
ical considerations often prompt  the  technicians to overstep the  limits of 
technical  realism,  and  technicians frequently  overestimate their own  ability 
to modify peasant behaviour patterns.  To  justify a  project,  there is a  tend-
ency  to  'make  believe'  that peasant agriculture with  a  low of level  of pro-
ductivity,  most  of which  is given  over  to  subsistence activities,  can  be  made 
profitable.  Standards  which  are difficult to uphold  in Europe's  highly inte-
grated agriculture tend  to be  imposed  on  under-equipped  farming  systems  which 
have  to contend with  unfavourable  input/output  terms  of trade. - 233  -
Three  factors  seem  to account  for  the  failure  to attain project objectives. 
The  first factor,  overestimation of objectives at the  outset,  may  be  regarded 
as  a  constant.  This  applies not  only  to overall production volumes,  but also 
the  technical  coefficients anticipated.  The  yields which  can  be  achieved  by 
the  introduction of new  methods  are  estimated according to results obtained 
on  research stations or experimental plots,  rather than  on  the basis of aver-
ages  achieved  by  ordinary  farmers.  Nor  are  coefficients of variation taken 
into account  in averages. 
Overestim?tion of technical  coefficients  and  overall  production objectives is 
guaranteed  to convince  the  financiers  of the viability of projected  schemes 
(cf.  2.3.3).  However,  the  chronological  series for  areas under  cultivation, 
yields,  production,  equipment etc.  show  that the progress of agriculture fol-
lows  long-term trends which  are barely influenced by  the  adoption  of more  or 
less ambitious  objectives.  In  Chad,  as  may  be  seen  from  the figure,  the fore-
casts for production in 1965  and  1972  took  account of the  highest production 
probabilities,  rather than  average possibilities bearing in mind  climate  and 
other risks.  Figure  b  also  shows  that the forecasts  of average yields were 
also overestimated.  Finally,  it can  be  seen  from  figures  a  and  b  showing are-
as under  'extensive'  and  'intensive'  cultivation the  most  serious possible 
climate  conditions  (drought)  and  the  fixing of somewhat  exaggerated  objec-
tives  had  short-term effects,  but  only very slight influence  on  long-term 
trends  (+2.73%  per  annum). 
Although  overestimation of technical  coefficients is a  means  of exaggerating 
the  forecast profitability of projects  to  some  extent,  it in fact distorts 
the  real  prospects  for results from  farming.  If they accept  overestimated co-
efficients when  scrutinizing projects initially,  those  responsible for fi-
nancing  them will  have  no  alternative when  it comes  to ex-post evaluation but 
to conclude  that the  objectives fixed  were  not attained  and  that the projects 
will  not be  able  to  finance  their own  running costs. 
The  principle of structural  aid was  established when  it was  found  that pro-
ductivity was  too  low  in African agriculture  compared  with that achieved  by 
agriculture in the  developed  world  and  on research stations in Africa.  This 
being the case,  why  is it necessary to claim very similar levels of produc-
tivity  (when  projects  do  not last more  than  5  years)?  What  purpose is served 
by  attempting to prove  viability from  the  individual  farmer's  viewpoint,  when 
it is known  that the  whole  price  system is manipulated?  Would  it not  be  bet-
ter to admit  the real  technical  coefficients  as  borne  out  by  tests in the 
rural  environment  and  to  admit  that viability can  only be  achieved  in the 
long-term  once  the  necessary  action has been  taken  to  ease  the  various  con-
straints limiting productivity?  Would  it not be  better to place greater em-
phasis  on price ratios  (goods,  factors)  evolving  over  the  long  term  in re-
spect of each product  than  on  technical  coefficients over which  the  'develop-
ers'  have  only very little control,  since they  depend  largely on  what  is done 
by  peasant  farmers? 
Unsatisfactory technical results are  a  second  factor  accounting  for  the fail-
ure  of projects  to reach  their objectives.  They  stem  from  the  fact that it is 
impossible  for projects to control all the  factors  needed  to achieve  the re-300 
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sults anticipated:  climate  conditions,  organization of supplies,  psycho-soci-
ological  factors,  compatibility of farming  calendars etc. 
A third explanation is to be  found  in  the  constant change  in rural  conditions, 
as  a  result of which  objectives that appear  feasible at a  given  time  can  be-
come  unrealistic shortly afterwards.  Because  of this,  it is essential  that 
project objectives be  fixed  not  only  on  the  basis  of the  time-frames  of the 
projects  concerned,  but also in the  light of desirable  trends and  long-term 
development potentialities in the  region  and  on  the  farms  concerned. 1 
The  fixing  and  attainment of objectives polarizes activities of institutions 
responsible  for  planning  and  carrying out projects.  However,  it is clear that 
such  objectives cannot  be  given the  force  of standards of behaviour for  peas-
ant farmers.  The  confusion of studies  on  standard, models  for  peasant farms 
geared  to whatever  crop  the  'developer'  wishes  to promote  shows  that the er-
ror of confusing  objectives with  the  complex realities of farming  conditions 
is widespread.  It is less common  practice to consider  such  objectives as 
plausible and  revisable,  but no  mandatory,  hypotheses. 
6.3.  THE  RISKS  ASSOCIATED  WITH  PROJECT-BASED  METHODOLOGY 
The  project-based approach,  when  aimed  at bringing about  changes  in peasant 
behaviour patterns and  attitudes,  involves risks of various  types  which re-
quire analysis  so  that they  can  be  mitigated.  These  risks  may  be  considered 
under  three headings:  'foreignness',  enclavement  and  inflexibility. 
6.3.1.  Foreignness 
The  'foreignness'  of projects in relation to the rural  environment  can  stem 
from  several  factors:  adoption of priorities which  differ  from  those  of the 
environment;  technical  approaches  which  are  too alien to the  environment, 
being  based  on  insufficient assessment  of the  advantages  ar.d  disadvantages  of 
existing farming  systems;  excessive pressure  from  technical  assistance per-
sonnel  who  do  not know  enough  about  the constraints of the  environment  and 
are given  too  much  direct operational responsibility;  inadequate provision 
for  consultation between  official agencies  and  rural  communities,  sometimes 
with its corollary of denigration of farmers  by  supervisory staff. 
The  risk of  'foreignness'  is inversely proportional  to  the  scope  and  desire 
for negotiation between partners.  In  some  cases,  it arises through the appli-
cation of coercive  measures  which  are  a  manifestation of the difficulties ex-
perienced  by  a  State  to  evolve  economic  and  social policies  which  are suffi-
ciently attractive to the rural population. 
1  On  this  subject,  see  the  conclusions of the evaluation of a  series of proj-
ects in Kenya,  Doc.  42,  especially pp.  21  and  22. - 238  -
The  main  danger with projects marked  by  such  'foreignness'  is that their fu-
ture  is likely to  be  jeopardized,  since,  under  these  circumstances,  cultural, 
technical  and  economic  takeover  by  the  local  community  is rare. 
6.3.2.  Enclavement 
The  project-based method  also  involves  a  risk of enclavement: 
For  example,  in Rwanda,  enforcement  of the  occupancy  norms  for  'farming  com-
munities'  would  necessitate  the  removal  of excess  numbers  of farmers  to 
neighbouring  regions,  themselves  already  overpopulated.  This  would  create  an 
enclave  of relative well-being,  but would  not solve  the  crucial  problem of 
overpopulation in this  country. 
Enclavement  within the  national  economy  ---------------------------------------
For  example,  the  enclavement  of a  well-structured cotton economy  in Chad  in a 
context  lacking  integration:  lack of investment in the  northern part of the 
country  for  the benefit of cereal growers,  lack of integration with  nearby 
markets  in neighbouring  countries etc. 
The  same  is true of Zaire,  where  the  level  of supervisory services  and  subsi-
dies  on  inputs  in the  CAKO  'farming  community'  area is far  in excess  of what 
the  Government  could  afford  for all the  other farming  areas if they offered 
comparable  potential. 
Aid  projects have  different characteristics according to the  source  and  are 
readily referred to as  EDF  projects,  UNDP  projects,  World  Bank projects,  pri-
vate projects etc.  The  local  institutions seem  to be  afraid to adapt certain 
aspects of projects according to their national policies because  they think 
this would  be  running  the risk of having  the  aid withdrawn. 
In  Chad,  for  example,  a  private Swiss project distributes free  supplies of 
fertilizers and  insecticides in a  region where  the  ONDR  is charging  CFAF 
7  500  per hectare  for  the  same  products.  WFP  aid  imports  cereals at a  time 
when  the  EDF  aid  is trying to find  ways  of organizing diversification of 
crops  and  the  office responsible  for  regulation of cereals lacks  the neces-
sary working capital. 
Enclavement  of financial  resources 
Substantial financial  resources  are  deployed  during ·the  course  of a  project 
(3,  4  or  5  years).  It is assumed  that by  the  end  of this time  the recipient - 239  -
country will  have built up  the  resources necessary to carry on  the  project at 
the  same  level,  or at least to  take  over  the  recurrent costs  (e.g.  replace-
ment  of vehicles,  maintenance  of vehicles,  salaries  and  wages  of additional 
supervisory staff employed  under  the  project etc.).  However,  the  effects of 
real  rural  development first become  apparent in the  prosperity of farm  hold-
ings.  A project lasting 3  to  5  years  cannot bring  about  a  fundamental  change 
in the  capacity of the  communities  concerned  to generate  the  finance  needed 
to meet  the  capital costs  and  operating costs of their  own  supervisory struc-
tures.  As  has  been  mentioned  above,  farmers  growing  annual  crops  take  at 
least  two  years  to react,  as it takes  this length of time  before results be-
come  apparent.  With  the  perennial  crops,  it takes  4  to  5  years before  the 
very first productive results become  apparent. 
Operating resources  'enclaved'  over  too short  a  period do not generally pro-
duce  significant medium-term results,  particularly when  accompanied  by  the 
permanent presence of very influential technical  assistance personnel  who  de-
termine  the  pace  of operations  and  impose  their own  responsibility structures. 
In addition,  the  resources  linked  to projects are entered under  specific 
headings  in national  budgets.  The~e budgets are.allocated according to pre-
cise rules  regarding  commitment  formalities,  procedures  for  invitations  to 
tender,  sites,  types  of equipment  etc.  which  are  sometimes different  from  the 
rules prevailing in the  recipient country.  The  provision of these  resources 
is conditional  on  a  substantial contribution  from  the recipient country which 
is always  difficult to evaluate  since it usually takes  the  form  of staff and 
·administrative resources  included in ordinary budgets.  Finally,  the  financial 
institutions of recipient countries  are  apparently not always  notified of the 
recurrent costs which  they will  have  to cover once projects are  completed. 
For  instance,  the  activities of the  animal  health protection groups  in Chad 
are  in  jeopardy because  no  budgetary provision has  been made  for  working  cap-
ital to buy veterinary products. 
When  the  EDF  project in Central  African Republic  came  to  an  end,  the  supervi-
sory staff had  to live at the  expense  of the  villagers because  they  were  not 
paid  by  the  Ministry of Agriculture. 
The  vehicles of the  ONDR  in  Chad  are  worn  out,  having  been  used  under  very 
difficult conditions during  the project,  and  the  external  finance  has  also 
come  to  an  end. 
The  roads  Rnd  tracks  in Niger  cannot be  maintained regularly because of the 
lack of fuel  for public  works  vehicles. 
Bridges built in Togo  have  not been  linked  by  road  as  planned,  for  lack of 
finance  from  the  Togolese  budget. 
Two  ideas  follow  from  this assessment  of the risks of enclavement. 
First,  this process of rural development  takes  place at the  level  of local 
communities.  Once  these  communities  consider  the need  for  a  project as  being 
their problem,  the risk of enclavement  disappears.  A project should  always  be - 240  -
presented  as  'the project of community  X supported  by  EDF  aid'  rather than 
the  EDF  project'.  Second,  a  way  of avoiding  enclavement  would  be  to arrange 
for  aid to be  provided  to support action  taken  by  communities  themselves  on 
the  basis  of their  own  decisions.  For  example:  when  a  group  of farmers  decide 
to purchase  a  plough,  the  EDF  automatically meets  50%  of the  cost;  when  an 
animal  health protection group  calls for veterinary services,  they are  auto-
matically provided;  farmers  on  the  3M  project finance  their own  technical 
leaders  who,  in  some  cases,  receive additional  payment  from  the  UNCC. 
Applications of this principle  can  be  visualized  on  the  basis of other  types 
of action.  For  example,  support  for  'a  la carte'  training requested  by vil-
lage  associations:  training for  cooperative  members,  literacy training,  voca-
tional  training advice  on  farming  methods  on  request.  This  type  of support 
differs from  generalized advisory  programmes  in that it corresponds  exactly 
to the wishes  of the  communities  concerned  and  is provided at the  time  they 
consider most  suitable.  This  type  of training is clearly fully  effective~  its 
effects are  immediate  and  spread quickly. 
Another  example  is the support for  savings  and  mutual  credit operations.  In 
Niger  the  cooperatives were  unable  to raise the  savings which  they would  have 
needed  to set up  stores.  In  Rwanda,  the  popular  banks  are gradually  drawing 
off the  meagre  savings of the local population.  Support  of local initiatives 
through  such  structures could  have  been  more  effective than  premiums  for var-
ious  types  of operation  (for building manure  barns,  silage pits etc.). 
Increasjng  the  resources  available to local  communities  in order to support. 
their own  initiatives rather than precise  operations  whose  efficiency is ap-
preciated by  the  technical  agencies  only,  would  be  a  way  of releasing proj-
ects from  enclavement.  Such  practices would  be  effective complements  to the 
forms  of aid already  in use  (6.1). 
6.3.3.  Inflexibility 
Finally,  the project-based method  of operation involves  a  risk of inflexibil-
ity. 
The  internal planning  of projects reflects the  importance  attached to de-
tailed interim objectives,  resources  to  be  deployed,  schedules,  procedures 
etc.  The  profusion of detailed forecasts  is generally an  irrelevant exercise. 
Resources  are allocated according to objectives  and  procedures  adopted  in the 
context of the project,  not in the  light of prevailing farming  constraints. 
If a  farmer  encounters  a  problem  falling within the  scope  of the project,  he 
will receive help  from  the project organizers.  However,  if the  problem is 
outside the  scope  of the project,  he  must  tackle it on his own.  For  instance, 
remedial  action can  be  taken if a  cotton crop  is attacked  by  insects,  but not 
if a  millet crop  is attacked by greenfly,  for  lack of resources.  However,  the 
attack of greenfly,  by  jeopardizing the cereal harvest,  obliges  the  farmer  to 
devote  more  time  to  sowing  sorghum  and  cowpeas,  which  in turn  jeopardizes the 
cotton crop. - 241  -
Further examples  of inflexibility can  be  found  in the regulations applicable 
to individual projects.  For  example,  under  the rules for  settlement of farm-
ing  communities  in Bugesera-Mayaga,  plots are laid out perpendicular to the 
contour lines.  This  increases the difficulty of certain kinds  of work  consid-
erably  (carting,  of compost  or manure,  coordination between plots on  hedges 
to prevent erosion,  etc.). Elsewhere  the rules are  such that the  supervisors 
penalize farmers  using fertilizers  for crops  other than those  specified under 
the project or for growing mixtures  of crops  other than those  recommended;  in 
other cases,  the rules for  the grouping of holdings  (e.g.  cotton-growing 
blocks)  are applied in such  a  way  that farmers  are  obliged to work  land  on 
these blocks rather than the  land  on  their own  holdings  where  they could ro-
tate their crops. 
Further instances of inflexibility are to be  found  in the  training of super-
visory staff,  which  often gives little weight  to overall  appreciation of the 
limitations and  potentialities of local  farms,  and little encouragement to 
the tailoring of advisory services to meet  demand  or the  development  of con-
tact between  farmers  and  scientific researchers. 
Monopol~zation is another  source of inflexibility,  especially monopolization 
of supplies of factors  of production,  which  occurs both nationally and  local-
ly.  Examples  have  been quoted of cases in which  the monopolization  of sup-
plies limits the quantities  or quality of factors  reaching the  farmer:  quan-
tities are  limited by  the  volume  of financial  resources allocated  and  the  im-
possibility of supplies being  topped  up  by private sector traders;  losses of 
quality occur  as  a  result of the specific rules according to which  the  supply 
organizations  carry out their purchasing  (international  invitations to tender, 
compulsory  requirement  to purchase  from  factories in the  home  country,  etc.) 
and  also because  these  organizations are not  always  aware  of experimentation 
and  testing being carried out in the rural  environment.  Such  rules are  justi-
fied  in terms  of the  importance  of regularizing the prices of factors  of pro-
duction,  but it is by  no  means  certain that this necessarily entails depriv-
ing the user of all scope  for  choosing those  which  he  considers best suited 
to his needs  by allowing  the  supply services  a  de  facto monopoly. 
The  procedures for  invitations to tender which  cover  a  whole  crop year  can 
also lead to inflexibility.  In the  case  of essential factors  of production 
(fertilizers,  insecticides,  machinery etc.),  calls for  tender have  to be  is-
sued  two  years  in advance.  During the  intervening period farming  conditions 
can  develop  considerably,  with  corresponding changes  in demand.  States would 
be  well  advised  to establish stocks  so that they could  respond flexibly to 
farmers'  overall requirements.  In some  cases,  demand  needs  to be  met without 
delay.  For  instance,  in order to save the :millet corps  in Magaria  from  at-
tacks of greenfly, it would  have  been necessary to supply appropriate insec-
ticide  immediately.  In these conditions,  what  is the use  of a  delivery period 
of one  to  two  years? 
The  risks of inflexibility could  be  reduced if the practice of making avail-
able working capital or capital appropriations  became  more  widespread:  work-
ing capital for fertilizers with which  stocks  could  be  established in advance 
and  regulated  according to quantities distributed  and  forecast  demand;  work-
ing capital for cooperatives;  non-annualized capital appropriations for  the - 242  -
development of animal-drawn  equipment  or  infrastructure;  price stabilization 
funds  for  factors  of production,  etc. 
The  rigidity of some  project formats  hampers  the  expression of local  dynamism 
and initiative. It would  seem  desirable  to adopt more  flexible  methods  and  to 
develop  services provided in response to  demand. - 243  -
Annex  1 
INSTITUTIONS  INVOLVED  IN  THE  PROJECTS 
Improvement  of cotton productivity in the  cotton-growing region of Chad 
ONDR:  Office National  de  Developpement  Rural.  Set up  in 1967 with re-
sponsibility for  carrying out the programme.  Although  supposed 
to cover the  whole  of the  country,  the  ONDR  devoted most  of its 
efforts and  resources to the  southern region.  Its primary role 
was  to provide  advisory services  and  supplies  to producers.  It 
derived its finance  from  the national  budget,  EDF  and  FAC  subsi-
dies  and  its own  resources. 
COTONTCHAD:  Chadian  cotton marketing  company.  This  mixed  investment  company 
was  formed  in 1971  to succeed  CONTONFRAN,  whose  facilities it 
took over.  It is responsible  for  the  marketing  of cotton,  having 
the monopoly right and  obligation to purchase  cotton crops  from 
growers.  In 1975,  the  Chadian  Government  acquired  a  75%  holding 
in the  company  through  the purchase of shares  from  CONTONFRAN. 
CFDT: 
FDAR: 
BTD: 
IRCT: 
Compagnie  fran~aise de  developpement  des  textiles.  This  compa-
ny's  involvement  took the  following  forms:  organization of tex-
tile exports  (office in Paris),  technical  assistance  to the  ONDR 
and  COTONTCHAD,  shareholding in  COTONTCHAD. 
Fonds  de  developpement et d 1action regionale.  This  Fund  took 
over  from  the welfare  funds.  The  cereal  department is responsible 
for promoting the distribution of cereals  and  regulating their 
prices,  and  for  the  distribution of food  aid. 
Banque  Tchadienne  de  Developpement.  This  bank  went bankrupt in 
1971,  as  a  consequence  of which agricultural credit was  super-
seded  by  a  more  interventionist system  of levies. 
Caisse  de  soutien et de  stabilisation des prix du  coton. 
Institut de  recherches  des  cotons et textiles,  responsible for 
cotton research. DEA: 
Service  de 
l'Elevage: 
DEFPA: 
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Direction des  Etudes  Agronomiques,  responsible  for  food-crop re-
search  and  management  of agricultural stations. 
Responsible  for carrying out the  livestock section of the  cotton 
plan.  This  programme  operated relatively independently. 
Direction de  l'Enseignement et de  la Formation professionnelle. 
Responsible  for vocational  training at the  training centres in 
Tikem  and  the  college at Bailli. 
Agricultural  development  in the  Central  and  Plateaux Regions  in  Togo 
SOTOCO: 
OPAT: 
TOGOGRAIN: 
CNCA: 
IRCT: 
!RAT: 
INSTRUPA: 
SONACOM: 
Societes Regionales  d'Amenagement et de  Developpement.  These  are 
public agencies responsible for rural  development  in the widest 
sense of the  term.  They  derive  their finance  from  the national 
budget or from  their own  resources.  The  operations  financed  by 
the  EDF  involved  the  two  SORADs  covering  the  Central  and  Pla-
teaux regions respectively.  In 1974,  sectoral responsibilities 
were  taken  away  from  the  SORADs,  which  then concentrated more 
specifically on  food  crops.  The  scale of their activities was 
greatly reduced when  the  supply of EDF  funds  was  discontinued. 
Societe Togolaise  du  Caton.  Responsible  for  the promotion  and 
marketing  of cotton since  1974. 
Societe pour la Regeneration  de  la Cafeiere et Cacaoyere;  oper-
ated in the Plateaux region  from  1974. 
Office  des  Produits Agricoles  du  Togo,  responsible  for prepara-
tion for marketing,  export  and price stabilization of agricul-
tural products  (cotton,  groundnuts,  coffee,  cocoa,  etc.). 
responsible  for cereal marketing  and  market organization. 
Caisse Nationale de  Credit Agricole.  Provides  annual  loans  for 
farmers  and  loans  to enable  them  to buy  equipment. 
Institut de  Recherche  du  Caton et des  Textiles. 
Institut de  Recherche  en Agronomie  Tropicale. 
A German  firm  of consultants,  responsible for  technical assist-
ance. 
A distribution and  supply  company  responsible  for delivering 
factors  to the  ORDs,  and  later SOTOCO. - 245  -
Bugesera-Mayaga  farming  communities  in Rwanda 
OBM: 
OCIR: 
RWANDEX: 
Banque 
Populaire: 
ISAR: 
SOCINCO: 
AESED: 
ITC: 
SEDES: 
AIDR: 
Office  de  la mise  en  valeur du  Bugesera-Mayaga,  set up  in 1959. 
It was  in charge  of the  project throughout  the period of the  EDF 
intervention.  In  1976  the staff of the  OBM  were  placed under the 
competent administrative authorities.  In its present role,  the 
OBM  is more  of a  central organization for cooperatives  than  a 
development  organization. 
Office  de  commercialisation des  produits  industriels du  Rwanda. 
Responsible  for exports  of agricultural  produce  and stabiliza-
tion of prices of products. 
Prepares coffee  for  marketing. 
Savings  and  credit bank  currently being set up  in Rwanda. 
Institut de  recherche  agricole  au  Rwanda  (successor to the 
INEAC). 
A Dutch  firm  of consultants which  carried out  the preliminary 
hydraulic studies. 
Association europeenne  des  bureaux d'etude.  Also  involved  in the 
preliminary studies. 
International Training Center for Aerial  Survey.  Carried out the 
aerial photography  for  the  initial plans  for  the  layout of plots. 
Societe d'etude pour  le developpement  economique  et social.  Car-
ried out  the  population surveys. 
Association internationale pour  le  developpement rural.  Carried 
out  the  village water supply programme. 
Rural  development  in the  Zinder region  (3M  project)  and  development  of the 
Badeguicheri Valley 
UNCC:  Union  Nigerienne  de  Credit et de  Cooperation.  Set up  in 1962 to 
promote  cooperative  structures,  the  UNCC  performs various func-
tions:  execution and  supervision of projects,  marketing of prod-
ucts  through the  cooperative  system,  organization of mutual 
credit,  training of staff for  cooperatives. 
The  UNCC  was  the  executive  agency  for  the  Badeguicheri project. 
In Zinder,  it had  a  seat on  the Departmental  technical  committee 
and  was  its primary  executive  agency.  The  UNCC  exports cotton 
and  delivers other marketed products to either the  SONARA  or the 
OPVN. COTEDEP: 
SONARA: 
OPVN: 
CNCA: 
~: 
IRHO: 
IRCT: 
CFDT: 
SOGETHA: 
GRONDMIJ: 
SDRAT: 
OFEDES: 
CES/DRS: 
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Comite  technique  departemental.  In the  3M  project  (Zinder),  the 
COTEDEP  was  responsible  for  coordinating  the  various  activities 
involved:  agriculture,  livestock  farming,  forestry,  education 
and  training,  health,  planning  (SDRAT).  It operated under  the 
auspices  of the  Prefet. 
Societe nigerienne  de  commercialisation  de  l'arachide,  a  mixed 
investment  export company,  set up  in 1962. 
Office  des  Produits vivriers au  Niger.  Set up  in 1974,  it buys 
food  crops  from  cooperatives at the  official prices  and  is re-
sponsible  for  promoting  trade  in  food  crops  and  stabilizing 
prices. 
Caisse nationale  de  credit agricole. 
Caisse  de  soutien des prix des  produits  du  Niger. 
Institut de  Recherche  sur les huiles et oleagineux. 
Institut de  Recherche  des  cotons et textiles. 
Compagnie  fran~aise de  developpement  des  textiles.  Provides 
technical  assistance  to  the  UNCC. 
Societe generale  d'Etude  et de  Travaux  d'hydraulique agricole.  A 
French  firm  of consultants  involved  in the  preliminary studies. 
A Dutch  firm  of consultants which provided  the  technical assist-
ance  for  the  Badeguicheri  Valley  development project. 
Service  de  Developpement  regional et d'Amenagement  du  Territoire 
(Ministry of Planning). 
Office d'etude et de  developpement  des  eaux  du  sous-sol.  Respon-
sible for building the  bridges in the Badeguicheri project. 
Service  de  la Conservation  des  Eaux  du  Sol  et de  la Defense et 
Restauration des  Sols.  Was  responsible  for  the  technical  moni-
toring of the  Badeguicheri  Valley development  works  (building of 
terraces,  control of erosion etc.). 
Ouaka  regional  programme  and  integrated project in Central African  Republic 
ORDOHK:  Office  de  Developpement  de  la Ouaka  et de  la Haute-Kotto.  Until 
it was  closed  in 1970,  it had  been  in charge  of the  execution of 
the project,  with responsibility for  the  marketing of oil crops, 
maize,  rice  and  other local  crops in conjunction with  the  coop-
eratives and  private traders.  From  1970  on,  AGROPROGRESS  took 
over its role,  providing  advisory services  and  supplies  to pro-
ducers. - 247  -
AGROPROGRESS:  A German  firm  of consultants providing research services,  work 
in the  field  and  technical  assistance.  Took  over  overall re-
sponsibility for  the project after the  1970  agrarian reform un-
der  which  the  ORDs  were  abolished.  AGROPROGRESS  succeeded  the 
CFDT,  taking  over  some  of its staff. 
ENPROCAF: 
SICPAD: 
CSPC: 
INRTV: 
IRCT: 
EUROPREDE: 
UCCA: 
~: 
Entente  professionnelle cafeiere.  A consortium of five private 
traders  marketing coffee  in conjunction with  the  cooperatives. 
Societe industrielle centrafricaine  de  produits alimentaires 
divers. 
Caisse  de  stabilisation des  prix du  cafe et du  coton.  In  addi-
tion to its support  and  stabilization role, it handled the fi-
nancial  management  of the projects. 
Institut national  de  recherche  textile et vivriere. 
Institut de  recherche  des  cotons et textiles. 
Groupement  europeen  de  programmation et d'etudes generales  de 
developpement.  Carried  out  the  preliminary regional  and  sector-
al studies. 
Union  Cotonniere Centrafricaine.  Company  holding  the  monopoly 
for  the collection,  processing and  sale of cotton. 
Office national  de  commercialisation des  produits agricoles. 
Set  up  in  1970,  this office was  responsible  for marketing  food 
crops.  It was  closed  down  in 1974  and its functions  were  taken 
over by  approved private buyers,  who  had  already been  engaging 
in marketing  in parallel with  the  ONCPA  since  1972. 
Evaluation of the  Atacora development  project  in Benin 
CARDER: 
ODAA: 
MDRAC: 
CNCA: 
SONAGRI: 
Centre  d'action regionale pour  le developpement  rural.  A broad-
based regional  development  agency,  responsible  for project im-
plementation. 
Operation  de  developpement  agricole de  l'Atacora.  The  CARDER's 
predecessor. 
Ministere  du  developpement rural et de  !'action cooperative. 
Caisse nationale de  credit agricole.  Financing of supply  and 
marketing structures. 
Societe nationale  de  developpement  agricole.  Responsible  for 
supplying all the  regional  CARDERs  with factors  of production, 
cotton-seed etc. COBEMAG: 
SONACO: 
SNAFOR: 
ONATHO: 
SONIAH: 
SONIB: 
SONAFEL: 
SOFITEX: 
SONACEB: 
RGA: 
RTA: 
CPBMI: 
SOCAD: 
BBD: 
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Cooperative  Beninoise  de  materiel  agricole. 
Societe nationale agricole pour  le eaton.  Development  of cotton 
growing. 
Societe nationale  de  developpement  forestier. 
Office  national  du  tourisme et de  l'hotellerie.  Administration 
of tourism. 
Societe nationale d'irrigation et d'amenagement  hydro-agricole. 
Primarily concerned  with rice growing. 
Societe nationale d'importation du  Benin.  Supply of imported 
provisions  (flour,  rice,  milk,  sugar,  salt etc.). 
Societe nationale  des  fruits et legumes.  Responsible  for  manag-
ing State orchards  (oranges,  lemons,  grapefruit,  mangoes).  Mar-
keting of tomatoes  and  potatoes. 
Societe  des  fibres  textiles.  Concerned  exclusively with cultiva-
tion and  purchase of Kena  fibres. 
Societe nationale  de  commercialisation et d'exportation du  Benin. 
Monopoly  in groundnuts,  cotton,  cashew nuts,  karite  and  tobacco. 
Regie  des grains  de  l'Atacora.  Marketing  of food  crops  (sorghum, 
maize,  millet,  beans,  sesame,  yams  and  manioc). 
Regie  des  transports  de  l'Atacora.  Transport of goods. 
Regie  d'approvisionnement et de  distribution de  l'Atacora.  Sup-
plies of essential provisions  (salt,  sugar,  preserves,  building 
materials,  cement,  sheet-metal,  steel). 
Cooperative provinciale  de  batiment et de  menuiserie  industri-
elle.  Siting,  construction  and  fitting out  of all buildings  for 
the purposes  of accomodation,  tourism,  administration,  industry 
etc. 
Societe  de  commercialisation et de  credit agricole. 
Banque  Beninoise  de  developpement.  Finance  for  supply  and  mar-
keting of structures. 
Rice-growing  development  operation in the  Ivory Coast 
SODERIZ:  Societe  pour  le developpement  de  la riziculture.  A State  company 
responsible  for carrying out  the  rice-growing programme:  promo-
tion of the  crop,  hydraulic  and  other works,  purchase  and  proc-
essing of paddy,  importing  and  wholesale  marketing  of rice. SATMACI: 
CPR: 
SEDES: 
BEI-AGRER: 
CFDT: 
GVC: 
CIDT: 
GERDAT: 
CSSPPA: 
GRONTMIJ: 
AGROTEC: 
LOTI: 
CENAPEC: 
CFCI: 
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Societe d'assistance  technique  pour la modernisation  de  la Cote 
d'Ivoire.  Responsible  for supervision of production,  collection 
of marketed paddy,  management  of rice-fields. 
Caisse  de  perequation du  riz. 
Societe d'etudes pour  le developpement  economique  et social. 
Consultancy  bureau  (Paris). 
Bureau  d'etudes  Fernand  Courtois  (Brussels). 
Bureau pour le developpement  de  la production agricole  (Paris). 
Technical  assistance. 
Compagnie  fran~aise de  developpement  des  textiles.  Technical  as-
sistance. 
Groupement a vocation cooperative. 
Banque  nationale  de  developpement  agricole. 
Compagnie  Ivoirienne  de  developpement  des  textiles. 
Groupement  d'etudes et de  recherche  pour  le developpement  de 
l'agronomie  tropicale  (Montpellier). 
Caisse  de  stabilisation et de  soutien des  prix des  produits 
agricoles. 
A firm  of consultants responsible  for  technical assistance 
(Netherlands). 
A firm  of consultants responsible  for technical  assistance  (Fed-
eral Republic  of Germany).  • 
A firm  of consultants responsible  for  technical assistance 
(Italy). 
Centre national  de  promotion  des  entreprises  cooperatives. 
Compagnie  franraise  de  la Cote  d'Ivoire. 
Agricultural  development  in the  Department of Comoe  in Upper  Volta 
ORO:  Office  regional  de  developpement.  Responsible  for  coordinated 
development  of the  agricultural  economy: 
(i)  improvement  of productivity through  the  distribution of in-
puts  (insecticides,  seed,  fertilizers etc.); 
(ii)  organization of marketing. BND: 
OFNACER: 
CFDT: 
OFCOM: 
CCCHV: 
SOVOLCOM: 
IRHO: 
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Banque  nationale  de  developpement. 
Office  national  des  cereales. 
Compagnie  franraise  de  developpement  des  textiles. 
Office  de  commercialisation.  Agricultural  produce. 
Cooperative centrale  de  consommation  de  Haute-Volta. 
Societe  volta2que  pour  la commercialisation  (formed  by  the  merg-
er of  OFCOM  and  CCCHV). 
Institut de  recherches  des huiles et oleagineux.  Specializes in 
research  on  groundnuts  and  sesame. 
Agricultural  redevelopment project in Eastern Kasai,  Zaire 
ONAFITEX: 
CFDT: 
ONACER: 
INDACOM: 
SORCA: 
Commission  agricole  du  Kasa1 Oriental.  An  independent,  broad-
based  body  set up  for the purposes  of the  project.  Responsible 
for establishing farming  communities,  instructing peasant  farm-
ers  and  providing technical  support for  cotton marketing  (this 
role was  in fact performed  by  ONAFITEX)  and  developing  other 
crops. 
Office national  des  fibres textiles.  Responsible  for  supplying 
cotton seed,  purchasing  and  processing seed-cotton,  marketing 
the  fibre  and  the  by-products. 
Compagnie  franraise  de  developpement  des  textiles.  Technical  as-
sistance. 
Office  national  des  Cereales.  Handles  the marketing  of cereales 
where  there  are  no  private traders  performing this function. 
A firm  of consultants responsible  for  technical assistance. 
Consultancy bureau. - 251  -
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